Could the P51A have been made available to the defenders at the Battle of Midway?

[tyrodtom]

There was about 5,000 Japanese troops in the occupation force verses a reinforced Marine battalion on Midway, about 1200 troops.
Plus there were 7 battleships, 12 cruisers, 42 destroyers, and 15 subs altogether in all the Japanese forces.
daves just on his usual agenda, deflate any allied accomplishments, and inflate anything axis.

 

[syscom3]

Our forces on that small island were overmatched. They literally had to dig in for the fight. I don't know that any aircraft could have kept that onslaught off the turf.

In the book "Shattered Sword", the authors ripped apart the idea that the IJN forces would have it easy in invading the atoll. They had little if any doctrine in attacking a defended beach, little training or eqmt. for fire support calls from the beach, and most importantly; no specialized landing craft to get the troops off the beach.

Think Tarawa in reverse. The Japanese marines were going to be slaughtered.

There were other factors at play here. Namely the Japanese did not have any staying power in case things got strung out. Just by being a few days behind schedule even before invading would have played havoc with their fleet logistics.

As for US subs ..... I doubt they would have done anything considering how poorly they were performing. Maybe scare some Japanese skippers, but nothing more.

oldcrows statement is essentially correct. I think it was the morning of the 6th that Yamamoto gave the signal to retire.

 

[tyrodtom]

They might have learned something at Wake island.
7 battleships, 12 cruisers, and 40+ destroyers is a lot of fire support.

 

[davebender]

Most U.S. forces on Midway were construction, logistical and aircraft support personnel. The same holds true for the Japanese occupation force. Japan had no more combat troops invading Midway then the USMC had defending it.

However defenders have a huge advantage. U.S.M.C. construction engineers and supply clerks can be relatively effective manning machineguns in prepared bunkers. IJA construction engineers and supply clerks would contribute practically nothing (except corpses) when conducting an amphibious assault against those bunkers.

For the Midway invasion to succeed IJN shore bombardment would need to be extremely effective. More effective then USN shore bombardment vs Tarawa. Might work but I have my doubts.

What would Admiral Yamamoto do if he defeats USN CVs but his invasion force gets shot to pieces? That could happen.

 

[davebender]

Japan did not have an equivalent to the USMC. For all but the smallest invasion they used army troops who had received amphibious training.

"Shattered Sword" notwithstanding, the IJA had good equipment and doctrine for amphibious operations. IMO the USMC did not reach the same level of competence before 1944. Which is why almost all IJA landings chose a weakly defended (or undefended) landing beach. Attacking into the teeth of enemy beach defenses is normally a bad idea. But the IJA have no choice if they want to land on Midway as USMC defenders are numerous enough to cover the entire shoreline with fire.

 

[tyrodtom]

The Marine defense battalion consisted of 810 em and 33 officers, armed with 6- 5 in cannons, 12- 3 inch aa guns and 60 mgs. I'm sure the ground crew that came with the Army aircraft at least had .45s, but where the arms for the construction workers were going to come from, only dave knows.
This was against 2000 Special Naval Landing Force troops ( what you'd call Japanese Marines) led by Capt. Minoru Ota, and 3000 IJA troops led by Col. Ichiki Kiyano, these are not clerks and supply people, they're combat troops. Supported by 7 battleships, 12 cruisers, and 40+ destroyers.

 

[VBF-13]

I don't believe we turned back the occupation force until the entire operation was canceled due to the loss of the 4 IJN carriers and subsequent inability of Yamamoto to come to grips with the USN carriers in a night surface engagement. I think the final decision to turn around came on the 5th or 6th of June a day or two after the loss of its f CVs.

Yes, I believe you're right. They were hit by the B-17s the afternoon before but they didn't turn back until the Striking Force threw in the towel.

 

[tyrodtom]

But to get back to the origional question. There was only about 2 weeks between when they knew for sure that Midway was to be invaded, and only a little over a month since they knew the IJN was planning a big operation, but we weren't sure where it would be, but Midway was suspected.

Neither timeline gives the US much time to shuffle much of anything to Midway. It was a mad scramble to get anything there in time.
It doesn't take long to just fly aircraft to Midway, but aircraft need a lot of tlc, groundcrew and supplies to operate take much longer.

 

[syscom3]

They might have learned something at Wake island. 7 battleships, 12 cruisers, and 40+ destroyers is a lot of fire support.

Tarawa was pounded too and look what happened there. And unlike that battle, the AAF and USN were still going to dispute the landings.

 

[syscom3]

Most U.S. forces on Midway were construction, logistical and aircraft support personnel. The same holds true for the Japanese occupation force. Japan had no more combat troops invading Midway then the USMC had defending it.

A majority of the US troops were infantrymen by specialty, or support personnel who had infantry backgrounds. There were no civilians on the atoll.

Just a word about the Japanese attack plan. Since they had no amtraks, all the invading troops were going to be dumped off at the outer edges of the reefs and then they had to walk to the beaches in waist deep water for 200 - 300 yards. And do that against machine guns. As good as the IJN soldier was, I don't suspect any heavy demolitions or weapons were going to be available.

 

[VBF-13]

We had over 100 aircraft on Midway [...]

The Japanese attacked the island with 130 aircraft. We threw everything we had at them to greet them. Do you know what that consisted of? Just 27 fighters.

The Japanese would have a tough time seizing Midway even if USN CVs remained at Pearl Harbor.

Really? Somebody should have told that to Henry Fonda.

 

[davebender]

invading troops were going to be dumped off at the outer edges of the reefs and then they had to walk to the beaches in waist deep water for 200 - 300 yards.

I agree.

Only a portion of the Tarawa invasion force rode ashore in AMTRACs. The remainder waded ashore from the reef in a similiar manner.

Tarawa was a bloodbath despite having an invasion force seven times as large (about 35,000 troops) as what Japan had for Midway. That doesn't bode well for an IJA attempt to seize Midway.

 

[tyrodtom]

Of course the fact that Japan had occupied Tarawa almost 2 years before , and building bunkers and emplacements the whole time has nothing to do with that bloodbath.

Nor that they had over twice the heavy cannons, and almost twice the machineguns have nothing to do with it either.

Over half of the Tarawa defenders were Japanese marines, (SNLF) just like 2000 of the troops for the Midway invasion.

 

[tyrodtom]

Of course Tarawa was still taken, 1027 Marines killed, verses 4700 Japanese.

There were not 35,000 in the Tarawa invasion, 6500 were used for Makin Island invasion.
One of my uncles was wounded at Tarawa.

 

[VBF-13]

Just a word about the Japanese attack plan. Since they had no amtraks, all the invading troops were going to be dumped off at the outer edges of the reefs and then they had to walk to the beaches in waist deep water for 200 - 300 yards. And do that against machine guns. As good as the IJN soldier was, I don't suspect any heavy demolitions or weapons were going to be available.

But that's what the Striking Force was for, no? The Occupation Force wasn't an invasion force. By the time it hit the beaches they were counting on no resistance left. The Occupation Force wasn't equipped to invade anything. That operation was contingent on the success of the Striking Force. Without the Striking Force having pummeled that island to death, the Occupation Force had nothing to do, that's why they ultimately turned it back.

 

[Balljoint]

It's interesting that the initial IJN force at midway was essentially carriers. Aircraft were used both to soften up the island and to concurrently defend against navel resistance, a strategy that ultimately caught them with lowered trousers. The battleships etc of the distant Main Force could have pounded the beaches while aircraft remained primarily tasked with CAP and armed with torpedoes as appropriate. This would have provided both a more robust defense against the America planes and avoided the randomly stashed ordinance aboard the carriers.

Apparently the official IJN doctrine precluded the use of surface ship firepower against land "forts".

 

[tyrodtom]

The invasion force had 2 battleships, 10 cruisers, around 15 destroyers, along with all the transports, light carriers, gunboats of various sizes, but they were to be held back till the main force softened Midway.
Which never happened, once the sea battle developed different than planed.

 

[VBF-13]

Their "plan" was to come in unmolested. That's what went wrong. They were planning on landing with their Striking Force, followed by their Occupation Force. They'd have taken that island in a day had we not been onto their plan and ready for them.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Every marine is a rifleman firs what ever his warfare specialty. and Midway was well defended in virtually every category. Far better defended than Wake Island (once the IJN carriers were out of the picture, it would have been a very tough nut to crack.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/midway.txt

These were Batteries A and C, 4th Defense Battalion,
FMF (both 5-inch seacoast batteries, under command of Capt. Custis Burton,
Jr.) bringing with them, in addition to miscellaneous supplies of all types,
the Navy 7-inch and 3-inch guns, with necessary materiel, which had been
shipped to Pearl Harbor for Midway prior to the outset of war. On Christmas
Eve the reinforcements arrived, and Colonel Shannon lost no time in turning
over to Captain Burton with one battery (A) the mission of installing,
organizing, and manning the 7-inch and the 3-inch batteries to be emplaced on
Eastern Island. To First Lieutenant Lewis A. Jones, who commanded Battery C of
this group, the assignment was to carry out a similar role with regard to the Navy
3-inch battery planned for Sand
Island.

Three more 3-inch antiaircraft batteries (12 guns in all) a 37-mm.
antiaircraft battery (eight guns) and a 20-mm. antiaircraft battery (18 guns),
were to be attached temporarily from the 3d Defense Battalion, then at Pearl
Harbor.<20> Two rifle companies of the 2d Marine Raider Battalion, together
with a platoon of five light tanks, would augment the small infantry reserve
already at Midway;<21> and, for MAG-22, which was still flying its Brewster
fighters and Vought Vindicator dive bombers ("Wind Indicators" or "Vibrators,"
some pilots called them), there would be provided some 16 SBD-2 dive bombers
and

 

[tyrodtom]

That was a very good read, but it was impossible for me to keep track of all the numbers with units being added and relieved.