Could the Luftwaffe survive against Allied attacks if the USSR had been defeated?

Could the Luftwaffe survive after 1943 if it faced only the US/UK airforces?


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If Stalin escaped, he would be probably in Siberia with the partisans. However with all lend-lease cut off {especially trucks!}, once the factories in the Urals fall the Soviets are without artillery, aircraft, tanks ans short on ammo.

The Germans never had a fleet involved in the Med {other than subs}. The Kreigsmarine in Norway would still be facing the British. If the Axis capture Suez intact, the Italian fleet would then be facing the British fleet in the Indian Ocean {4 "R' class BB's + Cv's Formidable, Indomitable} If Suez is impassable then the Italian fleet would be stuck in the Med unless Gibraltar falls. By 1942 the Italian fleet is somewhat weaker, due to sinkings at Taranto, and a couple of BB's hit by British subs. Going against Gibraltar would be a very risky proposition for the rather timid Italian Naval command, especially without a CV
 
Hi Parmigiano,

>I don't think that the 262 would have been esential in 42 or 43, the prop jobs were very effective against bombers until the long range P51 were available in numbers. If the LW had available almost the double of 109 and 190 to hold the few months between the P51 menace and the time when the 262 was in operation, they could have done the job.

An interesting question is how the raw materials available from a conquered Soviet Union would have affected the Me 262 development and production timetable.

The lack of certain materials - such as tungsten, chromium and nickel - was the main reason for the delay in getting the Me 262 into service, and if these materials could be provided from Russian sources, the historically fateful delays perhaps could have been avoided or minimized.

The Jumo 004A engine went into small-scale series production in 1942 (40 examples ordered), and while it was not as mature as the later Jumo 004B-2, being somewhat heavier and slightly less powerful, it had made a successful 100-hour run in 1943 (and in late 1942 it had even been bench-tested with an afterburner, by the way).

The work that resulted in the Jumo 004B was begun in early 1943, and it first flew in the Me 262 in October of the same year. As the main difficulties encountered with the Jumo 004B were caused by the problems resulting from insufficient supplies of temperature-resistant materials (that had been used liberally in the Jumo 004A engines), it appears that it might have been possible to save some six to nine months in getting the jets into combat, provided that these materials could have been supplied by newly conquered sources in the Soviet Union.

(I'm relying on Müller's "Junkers Flugtriebwerke" here.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
What was the dynamic of the air war in the last half of 1943? {June - Dec} Were the German fighters superior to the long-range Thunderbolt Mustang?

I don't believe the long-range P-51 started ops until Dec 43 / Jan 44 after Black Thursday. So in that time frame it would be P-38s, P-47s and Spits, right?
 
I don't believe the long-range P-51 started ops until Dec 43 / Jan 44 after Black Thursday. So in that time frame it would be P-38s, P-47s and Spits, right?

P38's in the UK started ops in November 1943.

They also were flying in the Med since the "Torch" invasion.

And anyway you want to slice it .... the P38 flying over Germany was a mortal danger to the LW. it was a threat they couldnt ignore.
 
P38's in the UK started ops in November 1943.

They also were flying in the Med since the "Torch" invasion.

And anyway you want to slice it .... the P38 flying over Germany was a mortal danger to the LW. it was a threat they couldnt ignore.

So presumably the p-38's that were sent to the Med would be in the UK instead. How many squadrons were there? Did they have the range to reach Germany?
 
The early P-38's had a range (on 300 US gal internal) of ~900 mi with ~1,750 mi with 2x 165 US gal drop tanks.

They had problem though, the lack of cockpit heating heating could be a considerable hinderance for the pilot at high altitudes (particularly in the cold skies of Norther Europe). There were some engine problems (possibly fuel or maintenence related, sometimes overcooling of the radiators too) and problems with the turbochargers at high alt. The intercoolers in the wing LE were inadequate to allow full combat power at altitude (designed for 1,150 hp). And of course there were the compressibility issues.

All models (prior to the boosted ailerons on the late P-38J's) suffered from mediocre roll performance, and prior to the addition of maneuvering flaps on the P-38G also had rather poor turn rate. (the flaps, combined with an increased in engine power gave the P-38G roughle double the sustained turn rate of the P-38F)


The P-38 was the best climbing fighter the US had at the time though, and was slightly longer ranged than the contemporary P-47's. (and significantly longer ranged than the P-47's w/out wing tank capability)

The P-47 pre-D-25 (with 305 US gal) had ranges of ~800-850 mi clean, and the max extenal fuel carried on the belly was a 200 long US gal semi-conformal laminated paper tank that was not well liked. And even then it would only allow ~1,400 mi max range.

Once they started getting wing pylons standard (some were modified in the field, but it was a long and time consuming process, particularly with the necessary plumbing for wing tanks) the 200 gal ferry tank was not used at all. (though a 200 gal flat steel belly tank was introduced later in the war) With the wing pylons they could carry 150 US gal under each wing plus one 75 or 110 gal belly tank. This allowed a max "yardstick" range of ~1,850 mi with 410 gal external, and a max combat radius of ~600 mi. (which would allow a maximum of only ~15 min at combat power with 30 min reserve at cruise power -assuming tanks are dropped at start of combat-)

I believe the early P-38's had nearly double that combat time at similar ranges.

The first P-38Js' range decreased a bit as they still had only 300 US gal capasity (and it was a bit less fuel efficient than it's predicessors, due in part to the increased drag of the new "chin" intercooler/oil cooler intakes), but this was quickly mitigated by a 62 gal tank added to the LE of each wing.(where the intercoolers had prevously been) This increased internal capacity to 424 US gallons and max range (on internal fuel) to ~1,200 mi.


Starting with the P-47D-25 internal capacity was increased by 65 gal to 370 US gal allowing a max range of 1,050 mi on internal fuel. But this model was introduced after the P-51 began taking over escort duties.


By comparison the ealr P-51's (B's and C's w/out fuse tank) ranged ~950 mi on internal fuel. (with fuse tank ~1,350 mi, though part of the fuse tank had to be used up before being stable for combat)
Also range figures for models with the V-1650-7 seem to be significantly lower (over 100 mi) than those with the 1650-3.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p-51-tactical-chart.jpg
 
Are you talking "yardstick range" or useful combat range? (since the P-38 could carry 2x 300 gal drop tanks -and did in the PTO it's "yardstick" or max ferry range, far exceeded its useful combat range)


I was comparing the early (pre J) P-38's (with 300 gal) to the contemporary P-47's (305 gal). Those P-38's might be able to get anothe 100 mi combat radius than the P-47 (with wing tanks), but probably not much more than that. Granted 100 mi, was probably poorly described as "slightly longer."

Now, the P-38J's (with 424 gal) were capable considderably larger combat radii than the pre-D-25 P-47's with the P-38 now having ~350-400 mi advantage (the J being introduced some time before the P-47D-25). However, the D-25 closed this gap somewhat again. (with the P-38's lead down to ~100-150 mi)

(again I'm atempting to compare useful combat radius, not range)

And I'm nt getting into the P-47N...
 
Does anyone have information on the numbers types of US aircraft? How many P-47's P-38's were available in the ETO in June/July of 1943? {including MTO}

And how did the P-38 match up against the FW-190? losses even? Or 60/40 in favor of the US?
 
Hi Koolkitty,

>and prior to the addition of maneuvering flaps on the P-38G also had rather poor turn rate. (the flaps, combined with an increased in engine power gave the P-38G roughle double the sustained turn rate of the P-38F)

What's your source on this?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Another thing, if Russia was beaten by '43, wouldn't this also mean then more of Luftwaffe's Top Guns (Aces that was killed on the Eastern Front) would be fighting over Western Europe, and also train more green pilots, I'm sure that this would cause more headache for 8th and 9th Air Force....
 
Don't forget the massive increase in AAA (incl. airfield protection), maintenance crews etc...

The main difference would be on the ground though, I doubt any invasion would've been possible for a long, long time.

I guess eventually day time bombing campaigns would've stopped due to non-satisfactory ratio of effect to losses. This was discussed in 1943 even without any German victory in the east in sight.
 
Does anyone have information on the numbers types of US aircraft? How many P-47's P-38's were available in the ETO in June/July of 1943? {including MTO}

And how did the P-38 match up against the FW-190? losses even? Or 60/40 in favor of the US?

First - the P-38, until the late J and L were not a great match for either the Fw 190 or Me 109 in a turning fight. It was also handicapped at high altitude in that it quickly entered compressibility in a dive - so the 109/190 could evade by diving.

The 56th FG brought the first P-47s to UK in February 1943, followed by the 78th and the re-equip of the 4th by March 1943

The 82nd FG had P-38 in Oct 1942 but transferred to 12th AF in Dec 1942. The other P-38 Groups that were active included the 14th (oct 42) in 12AF in North Africa. In the PTO the 35th and 49th FG were equipped with P-38's in operations in April/May 1943.

The 348th FG had 47's in PTO at same time.

None of the 9th AF P-47s were in UK at that time but the 'flood' started in summer to re-equip most front line FG with either P-38G/H or P-47C/D's

The P-38 still had a lot of value on Long Range Escort simply because of it's presence - stall a great deterrent of T/E fighters of all types and it's great speed and climb at 25000 feet still made it formidable against the Fw 190 and Me 109 if used properly.

I think the net effect would have been to shift from 12th AF and PTO to ETO for all the P-38's and continue using the less capable P-40 for MTO and PTO, replacing with P-38s as production continued to ramp up.

There would have been more USAAF Fighter losses engaging larger LW forces, but more P-38s would have meant far fewer losses to the Me 110/210/410s than experienced from Aug 1943 to March 1944.
 
I haven't posted any comments on this issue until now.

I don't think that a Russian surrender was ever likely, but a temporary ceasefire may have been possible. All this talk about a Russian surrender is a gross westernized misunderstanding of how the Russians think. The deeper you penetrated Russia, the more intractable their psyche becomes, the Russians would never have surrendered, although they would have sort a temporary ceasefire. Moreover the ground east of Gorki rapidly descends into dense swampy forests, almost totally devoid of roads, and completely unsuited to a war of maneuver.

Admittedly the capture of Leningrad, Moscow, the Caucasus and Stalingrad would deal a heavy blow, but instead of fighting with an average of 600 Divisions, they would fight with 300. The eastern front would scale down in importance, but would never quieten down. Moreover, in 1941, the British had promised to intervene on the ground with British troops on the eastern front. The Americans would also have committed to a united effort on the eastern front, with surplus Lend lease (now that the Russians were only half as strong as they were historically, being poured into India, to raise an additional 70 or so Divisions from the subcontinent. This had been envisaged, but never implemented because of equipment shortages, and because these troops were never needed. The most obvious place where these troops would be used would be on the southern front in the Caucasus. Along with the fully implemented Marshal Mobilization plan, which envisaged a full 200 divs taking to the field by 1943 (albeit not completely trained), and assuming that a quid pro quo somewhere exists, that probably would see less shipping in the pacific (and no counteroffensive) so that more can be poured into the ETO, I think a wavering Russia spells big trouble for Germany.

As for this notion that oil would be enhanced, and that Luftwaffe training could be moved east, thats a complete pipe dream. With the front line moved approximately 1000 kms further east than it reached historically, the German logistics system would have been in total melt down. They lacked the rolling stock to keep the armies in their historical positions, what lesser chance would they have if the front was even further from home. As for the economic resources of the occupied territories, well this too was never able to be exploited, again because of the breakdown in the German supply systems. The only hope for Germany was to secure a negotiated settlement with the Russians. The distances and the terrain, along with the Russian attitudes would ensure that outright surrender was never going to happen.....
 
Parsifal, I was thinking the same thing. I don't think surrender would be a good term. More like a cease-fire as you said with concessions. Maybe some territories under German control or access to industries or something similar.

But that would be hard with Nazi ideaology. Which leaves no surrender, no cease-fire, just all out war.
 

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