I think the Luftwaffe did very well considering the circumstances. I am sure they would have liked more maitenance technicians, more Ju 52 production and more spare engines but they didn't have these. The problem was making the commitment for airlift and then not rescinding it after it had been studied and after several highly respected officers (von Richthoffen) had said the process was impossible.
It seem it was thought that 1500 aircraft would be required to provide 500 sorties per day supplying 500-600 tons. The over supply of aircraft accounts for serviceabillity issues and combat damage. (Ju 52 had several gun stations for a reason, while DC-3 didn't have them for a reason as well).
Since 1500 aircraft and crew were not available it was attempted to shorten the distances involved and use less aircraft (below 500) flying multiple missions with heavier loads, something which would lead to congestion issues and meant the use of vulnerable airfields.
Winter starts could be extremely damaging to the engines and it seems Ju 52 crews arrived from Nth Africa had not been familiarised with cold starting procedures; something which worsened the engine situation.
I would say that if the Luftwaffes procurment program had of been managed better the Luftwaffe could have had more suitable transports.
If the Heinkel He 177 had of been a sucess in Early 1941 (eg as a He 177) production dedicated to FW-200s could have been turned over to transport use from the maritme partrol role.
He 111 and Do 217 production would also be wound back.
The FW 200 is a efficient transport when long distances are involved: it could just about carry 4 tons from Berlin to Stalingrad and almost fly back without refueling. It would fly faster and carry more load per crew member and reduce the need for pilots. The FW 200 had its faults but I would see them as being limmited and of great use in resupply of stalingrad and nth Africa. Due to its larger load capacity fewe trips would be required, therefore reducing congestion.
The Me 210 program was also a disaster that severely disrupted production of many types of aircraft and consumed resources.
Had the He 177 and Me 210 programs gone to schedule the Luftwaffe can likely afford considerably more transports.
The Ju 252 was simply not developing fast enough so the FW 200 would need to do.
An aircraft known as the Ar 232B likely would have provided a big boost in delivery. This aircraft had a STOL capabillity of 200m runway, less than 40% that of the Ju 52. Even a small number would have made a big difference.
In theory, in order to supply 500 tons of cargo using FW 200's some 125 sorties per day are required assuming 4 tons is carried. However in considerating of combat damage, accidents and general wear and tear one would assume at least twice this number are required perhaps 3 times. Some 125 sorties means one aircraft landing every 4 minutes if we assume 8n hours daylight. Ju 52's could only lift that quantity of cargo over very short distances which neccesitates double handling at combat zone airfields.
It seem it was thought that 1500 aircraft would be required to provide 500 sorties per day supplying 500-600 tons. The over supply of aircraft accounts for serviceabillity issues and combat damage. (Ju 52 had several gun stations for a reason, while DC-3 didn't have them for a reason as well).
Since 1500 aircraft and crew were not available it was attempted to shorten the distances involved and use less aircraft (below 500) flying multiple missions with heavier loads, something which would lead to congestion issues and meant the use of vulnerable airfields.
Winter starts could be extremely damaging to the engines and it seems Ju 52 crews arrived from Nth Africa had not been familiarised with cold starting procedures; something which worsened the engine situation.
I would say that if the Luftwaffes procurment program had of been managed better the Luftwaffe could have had more suitable transports.
If the Heinkel He 177 had of been a sucess in Early 1941 (eg as a He 177) production dedicated to FW-200s could have been turned over to transport use from the maritme partrol role.
He 111 and Do 217 production would also be wound back.
The FW 200 is a efficient transport when long distances are involved: it could just about carry 4 tons from Berlin to Stalingrad and almost fly back without refueling. It would fly faster and carry more load per crew member and reduce the need for pilots. The FW 200 had its faults but I would see them as being limmited and of great use in resupply of stalingrad and nth Africa. Due to its larger load capacity fewe trips would be required, therefore reducing congestion.
The Me 210 program was also a disaster that severely disrupted production of many types of aircraft and consumed resources.
Had the He 177 and Me 210 programs gone to schedule the Luftwaffe can likely afford considerably more transports.
The Ju 252 was simply not developing fast enough so the FW 200 would need to do.
An aircraft known as the Ar 232B likely would have provided a big boost in delivery. This aircraft had a STOL capabillity of 200m runway, less than 40% that of the Ju 52. Even a small number would have made a big difference.
In theory, in order to supply 500 tons of cargo using FW 200's some 125 sorties per day are required assuming 4 tons is carried. However in considerating of combat damage, accidents and general wear and tear one would assume at least twice this number are required perhaps 3 times. Some 125 sorties means one aircraft landing every 4 minutes if we assume 8n hours daylight. Ju 52's could only lift that quantity of cargo over very short distances which neccesitates double handling at combat zone airfields.