Could the Luftwaffe have done a better job supplying the 6th army at Stallingrad

[davebender]

I doubt it.

The objective of American Lend-Lease was to provide the Soviets with whatever their economy lacked. Take away Soviet oil and the USA will make up the shortfall. Just as the USA made up shortfalls in steel, explosives, aluminum, food and a whole lot of other stuff.

Furthermore German conquest of the Caucasus would almost certainly result in an American army and air force being committed to the Persian Gulf in order to safeguard that Lend-Lease route. By the fall of 1942 we had dozens of army divisions and army air corps units sitting idle so finding units for deployment would not be an issue. Stalin would get his wish to have the American Army in large scale ground combat vs Germany during 1942 or early 1943.

 

[Jenisch]

Exactly what I was thinking. Also, the Soviets probably would set fire in the oil fields, which would take many months to be extinguished. If they didn't, the Allies would probably bomb them from Soviet bases. An easy destruction of the highly inflammable land would be ensured. Apparently, Germany really didn't have any safety, if any mean at all, to obtain victory.

 

[davebender]

Not from Soviet bases. Stalin did everything possible to discourage American units from operating on Soviet territory. However Caucasus oil fields can be bombed from air bases located in British occupied Iran.

 

[parsifal]

There were more than twenty divisions in the US by the end of 1942, but only a very few of them were considered combat ready . Every time a division was worked up to combat readiness, it had to be broken up as cadres to form yet more Divisions. It took a very long time to work up the expanded US army because of its very small starting base.

Torch represented a major committment by the US army and was done only with the direct intervention by the CinC. The brass had wanted to continue its expansion of the army, rather than comitting any part of the army incompletely. a Torch style effort was about the maximum force committment the US could make at that time.

Operation Roundup was the code name for a 1942 plan for an invasion of northern France by Allied forces during World War II. The plan, for an invasion in the Spring of 1943, and drawn up by then-Brigadier General Dwight Eisenhower, reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe. The British were reluctant to commit to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the Battle of the Somme, they preferred to avoid a direct assault on a powerful enemy. Winston Churchill preferred a strategy of attacking German forces in the Mediterranean instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly"), while other British military leaders hoped to defer an invasion until the Germans had been worn down by fighting on the Russian front. more than anything, ROUNDUP was killed off by the crippling losses in shipping that had been suffered in 1942. Moreover, a division deployed into the Middle East needed roughly five times the shipping that a division deployed to britain would require. Given that ROUNDUP was unrealistic, and had proposed 48 divs in april 1943, and shiiping demands per div were five times greater for a division in the Middle East than into Europe, the maximum number of divs the US could commit would be less than 5.

The Brits had an army in the Middle East for this very purpose, relying on locally raised Indian Troops. The force was around 8 understrength divisions, includng 1 indian Armoured Div, under the aegis of the Indian 10th Army. Its orders were to defend the Middle eastern Oilk resources should the Germans break through in the Caucasus. Contingency plans were also to provide support the Indian 9th Army deployed in Palestine and the Levant against any German incursion by DAK into the Delta.

These two armies were later reorganized into the 12th Army Group. In 1941 they were known as PaIForce. They are often overlooked in "what if" assessments, but they made any ideas of a German domionance in the Middle east a pipe dream.

Getting back to ROUNDUP, given shortages of merchant shipping, landing craft, and other resources, the plan was unrealistic; it called for a force consisting of 48 divisions and 5800 aircraft, with a landing on broad beachheads between Boulogne and Le Havre.

As acompromise, and following a re-appraisal of Allied logistic capabilities in the latter half of 1942, , the decision was made to carry out Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa. Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch and preparations for Roundup were given lower priority due to the uncertainties of future Allied strategy. The British were as reluctant to fully abandon Roundup as they had been to commit to it, but in November 1942 Eisenhower told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.

 

[davebender]

took a very long time to work up the expanded US army because of its very small starting base

IMO that's a rather lame excuse.

German army expansion from 100,000 active duty (no reserves) to 36 divisions began during March 1935. Four years later German army expansion still had a long way to go but they were able to put dozens of divisions in the field for the invasion of Poland.

July 1939. U.S. Army Strength.
189,867 active duty.
310,000 National Guard and Army Reserve.

June 1940.
U.S. active duty enlisted strength increased to 375,000. A little over double from July 1939.

September 1940.
U.S. National Guard mobilized.

1940 U.S. Army goals.
1 million man army by 1 Jan 1941.
1.4 million man army by July 1941.
.....27 infantry divisions.
.....4 armored divisions.
.....2 cavalry divisions.
.....54 combat air groups.

December 1941.
U.S. Army strength reaches 1,647,477.

December 1942.
U.S. Army strength reaches 5,397,674.

It's easy to see why Stalin thought we should have a couple armies in Europe during 1942. We had plenty of divisions. If they weren't trained two years after the 1940 mobilization then someone wasn't doing his job.

 

[Juha]

Guys, I don't want to start an alternative history discussion here, but in your opinions Germany could have defeated the Soviets if taked Stalingrad and subsequentely the oil fields? Germany would have logistical capabilities for this? (in certain way this is inside the topic)

No, because Germans would not have been able to keep them during the winter 42/43.

Juha

 

[Shortround6]

IMO that's a rather lame excuse.

It's easy to see why Stalin thought we should have a couple armies in Europe during 1942. We had plenty of divisions. If they weren't trained two years after the 1940 mobilization then someone wasn't doing his job.

Germans had about a 9 year jump on the US Army in expanding. Raw figures do not tell the whole story. How much of the US army of the '30s' was coastal artillery? the German Luftwaffe was much larger than the USAAC for most of the 30s. the Germans built many more tanks than the US did during the 30s. Granted they were MK Is and IIs but you have to have something to train WITH. US production of the 105 Howitzer doesn't start until 1940. US was short of heavy weapons and even it's basic infantry rifle. M-1 grands were in short supply in 1941-42. Springfield's and Enfield's made up the difference but without a proper LMG the US squads would have been in trouble. Throwing US divisions into the war much earlier than was done would have accomplished little but showing that the US was willing to sacrifice thousands of troops to "support" Uncle Joe, with no real strategic gain.
The US was also a bit too obsessed with numbers. They kept breaking up trained units to form cadres for multiple new units.

 

[Just Schmidt]

Guys, I don't want to start an alternative history discussion here, but in your opinions Germany could have defeated the Soviets if taked Stalingrad and subsequentely the oil fields? Germany would have logistical capabilities for this? (in certain way this is inside the topic)

Stricktly speaking the immidiate problems for the Germans was that they didn't possess forces or logistics to take both Srtalingrad and the oil in the Caucasus region.

My earlier post might give the impression that a german Victory at Stalingrad could have won the war for them, if so it gives the wrong impression. In and by itself stalingrad was of minor importance, the best course of action woulkd probably have been to maski the city and pour all offensive assets into the southern drive. But there's no guarantee that would have led to success.

If it led to success, and if Germany could have consolidated this gain (they just might have, though I doubt it), USSR would have been in a weakened postion.

They would have less oil, but this could have been alleviated through lend-lease.

This lend-lease in itself would have been hampered as most of the lease through Persia would have been cut off.

It would have been possible for the germans to improve their supply of petrol, although how much and how soon is open to question.

On the other hand (providing Turkey remained neutral) german forces at the Caspian sea and in the Caucasus would have nightmarish supply lines, only to be partly offset IF turkey joining the axis.

Still I don't think they would have defeated the USSR. Had they succeeded they would still only have reached (approximately) one of the three points on the AAA line which they (according to shedule) should have reached six weeks after july 22 1941. IMHO the war effectivelyt was lost when the Wehrmacht stalled in front of Moscow, at the wery latest.

 

[davebender]

german forces at the Caspian sea and in the Caucasus would have nightmarish supply lines

Why?

There are good rail lines extending into the Caucasus from Germany. Certainly better then what an Anglo-American army operating from northern Iran would have.

 

[Just Schmidt]

Why?

There are good rail lines extending into the Caucasus from Germany. Certainly better then what an Anglo-American army operating from northern Iran would have.

Because with the rail line through Stalingrad unavailable, there is only one line into the Caucasus (with Rostov as obvious chokepoint), and Germany is a long way off. Railways elsewher3e in Russia didn't always suffice. Routes through Perrsia were good enough to handle 30 % of lend lease in 43 (Evan Mawdsley "Thunder In The East" page 192), and at the wery time of Stalingrad it was decided to "upgrade" the supply route from the Persian Gulf (ibid).

Not that I would expect much heavy fighting (but upkeep in itself would pose some demands on supply), the most likely scenario is an outflank of the region from the north against Rostov. If western allies would have prioritised a front in Persia and didn't have sufficient land routes available, they would have far better prospects of arial supply here than the Germans at Stalingrad, although to the detriment of other areas (probably Burma and China).

 

[davebender]

Tunnels and bridges on the new Iranian rail line are much better choke points. Germany just needs an airfield within Ju-88 or Me-410 range.

 

[iron man]

Stricktly speaking the immidiate problems for the Germans was that they didn't possess forces or logistics to take both Srtalingrad and the oil in the Caucasus region.
IMO? They didn't have the logistic capability to take either...
My earlier post might give the impression that a german Victory at Stalingrad could have won the war for them, if so it gives the wrong impression. In and by itself stalingrad was of minor importance, the best course of action woulkd probably have been to maski the city and pour all offensive assets into the southern drive. But there's no guarantee that would have led to success.
But how to support it? The closest railhead that was converted/upgraded to DRG (Reichsbahn Ost) standards in November of 1942 was at Stalino.
If it led to success, and if Germany could have consolidated this gain (they just might have, though I doubt it), USSR would have been in a weakened postion.
Not a hope of this happening...to address to question in the OP? The reason the Airlift into Stalingrad failed had a lot to do with the FACT that the Luftwaffe's air transport assets were already HEAVILY engaged supplying Heer and Luftwaffe combat assets in the Caucasus push, in addition to the needs of Luftwaffe combat units operating in the Don bend area (i.e. the fuel/spares needs of JG3 and JG52 at Pitomnik. All of this supply was being moved from the above noted railhead to the airfields by truck, rehandled onto aircraft, and subsequently flown in to those who were screaming the loudest at the moment. Reichsbahn Ost had expressed grave reservations about their ability to properly support Fall Blau when the planning was underway in the Spring of 1942. Another poster made note of the reservations expressed by von Richthofen (et al) /I] regarding the possibility of delivering on Jeschonnek's impulsive promises? They already knew they were overtaxed (as it were) and with the weather quickly turning, it was only going to get tougher to keep the sortie numbers up.

They would have less oil, but this could have been alleviated through lend-lease.
The "shoe was on the other foot" by this point in time. What of the forces that conducted the Uranus operation? You don't have to be a genius to see that the Germans were severely overstretched as it was. So they decide to establish a defensive line on the Don and "go for it" in the South? I see a massive Soviet offensive directed on the Rostov axis cutting the German salient off. Such an outcome would make the "Stalingrad" losses look like a pimple on the *ss of an elephant.

This lend-lease in itself would have been hampered as most of the lease through Persia would have been cut off.
Only in another universe; IOTL?
It would have been possible for the germans to improve their supply of petrol, although how much and how soon is open to question.
Maybe 18 months down the road once they managed to put the fields back into production and sorted out the logistics (tankers/pipelines) to get the crude across the Black Sea to the mouth of the Danube so they could trans ship it to Romania for refining.
On the other hand (providing Turkey remained neutral) german forces at the Caspian sea and in the Caucasus would have nightmarish supply lines, only to be partly offset IF turkey joining the axis.
They already HAD "nightmarish" supply lines...
Still I don't think they would have defeated the USSR. Had they succeeded they would still only have reached (approximately) one of the three points on the AAA line which they (according to shedule) should have reached six weeks after july 22 1941. IMHO the war effectivelyt was lost when the Wehrmacht stalled in front of Moscow, at the wery latest.
Well at last we agree on something (or maybe we've been in agreement all along? 8) ). Barbarossa failed on logistics, so did Blau.

Cheers!

 

[parsifal]

Why?

There are good rail lines extending into the Caucasus from Germany. Certainly better then what an Anglo-American army operating from northern Iran would have.

Not in 1942, at least in working condition. After the abortive Soviet offensive that captured Kharkov in the winter of 41-2, the supply heads for AGS were pushed back several hundred miles. The German Rail Authority was already struggling in the east to keep frontline units supplied by that time, and complete the repairs to the Soviet rail system. Germany had started the war in Russia short of both rolling stock and prime movers, and had found much of its German locomotives and carriages unsuitable for the eastern front. These problems were eventually solved, by modification to both the rolling stock and the trains, but such work was slow. The states of many bridges and rail lines in Russia were found to be extremely poor, and the captured equipment fell apart very raipdly.

All of these problems were eventaually solved, but it all took time, and time was something germany did not have. moreover the stockpiles of supplies needed to repair or replace sections of track, install water and coaling stations, develop marshalling yards and the like had been basically used up in the 1941 campaign. Replacement supplies of this kind were slow in being produced and brought to the front where needed. moreover the German State Railways were beginning to suffer the first of their acute manpower shortages. They attempted to remedy this by employing local labour, but this proved rather abortive and unsuccessful.

The result of all this was that the advances achieved under Fall blau were not matched by a repair and re-gauging effort much beyond the start lines. This is one reason why Stalingrad, and the advance of 1Pz and 17 Army into the Caucasus became logistic nightmares for the Germans. The rail lines that you are relying on were there, damaged and inoperable, and they basically remained as such until recaptured by the Russians in the winter of 42-3. After the capture of the oilfields in Maikop, the German Supply Ministry (I think it was them) undertook an investigation and found that the oil wells were so badly damaged, it would take an estimated 2-3 years to restore them back to production, and would have required the diversion of military supply arriving by rail into the TO to the tune of a reduction of military traffic by an estimated 50% (I will confirm that figure tonite). Since military supply traffic on ASGS never exceeded 70% of estimated requirements, that means that the whole AG would have needed to reduce its daily military supply expenditursres to about 35% of what it thought it actually required, in order to restore these lines and network to anything like operational condition, and restore the economic infrastructure to working order. In other words, whilst Germany remained locked in combat with the USSR in major operations, it was impossible to extend the working rail network much beyond what it already was.

By comparison, the effort put into uprading the Iranian and Persian rail networks is generally unknown, and really quite astonishing. India has a rolling stock reserve bigger than the whole of Germany at this time, and in 1942 something like 45%of Indian rolling stock was moved to Persia for supply operations to support the Russians. The Americans provided very significant levels of prime movers to haul this rolling stock. Vast numbers of railway workers were shipped out from the US to build up the persian rail network. It was an effort far bigger than the Germans were capable of in Southern Russia at that time. The fact that the transfer of the Indian rolling stock probably was a major cause of the 43 famine in bengal (where more than 2million people perished from starvation) is worth noting, but not really relevant to the issue. There is just no way that the germans, despite operating on interior lines could match the logistic effort mounted by the allies into persia in 42-3, neither could a few well placed bombs make much difference, or cause delay to the re-supply activities. The Persian route for Lend lease was far bigger than the murmansk run, and this was a massive effort in itself.

 

[Jenisch]

Not in 1942, at least in working condition. After the abortive Soviet offensive that captured Kharkov in the winter of 41-2, the supply heads for AGS were pushed back several hundred miles. The German Rail Authority was already struggling in the east to keep frontline units supplied by that time, and complete the repairs to the Soviet rail system. Germany had started the war in Russia short of both rolling stock and prime movers, and had found much of its German locomotives and carriages unsuitable for the eastern front. These problems were eventually solved, by modification to both the rolling stock and the trains, but such work was slow. The states of many bridges and rail lines in Russia were found to be extremely poor, and the captured equipment fell apart very raipdly.

All of these problems were eventaually solved, but it all took time, and time was something germany did not have. moreover the stockpiles of supplies needed to repair or replace sections of track, install water and coaling stations, develop marshalling yards and the like had been basically used up in the 1941 campaign. Replacement supplies of this kind were slow in being produced and brought to the front where needed. moreover the German State Railways were beginning to suffer the first of their acute manpower shortages. They attempted to remedy this by employing local labour, but this proved rather abortive and unsuccessful.

The result of all this was that the advances achieved under Fall blau were not matched by a repair and re-gauging effort much beyond the start lines. This is one reason why Stalingrad, and the advance of 1Pz and 17 Army into the Caucasus became logistic nightmares for the Germans. The rail lines that you are relying on were there, damaged and inoperable, and they basically remained as such until recaptured by the Russians in the winter of 42-3. After the capture of the oilfields in Maikop, the German Supply Ministry (I think it was them) undertook an investigation and found that the oil wells were so badly damaged, it would take an estimated 2-3 years to restore them back to production, and would have required the diversion of military supply arriving by rail into the TO to the tune of a reduction of military traffic by an estimated 50% (I will confirm that figure tonite). Since military supply traffic on ASGS never exceeded 70% of estimated requirements, that means that the whole AG would have needed to reduce its daily military supply expenditursres to about 35% of what it thought it actually required, in order to restore these lines and network to anything like operational condition, and restore the economic infrastructure to working order. In other words, whilst Germany remained locked in combat with the USSR in major operations, it was impossible to extend the working rail network much beyond what it already was.

By comparison, the effort put into uprading the Iranian and Persian rail networks is generally unknown, and really quite astonishing. India has a rolling stock reserve bigger than the whole of Germany at this time, and in 1942 something like 45%of Indian rolling stock was moved to Persia for supply operations to support the Russians. The Americans provided very significant levels of prime movers to haul this rolling stock. Vast numbers of railway workers were shipped out from the US to build up the persian rail network. It was an effort far bigger than the Germans were capable of in Southern Russia at that time. The fact that the transfer of the Indian rolling stock probably was a major cause of the 43 famine in bengal (where more than 2million people perished from starvation) is worth noting, but not really relevant to the issue. There is just no way that the germans, despite operating on interior lines could match the logistic effort mounted by the allies into persia in 42-3, neither could a few well placed bombs make much difference, or cause delay to the re-supply activities. The Persian route for Lend lease was far bigger than the murmansk run, and this was a massive effort in itself.

That's why some people, specially from the wartime, belived that the multi front war cost Germany the defeat. They simply didn't have the capability to maintein the fight against all their enemies.

 

[iron man]

Not in 1942, at least in working condition. After the abortive Soviet offensive that captured Kharkov in the winter of 41-2, the supply heads for AGS were pushed back several hundred miles. The German Rail Authority was already struggling in the east to keep frontline units supplied by that time, and complete the repairs to the Soviet rail system. Germany had started the war in Russia short of both rolling stock and prime movers, and had found much of its German locomotives and carriages unsuitable for the eastern front. These problems were eventually solved, by modification to both the rolling stock and the trains, but such work was slow. The states of many bridges and rail lines in Russia were found to be extremely poor, and the captured equipment fell apart very raipdly.

All of these problems were eventaually solved, but it all took time, and time was something germany did not have. moreover the stockpiles of supplies needed to repair or replace sections of track, install water and coaling stations, develop marshalling yards and the like had been basically used up in the 1941 campaign. Replacement supplies of this kind were slow in being produced and brought to the front where needed. moreover the German State Railways were beginning to suffer the first of their acute manpower shortages. They attempted to remedy this by employing local labour, but this proved rather abortive and unsuccessful.

The result of all this was that the advances achieved under Fall blau were not matched by a repair and re-gauging effort much beyond the start lines. This is one reason why Stalingrad, and the advance of 1Pz and 17 Army into the Caucasus became logistic nightmares for the Germans. The rail lines that you are relying on were there, damaged and inoperable, and they basically remained as such until recaptured by the Russians in the winter of 42-3. After the capture of the oilfields in Maikop, the German Supply Ministry (I think it was them) undertook an investigation and found that the oil wells were so badly damaged, it would take an estimated 2-3 years to restore them back to production, and would have required the diversion of military supply arriving by rail into the TO to the tune of a reduction of military traffic by an estimated 50% (I will confirm that figure tonite). Since military supply traffic on ASGS never exceeded 70% of estimated requirements, that means that the whole AG would have needed to reduce its daily military supply expenditursres to about 35% of what it thought it actually required, in order to restore these lines and network to anything like operational condition, and restore the economic infrastructure to working order. In other words, whilst Germany remained locked in combat with the USSR in major operations, it was impossible to extend the working rail network much beyond what it already was.

By comparison, the effort put into uprading the Iranian and Persian rail networks is generally unknown, and really quite astonishing. India has a rolling stock reserve bigger than the whole of Germany at this time, and in 1942 something like 45%of Indian rolling stock was moved to Persia for supply operations to support the Russians. The Americans provided very significant levels of prime movers to haul this rolling stock. Vast numbers of railway workers were shipped out from the US to build up the persian rail network. It was an effort far bigger than the Germans were capable of in Southern Russia at that time. The fact that the transfer of the Indian rolling stock probably was a major cause of the 43 famine in bengal (where more than 2million people perished from starvation) is worth noting, but not really relevant to the issue. There is just no way that the germans, despite operating on interior lines could match the logistic effort mounted by the allies into persia in 42-3, neither could a few well placed bombs make much difference, or cause delay to the re-supply activities. The Persian route for Lend lease was far bigger than the murmansk run, and this was a massive effort in itself.

Martin Van Crevald + Alfred Meiezejewski = The Reality of Reichsbahn Ost. Thanks for the "like"; back at ya!

Cheers, Ron

 

[parsifal]

That's why some people, specially from the wartime, belived that the multi front war cost Germany the defeat. They simply didn't have the capability to maintein the fight against all their enemies.

The Germans had plenty of fight, but their logistics capability was limited. The germans, as they moved further and further from Germany had greater and greater difficulty in supplying their forces.

Because of this the germans were never going to progress beyond regional power status, whereas the US was in a whole different category. In '42, the US was recovering from the shipping losses it had suffered at the hands of the U_Boats, but once this problem had been overcome, the US ability to project is military power worldwide was unmatched by anyone.

 

[parsifal]

Martin Van Crevald + Alfred Meiezejewski = The Reality of Reichsbahn Ost. Thanks for the "like"; back at ya!

Cheers, Ron

Thanks....that was the book I was trying to remember..... Hayward has a bit of a summary as well on this issue

 

[Just Schmidt]

Yes, I think we are in basic agreement.

My post was an 'even if' scenario. I tried (with reservations) to show that only a string of 'miracles' would get the Germans to Baku, and that even this wouldn't be enough. I didn't meen to imply that I saw it as realistic.

 

[Just Schmidt]

Tunnels and bridges on the new Iranian rail line are much better choke points. Germany just needs an airfield within Ju-88 or Me-410 range.

Hawing travelled by train from Narvik through Kiruna I shall freely admit that railroads through mountainous regions can seem very vulnerable, and frankly I don't possess the relevant data for a detailed comparision between these supply lines to a highly hypothetical front in Persia (and therefore I'm gratefull for Parcifals post #93). An (unlikely) german drive into Persia would have ment that soon the Germans would have this tenious link in their rear, equally open to attack from (say) B 25's and P 38's. It dosn't make the distance back to Germany any shorter either.

Even IF the german rail line was theoretically the best of the two, that dosn't prove it was sufficient to their (again hypothetical) needs.

Rostov as choke point was ment in the logistic and strategic sense.

But all of this is becoming a derailment of the post that stated this thread.

 

[davebender]

I don't see that happening. The Caucasus Mountains form a natural barrier between Iran and the Soviet Union. If Germany can hold the Caucasus region that's where the front line is likely to stabilize.

The Luftwaffe would have airfields north of the mountains. Britain and the USA would have airfields south of the mountains. Britain and the USA would have a lot more bombers and those bombers have more range. However German Me-410s and Ju-88s can bomb a lot more accurately. Not sure how that would play out as they attempt to destroy each others rail lines.