Could the British have sent enough aircraft to Singapore to make a difference?

LDSModeller said:

One of the things which helped the Japanese was the fact that British/Commonweatlh
personel vacated their bases without destroying fuel/ammunition/food supplies.
)

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Indeed, and a good portion of that was the inexperience of the defending troops, breakdowns in communication led to many of these, Bde/Div HQ's didn't inform airbases of impending withdrawl timetable, bridges not blown due to comm breakdown etc.

buffnut453 said:

That was the purpose behind the string of airfields through Burma. The idea was to stage aircraft from India through Burma to Malaya. Again, resupply convoys continued to reach Singapore unopposed through a fair proportion of January 1942 - and that was after the Force Z debacle. I have no doubt that the Japanese would have struggled to disrupt British supplies if Singora had been held by British/Thai forces in Dec 41.

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Even if the RAF lose the northern airbases the Japanese have some difficulties with controlling approaches to Singapore, as they are still 300 miles away. There is a large gap between the 8 northern airbases and Singapore, with only 2 near Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan in the middle.

With some radar and better command and control than yes, you may even be able to get some bombers in there then and become a large thorn in the side of the IJN. But the fog of war is a difficult obstacle to overcome, and we have the benefit of hind sight, and I still think that the outcome would be the same, as the Japanese would have just applied more pressure to the area.

In the long run, after losing sea control the Aliess were doomed in the PI, Malaya and the Indies.

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WWI Germany lost sea control on 4 August 1914. None the less, Lettow-Vorbeck and his tiny Schultztruppen force retained control over German East Africa for more then 18 months against odds many times worse then what Britain faced in 1941 Malaya. That's the difference good training and leadership provide.

If Malaya and/or the Philippines hold out largely intact I've got to assume the invasion of French North Africa and publicity stunts like the Doolittle Raid would be cancelled. Instead virtually the entire USN (less some ASW assets) plus a generous slice of the RN would show up before the end of 1942. The American and British public would demand such action.

dennis420b said:

With some radar and better command and control than yes, you may even be able to get some bombers in there then and become a large thorn in the side of the IJN. But the fog of war is a difficult obstacle to overcome, and we have the benefit of hind sight, and I still think that the outcome would be the same, as the Japanese would have just applied more pressure to the area.

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Maybe so, Dennis, but any additional pressure applied by the Japanese could only be done at the expense of other activities. The NEI could not have been taken before the capture of Singapore but Japan took a huge gamble, and greatly overstretched herself, in seeking to take on the Phillipines, Pearl Harbor and Malaya simultaneously. Time was the key issue. Yamashita needed a quick victory because he knew he lacked the resources to sustain pressure. Conversely, the British needed more time to build up resources. I firmly believe that a longer campaign would have been extremely damaging to Japan, potentially fatal.

with regard to the Japanese air units deployed into Indochina, it should be noted that from December 23, some of the formations (roughly half in fact) began redeployment to western Thailand, in prepration for the attck into Burma. Also the Ki-43s arriving as replacements for the Ki-27s were not reinforcements, they were replacements, as some of the formations in the air fleet attacking Malaya were re-equipping with the oscars, not expanding their formations. One other thing, Navy bombers were not escorted by army fighters, or vice versa. In fact the long range escorts and fighter sweeps were the express responsibility of the Yamada Detachment with 25 Zeroes on strength. Until well into the second week all except one of the army sentais were primarily the defending the beacheads at pattani.

The Jap[anese forces in Malaya were very stretched, and had to make up by quality what they lacked in numbers

parsifal said:

with regard to the Japanese air units deployed into Indochina, it should be noted that from December 23, some of the formations (roughly half in fact) began redeployment to western Thailand, in prepration for the attck into Burma. Also the Ki-43s arriving as replacements for the Ki-27s were not reinforcements, they were replacements, as some of the formations in the air fleet attacking Malaya were re-equipping with the oscars, not expanding their formations. One other thing, Navy bombers were not escorted by army fighters, or vice versa. In fact the long range escorts and fighter sweeps were the express responsibility of the Yamada Detachment with 25 Zeroes on strength. Until well into the second week all except one of the army sentais were primarily the defending the beacheads at pattani.

The Jap[anese forces in Malaya were very stretched, and had to make up by quality what they lacked in numbers

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Parsifal,

I'd love to know where you get your information. The units and numbers I have quoted were deployed before 7 Dec. None of the Ki-27 units re-equipped with Ki-43s during the battle - all the Ki-43s were amassed in the 64th and 59th Sentai but reinforcements to replace losses in those units were still problemmatic.

Please, please read "Bloody Shambles" and "Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Aces and Their Units, 1931-1945" by Hata Ikuhiko, Izawa Yasuho and Chris Shores. The 1st and 11th Sentai commenced operations from Singora Airfield on 8 Dec and the airfield was used as a staging post by Ki-43s the following day for further raids against RAF airfields (on 8 Dec, the Ki-43s had escorted Army bombers for the initial wave of attacks against Sungei Patani and other RAF airfields in the north). The Army had responsibility for air defence over the Army invasion forces, primarily using Ki-27s for that role) and the Ki-43s had the express role of achieving air superiority over Northern Malaya.

According to "Bloody Shambles", apart from one possible engagement with a Hudson on 8 Dec, 22nd Air Flotilla A6Ms weren't encounted by the RAF until after they moved to Kota Bharu on 26 Dec (in other words, it seems reality is the exact opposite of your statement), with the first engagements involving RAF aircraft occurring in mid-Jan 42.

Kind regards,
Mark

Other people have already said it but I'll toss a few lines in, just for the hell of it.

Singapore was Doomed (MM) but could've been held if the priorities had changed (Parsifal), those changes would've required losses in other theatres that would've been far more severe than the loss of Singapore. The loss of Singapore was an emotional shock to the British Empire, but it was not an economic or strategic shock. Singapore showed the Asians that the British could be beaten by other Asians. However, the supplies that came from there could be replaced from other locations.

Singapore was a backwater where generally second rate officers ended their careers. The day started at 7:30am and ended at Noon because it was too hot to work. The equipment was second rate, the training was generally inferior. It was an Empire outpost, not a bastion it was portrayed to be.

Lastly, WW2 showed that while Airpower could not win a campaign, you could lose a campaign without it. So, British Airpower was second rate at Singapore and the Japanese trashed it (by a combination of Air and Ground attack, Japanese agressiveness and British incompetence). But even if the British had first rate airpower, they still would've lost Singapore. First rate aircraft flown by generally good but inexperienced pilots, with second rate (or third rate) leadership and an Army that wasn't ready to fight anyone ready to fight back effectively would've led to the same loss the British ended up with. Maybe with more losses to the Japanese, maybe a slightly longer campaign, but the same result in the end.

Dont forget that even if Singapore held out, the Japanese still had their eyes on their prize .... the oil fields of the NEI, of which Sumatra was included.

The Japanese would have eventually enveloped Singapore from the west and shut down the adjacent sealanes.

Its fate would have been the same as Corregidore.

But the whole purpose behind attacking Malaya and Singapore was to get to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese didn't want their flanks exposed by attacking the DEI without first subduing Singapore which offered airfields, coastal defences etc. there were inherent risks in taking the DEI because the Japanese forces could have been cut off from resupply. Again, if the British could have prevented Japanese domination of Thailand, there would have been ample opportunity for resupply via sea and by aircraft staging through Burma. Japan was reassigning units between the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma and the DEI in order to complete their objectives. Interrupt that process of reallocation and the entire Japanese offensive would have bogged down completely. The simply didn't have the forces to sustain pressure for the long haul - ie more than 3-4 months at most.

buffnut453 said:

But the whole purpose behind attacking Malaya and Singapore was to get to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese didn't want their flanks exposed by attacking the DEI without first subduing Singapore which offered airfields, coastal defences etc. there were inherent risks in taking the DEI because the Japanese forces could have been cut off from resupply. Again, if the British could have prevented Japanese domination of Thailand, there would have been ample opportunity for resupply via sea and by aircraft staging through Burma. Japan was reassigning units between the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma and the DEI in order to complete their objectives. Interrupt that process of reallocation and the entire Japanese offensive would have bogged down completely. The simply didn't have the forces to sustain pressure for the long haul - ie more than 3-4 months at most.

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The Japanese would have moved northwards from Java up the length of Sumatra.

Just because Singapore holds out, doesnt mean the PI does. And then its pretty much a simple jump from Borneo, to Java, then to Sumatra. Sort of like what happened historically.

syscom3 said:

The Japanese would have moved northwards from Java up the length of Sumatra.

Just because Singapore holds out, doesnt mean the PI does. And then its pretty much a simple jump from Borneo, to Java, then to Sumatra. Sor tof like what happened historically.

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Yes, but that would still leave British-held Malaya and Singapore between DEI and the rest of Japanese forces.

buffnut453 said:

Yes, but that would still leave British-held Malaya and Singapore between DEI and the rest of Japanese forces.

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Which brings up an interesting point.

Whereas the Allies and, especially the US, could island hop, neutralizing Japanese bases and moving closer to Japan, could the Japanese do the same thing?

My belief is they could not. For two reasons, one, the reason why the US could island hop is it was the strategically stronger of the Japanese/US war. The Japanese had to hold all the turf the us could possible take whereas the US could go where it wanted to because it could bring more power to any point it chose to attack, especially in the later part of the war.

Secondly, the US did not need the Territory it bypassed or attacked from a economic standpoint. The US could and did fight the war with little (possible, any) raw supply from the Pacific. The Japanese did not have that luxury as they need almost all the raw materials required for their war machine from the territories they counqured. As a consequence, having an Allied base in their rear, even a supressed one, gave the oposition the option of attacking lines of communication. What was a supressed base could turn into a position to jump off from in an strategic counterattack/advance.

timshatz said:

Other people have already said it but I'll toss a few lines in, just for the hell of it.

Singapore was Doomed (MM) but could've been held if the priorities had changed (Parsifal), those changes would've required losses in other theatres that would've been far more severe than the loss of Singapore. The loss of Singapore was an emotional shock to the British Empire, but it was not an economic or strategic shock.
Lastly, WW2 showed that while Airpower could not win a campaign, you could lose a campaign without it. So, British Airpower was second rate at Singapore and the Japanese trashed it (by a combination of Air and Ground attack, Japanese agressiveness and British incompetence). But even if the British had first rate airpower, they still would've lost Singapore. First rate aircraft flown by generally good but inexperienced pilots, with second rate (or third rate) leadership and an Army that wasn't ready to fight anyone ready to fight back effectively would've led to the same loss the British ended up with. Maybe with more losses to the Japanese, maybe a slightly longer campaign, but the same result in the end.

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I disagree with your conclusion, the "army" of the British Aussie units were able to fight the Japanese, but the Indian troops that were facing the japanes for the first 6 weeks were unmotivated inexperienced. With more effective resistance the campaign could have been much different

syscom3 said:

Dont forget that even if Singapore held out, the Japanese still had their eyes on their prize .... the oil fields of the NEI, of which Sumatra was included.

The Japanese would have eventually enveloped Singapore from the west and shut down the adjacent sealanes.
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buffnut453 said:

But the whole purpose behind attacking Malaya and Singapore was to get to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese didn't want their flanks exposed by attacking the DEI without first subduing Singapore which offered airfields, coastal defences etc. there were inherent risks in taking the DEI because the Japanese forces could have been cut off from resupply. Again, if the British could have prevented Japanese domination of Thailand, there would have been ample opportunity for resupply via sea and by aircraft staging through Burma. Japan was reassigning units between the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma and the DEI in order to complete their objectives.

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Agreed. If the British are able to give a solid resistance to the Japanese in Malaya it would prevent attacks on other more distant targets.

Let's review the timeline here:
Western Forces
8 Dec Japan invades Malaya
There are 3 CW divisions in Malaya in the first 6 weeks, + a few other brigades.

the 11th Indian is basically destroyed by the attacks of the 6th of Jan.
the 9th Indian has been mauled during the fighting of Dec.
The 8th Australian hands the japanese a bloody nose in an ambush, but 1 brigade of the division is destroyed in the fighting of the 19th/20th as the green Indian brigade guarding the flank gives way.

So by the 20th of Jan, the Japanese have dealt a crushing blow to all 3 Allied divisions.
The Japanese 15th army launchs their main attack into Burma on Jan 20 after they have effectively neutralized all of the allied divisions, and they are confident of victory.
No other attacks are made by west force until the Japanese invade DEI on 14 Feb after Singapore has been effectively defeated (Japanese forces capture the water supply ammo dumps on 13 Jan and capture/neutralize all allied airpower, Singapore's fate is sealed.
Now, if the British had managed to hold back the Japanes in northern malaya, or repulsed the assault on Singapore, the DEI invasion would be postponed, as they needed to use the troops aircraft from the malaya campaign to hit DEI.

Eastern Central Force
The Japanese only make landings in Dutch Borneo (11 Jan) after the main US force has been bottled up in Baatan, and the air 7 naval forces have been neutralized.
If there had been an effective Allied air force in southern Philippines for example, I doubt that the Japanese would have attacked DEI Borneo.

Allies and, especially the US, could island hop, neutralizing Japanese bases and moving closer to Japan, could the Japanese do the same thing?

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Japan hopped across half the Pacific during a 4 month period (Dec 41 to Apr 42). It took the USN over 3 years to cover that distance in reverse.

davebender said:

Japan hopped across half the Pacific during a 4 month period (Dec 41 to Apr 42). It took the USN over 3 years to cover that distance in reverse.

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But most of those islands were undefended in 1941 but the Japanese turned them all into fortresses of varying scales. The key problem was that the Japanese "tide of conquest" - a great red wave sweeping across the Pacific - providing a buttress against attacks on the homeland was, in reality, a series of defended islands with huge expanses of ocean in between, with the consequence that many of the islands could simply be bypassed. Japan couldn't afford that luxury in the DEI or Malaya because both provided war-critical raw materials.

The British do not know that the Japanese are stretched thin, or their overall intentions. With little time to assess your enemy, to take a guess at what was happening is literally a stab in the dark. Look at Force Z, that is a prime example of the allies not knowing the Japanese capabilities or readiness to react. After such a loss, there would have been a natural want to be conservative, maybe to the point that they decided that Singapore would not have been defensible, or just to costly to defend. The allies did seem to be totally took back by the swiftness of the Japanese attacks.

dennis420b said:

The British do not know that the Japanese are stretched thin, or their overall intentions. With little time to assess your enemy, to take a guess at what was happening is literally a stab in the dark. Look at Force Z, that is a prime example of the allies not knowing the Japanese capabilities or readiness to react. After such a loss, there would have been a natural want to be conservative, maybe to the point that they decided that Singapore would not have been defensible, or just to costly to defend. The allies did seem to be totally took back by the swiftness of the Japanese attacks.

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Dennis,

I entirely agree. The key to the entire Japanese strategy was Thailand. Like I keep saying, robust British and Thai defence of Singora would have exposed all the risks inherent in the Japanese plan - no reinforcements, no logistics chain, no ability to sustain operations for an extended period.

buffnut453 said:

Parsifal,

I'd love to know where you get your information. The units and numbers I have quoted were deployed before 7 Dec. None of the Ki-27 units re-equipped with Ki-43s during the battle - all the Ki-43s were amassed in the 64th and 59th Sentai but reinforcements to replace losses in those units were still problemmatic.

Please, please read "Bloody Shambles" and "Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Aces and Their Units, 1931-1945" by Hata Ikuhiko, Izawa Yasuho and Chris Shores. The 1st and 11th Sentai commenced operations from Singora Airfield on 8 Dec and the airfield was used as a staging post by Ki-43s the following day for further raids against RAF airfields (on 8 Dec, the Ki-43s had escorted Army bombers for the initial wave of attacks against Sungei Patani and other RAF airfields in the north). The Army had responsibility for air defence over the Army invasion forces, primarily using Ki-27s for that role) and the Ki-43s had the express role of achieving air superiority over Northern Malaya.

According to "Bloody Shambles", apart from one possible engagement with a Hudson on 8 Dec, 22nd Air Flotilla A6Ms weren't encounted by the RAF until after they moved to Kota Bharu on 26 Dec (in other words, it seems reality is the exact opposite of your statement), with the first engagements involving RAF aircraft occurring in mid-Jan 42.

Kind regards,
Mark

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Hi Mark

You are right I should read these sources that you refer to. But in making the statements that I have I was relying on some reasonable sources. They happen to corroborate the source posted by Davebender, Niehorsters Orders Of battle site.

My main sources include the following

Japanese Army Forces Order Of Battle - Vols I II (564 Pages) Victor Madej Pennsylvania Printing house 1981

The Struggle For Malaya; Hammer EJ, Stanford University Press, 1976


Order Of Battle Of the Japanese Armed Forces - Military Intelligence Division US Department Of the Army 5th Edition (the final version - I saw this and made copies of bits of it when I was on exchange in the US)

Japanese Army In the Pacific other details unknown, but it was written by an ex-member of IGHQ so it might be Kogun...I have photocopies of bits of this book

Japanese Armed Forces Handbook 1939 -45 ; AJ Barker Ian Allen 1979

Niehorsters site, which substantially follows the information contained in the abovementioned references.

I also have access to the US Military atlas of WWII, which is absolute gem. Its owned by a friend of mine, based in Canberra, and has lots of information on this subject.

I also use the USSBS which devotes a chapter to this subject. The USSBS summary says that the JAAF fileded 550, whilst the Navy deployed 175 aircraft. However it also says the Allies fielded 350 aircraft in Malaya at the start of the campaign. My guess this includes everything in Indochina, including the aircraft deployed in the north of the territory (and which took no part in the battle) and the transports which i think at that time were based in Hainan.

I also own a copy of Australia In the War Of 1939-45, the 22 volume official history, which is useful, but not a great source

3rd air fleet at the beginning of the campaign had about 350 aircraft attached. In addition there were three squadrons on loan from the 5th air fleet, so the numbers were somewhat higher than normal. In the coming days I can do a detailed head count if you like and give what I think was deployed at the beginning of the campaign

As far as the zero issue, well I do stand by the statement, but I will double check, but might I suggest this particular issue, which we always argue about, is not that relevant to the matter discussed here. The point that was raised was the strength of the JAAF (and IJN) air units in the campaign, was it not?

Hi Parsifal,

My intent was not to go over old ground again...we've done this waltz often enough already!

Hmmm, friend in Canberra and you did an exchange job in the US - are/were you Aussie armed forces? Just wondering...

I can't find reference to Hammer's book. She did write "The Struggle for Indochina" - is that the volume to which you refer?

In addition to the books mentioned, I'd also recommend the essay "Air Operational Leadership in the Southern Front: Imperial Army Aviation's Trial to be an 'Air Force' in the Malaya Offensive Air Operation" by Hisayuki Yokoyama (found in "British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945" edited by Brian Bond and Kyoichi Tachikawa (Cass, 2004)). Finally, there's the Japanese Monograph No.55 "Southease Area Air Operations Record, Phase 1 - November 1941-February 1942" which contains interesting, if somewhat contradictory, high-level information on IJAAF operations and losses.

Cheers,
Mark

buffnut453 said:

Dennis,

I entirely agree. The key to the entire Japanese strategy was Thailand. Like I keep saying, robust British and Thai defence of Singora would have exposed all the risks inherent in the Japanese plan - no reinforcements, no logistics chain, no ability to sustain operations for an extended period.

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The problem was that Roosevelt had given Churchill a guarantee to intervene on the Allied side, provided however that the Japanese were the aggressor. While the forward deplyment (into Thailand) made perfect sense from a military perspective, the japanese invasion would be spun to be deploying to protect Thailand from British aggression.
Rather like the situation in Belgium, while it made sense to deploy forward and prepare positions, it wasn't possible (until the 11th hour) due to political considerations.

buffnut453 said:

That was the purpose behind the string of airfields through Burma. The idea was to stage aircraft from India through Burma to Malaya. Again, resupply convoys continued to reach Singapore unopposed through a fair proportion of January 1942 - and that was after the Force Z debacle. I have no doubt that the Japanese would have struggled to disrupt British supplies if Singora had been held by British/Thai forces in Dec 41.

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The plan to move the aircraft Eastward was the wrong direction, as it involved transiting Africa, and then supplying the air armies through the Middle east, which was already a war zone. The better plan would have been to fly aircraft westwards across exisiting bases in the Pacific

renrich said:

dennis touched on this but how are the British to get the aircraft to Malaya and keep them supplied with gasoline, etc. when they don't have control of the sea. The US faced the same problem in the PI. The Japanese controlled the sea in that part of the world, just as Britain did the English Channel and practically speaking, the Allies could not wrest control of the sea from the IJN. A little later, the US kept pumping airplanes into the battle in SE Asia, (Java, Sumatra) and all they did was lose the airplanes.

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The US never put a decent size fighter force into NEI.
The fuels situation was not a problem at all. the British ( Dutch) had 3 big overseas refineries making Avgas. One was in Aruba, one was in Abadan, and the third was Palembang, Sumatra. (Right across the straight from Singapore)
The Dutch had also prepared a good number of airfields for use. Now, as it turned out they were really only used by the US bomber crews, who had trouble using dutch bombs. However, US or British fighters could have used Dutch .303 or .50 cal ammo without problems

One last thing, as long as the allies hold Sumatra malaya the Japanes do not have control of the seas, specifically the straights of Malacca.