Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

[Schweik]

You have long generations,

Two generations early the Japanese were more like this,
View attachment 557963
See Sino-Japanese war of 1894. Also the battle of Yalu which was the first battle between armoured warships since the Battle of Lisa in 1866 ( a few isolated incidents aside like the HMS Shah vs the Huascar).

The Russo-Japanese war (1904) should have been enough to dissuade people from thinking the Japanese military was like your picture.

And you my friend are knowledgeable man but not a historian.

Some of the Japanese of that generation were like that. The ones trying to get the country ready for the 20th Century. But they were not alone.

Ever heard of the Satsuma rebellion? That was the last gasp of the medieval type Samurai, in 1877.

Satsuma Rebellion - Wikipedia

These guys were from the Boshun War, about 10 years earlier (1868-69), another Samurai rebellion.

Boshin War - Wikipedia

 

[taly01]

The more I've thought about it and looked at the outcomes the whole perimeter defence plan of Japans Navy in WW2 was flawed, they were establishing outposts too far from their logistic and force capabilities.

Guadalcanal and Midway were the great loss battles of IJN and they were both at their extreme reach, and offered no material or produce reward.

 

[ThomasP]

Hi guys,

There are a lot of interesting ideas posted in this thread (and no that is not my way of saying some or all of you are all nuts or anything like that).

I would again like to suggest that anyone interested in the war in the PTO read the following book:

"War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945" by Edward S. Miller, published by the United States Naval Institute, and by Shinchosa Ltd. in Japanese

Although it is primarily concerned with the US perspective, it also necessarily includes some of the aspects of Japanese thinking on the subject of taking control of various areas in the PTO.

One aspect closely relating to this thread's subject is that the Japanese high command never considered it feasible to invade Hawaii in any early operation, and impractical at a later date unless they could defeat the USN in a decisive final manner, in which case there would have been no need to invade.

Another aspect is that the US also considered it impractical to invade a similar Japanese target at a similar distance in any early operation. At the beginning of the war in the PTO , the US planners knew the US did not have enough force projection ability to have a reasonable chance of holding distant areas already under US control (such as the Philippines) let alone invade and hold other objectives at similar distance.

Contrary to popular myth (at least in the US) the Japanese government had no interest in going to war with the US, and their war planners never thought it likely (possible? yes, but not likely) that they would win a short war with the US. The Japanese war planners considered it a certainty that they would not win a sustained war with the US (barring devine intervention, pure luck, extreme US incompetence, etc.). The reason for Japan's willingness to start a war with the US, UK, and Dutch (at least at that point in time) rested solely on the fact that these countries had all ceased to supply oil to Japan. Even if the US alone had continued to supply oil to Japan, the Japanese high command would not have started a war at that point in time. The Japanese government knew that without oil the Japanese nation would have returned to its late-1800s to early-1900s status. They would most likely have lost Manchukuo, Korea, and have had to stop their invasion of China. This would have destroyed their economy and their ability to defend themselves, putting them at the mercy (once again) of the European nations and the US, and possibly the Soviet Union.

I have met a fair amount of resistance to this idea, all I can say is that if tomorrow the US (or any other modern high standard of living industrial nation) was suddenly cut off from oil: what would they do? I think that it is safe to say that the US and various European nations would go to war to regain access to oil.

 

[Tkdog]

While I don't know if the details are correct in this article it does seem to align with what I have read elsewhere about the difficulties with logistics on both sides. It gives a peek at what trying to set up an airfield on an atoll actually involved.


History Net article

 

[The Basket]

Japan. We want to invade other countries.

Britain. Wanna buy Battleships?

Japan. Sweet.

 

[michael rauls]

Hi guys,

There are a lot of interesting ideas posted in this thread (and no that is not my way of saying some or all of you are all nuts or anything like that).

I would again like to suggest that anyone interested in the war in the PTO read the following book:

"War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945" by Edward S. Miller, published by the United States Naval Institute, and by Shinchosa Ltd. in Japanese

Although it is primarily concerned with the US perspective, it also necessarily includes some of the aspects of Japanese thinking on the subject of taking control of various areas in the PTO.

One aspect closely relating to this thread's subject is that the Japanese high command never considered it feasible to invade Hawaii in any early operation, and impractical at a later date unless they could defeat the USN in a decisive final manner, in which case there would have been no need to invade.

Another aspect is that the US also considered it impractical to invade a similar Japanese target at a similar distance in any early operation. At the beginning of the war in the PTO , the US planners knew the US did not have enough force projection ability to have a reasonable chance of holding distant areas already under US control (such as the Philippines) let alone invade and hold other objectives at similar distance.

Contrary to popular myth (at least in the US) the Japanese government had no interest in going to war with the US, and their war planners never thought it likely (possible? yes, but not likely) that they would win a short war with the US. The Japanese war planners considered it a certainty that they would not win a sustained war with the US (barring devine intervention, pure luck, extreme US incompetence, etc.). The reason for Japan's willingness to start a war with the US, UK, and Dutch (at least at that point in time) rested solely on the fact that these countries had all ceased to supply oil to Japan. Even if the US alone had continued to supply oil to Japan, the Japanese high command would not have started a war at that point in time. The Japanese government knew that without oil the Japanese nation would have returned to its late-1800s to early-1900s status. They would most likely have lost Manchuko, Korea, and have had to stop their invasion of China. This would have destroyed their economy and their ability to defend themselves, putting them at the mercy (once again) of the European nations and the US, and possibly the Soviet Union.

I have met a fair amount of resistance to this idea, all I can say is that if tomorrow the US (or any other modern high standard of living industrial nation) was suddenly cut off from oil: what would they do? I think that it is safe to say that the US and various European nations would go to war to regain access to oil.

From what I've read anyway I agree but isn't the next layer to this that the reason that the western nations cut off the oil is the invasion of China and the abuses there.

 

[The Basket]

So if there was no embargo then Japan wouldn't be forced to go to war with the western powers.

So no embargo no Pearl Harbour.

 

[buffnut453]

So if there was no embargo then Japan wouldn't be forced to go to war with the western powers.

So no embargo no Pearl Harbour.

But without the embargo, Japan would have far greater freedom to operate in China, which would make any nation supplying oil to Japan complicit in the atrocities committed.

 

[Schweik]

While I don't know if the details are correct in this article it does seem to align with what I have read elsewhere about the difficulties with logistics on both sides. It gives a peek at what trying to set up an airfield on an atoll actually involved.


History Net article

Just to be clear, all of the Atolls and islands that I mentioned my theoretical Japanese war-plan already had (American made) airfields in 1942.

 

[Schweik]

But without the embargo, Japan would have far greater freedom to operate in China, which would make any nation supplying oil to Japan complicit in the atrocities committed.

It's quite complex - I highly recommend Dan Carlin's "Supernova in the East" series as a great introduction to the nuances of the situation. Japan had originally been opportunistic in China but over time they had kind of gotten stuck there with no easy way out. The US and others saw themselves as in the right to conduct the embargo but also didn't consider the Japanese as "one of them". The embargo was taking place in the absence of any kind of realistic diplomacy on either side that could have really de-escalated the situation.

It's kind of reminiscent of some of the same kind of things the US is doing today...

 

[Schweik]

When considering the humanitarian aspects of the US vis a vis China vs predatory Japan the previous history should also be kept in mind

http://www.fofweb.com/Electronic_Images/Maps/HMOF8-34-c.pdf

European powers, the US and Japan were all involved in quite predatory activities in China prior to WW2. We talk about the rape of Nanking but seldom discuss the Boxer Rebellion or the Opium Wars...

Boxer Rebellion - Wikipedia

Eight-Nation Alliance - Wikipedia

 

[RCAFson]

Also consider how badly the Japanese airgroups got mauled at Coral Sea and Midway. At Coral sea they faced what, 18 Wildcats per carrier, 36 total give or take. First strike on Midway caused the Japanese strike force 20% of their aircraft. They were opposed by 21 Buffaloes and 6 Wildcats flown by inexperienced marine pilots. Imagine if it had been 50 or 75 Wildcats with well trained navy pilots?

According to Lundstrom's First Team and Shattered Sword IJN losses to fighters against Midway were minimal, (~4 aircraft) with the majority of losses being from Midway AA:

The total casualties to the Midway strike force ( 121 aircraft ) was eleven aircraft lost, with another fourteen heavily damaged, and twenty-nine more shot up to some degree. Fully half the aircraft involved had been hit. Counting missing aircraft and those rendered out of commission, the mission had lost 23 percent of its strength in about thirty minutes of combat. Twenty aviators were dead or missing, and several more had been wounded.
(Shattered Sword)

 

[Schweik]

What battles / regions does First Team cover exactly?

 

[RCAFson]

What battles / regions does First Team cover exactly?

The two volumes of First Team covers all USN naval air combat in the PTO from Dec 1941 to Nov 1942.

 

[Schweik]

Gotcha. Have you ever looked at South Pacific Air War?

 

[RCAFson]

South Pacific Air War

No, but the latter two volumes dealing with carrier to carrier battles are not yet published, AFAIK.

 

[RCAFson]

An interesting twist is that the USN, in 1942, was periodically appealing for RN carrier support. However, the Allies big fear would be another IJN foray into the Indian Ocean.

 

[Barrett]

By a long-ago rough count, more than 90% of WW II phib ops succeeded.
But
they were largely allied.
IMO a Midway loss would ensure that Hawaii was untouchable. The global strategy game might have been affected (Torch leaps to mind) but as noted here, Japan did not have the sealift or the offensive capability to mount a corps-sized operation on Oahu. The empire was already spread thin on the Asian mainland and in the W Pacific.
And THAT is worth just what you paid for it!

Sidebar: there's been recent discussion about Germany seizing Britain, with next year's 80th anniversary of the BoB. Was extremely unlikely. Apart from "D-Day in reverse," the Wehrmacht had no bow-ramp landing craft, a puny navy within a day's sail of the RN (KM capital ships were delegated to diversions, I believe), and the need to seize some channel ports intact. That was, IMO, never gonna happen.

 

[uberdave]

I read this scenario somewhere. I think it was " If Mahan Ran the Great War". Oahu is too well defended to be captured easily. Instead of sending their troops to SE Asia/Phillipines, have the transports a safe safe distance behind the Pearl Harbor strike force. If the Pearl Harbor attack is not a success, the transports can withdraw with no losses.

If the attack is a success, invade one of the other islands (I believe Maui had a small airfield). Land a portion of the planes from the carrier strike force and keep Peal Harbor under attackI think that scenario could have worked if the Japanese had been bold enough.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan. We want to invade other countries.

Britain. Wanna buy Battleships?

Japan. Sweet.

Made sense at the time. Britain needed to recall its fleet to counter the Germans in Europe and was worried about growing Russian naval power in the Pacific. And of course Britain's shipbuilders were private companies seeking export business and foreign currency.

Had Britain refused to sell Japan battleships they would have bought them from the Germans, thus strengthening Germany's shipbuilding capability.

Back to aircraft, Britain is also responsible for the IJN air arm. William Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill - Wikipedia and Mitsubishi 1MF - Wikipedia. Had Britain refused that assistance there was no one else to help them.