Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

[Tkdog]

So what it would come down to is the Japanese betting the whole war on an attempt to get an island they don't really want.

 

[Conslaw]

I find Jon Parshall's research very pertinent on this point. The Japanese Navy used up most of its oil in the failed Midway attack. The war of conquest took a huge toll on the Japanese Navy's petroleum reserves. Even the conquest of the Dutch East Indies didn't change things much as, the Dutch oil workers sabotaged the facilities, leaving a lot of work to get production back up to speed. Taking the historical Guadalcanal campaign as a touchstone, the IJN's tactics and strategies were at every stage influenced by the availability of oil. (It influenced the Americans too, but in their case more because a shortage of fleet oilers than petroleum stocks.) Japan didn't have the oil and support ships necessary even to support a capable garrison on Midway, much less Oahu or any of the other Hawaiian Islands. Remote islands like Johnson atoll may have been easily taken by Japan, but they could be equally easily retaken by the US, as it would have been impossible for Japan to maintain a defensive naval presence.

IMHO, the best Japan could have hoped for is a defeat of the American carriers and a successful invasion of MIdway. This invasion would have come at a great cost as the Midway garrison had been reinforced. US submarines based in Hawaii could have put a vice grip on Midway Atoll, and it would have become Japan's first "starvation island. Even if all the US carriers in the Midway battle had been sunk, by August, 1942, the Wasp and the Saratoga could land the First Marine Division to take Midway atoll. Japan would not have had the oil or the warning to prevent it.

Guadalcanal would have been an annoyance to supplying Australia, but that could be worked around and/or endured. Even absent any of the carriers the US committed to Midway, and even without retaking any of the Solomon Islands, The US Navy would have been able to march across the Central Pacific in 1944. If anything the lack of confidence in suitable basing may have caused the Army Air Force to put some effort into in-flight refueling of the B-29.

 

[Schweik]

You seem to be denying any possibility of a counter to your scenario. For one that hasn't been mentioned - weather. They would have to launch this amazing endeavor weeks before their d day. Once they have begun their journey (that the enemy knows all about) they are committed to a very small window to attack. Linger someplace for the weather or surf to be more favorable and you're out of fuel oil and aviation fuel. The whole fleet becomes more vulnerable each day of delay. At some point you have to go home. Do the troop ships have enough food?

No I grant that it would be very much a roll of the dice for the Japanese. I was just trying to figure out plausibly how they might try to do it, and pointing out the flaws in some of the critiques which claimed they couldn't have even had a chance. I certainly concede that it would be enormously difficult and there was many ways such an endeavor could fail. Part of the rationale for the whole scenario is that they could have won at Midway because Midway itself hinged on luck quite a bit (one or two scout planes having radio trouble etc. could have made god knows how much difference). Perhaps if they had won at Midway it would have made the IJN leadership more reckless, sufficient to take the big risks.

But I already conceded logistics like fuel could be a major problem, and so could an attack by the US carriers. Even a well orchestrated defense purely from the land based forces could thwart it. I just don't agree there is any guarantee of failure of a Japanese invasion. It would have been very hard, but they did very hard things and succeeded several times early in the war.

Send those battleships in to shell and those that survive the subs, counter fire from shore and sea, torpedo boats and mines (they knew you were coming) have reduced their supply of shells accordingly. They are now more vulnerable in a surface battle.

True but I think the IJN has a lot more BBs and we know that their destroyers were deadly and their night tactics generally superior to the US (or anyone else). The US had the advantage of radar, and the ground based radar on Hawaii would be a big plus. But the Japanese were no slouches.

There are countermeasures that can be taken against subs and mines. They knew the bombardment strikes were coming in the Solomons too but it didn't stop them bombarding successfully numerous times.

I have dove around Oahu when u was stationed there. The currents off shore are serious as can be the surf. Terrain ashore is tricky. There aren't that many beaches.

Sure currents but you have been there so you know - there are beaches you could land on with landing craft on both the West and East side of the Island as well as around Honolulu and Pearl. Enough to mix up your invasion a bit. North shore I wouldn't try due to the big waves and rocks.

I think the most telling part of your post is your assessment of the Dec 7th attack. It the work of dilettantes, seriously. They were functioning at a strategic level. They went for the battleships, scrub tier move. They should have thought logistically and either had the sense to not attack or at least focused on the fuel reserves and the port facilities themselves. The very fact that those are harder to destroy in total should have been the warning they needed to not attack.

All of which underlined the issue with them trying to invade Oahu. Logistics. They can't possibly pull the logistical train together to sustain an attack. They have to burn fuel oil to make drinking water. The defenders have to turn a tap. The defenders just have to slow them down by not many days and the whole thing crumbles. There is no "living off the land" at sea. Things break daily and they have to be fixed.

Someone here can probably dig up the lifetime of a Zero's engine. Couldn't have been all that many flights.

I agree logistics would be a challenge. Timing would be critical, you'd need a Yamamoto or somebody of similar talents to pull it off.

I think Zeros were actually pretty good on maintenance. Air cooled engine and all.

 

[Schweik]

I find Jon Parshall's research very pertinent on this point. The Japanese Navy used up most of its oil in the failed Midway attack. The war of conquest took a huge toll on the Japanese Navy's petroleum reserves. Even the conquest of the Dutch East Indies didn't change things much as, the Dutch oil workers sabotaged the facilities, leaving a lot of work to get production back up to speed. Taking the historical Guadalcanal campaign as a touchstone, the IJN's tactics and strategies were at every stage influenced by the availability of oil. (It influenced the Americans too, but in their case more because a shortage of fleet oilers than petroleum stocks.) Japan didn't have the oil and support ships necessary even to support a capable garrison on Midway, much less Oahu or any of the other Hawaiian Islands. Remote islands like Johnson atoll may have been easily taken by Japan, but they could be equally easily retaken by the US, as it would have been impossible for Japan to maintain a defensive naval presence.

IMHO, the best Japan could have hoped for is a defeat of the American carriers and a successful invasion of MIdway. This invasion would have come at a great cost as the Midway garrison had been reinforced. US submarines based in Hawaii could have put a vice grip on Midway Atoll, and it would have become Japan's first "starvation island. Even if all the US carriers in the Midway battle had been sunk, by August, 1942, the Wasp and the Saratoga could land the First Marine Division to take Midway atoll. Japan would not have had the oil or the warning to prevent it.

Guadalcanal would have been an annoyance to supplying Australia, but that could be worked around and/or endured. Even absent any of the carriers the US committed to Midway, and even without retaking any of the Solomon Islands, The US Navy would have been able to march across the Central Pacific in 1944. If anything the lack of confidence in suitable basing may have caused the Army Air Force to put some effort into in-flight refueling of the B-29.

Interesting, maybe you are right. I don't know enough about it to really have an opinion on how much they really had or if your assessment is good. But from the accounts of the various campaigns, I agree oil seemed to be a big problem for the Japanese, and even for the Americans too. One of the surprising assertions in Neptune's Inferno is that was the real reason why the USN didn't bring out their remaining older (but still pretty tough) battleships out to the Solomons where US cruisers and destroyers were forced to face Japanese battleships (some of them were rather antiquated ones too, but they could throw a heavy punch). Hornfisher said that the old BBs just burned up too much fuel, sending them around to the South Pacific and just getting them into position would use more fuel than a whole task force of more modern CA, CL and DDs operating for three months.

The mode modern Washington and South Dakota were bad on fuel too but not quite the gluttonous hogs as the older ones, so when they were available they were brought in to mix it up, and they, or especially the Washington did indeed come in handy, radar helped in night fighting if you knew how to use it (not all US ship crews did, apparently).

 

[Schweik]

Uh,,,,, no. Star shells only work if the firing ship has a visual on the target. or at least a reference point. Can the Japanese bombardment ships actually see the airfields on Oahu form 5-10 miles offshore? (that is assuming the 16in guns are knocked out, otherwise the distance might be much greater) the 16 in guns were in the open during the attack on Pearl harbor, at some point in 1942 they got concrete roofs that were 8 to 15 feet thick.
View attachment 557754
one of the 16 in gun positions after it got the concrete roof. Before or after your proposed invasion?

I don't buy your argument about the Japanese Destroyers - if US Subs could decimate an IJN fleet I think they would have done so at Guadalcanal and across Iron Bottom Sound etc. Hell do it at Midway why make the planes do all the work? But they were still working out major ... glitches is too mild of a word, defects in the Mark 13 torpedo, and they were limited by the performance of submarines of that era more generally.

But I wasn't aware they had 16 inch guns in dug in fortifications, that is impressive.

Here is maybe one scenario I can imagine - lets say the Japanese try a bombardment, and unaware of the 16" gun or guns, they take some fire and after an exchange of shells, retreat. Once you know they are there, then I say, send your bombardment group back the next day, and bring along the Yamato and the Musashi with their type 94 46 cm guns (18 .1 inches).

Have those hang back a bit, about 12 miles maybe. When the big shore guns open up on the bombardment fleet again, have the Yamato fire star shells at the flashpoints, and then have Yamato and Musashi open up with their 18 x type 94 guns. I think maybe they could knock those out. Those shells hit hard. Maybe they would get hit and sink though that's possible too.

Be a trip to watch it though the way the Marines did from Guadalcanal...

 

[The Basket]

From what I know the Midway invasion was a feint to get at the carriers and then bacame an invasion due to mission creep. A bit like Verdun.

Invasion of Hawaii would be a nonsense for the IJN. Why? A huge garrison sitting there. Needing much supply and easily cut off. It would be a submarine delight.

Real war is in China and in the south east Asia cos that's where the oil is.

The whole Pearl Harbour thing is to knock America out of the war so they run home with a bloody nose to hide under the bed.

Maybe Pearl could be the jump off point for the USA invasion and the Long Road to the White House. Yikes!

The Japanese plan was to buy time to prepare for any future American plans by basically a fait accompli and so the Americans can like it or lump it. Going full war and getting cities vaporised was not part of that strategy. If you look at ww1 the Americans took about 18 months to get fully going so it could be safe to assume the Japanese knew they had time. But after that it was clobbering time.

Japan's American plan was that they could never win a war against USA but we will bomb them anyway. Utter genius.

 

[buffnut453]

Well, they had the sealift capacity to invade the Philippines with 150,000 men. And the 1.5 to 1 ratio would be helped a lot by a series of heavy naval bombardments, and if they could manage it, air strikes.

I could see the various atolls and islands previously mentioned being staging areas, though admittedly they are not close.

The sealift capacity problem is more complex than outright numbers, I'm afraid. Japan had zero potential to lift 150,000 troops in one go.

According to Wiki (yes....I know, but it's all I have to hand), just less than 130,000 Japanese troops were landed in the Philippines but that was spread over 2 weeks. The largest single landing was 43,110 men on 22 Dec, when the prior landings had taken place in 8, 12 and 19 Dec.

Geography is key. For the Philippines, Japan could Garrison forces in a safe location (Formosa) and the lift was only 200 miles. That means a slow transport could complete a round trip in a couple of days. Quadruple that distance and your turnaround time to get follow-on forces into the battle is greatly extended. The bigger the force to be carried, the longer it takes to assemble, load and offload. All that means that your op tempo runs the risk of stalling if you can't get follow-on forces into the fight quickly enough.

It's also worth pointing out that some of the early landings took place at great distance, oner 150 miles in one case, from defending US and Filipino forces.

Looking at the Hawaii case, you have stronger defending forces (after Pearl Harbor), a smaller geographic area (no opportunity to land small forward parties away from US defenders), your lift distance is far greater, perhaps by 4x or more, AND there's no good place to garrison your invasion army. Your turnaround times will be much longer and your transports are exposed to submarine threat almost the entirety of the journey.

I still say the invasion of Hawaii was a non-starter.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't buy your argument about the Japanese Destroyers - if US Subs could decimate an IJN fleet I think they would have done so at Guadalcanal and across Iron Bottom Sound etc. Hell do it at Midway why make the planes do all the work? But they were still working out major ... glitches is too mild of a word, defects in the Mark 13 torpedo, and they were limited by the performance of submarines of that era more generally.

Uh, the MK 13 was the aircraft Torpedo. Granted the sub torpedo had the same or more problems than the MK 13.
The US wasn't using subs as fleet support at Guadalcanal, they were already using them for attacking supply lines and Guadalcanal was nowhere near the Japanese trade routes.
Attacking Pearl Harbor is attacking the Pacific fleets main submarine base.
The Japanese in mid to late 1942 have no way of knowing how bad the American torpedoes are, and they have no way of knowing just how bad their own anti sub capabilities are..

 

[Peter Gunn]

I don't know if anyone has touched on it yet, I haven't read the whole thread (shame on me I know) but, even a victory at Midway was a non-starter for the Japanese. Nimitz wasn't sending out his carriers in a do or die mission, in fact, he was willing to sacrifice Midway to preserve his carriers because he knew he could recapture Midway almost at leisure. It was well within range of AAF heavy bombers out of Hawaii and American naval power but also it would have been at the end of a VERY LONG Japanese supply line to be sustained on a regular basis. Even some of Yammamoto's staff tried to point that out to him during the planning stages for the Midway operation, fruitlessly I might add.

Besides, even a Japanese naval victory off Midway does not guarantee a successful invasion. If you read Shattered Swords Appendix 5, Parshall and Tully give a detailed analysis of what could have happened to the Japanese had they tried to invade. Then there's an extrapolation for the Hawaiian Islands where the Japanese would be outnumbered and and attacking some pretty hefty prepared positions. Not to mention that Hawaii's geography pretty much negates the swift flanking maneuvers which the IJA liked so much.

If you want a detailed analysis that pretty much answers the question(s) posed by the thread and its title, read Shattered Sword. All your questions will be answered.

 

[Tkdog]

Oahu has 112 miles of coastline. If we are kind and say 25% is suitable for invasion craft that is only 28 miles to defend.

 

[Conslaw]

Musashi was not ready for combat in the summer of 1942. Yamato was still a little bit raw too, and in any case, neither ship would be good for shore bombardment as GP shells were never manufactured for either ship. (One thing that I've read conflicting things on is how many rounds each of the 18.1 gund was rated for. It probably depends on whether they were full or partial charge rounds, but if Yamato's guns were only rated for 100 rounds before the barrel had to be changed, and the long range hit percentage was 1%, it doesn't seem worth it to me to fire the shots.)

 

[The Basket]

Defend 28miles of coastline is a very difficult job! Even with massive forces.

Lots of problems. All depends if you have air or sea supremacy but probably not.

That means any shore fortification is going to be bombarded and blasted to bits. Any movement is going to be attacked by aircraft and a good chance the enemy will attack at the point he chooses and not at your strongest point.

The Japanese plan of defending away from the beaches and hoping to beat them by attrition is different from normal doctrine which is to push the attackers back into the sea as soon as possible.

A weak military force landing on an island against a military superior force is in for some very bad times. Which is why in allied landings they always held the upper hand and did so after all conditions were met.

The Dieppe landing is a classic example of how not to do it.

 

[Schweik]

Ok I'm starting to feel like it may indeed have been impossible. I'd say the main issues that I find convincing are fuel and just the overall distances involved, without robust enough staging areas (those atolls are close but not quite sufficient I think, and kind of exposed, especially for stockpiling fuel and so on). I still say it could have been attempted with some possibility of success, if they had committed a large proportion of their resources to the task, but it would have been an enormous risk. I think Hawaii would be a prize for Japan but it's very isolated and far from their main A/O.

However I stand by the original assertion that Midway could have gone either way and if the Japanese had won it, the US would have shifted major extra resources to the defense of Hawaii and into the Pacific Theater more generally.

 

[Schweik]

I don't know if anyone has touched on it yet, I haven't read the whole thread (shame on me I know) but, even a victory at Midway was a non-starter for the Japanese. Nimitz wasn't sending out his carriers in a do or die mission, in fact, he was willing to sacrifice Midway to preserve his carriers because he knew he could recapture Midway almost at leisure. It was well within range of AAF heavy bombers out of Hawaii and American naval power but also it would have been at the end of a VERY LONG Japanese supply line to be sustained on a regular basis. Even some of Yammamoto's staff tried to point that out to him during the planning stages for the Midway operation, fruitlessly I might add.

Nimitz may have been willing to give up Midway to save his carriers but once he got engaged with the Japanese fleet his carriers were exposed to attack and there wasn't much he could do about that. If things had gone a bit differently he very well could have lost all four carriers instead of just one.

If you want a detailed analysis that pretty much answers the question(s) posed by the thread and its title, read Shattered Sword. All your questions will be answered.

I may pick it up, a lot of people have recommend it and referenced it. I highly recommend Neptune's Inferno if you haven't read that.

 

[Milosh]

A weak military force landing on an island against a military superior force is in for some very bad times. Which is why in allied landings they always held the upper hand and did so after all conditions were met.

Tarawa was a success but at a very high cost and that was a superior force landing against a inferior force.

 

[The Basket]

Tarawa was a success but at a very high cost and that was a superior force landing against a inferior force.

Still won though. At Iwo Jima the landing sights were more limited so the Japanese could predict landing sights. Okinawa they couldn't.

The initial landing is bad because you are sending troops in without any kind of cover or fortification and the enemy can already zero in his weapons. Plus any obstacles and booby traps he can set up. So even one guy with a MG-42 can be a formidable adversary against infantry coming ashore.

You have to keep on feeding the fresh bodies into the meatgrinder. Until you can establish the beachhead and then break out.

One aspect is landing troops is you need fresh troops and fresh supplies. If you lose that superiority then your beachhead is gone and suddenly your troops already landed have lost all means of retreat and resupply and surrounded by enemy. So that's the end for them. Even bad weather can do this.

Usually the guy with the biggest army wins. So only fight weaker opponents and don't bomb counties who can build atom bombs.

 

[pinsog]

Let's also remember that the tiny island of Wake, with a token force, no radar, and a tiny area to fight from (ie no place to hide) repulsed the first assault from the Japanese. If they would have had radar they might have been able to intercept the first few raids instead of being caught on the ground and held out until reinforced or evacuated.

Hawaii, with the ability to hold as many fighters as could be shipped, radar coverage etc, would have pummeled anything that happened after a US loss at Midway.

The big take away here is how bad would the fallout be for our allies around the world when the US shifted resources around.

 

[Schweik]

Well that was the original point anyway. But the Japanese shouldn't be too readily dismissed. They had a crack military force, and they accomplished far beyond anyone even remotely expected. Keep in mind two generations earlier they were still running around like this

 

[michael rauls]

Lots of good info and analysis on this thread. I must admit I think I've changed my perception of the likelihood of the Japanese being able to take Hawaii after a U.S. defeat at Midway from unlikely but still a posibiity to almost impossible.
Emphasis on the almost though. I don't think the threat could exactly be written off as laughable especially at the time.
Sounds like they'd really have to catch every posible beak to even have a slight chance of success however.

 

[Shortround6]

Well that was the original point anyway. But the Japanese shouldn't be too readily dismissed. They had a crack military force, and they accomplished far beyond anyone even remotely expected. Keep in mind two generations earlier they were still running around like this

View attachment 557962

You have long generations,

Two generations early the Japanese were more like this,

See Sino-Japanese war of 1894. Also the battle of Yalu which was the first battle between armoured warships since the Battle of Lisa in 1866 ( a few isolated incidents aside like the HMS Shah vs the Huascar).

The Russo-Japanese war (1904) should have been enough to dissuade people from thinking the Japanese military was like your picture.