Manstein:
Both your claims are wrong.
Manstein wasn't involved between 20-25 Nevomber at Stalingrad, he took command of the Heeresgruppe Don at 26 November.
His first radio to Paulus was: We will come to get get you out, make praparation that the Army can stroke south!
After that he criticised General Weichs hard for his orders (see above) to the 29 ID mot. at the 21 November!
At 19 December Manstein had done the very specific order to Paulus to make preparation that Wintergewitter (shake hands with Hoth) and Donnerschlag (break out of the 6th Army) can go hand in hand. He couldn't order Donnerschlag without Hitler but his plan was that Hitler would be overtaken by events.
At 19 December General Schulz Ia Heeresgruppe Don radioed again to General Schmidt Ia 6th Army to force Wintergewitter as soon as possible (without waiting of Hoth to reach the Businowka) with the preparation that Donneschlag can go hand in hand with Wintergewitter!
That was all what Manstein could do with his power, without to make a kind of suicide! He wanted absolutley the break out of the 6th Army!
What is a correct claim, that Manstein wanted at January 1943 that the 6th Army was fighting as long as possible to bind several soviet army's, but he wanted always the brake out of the 6th Army as long as it was possible (till 21-22 December)!
Manstein believed he could break into the encirclement with a moderate committment of forces. He grossly under-estimated the new abilities of the red army, and over-estimated the abilities of the heer to alter the situation.
Very wrong! That was alone Hitler's decission. Manstein wanted as much units as possible! Hitler denied more units from France, only the 6th Pz. Division and only Manstein personal intervention was helpfull to get the 17.Pz Div. later, after Hitler had denied this unit for days!
You are entitled to your opinion, however, I would point out that your statements are unsubstantiated opinion at this stage. As I have read material from good sources that back up the opinions I have expressed I will defer to those sources in preference to your unsubstantiated claims.
Principal sources I have used are Beevors book on Stalingrad, Hardesty's book on the Red Air Force, Haywards book on the defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1942-3 and some basic statistics from Costellos book on WWII statistics. Previously I have also used Bartovs book on the German Army as well, as well as the small book by Tsouras (strictly speaking he is just the editor....the authors are German officers) on German army operations on the East Front.
I am not going to post a comprehensive reply...we both know where that will end up, however just one observation...You claim that 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties (thats ten thousand) to the 23 November 1942. I cannot accept 10000 as a credible figure, and at home have source material that will give 6th Army casualties in a fair amount of detail. Typically, for the whole of the eastern front, the heer was running casualty rates of around 40% for its frontline formations, that is units were operating at 60% of their authorised strength...when the system was working correctly, there was a steady rotation of personnel to and from convalesence, with about 20% of the total casualty figures never able to return due to death, capture, excessive wounds and the like. One problem faced by the heer, as detailed in Halders Diary, is that in periods of heavy intensity casualties shipping out of units far exxeeded personnel returning to the front. I need to dig out his diary, but i recall Halder noting that at the time of Operation Typhoon, casualty rates were running at over 30000 per week, whilst returns were running at just 12000.
In Stalingrad, the system broke down....Germany even before the encirlclement was operating on overstretched lines of communication, with one effect being that the wounded tended to remain close to the front as there was simply not the transport to get them evacuated properly. Moreover the fighting at Stalingrad was exceptionally heavy, and that blanket estimate of 60% strength was greatly exceeded in the battle. Authorised strengths of most units were down to about 40% or less by the time of the battle. As to the claim of just 10000 casualties for the whole of 6th Army, I aasked my father, who was there and decorated twice. I asked him...."did the 6th Army suffer 10000 casualties to the 23 November?". He wants to know what you are smoking. He says that his division alone had suffered more than 10000 casualties by the time of the encirclement (from August through to November). He says he was one of the lucky ones.....he was wounded on the 24th and flown out of the pocket several days later.
Perhaps you meant 100000 which would still be too low but at least plausible
Also, claiming that military units on the Eastern Front were at 100% full strength is very unuaual. Any movement, any combat was bound to result in losses. In the advance from Minsk to Smolensk, apart from combat losses AGC suffered breakdown rates of up to 50% in its tank formations. Similar breakdown rates were suffered by the Motorized units. In the over-extended environment of Stalingrad, it is simply implausible that ANY unit however fresh would be at completely full strength. I have the unit history of the 29th at home will check its status as at 20 November and get back to you.