Could proximity fuses have halted the bomber offensive against Germany in 1944?

[bbear]

@ bbear reply #103

Thx for the links but these are the sources which are mentioned in the Internet again and again without contributing to technical details or naming original sources.

Although GregP may be the only one here with practical fuze design knowlegde he first was not aware and / or did not believe that you could do a proximity fuze with vacuum technology although it was built hundred of thousand times and information about it is just a click away. And let´s not forget the Oslo Report of 1939 which contained parts of a German proximity fuze for atrillery shells.

I highly recommend reading Ralph B. Baldwin´s book "The Deadly Fuze" for a detailed story of the development of the proximity fuze in the US. Baldwin was part of the r&d team.

Btw it is quite certain that Rheinmetall developed an anti aircraft artillery proximity fuze based on passive electrostatic principles which was production ready at the end of WW2. It is mentioned by Fritz Trenkle (1982) in "Die deutschen Funklenkverfahren bis 1945" page 187 and in Adalbert Koch`s book (1954) "Die Geschichte der deutschen Flakartillerie 1933 - 1945" page 154. Both are very well researched books and rely on original sources.

Hi, good, thanks.
I have the book by Baldwin and can confirm it's a good read.
Regarding the certainty that Rheinmetall developed a production ready fuze I have a difficulty, two in fact.
1. If the two sources are as well referenced as you say and I confirm that they seem to be respected, why don't they have the original references for their mentions? Could I trouble you for the actual quotes from these two sources?
2. I looked at the Oslo report and this is the relevant part of the proximity fuze Wikipedia talk page

"German work?[edit]
The article makes a comment about abandoned German work on proximity fuzes. There's no citation, but I suspect it refers to the book by Igor Witowski which is cited in the German Wikipedia version of this article. Since that book is highly suspect, is there a reliable source for this claim and some more information? DonPMitchell (talk) 18:40, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

Looking a little further into this, there is also the Oslo Report, which described the Rheinmetall fuze, which was apparently abandoned or did not work. The tube they describe is not a radio vacuum tube, it is a type of neon lamp, used in a circuit that is sensitive to capacitive effects of nearby objects. But this was not a radar proximity fuze. DonPMitchell (talk) 18:55, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

From the report: "The newest development uses neon lamps with grids, Fig. 3. When the battery voltage is so chosen that it is just below the ignition voltage and when the grid is insulated, the lamp can be ignited by changes in the partial capacitances"One of Ian Hogg's books briefly discusses half a dozen different German proximity fuzes, using every physical principle they could think of, including radar. None seemed to work very well, or to be as simple to produce as the VT. I'll try to dig it out and give a full cite. Andy Dingley (talk) 23:02, 7 April 2014 (UTC)Sounds interesting. Neon lamps can serve as crude thyratrons. DonPMitchell (talk) 21:53, 12 June 2014 (UTC)Why not just use thyratrons? Germany was producing good thyratrons in the 1930s and exporting them to the UK. Andy Dingley (talk) 22:27, 12 June 2014 (UTC)They're pretty much the same thing. It may have been a cost or supply-shortage issue. Neon lamps were used in circuits like that very commonly. You probably also do not need the precision of a thyrotron for this application. DonPMitchell (talk) 22:26, 17 May 2015 (UTC)Actually you do - neons are far too slow. Andy Dingley (talk) 22:40, 17 May 2015 (UTC)"

I think, with respect, we must either nail down the references all the way to the origin or agree for lack of evidence to the contrary and some evidence to the fact that the Rheinmtall fuze was a sensitive electrometer that didn't work in practice and that development was stopped somewhere short of 1944. if you can see a third option I'll be more than happy to consider it.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey guys,

I do not mean to be dismissive in any rude way - but, if the Germans had a working proximity fuse of a type suitable for use in AAA shells, and it was anywhere near ready for production by the end of the war, this information would have been available to all of us before now. And there would be no uncertainty about it.

The US and UK intelligence reports concerning this type of stuff have been declassified for a long time, and the Russian reports have largely been available since the early 2010s.

As far as I have seen there has never been any claim by any Allied intelligence unit that the Germans had or were about to have a working AAA proximity fuse ready for production. There is no benefit to be gained by anyone on the Allied side by keeping such information from the public sector.

 

[basil]

Thx for your thoughts.

@ bbear
Unfortunately in the books of Trenkle and Koch there are no original documents or CIOS or BIOS reports mentioned where the work of Rheinmetall is described in detail. That is the reason why I would like to know where Koopernic (post #79) has got his detailed information about the function of the Rheinmetall fuze.

However Trenkle mentions that the electrostatic fuze was designed simultaneousely at Rheinmetall and at the TH Darmstadt (by Prof. Vieweg) (TH = technical University). Trenkle, who is known for his meticulous research as a technical historian who has started his technical career in WW2 of course had a much broader possibility for research when most of the technical personnel of this period was still alive.

Koch in his book just mentions that his source relies on British and American information after the end of WW2.

In another source I have read (regrettably I do not remember where) it was stated that the AAA fuze production was planned to start during the second half of 1945 in the Rheinmetall Werks at Sömmerda - which seems plausible.

@ ThomasP
At the end of WW2 the Allies had a very satisfactorily working VT fuze in combat for over a year and the fact the the Germans were working on similar devices certainly was not sensational for the CIOS or BIOS teams. There were many other similar researches in technical fields which did not find much mention.


As the VT fuze is a product of electronic research and manufacturing capability - one may not forget that regarding electronic R&D the Allies (British and US) and Germans generally were on similar niveau during the war.
As stated by R. V. Jones - I think it is safe to say that Germany had a lead in "the war of beams" during the first period of war (especially in long range bomber guidance over England, but also with the introduction of the Wuerzburg air defence radar).

However, Germany missed the jump to centimeter waves in time due to several reasons although the technology was there in laboratory research scale (magnetrons, klystrons, metal-ceramic coaxial tubes). Among the reasons for not having adopted the centimeter waves until later in the war was the fact that at this time the regime forbid any research on electronics which would not be ready in the next six months (awaiting final victory) and a not very well focused strategy of common research of the major electronic manufacturers (AEG-Telefunken, Siemens; Lorenz, Blaupunkt, etc.) compared to the US. It also did not help that some scientists had for some time general reservations to the suitability of centimeter waves for radar.

During the last year of the war Germany was constantly reducing the gap in the centimeter wave field but did not quite catch up to the US and UK lead (referring to charts of Trenkle and Jones). Of course at this time the bomb raids showed its effects and slowed down all activities of research and manufacturing. Besides human resources in R&D was less than 10 % compared to the US and UK in numbers.

 

[bbear]

Thx for your thoughts.

@ bbear
Unfortunately in the books of Trenkle and Koch there are no original documents or CIOS or BIOS reports mentioned where the work of Rheinmetall is described in detail. That is the reason why I would like to know where Koopernic (post #79) has got his detailed information about the function of the Rheinmetall fuze.

However Trenkle mentions that the electrostatic fuze was designed simultaneousely at Rheinmetall and at the TH Darmstadt (by Prof. Vieweg) (TH = technical University). Trenkle, who is known for his meticulous research as a technical historian who has started his technical career in WW2 of course had a much broader possibility for research when most of the technical personnel of this period was still alive.

Koch in his book just mentions that his source relies on British and American information after the end of WW2.

In another source I have read (regrettably I do not remember where) it was stated that the AAA fuze production was planned to start during the second half of 1945 in the Rheinmetall Werks at Sömmerda - which seems plausible.

@ ThomasP
At the end of WW2 the Allies had a very satisfactorily working VT fuze in combat for over a year and the fact the the Germans were working on similar devices certainly was not sensational for the CIOS or BIOS teams. There were many other similar researches in technical fields which did not find much mention.


As the VT fuze is a product of electronic research and manufacturing capability - one may not forget that regarding electronic R&D the Allies (British and US) and Germans generally were on similar niveau during the war.
As stated by R. V. Jones - I think it is safe to say that Germany had a lead in "the war of beams" during the first period of war (especially in long range bomber guidance over England, but also with the introduction of the Wuerzburg air defence radar).

However, Germany missed the jump to centimeter waves in time due to several reasons although the technology was there in laboratory research scale (magnetrons, klystrons, metal-ceramic coaxial tubes). Among the reasons for not having adopted the centimeter waves until later in the war was the fact that at this time the regime forbid any research on electronics which would not be ready in the next six months (awaiting final victory) and a not very well focused strategy of common research of the major electronic manufacturers (AEG-Telefunken, Siemens; Lorenz, Blaupunkt, etc.) compared to the US. It also did not help that some scientists had for some time general reservations to the suitability of centimeter waves for radar.

During the last year of the war Germany was constantly reducing the gap in the centimeter wave field but did not quite catch up to the US and UK lead (referring to charts of Trenkle and Jones). Of course at this time the bomb raids showed its effects and slowed down all activities of research and manufacturing. Besides human resources in R&D was less than 10 % compared to the US and UK in numbers.

I am really terribly sorry. But to me, if we don't have detail we don't have anything. To me it's an allegation about some real research with no known product. Not quite a rumour, but not far off.

I think we must agree to disagree and move on.

Thanks for the interchange though. I'm always interested in how others see things. Rationally, reasonably but not the same, like - wow!

 

[ThomasP]

In response to basil's post#123,

I am sorry but I am not really sure what you are saying?

The Allied intelligence reports looked for and reported on any technology potentially useful in warfare that they ran across - from rifles and pistols, to tanks, to aircraft, to ships, to guided weapons,...etc. Subsequent post-war analysis of the information included everything they ran across - the quality of powder and other explosives used in munitions, the quality of armor, the quality of fuels,...the quality of electronics (both in terms of operational capability, and in terms of reliability of individual components). The information they gathered was very seldom sensational, but was pretty thorough. Some of the most thorough reports involved what technologies the Germans were working on, what progress they had made, and what the production capability was at the end of the war. Information on electronics was broken down to quality of the various tubes and circuits, by individual manufacturing companies (whether inside Germany proper or in the occupied countries), and included a company's potential capacity for volume of production of said electronics.

If the intelligence teams had run across a working, or close to working, alternative to the VT fuse they would have reported it. To have overlooked it because it was not sensational or because the Allies already had a working fuse would have been counter to their mission - and very foolish/irresponsible/criminal. Even if it turned out that the Allies decided they had no use for the technology, not reporting such a find could result in an inability to prevent the technology being used against the Allies in the future.

 

[basil]

@ bbear

No problem at all
Although there are some hints from contemporary technicians - from a scientific point of view there seem to exist no black on white proof (anymore?).

@ ThomasP

You are certainly right; there are a lot of very detailed reports. However I am not sure if really everything was covered. For example there were several projects in aircraft armarment or fire control systems which do not seem to be mentioned anywhere. Perhaps all these things are still filed in some reports or in Russian archives.

 

[JAG88]

IIRC Schmalenbach mentioned that the USN had no interest on Prince Eugen's radar, they simply assumed theirs was better.

The US Army thought the StG 44 was a bad weapon, didnt care for it and you know what happened.

Plenty of documents got destroyed, others ended up in the USSR and were released only in the 90s, those which survived that is.

They could have possibly been destroyed/lost, likely? Doubtful.

 

[tomo pauk]

...
The US Army thought the StG 44 was a bad weapon, didnt care for it and you know what happened.
...

Any chance to provide a doc or two about US Army testing and/or opinion of the StG44?

 

[Shortround6]

The US Army may very well have thought the StG 44 wasn't up to par or had bad features.

Mistaken or not that is a very different thing than ignoring it or having no reports/tests on it.

That is the problem with some of these claims for German proximity fuses. Few, if any, notes or reports on their existence, as opposed to the reports being flawed or inaccurate.

 

[tomo pauk]

The US Army may very well have thought the StG 44 wasn't up to par or had bad features.

Mistaken or not that is a very different thing than ignoring it or having no reports/tests on it.
...

StG 44 was not up to par??
Apart from semi-auto rifles, German small arms issued were either equal or superior than those of US Army & Marines.

 

[P-39 Expert]

What is the smallest shell that would take the VT fuse?

 

[tomo pauk]

What is the smallest shell that would take the VT fuse?

In ww2, it was the 90mm IIRC.

 

[Shortround6]

StG 44 was not up to par??
Apart from semi-auto rifles, German small arms issued were either equal or superior than those of US Army & Marines.

The US was not going to entertain the idea of a less than full powered rifle for nearly 15 years after the end of WW II.
Rightly or wrongly, that is the fact of the situation.
They may have thought the sheet metal receiver wasn't strong enough to stand up to the needs of military service.
But that too is a matter of opinion and detail design.

The US had left the type of sight the MP44 used behind several years before. Together with the short sight radius that made long range shooting a bit problematic.

The US had plans for full auto M-1s with 20 round magazines.

The German pistols were nothing special and the submachine guns MP38 and MP40 were also not anything out of the ordinary by 1944-45.

It might be debatable if the MG 34 or MG 42 were really superior to the M1917 amd M1919 Brownings once you got them mounted on tripods and were using them for long range fire.
The MG 42 did well at a lot of things but may not have been the best in any one role.

 

[Shortround6]

What is the smallest shell that would take the VT fuse?

In ww2, it was the 90mm IIRC.

In 1942 it was the 5in shell, this fell to the British 4 in shell by 1944 or so. Tomo may be correct about the 90mm but 3in shells had proximity fuses either right at the end of the war or in a few years after. (prototype 3in gun with auto loader firing in Sept 1945) By the 70s or early 80s the 40mm Bofors had proximity fuses.

I don't know if any VT fuses were used by 3in/50 manual guns in service in WW II, they were certainly used post war.

 

[tomo pauk]

I've started the new thread about infantry weapons

 

[Shortround6]

A History of US/Allied proximity fuses is here.
Radio Proximty (VT) Fuzes

there was a 3in fuse issued in May of 1944 but it wasn't very good and was replaced by a new fuse in Nov 1944

Please note the difficulties in getting what was essentially the same basic design to work in a variety of guns and conditions and some of the difficulties in going from prototypes to mass production.

 

[fliger747]

Unfounded opinion...

VT fuses would not be terribly effective against very high altitude aircraft, aircraft being too far away for that many shells passing within the lethal triggering distance. Far more effective for point defense such as an airfield or ship for protection against low to medium altitude targets. Chances of approaching the target within the lethal distance excellent for aircraft fo instance heading toward you at several thousand yards.

Unfounded opinion! : )

 

[Brooke]

Germany was only still developing the proximity fuse at wars end after its development had been interrupted by a Hitler order around 1941. The proximity fuse was used with great effect by the Allies, most notably against the V1 flying bombs against which it was highly successful. The Americans were very mindful of the Germans reverse engineering proximity fuses and would at first not allow their use over enemy held territory through fear of a dud being captured. Proximity fuses were later used against ground targets with devastating effect and are generally considered to be one of the major inventions to come out of World War Two.
German anti aircraft batteries concentrated their fire into a box and relied on timed fuses which were timed to exploded at a pre-determined altitude with the hope and expectation that shell splinters would destroy the oncoming enemy aircraft. If the Germans had of had proximity fuses fitted to their anti-aircraft shells then presumably this would have made them far more effective as the fuse itself would have exploded the shell upon detecting the presence of a bomber.
Obviously the Allies had seen for themselves just how effective proximity fused shells were against the fast moving flying bombs and they would have been more than a bit concerned about the safety of their slow moving four engine bombers should the Germans had developed their own.

There are many flavors of proximity fuzes (a fuse is an electrical device, a fuze is used to set of explosives). One of those flavors is if the projectile rotates or not. Fuzes for antiaircraft missiles are a different animal from gun projectile fuses. For more on that see: China Lake Patents

 

[Hairog]

These might be of interest.

Here https://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/monographs/Introduction/Proximity_Fuzes.pdf

And Here Radio Proximity Fuzes

 

[JAG88]

Sorry for the delay.

Any chance to provide a doc or two about US Army testing and/or opinion of the StG44?

A useful way into this topic is once again to look at US military
appraisals of the rifle, this time from the War Department's Tactical and
Technical Trends series. The following report was published in April 1945,
by which time the Sturmgewehr had been in circulation for some time.

"In their attempts to produce a light, accurate weapon having
considerable fire power by mass production methods, however, the
Germans encountered difficulties which have seriously limited the
effectiveness of the Sturmgewehr. Because it is largely constructed of
cheap stampings, it dents easily and therefore is subject to jamming.
Although provision is made for both full automatic and semiautomatic
fire, the piece is incapable of sustained firing and official German
directives have ordered troops to use it only as a semiautomatic
weapon. In emergencies, however, soldiers are permitted full automatic
fire in two- to three-round bursts. The possibilities of cannibalization
appear to have been overlooked and its general construction is such
that it may have been intended to be an expendable weapon and to be
thrown aside in combat if the individual finds himself unable to
maintain it properly.

The incorporation of the full automatic feature is responsible for a
substantial portion of the weight of the weapon, which is 12 pounds
[5.4kg] with a full magazine. Since this feature is ineffectual for all
practical purposes, the additional weight only serves to place the
Sturmgewehr at a disadvantage in comparison to the U.S. carbine
which is almost 50 percent lighter.

The receiver, frame, gas cylinder, jacket, and front sight hood are
all made from steel stampings. Since all pins in the trigger mechanism
are riveted in place, it cannot be disassembled; if repair is required, a
whole new trigger assembly must be inserted. Only the gas piston
assembly, bolt, hammer, barrel, gas cylinder, nut on the front of the
barrel, and the magazine are machined parts. The stock and band grip
are constructed of cheap, roughly finished wood and, being fixed,
make the piece unhandy compared to the submachine guns with their
folding stocks.

The curved magazine, mounted below the receiver, carries 30
rounds of 7.92-mm necked-down ammunition. The rounds are
manufactured with steel cases rather than brass; inside the case is a
lead sleeve surrounding a steel core. With an indicated muzzle velocity
of approximately 2,250 feet per second [76.2m/sec] and a boat-tail
bullet, accuracy of the Sturmgewehr is excellent for a weapon of its
type. Its effective range is about 400 yards [366m], although the
Germans claim in their operating manual that the normal effective
range is about 650 yards [594m]. The leaf sight is graduated up to
800 meters (872 yards). (US War Dept 1945)

From an Osprey title, "German Automatic Rifles 1941-1945", McNab