Could proximity fuses have halted the bomber offensive against Germany in 1944?
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Shortround6
Major General
I too, add my thanks.
It is interesting and does open up a few points.
It is speculation on my part but the US criticism of the weapon itself ( and there appears to be very little discussion/criticism of the concept) seems to be on it's construction which may be understandable in view of the US fighting a global war. Using disposable weapons (instead of repairable ones) in combat areas 3-6000 miles away from the factories may impose a logistical burden that outweighs the manufacturing burden? I don't know, just suggesting it.
another point (and one that is common to many of these old evaluations) is that the term "effective range" is never defined. Perhaps the writer/s and reader/s of these reports understood what was meant at the time but 40-80 years later we are in the dark.
does it mean the rifle/ammo can put one shot in ten on a 6 ft x 6ft target at that range? or three out of ten? Or is it 4 ft by 4 ft target? No mention is made of how the weapon is being fired, Kneeling by average shot or laying down by expert shot.
The variables go on and on.
Again I say , the writer/s of these reports may have been familiar with the test/evaluation procedures/criteria of the time the report was written but for modern readers we all have our own idea of what "effective range" might be leading to a lot of arguments that can never be resolved.
I would also note that the effective range of a cartridge can vary considerably from the effective range of a rifle/machine gun it is fired out of.
It is interesting and does open up a few points.
It is speculation on my part but the US criticism of the weapon itself ( and there appears to be very little discussion/criticism of the concept) seems to be on it's construction which may be understandable in view of the US fighting a global war. Using disposable weapons (instead of repairable ones) in combat areas 3-6000 miles away from the factories may impose a logistical burden that outweighs the manufacturing burden? I don't know, just suggesting it.
another point (and one that is common to many of these old evaluations) is that the term "effective range" is never defined. Perhaps the writer/s and reader/s of these reports understood what was meant at the time but 40-80 years later we are in the dark.
does it mean the rifle/ammo can put one shot in ten on a 6 ft x 6ft target at that range? or three out of ten? Or is it 4 ft by 4 ft target? No mention is made of how the weapon is being fired, Kneeling by average shot or laying down by expert shot.
The variables go on and on.
Again I say , the writer/s of these reports may have been familiar with the test/evaluation procedures/criteria of the time the report was written but for modern readers we all have our own idea of what "effective range" might be leading to a lot of arguments that can never be resolved.
I would also note that the effective range of a cartridge can vary considerably from the effective range of a rifle/machine gun it is fired out of.
They may be criticizing the durability of the weapon but... its a wartime weapon, they and their users dont last that much, what is the point to make a weapon that would last for years?
Make it cheap, make it fast.
I think everyone here have seen videos of full auto StG 44s and know the statement about full auto to be incorrect.
The quip about part interchangeability is a valid one but it is the first time I have heard something of the sort.
In general, I think it is normal and human to look down on the weapons of the defeated enemy, and that could cause some people to overlook otherwise interesting developments as in this case... which was the point of bringing up this example in the thread.
Make it cheap, make it fast.
I think everyone here have seen videos of full auto StG 44s and know the statement about full auto to be incorrect.
The quip about part interchangeability is a valid one but it is the first time I have heard something of the sort.
In general, I think it is normal and human to look down on the weapons of the defeated enemy, and that could cause some people to overlook otherwise interesting developments as in this case... which was the point of bringing up this example in the thread.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Hey guys,
I figure most of you are already aware of this, but in case you are not.
A large part of the reason that the UK and US did not consider a copy of the StG44 worth pursuing was the ammunition situation.
The UK had been contemplating changing over to an intermediate round (~7mm) since before WWI, but the war intervened. At the end of WWI the UK had over a billion rounds of their .303 ammo. Experiments with an intermediate round (.280) continued and after WWII the UK was testing various assault type rifles, including a machined/forged receiver bullpup weapon with detachable 20-round box magazine (the EM-2) which was their choice for development. When NATO came along the UK tested various entries for their new rifle and the FN FAL won, primarily due to the fact that the EM-2 would not be readily adaptable to the 7.62mm NATO round (basically a shortened case .30-06 ballistically). The FN FAL was a selectable fire (semi- and full-auto) machined/forged receiver weapon with a 20-round detachable box magazine. The UK found that the FN FAL in full automatic fire to be only marginally controllable using the 7.62mm NATO round, that full automatic fire was unnecessary operationally, and ordered the weapon into production as a semi-automatic rifle.
The UK did not ignore or denigrate the StG44, they simply already had a design (which evolved into the EM-2) for an assault weapon that they considered superior to the German assault weapon. Then they most likely made the right decision and adopted the FN FAL, which remained the standard issue rifle for the UK for 35 years, and remains on the limited standard list today (I think).
The US had been contemplating a switch to an intermediate round (~7mm) since the end of WWI. At the end of WWI the US had somewhere over a billion rounds of .30-06 ammo. The US was again contemplating a switch to an intermediate round in the 1930s, with the M1 Garand originally intended for the .276 caliber, but WWII intervened and the M1 Garand entered service in .30-06 caliber. At the end of WWII the US had a several billion rounds of .30-06 ammo on hand. After WWII the US decided on a selectable fire weapon, what eventually became the M14, using the .30-06 round. The US continued development and when NATO came along, the US used the M1 Garand as the benchmark to beat. There were several entries into the competition but in the end it came down to the M14 and FN FAL. The FN FAL won on points but the M14 was chosen. The M14 was a selectable fire (semi- and full-auto) machined/forged receiver weapon with a 20-round detachable box magazine. The US found the M14 in full automatic fire to be uncontrollable using the 7.62mm NATO round.
The US did not ignore or denigrate the StG44, they simply designed an assault type weapon using the .30-06 round (originally), of construction considered superior to the German assault weapon, and to a different set of operational requirements (i.e. that their rifle use the same ammunition as their light and medium MG).
Interesting fact, at one point in time the FN FAL was the weapon of choice of more than 90 nations (more than ever used the AK-47 or its variants). FN used that statistic in their advertisements.
I figure most of you are already aware of this, but in case you are not.
A large part of the reason that the UK and US did not consider a copy of the StG44 worth pursuing was the ammunition situation.
The UK had been contemplating changing over to an intermediate round (~7mm) since before WWI, but the war intervened. At the end of WWI the UK had over a billion rounds of their .303 ammo. Experiments with an intermediate round (.280) continued and after WWII the UK was testing various assault type rifles, including a machined/forged receiver bullpup weapon with detachable 20-round box magazine (the EM-2) which was their choice for development. When NATO came along the UK tested various entries for their new rifle and the FN FAL won, primarily due to the fact that the EM-2 would not be readily adaptable to the 7.62mm NATO round (basically a shortened case .30-06 ballistically). The FN FAL was a selectable fire (semi- and full-auto) machined/forged receiver weapon with a 20-round detachable box magazine. The UK found that the FN FAL in full automatic fire to be only marginally controllable using the 7.62mm NATO round, that full automatic fire was unnecessary operationally, and ordered the weapon into production as a semi-automatic rifle.
The UK did not ignore or denigrate the StG44, they simply already had a design (which evolved into the EM-2) for an assault weapon that they considered superior to the German assault weapon. Then they most likely made the right decision and adopted the FN FAL, which remained the standard issue rifle for the UK for 35 years, and remains on the limited standard list today (I think).
The US had been contemplating a switch to an intermediate round (~7mm) since the end of WWI. At the end of WWI the US had somewhere over a billion rounds of .30-06 ammo. The US was again contemplating a switch to an intermediate round in the 1930s, with the M1 Garand originally intended for the .276 caliber, but WWII intervened and the M1 Garand entered service in .30-06 caliber. At the end of WWII the US had a several billion rounds of .30-06 ammo on hand. After WWII the US decided on a selectable fire weapon, what eventually became the M14, using the .30-06 round. The US continued development and when NATO came along, the US used the M1 Garand as the benchmark to beat. There were several entries into the competition but in the end it came down to the M14 and FN FAL. The FN FAL won on points but the M14 was chosen. The M14 was a selectable fire (semi- and full-auto) machined/forged receiver weapon with a 20-round detachable box magazine. The US found the M14 in full automatic fire to be uncontrollable using the 7.62mm NATO round.
The US did not ignore or denigrate the StG44, they simply designed an assault type weapon using the .30-06 round (originally), of construction considered superior to the German assault weapon, and to a different set of operational requirements (i.e. that their rifle use the same ammunition as their light and medium MG).
Interesting fact, at one point in time the FN FAL was the weapon of choice of more than 90 nations (more than ever used the AK-47 or its variants). FN used that statistic in their advertisements.
The British realized the Germans were onto something and the first development, the EM-1 was made by Korsach, a Polish refugee, which used features from the FG-42, it even fired 8mm Mauser and used the FG42 sights, in a bullpup configuration. There was another EM-1 by Thorpe, using the mechanism of the German Gerat 06 and finally the EM2 designed by another Polish refugee, both in the bullpup configuration pioneered by Korsach, which was the weapon finally adopted.
They didnt have a design prior to the StG44, their prototypes were often based on German weapons, but in the end decided to adopt the Polish designed weapons.
The FG-42 proved better than the Garand derivative they had adopted (the T20E2, later cancelled) but they were stubborn and developed yet another Garand derivative, the M14...
They did amalgamate 2 German weapons to make their M60 LMG though.
The FN is a very accurate but heavy rifle (common trait amount .308s of the period). I've had one since 1987, and it's a nail driver.
Cheers,
Biff
Glider
Captain
Meanwhile, back at the topic and the question regarding Proximity Fuses. Assuming that the German forces had both the design and ability to produce them in the numbers needed, then I don't see how the allied heavy bomber tactics and the assault as we know it could have continued.
German AA guns were very effective and the typical US box formation an ideal target. At night the radar guided guns would have been far more effective and heaven knows they were dangerous enough as they were. Read any narrative on the experiences of RAF bomber crews and that is loud and clear.
To pretend that somehow the allies could have continued is almost a fantasy. Losses would have significantly increased and something would have needed to fundamentally change and I cannot see what that would be.
German AA guns were very effective and the typical US box formation an ideal target. At night the radar guided guns would have been far more effective and heaven knows they were dangerous enough as they were. Read any narrative on the experiences of RAF bomber crews and that is loud and clear.
To pretend that somehow the allies could have continued is almost a fantasy. Losses would have significantly increased and something would have needed to fundamentally change and I cannot see what that would be.
Shortround6
Major General
That rather depends on what type of proximity fuse the Germans used.
The British/American proximity fuse was pretty simple device (in theory) that was a miniature radio/radar transmitter and receiver. The fuse started transmitting shortly after leaving the barrel. The Receiver simply listened for the return signal (transmitted signal reflected off target) and when the return signal reached a certain value/strength the fuse detonated. the system was pretty dumb in the sense that there was no real coding or any means of identifying the signal source. Any radio, if transmitting on the right frequency that got enough energy to the fuse receiver antenna would cause the fuse to detonate.
This was one reason for all the security and not using it over land. Not only the fear of it being copied but the fear that counter measures could be worked out and put into place in fairly short order.
The fuse transmitter was pretty weak and transmitted in pretty much all directions (any gaps were due to shell shape?) and the reflected energy was lot smaller. An aircraft mounted transmitter operating on the same frequency could be a lot more powerful and overload the fuse receiver (reach the expected signal strength needed to trigger the fuse) when the shell was still hundreds (if not thousands) of feet away.
The Americans had figured this out and built prototype "jammers" before the fuse went into service in large numbers.
Most any proximity fuse (of the time) can be defeated in the same manner. Use a strong enough signal to swamp the sensor and trigger the fuse early.
Modern fuses may have gotten smarter and use some sort of code in the signal so the receiver can tell the difference between it's own matching transmitter and transmitters innearby shells or enemy transmitters trying to spoof/jam the frequency band.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Hey JAG88,
I am not sure but I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say. Also, I believe we were talking about the StG44, not the FG42.
My point is that the UK and US did not ignore or denigrate the StG44 in any way due to its being a German weapon. They did not say the StG44 was worthless. They simply had their own requirements (smarter or not), which the StG44 did not meet.
If it helps to understand what I am saying, ask yourself the following questions:
1. Should the UK and US have discarded their rifles and SMGs at war's end, along with the several billion rounds of ammunition, and immediately started an emergency production program for the StG44? If so, why??
2. What reason did the UK and US have in 1945 to decide they should introduce another caliber of ammunition? Remember, one of the main reasons the US did not adopt the .276 or similar round was a requirement that their primary infantry rifle use the same ammunition as their light and medium MG. (It should be noted that a debate similar to this is going on today in the US armed forces.)
3. Did you ever read any reports from WWII where Allied soldiers said things like "Oh my God in heaven, here come the sturmtruppen with their StG44s, run away!! Run away!! Ignore the troops with the K98 and all the other German infantry weapons, they cannot compare to the effectiveness of the StG44." or "No Fred, do not advance, your ______ (insert any infantry rifle or SMG in the blank area) is no match for their StG44. Go over there and advance into the K98s, MG38s, MG42s,... At least you will have a chance to live!" You can imagine this being said in the King's English, American English, French, Russian, or any other language you choose - if you can keep a straight face when saying it yourself, let me know.
To be fair, I would challenge anyone to do the same concerning modern infantry assault rifles as well.
I may have been unclear as to the time frame of the selection of the M14, EM-2, FAL, etc. I meant that by the time the UK and US were ready to adopt a new weapon and associated ammunition (~1950, at the beginning of the NATO standardization process) they already had designs they considered better for their requirements. And yes, some of those designs used bits and pieces of other nations designs, including German designs such as the StG44, FG42, MG42, etc.
Your point of making the weapon cheap is valid to a certain extent. For certain it would apply to a war-time army that is in dire straights production-wise. (I started to say ...and/or already losing the war, but that by its self negates the value of the concept.) The problem with this concept is that an army spends most of its time in peace, not war. If you make the weapons cheap you have to replace them more often, with the replacement cost exceeding the difference in any savings due to a low unit cost. (It should be noted that a debate similar to this is going on today in the US armed forces.)
I am not sure but I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say. Also, I believe we were talking about the StG44, not the FG42.
My point is that the UK and US did not ignore or denigrate the StG44 in any way due to its being a German weapon. They did not say the StG44 was worthless. They simply had their own requirements (smarter or not), which the StG44 did not meet.
If it helps to understand what I am saying, ask yourself the following questions:
1. Should the UK and US have discarded their rifles and SMGs at war's end, along with the several billion rounds of ammunition, and immediately started an emergency production program for the StG44? If so, why??
2. What reason did the UK and US have in 1945 to decide they should introduce another caliber of ammunition? Remember, one of the main reasons the US did not adopt the .276 or similar round was a requirement that their primary infantry rifle use the same ammunition as their light and medium MG. (It should be noted that a debate similar to this is going on today in the US armed forces.)
3. Did you ever read any reports from WWII where Allied soldiers said things like "Oh my God in heaven, here come the sturmtruppen with their StG44s, run away!! Run away!! Ignore the troops with the K98 and all the other German infantry weapons, they cannot compare to the effectiveness of the StG44." or "No Fred, do not advance, your ______ (insert any infantry rifle or SMG in the blank area) is no match for their StG44. Go over there and advance into the K98s, MG38s, MG42s,... At least you will have a chance to live!" You can imagine this being said in the King's English, American English, French, Russian, or any other language you choose - if you can keep a straight face when saying it yourself, let me know.
To be fair, I would challenge anyone to do the same concerning modern infantry assault rifles as well.I may have been unclear as to the time frame of the selection of the M14, EM-2, FAL, etc. I meant that by the time the UK and US were ready to adopt a new weapon and associated ammunition (~1950, at the beginning of the NATO standardization process) they already had designs they considered better for their requirements. And yes, some of those designs used bits and pieces of other nations designs, including German designs such as the StG44, FG42, MG42, etc.
Your point of making the weapon cheap is valid to a certain extent. For certain it would apply to a war-time army that is in dire straights production-wise. (I started to say ...and/or already losing the war, but that by its self negates the value of the concept.) The problem with this concept is that an army spends most of its time in peace, not war. If you make the weapons cheap you have to replace them more often, with the replacement cost exceeding the difference in any savings due to a low unit cost. (It should be noted that a debate similar to this is going on today in the US armed forces.)
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ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Back to the original topic,
I think maybe the way to look at this question is as follows:
Lets assume that only 1 out of 1000 non proximity fuse rounds hit a bomber in the daytime. Now lets say that using proximity fuses (similar to the Allied fuses or not) increases the effective hit rate to 2 out of 1000 rounds. That small increment doubles the loss rate for the Allied bomber offensive. Could the bomber offensive have been maintained with those loss rates? Please note that it does not matter what the actual number of rounds it took to shoot down a bomber - it could be 1 out of 2000, 3000,...10,000 - by increasing the hit rate to 2 out of xxxx rounds you double the loss rate for the bombers.
I do not think the bomber offensive could have been maintained in the face of double the losses. It would probably have had to be reduced or halted until countermeasures were worked out, similar to what happened to the US daytime bomber offensive in 1943.
I think maybe the way to look at this question is as follows:
Lets assume that only 1 out of 1000 non proximity fuse rounds hit a bomber in the daytime. Now lets say that using proximity fuses (similar to the Allied fuses or not) increases the effective hit rate to 2 out of 1000 rounds. That small increment doubles the loss rate for the Allied bomber offensive. Could the bomber offensive have been maintained with those loss rates? Please note that it does not matter what the actual number of rounds it took to shoot down a bomber - it could be 1 out of 2000, 3000,...10,000 - by increasing the hit rate to 2 out of xxxx rounds you double the loss rate for the bombers.
I do not think the bomber offensive could have been maintained in the face of double the losses. It would probably have had to be reduced or halted until countermeasures were worked out, similar to what happened to the US daytime bomber offensive in 1943.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
I think the year is crucial. In 1943 IIRC the flak system was intact, the park of guns in good order, the bombers mostly on RAF night operations. For his period the figure I remember is 3,300 rounds per aircraft destroyed. In 1944 the guns were less well served, the targets greater in number including many in formation and daylight. So a number of factors involved. I have no rounds per destroyed target for this period. In 1945 the Luftwaffe was a nearly dead duck, looking a bit peaky anyway. But the efficiency of the huge investment* had deteriorated *(15,000 '88's for one). A number were being knocked out in ground attacks.
The anti-aircraft fire caused about half of all losses during 1944, much less by proportion and much less by absolute numbers in 1943, much more by proportion and much less by absolute number in 1945 according to research on these figures https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16.../AFD-090608-039.pdf?ver=2016-09-02-113908-487 shown here https://www.quora.com/Of-the-Allied...d-to-German-fighters-and-AA-fire-respectively .
So depending crucially on the date these nominal, imaginary, copy proximity fuses came into play for Germany the result could be devastating in 1944, at least at first. But after a period of weeks to hand build enough jammers we'd be back in business, I think. The researchers had already got their prototype countermeasure within 2 weeks of being asked for one.
Glider
Captain
I acknowledge what you say but as the Germans would be over their own ground the probability of the allies getting the required information would be at best limited. The time to design develop and issue the 'jammers' would be significant. Plus I always have a certain level of caution of magic solutions such as jammers, thinking of Vietnam where technology often didn't deliver the promised solutions.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
From this account Radio Proximity Fuzes the jammer was to be the AN/APT4 as -already- eventually fitted in up to 200 B24 & B29's.
Photograph here
Described here
as
AN/APT-4 : Army & Navy Aircraft Radar Transmitter - 4th in series. A design number not a manutacturer's desi]gnation
Radar Set AN/APT-4 is an airborne magnetron
radar barrage or spot jammer fcr use against German
radar systems such as the Rhubarb, Liechtenstein and
Wurzburgs operating in the frequency range of 150 to
770 mc. A liquid cooled magnetron, GL-5J30 or GL-
5J29, is used as an oscillator, resulting in simple tun-
ing controls, and high efficiency. The transmitter in-
volves simple components without critical adjustments.
The transmitter is continuously tunable in flight,
if necessary, over the complete frequency band. Two
tuning adjustments are necessary. In ordinary use the
transmitter frequency will probably be set on the
ground and three or four sets staggered to cover the
entire band.
Power is obtained from a 80/115 volt, 400-2600
c.p.s., a-c source and 24 volt d.c. source. The power
input of 1500 watts produces an output of 200 watts over
the frequency range. The transmitted signal is a ran-
dom noise modulated signal designed to jam the enemy
signal in the frequency range of the transmitter.
Production of this equipment started in June 1944
Army Supply Program Requirements as of 30 April
1944 indicates no equipment for the calendar year 1944
and 300 for 1945.
it weighed 230lbs range 2 miles?
i understand that possibly 100 units were built and installed of the Stromberg Carlson prototype design in the photo
According to this source Tube: USN-5J29 – PocketMagic There were 2,000 plus made of the GE main production type though I don't yet know when
You would need 4 per formation (to cover the frequency range 180 to 220 MHz)
So a shortish delay think.
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DerGiLLster
Airman
- 70
- May 1, 2015
Anybody have anymore information about electrostatic fuzes for AAA? Those seem to be the best bet for Germany to increase the effectiveness.
Anyways, I guess if Germany does manage to succeed in fielding a proximity fuze and figuring out how to defy the countermeasures(science in warfare is always back and forth), then it would be fair to say this would make bombing Germany much more difficult.
Wonder how it would play out once the A-Bomb comes in? Do they take the risk dropping it, or are too scared due to having sustained too high bombing losses?
Maybe such naval guns be optimized for AAA on land, sorta like the Beehive rounds Japan produced. That thing could have an effective range of 100 meters, but was lacking most likely due to a proximity fuze.
Anyways, I guess if Germany does manage to succeed in fielding a proximity fuze and figuring out how to defy the countermeasures(science in warfare is always back and forth), then it would be fair to say this would make bombing Germany much more difficult.
Wonder how it would play out once the A-Bomb comes in? Do they take the risk dropping it, or are too scared due to having sustained too high bombing losses?
Maybe such naval guns be optimized for AAA on land, sorta like the Beehive rounds Japan produced. That thing could have an effective range of 100 meters, but was lacking most likely due to a proximity fuze.
Glider
Captain
Maybe I am a sceptic as I worked in IT for many years and theory and tests tend to differ from reality, in particular in the early days. I cannot get the promised, tested performance vs reality of the guided missiles in Vietnam out of my head.
I should add that my niche were projects that had gone wrong, so pardon my caution
I should add that my niche were projects that had gone wrong, so pardon my caution
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Shortround6
Major General
It kind of goes both ways. The proponents of the the German use of Proximity fuses tend to overlook that it took the US from the summer of 1940 till Jan 1942 to get over a 50% success rate on laboratory built test fuses. That was considered the minimum success rate needed before talking to a manufacturer to start setting up production. It wasn't until April of 1942 that a "live" test was conducted (full scale airplane suspended underneath a balloon.) Other difficulties needed work and first successful trial firing was accomplished in Aug 1942 from the USS Cleveland. Crosley started mass production with first issues to the Navy in Nov/dec f 1942 and first use against Japanese aircraft in Jan 1943. This fuse would fit the US 5in/38 ONLY.
It took until Sept 1943 to get a fuse to fit the the British 4.5in shell and while it would fit the 5.25 in shell the firing characteristics of the 5.25in gun were not compatible with the fuse.
A new smaller fuse had to be made in order to fit the British 4in gun and still leave enough room for explosives. These 4in shell fuses were first issued in Nov-Dec 1943 (?).
A similar fuse was adopted for the US Army 90mm AA gun in very late 1943.
Perhaps the Germans could have developed a proximity fuse that worked in the 12.8cm flak guns, that doesn't mean it will fit in the 10.5cm flak guns ar that a fuse that works in the 10.5cm guns will work in the 8.8cm guns, especially the high velocity guns.
There was also a world of difference between the proximity fuses of 1943-45 and the jammers needed to counter them and the electronics of the late 50s-early 60s.
Even in the late 50s and early 60s missiles were being advertised as having the ability to home in on the source of a jamming signal if it was much stronger than the signal reflected form the target. SO you were getting into a several layer measure-counter measure battle instead of the simple one layer battle of WW II proximity fuse vs broadband (somewhat) white noise transmitter needed to counter them.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
Shortround6, thanks as ever. My impression was that the jammer wasn't broadband but rather swept frequency. All the power into one wavelength at a time, Makes sense to me.
wuzak
Captain
You'd have to separate losses from flak and enemy fighters. And year.
The 8th AF lost more aircraft to fighters than flak in 1943, but from mid-to-late 1944 it was the other way around.
In 1943 a significant increase in the loss rate would have been very detrimental to the 8th AF, and may have slowed operations, if not totally stopping them.
In 1944 the number of aircraft being sent and the number of reserve aircraft and air crew would have meant that loss rates would have had to increase substantially to have an effect on operations.
In 1944 a doubling of the loss rate would still have been a lower loss rate than in 1944.
In 1943 the Schweinfurt/Regensberg raid the losses were ~60 from 300 bombers, or about 20%. The second Schweinfurt raid was worse (77 bombers lost of 291).
In early 1944 there were a few raids with similar numbers of aircraft lost, ~60. However, there were as many as 1,000 bombers, or more, on these raids, which gave a much lower loss rate.
By 1944, as the Luftwaffe strength fell, the number of aircraft shot down reduced as well as the loss rates.
For the British night bombing the Luftwaffe night fighting force was significant in causing losses. Not sure of the balance between night fighters and flak, but the RAF expended a lot of resources in diversionary tactics to draw night fighters away from the intended target. From the development of Window, Monica tail warning radar and radar detectors, to the deployment of the Light Night Striking Force.
Doubling flak effectiveness would not lead to doubling the loss of allied aircraft at the crucial point of the air war in the ETO, from mid 1943 onwards.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Hey Wuzak,
re: "Doubling flak effectiveness would not lead to doubling the loss of allied aircraft at the crucial point of the air war in the ETO, from mid 1943 onwards."
Sorry, but I am not sure what you are trying to say here. By definition, if you increase the effective hit rate from 1 to two 2 it would double the loss rate per xxxx number of rounds. A direct hit is still a direct hit, a near miss with a time fuse or proximity fuse that takes down a bomber is still a near miss that takes down a bomber. Even if the average loss rate was only 10% the bomber offensive would be unsustainable. If the Germans had an effective fuse at the start of 1944, there is no reason I can think of that the losses would not have been around the 10% mark, at least until countermeasures were worked out or until the collapse of resistance due to the Russian advance and (possibly) an invasion by the UK and US.
I have read that about 2/3 of the losses at night by UK bomber command in the 1944 period (prior to the collapse of the Luftwaffe) were due to night fighters.
re: "Doubling flak effectiveness would not lead to doubling the loss of allied aircraft at the crucial point of the air war in the ETO, from mid 1943 onwards."
Sorry, but I am not sure what you are trying to say here. By definition, if you increase the effective hit rate from 1 to two 2 it would double the loss rate per xxxx number of rounds. A direct hit is still a direct hit, a near miss with a time fuse or proximity fuse that takes down a bomber is still a near miss that takes down a bomber. Even if the average loss rate was only 10% the bomber offensive would be unsustainable. If the Germans had an effective fuse at the start of 1944, there is no reason I can think of that the losses would not have been around the 10% mark, at least until countermeasures were worked out or until the collapse of resistance due to the Russian advance and (possibly) an invasion by the UK and US.
I have read that about 2/3 of the losses at night by UK bomber command in the 1944 period (prior to the collapse of the Luftwaffe) were due to night fighters.
wuzak
Captain
What I am saying is that doubling the losses from flak is not doubling the losses of the bombers.
That only works once the losses to fighters has gone to zero.
If the split between fighters and flak losses is equal, the loss rate would go up 50% if you double flak's effectiveness. If the split is 2:1 in favour of the fighters, the overall loss would go up 33%.
It also doesn't work if you double the number of planes shot down if they put up 3 or 4 times the number of aircraft. The loss rate would actually go down, even though your flak is more effective.
In 1944 the number of bombers ramped up quite significantly. To cause a 10% loss rate would require more than a doubling of flak effectiveness. The loss rates for the 8th AF fell from January/February to May/June, as the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses.
That only works once the losses to fighters has gone to zero.
If the split between fighters and flak losses is equal, the loss rate would go up 50% if you double flak's effectiveness. If the split is 2:1 in favour of the fighters, the overall loss would go up 33%.
It also doesn't work if you double the number of planes shot down if they put up 3 or 4 times the number of aircraft. The loss rate would actually go down, even though your flak is more effective.
In 1944 the number of bombers ramped up quite significantly. To cause a 10% loss rate would require more than a doubling of flak effectiveness. The loss rates for the 8th AF fell from January/February to May/June, as the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses.
