Could the P51A have been made available to the defenders at the Battle of Midway?

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I agree. it took me a while to isolate what was there on 6/4/42.
not sure yet if I got it all. I think the infantry force eamounted to the 6th defense battalion reinforced by the two raider companies, not to mention all the auxiliary units for air and coast artillery defense, and the air echelon.

It's not at all clear to me that any contemporary USAAF or USN aircraft supplanting an equal number of USMC F2A-3s would have done much better. This may seem a heretical view but with a few exceptions, US air forces were getting their butts kicked throughout the first three quarters of 1942. As much due to tactics as equipment shortcomings. Didn't the P-51A have the same engine as the P-40E? Would the performance difference in a Zero dominated fur ball be that overwhelming as to make a significant difference. I just wonder if the US wasn't on such a steep learning curve that the equipment played a subordinate role to tactical deficiencies. The F2A certainly came out of the battle with a tarnished reputation but was its performance that much worse than that of the P-40E and Hurricanes in the Far East in the early months?
 
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oldcrowcv63 said:
once the IJN carriers were out of the picture, it would have been a very tough nut to crack
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In addition to the carriers that Striking Force had 4 battleships, 9 cruisers, and 34 destroyers, as well as transports and supply ships. Are we at least in agreement they could easily have taken that island had the attack gone as planned and our task forces hadn't shown up and turned them back?
 
It seems to me that it would have proved costly to the IJN but I don't know how much emplacement hardening the USMC defenders had been able to accomplish in the 7 or so months since the island was fortified, That seems to me to be an important consideration. THe marines on Guadalcanal took an awful pounding from just two IJN Battleships and the area to be covered on the Henderson field beachhead was probably much larger so losses weren't likely to have been as heavy as on Midway. I have read at least one (novelized history) account that implies naval gunfire would have been sufficient to pulverize the defenders ability to resist. I don't know how much the IJN forces, tied to the island, would have been attritted by night and day air attacks by radar equipped PBYs and B-17s from Hawaii. That might have made the cost too high for them to persist in the effort.

If the core marine force alone was pitted against just the IJN landing party I expect the island could not have been taken. I expect the IJN learned a lesson from Wake although the Ichiki regiment's attack on Guadalcanal suggests perhaps not as much as might be expected.
 
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I don't have much confidence that B-17s would be any threat to the invasion fleet at Midway. Did the B-17 ever hit a ship at sea, at any time in WW2 ?
Though I won't discount the PBY. The only air launched torpedo to hit a Japanese ship in the whole Battle of Midway was dropped from a PBY.
 
I think we have to factor in we still had task force remaining in those waters when they made the decision they were licked and turned back. Certainly they could have pressed on without any aircraft, but it would have been really dumb, and in that close proximity to our main base at Pearl, as well. In short, that operation depended on their catching us by surprise. Had they achieved that, I don't think there's any question, they'd have succeeded and occupied that island. Midway on its own I don't think could have withstood that onslaught, had it gone as planned.
 

Oh yes, I wasn't counting on the actual USN scenario, just one where the USN CVs were out of the picture. With essentially 60+ surviving SBDs on hand to harass an invading force, I don't see the IJN being able to pull off an invasion. Also, the Sara was coming up to the front with an oversized air wing including a good number of new TBFs IIRC. I suspect the superstructure of many major combatants would have been wrecked during the invasion attempt, and most transports sent to the bottom. Also, with so many F4F-4s and their enhanced 6 gun battery, I expect the destroyer force would have been sorely hampered if not sent packing, leaving the US Subs to do some serious damage, not that IJN destroyers were all that effective at ASW but they could certainly keep the lid on USN attempts to target as occurred with the USN Nautilus.

Tyrod, Yes the B-17 did pull off a hit (I believe during the Guadalcanal campaign, and then more during the war, but probably not on maneuvering targets). In the case of an invasion where the vessels weren't maneuvering, I suspect they could have probably made some hits.
 
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But wasn't Yamamoto's objective to lure the US carriers into a confrontation and destroy the remnants of USN power? Midway was merely the bait. If this is the case, keeping the IJN's carriers ready and unstressed would seem to be indicated.
 
Balljoint said:
But wasn't Yamamoto's objective to lure the US carriers into a confrontation and destroy the remnants of USN power? Midway was merely the bait. If this is the case, keeping the IJN's carriers ready and unstressed would seem to be indicated.
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The overly optimistic IJN plan IIRC from Shattered Sword, was made in anticipation of a USN late arrival. In other words, The USN would have faced the 4 IJN CVs and the occupied Midway air complement of ~21 A6Ms and its use as a fixed recon base in reverse, assuming G4Ms and H6Ks were immediately deployed to Midway from distant Wake.

It's interesting, as reported in a number of historical accounts, how the Midway experience played into the USN planning for Guadalcanal . The USN didn't want to be caught in the same way as the IJN and tried to keep its CV force as ready as possible for a possible IJN riposte. Fletcher took a lot of heat for that posture even though he walked off the Eastern Solomons battlefield a winner.
 
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There were 2 light carriers and 5 battleships in the invasion force that never engaged in the battle, a few seaplane tenders too.

Once the sea battle was lost, there's no way they could risk the rest of the fleet on a invasion. But if the sea battle had came out more in Japans favor I think Midway island would have been in for a harsh battle.
 
to add to the IJN tally, the Zuikaku, with its air group replenished after Coral Sea was steaming eastward to a rendezvous with Yamamoto. Then there were two light to medium CVs on the Aleutian foray that might have, with time, made their way South to provide late support.
 
Regardless of what the Japanese had available to throw into the fight, they "would have" not been able to continually establish a supply chain to support their conquests. I think this Achilles heel became evident at Guadalcanal and would continue to haunt Japanese forces until the home islands were surrounded.
 

The MAG 22 CO didn't have any kind words for the F4F-3 either. Still you'd have to think that the P-51, especially, or even the P40 or Hurricane II would have done better. A P51 could have disengaged at will, probably leading to much lower losses.
 

If the IJN had opened the action with a dawn Battleship bombardment of the island, things would have been very sticky for the USN. With no effective torpedoes they would have been hard pressed to stop the IJN battleships and still find the IJN's carriers.
 
Balljoint said:
But wasn't Yamamoto's objective to lure the US carriers into a confrontation and destroy the remnants of USN power? Midway was merely the bait. If this is the case, keeping the IJN's carriers ready and unstressed would seem to be indicated.
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Certainly they were planning on engaging our carriers. They just weren't planning on engaging them on the doorstep, as they had. They were planning on taking out the island, first. Then, they await and engage the carriers. Then, they occupy the island.

On the latter, note, they came in on two fronts. They didn't want that Occupation Force rattled while their Striking Force was doing its job. That's why they divided those forces. At least, that's how I make sense of their plan.
 
RCAFson said:
The MAG 22 CO didn't have any kind words for the F4F-3 either. Still you'd have to think that the P-51, especially, or even the P40 or Hurricane II would have done better. A P51 could have disengaged at will, probably leading to much lower losses.
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I think the outcome would have been essentially unchanged but I agree that the biggest change in having an alternate fighter chosen from among your list would indeed be aircrew and airframe survival and thus more than just 2 F2A's surviving the battle.

I've said it before, and they can print it on my tombstone, I believe the biggest mistake was made in keeping the F2As at Midway. Not sending them as escorts for the Midway strike. JMO.
In that event, I suspect other aircraft would have done no worse and probably better with more surviving, but most important a significant increase in the probability of inflicting some damage to the IJN fleet.
 

That's an interesting scenario. Although they would probably have had to run a gauntlet of a few (I think there were 4 on the island) radar equipped night searching PBYs armed with torpedoes that worked, at least occasionally on odd nights in June, according to the skipper of the Akebono Maru.
 

It would be interesting to know more about the PBY's that made that attack. However, there seems to be a considerable body of evidence to show that the Mk-13 torpedo was not very efficient but a typical BB could absorb an aerial torpedo hit and keep going, so it would take a massed attack to make a difference.
 

Yea, I doubt a Mk 13 hit (assuming it actually exploded) would have slowed a BB much. It didn't do all much damage to the Akebono Maru, a tanker! There is a bit more detail in Knott's Black Cat Raiders although I was, in general, somewhat disappointed in his work and its lack of technical detail. I believe that detachment of 4 PBYs was the first actual USN use of radar equipped PBYs in a strike role.
 

As I recall, the PBY torpedo was a bit ad hoc and perhaps the only successful US torpedo attack at Midway. But the B-26 effort gets an A+++ for effort.
Like the PBY, a torpedo was hung on a B-26. However, the max water entry speed of the torpedo was well below the min speed of the B-26. So they omitted the water leg and flew up the flight deck of the Akagi. Damn near took out the bridge with both the plane and/or the torpedo.

They make it back to Midway with a well perforated plane and molten engines.
 

Didn't the torpedos have to travel some distance in the water before they armed ?
 
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