The only Idea I have is to engage the escorts for the withdrawal and make them drop their tanks, other experts here will surely tell me why they couldnt because the deutschers aint stupid.
Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?
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The only Idea I have is to engage the escorts for the withdrawal and make them drop their tanks, other experts here will surely tell me why they couldnt because the deutschers aint stupid.
Park's basic tactical unit remained the squadron. More than one squadron might well be tasked to a raid, simultaneously from the same airfield or (more often) from different fields. That allowed him far more flexibility than Leigh - Mallory (and others') preferred tactic, whereby several squadrons would need to be assembled to form a 'Big Wing' prior to even setting off to make the interception.
Cheers
Steve
Cheers
Steve
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
I'm trying to understand how Galland can be considered an "idiot"...he constantly fought over several different policies handed down by the big, true "idiot" (Goering), even risking his own position in the Luftwaffe.
During the Battle of Britain, Galland warned about needing escorts for the Bf110, he warned about the bomber formations flying too slow and at the perfect altitude for British interception (without success).
Galland pointed out early on the need to strengthen the Jagdwaffe and argued with Goering over the presence of American fighters, to which Goering refused to believe (1943).
Galland was a proponent of the Me262 as a fighter and not a bomber. He pushed for the Sturmbock conversion, and was relieved of command due to his protest of Operation Bodenplatt, which he insisted was a useless waste of men and machines.
He instituted several policies that allowed the Luftwaffe some margain of success against overwhelming odds...
Hardly an idiot.
During the Battle of Britain, Galland warned about needing escorts for the Bf110, he warned about the bomber formations flying too slow and at the perfect altitude for British interception (without success).
Galland pointed out early on the need to strengthen the Jagdwaffe and argued with Goering over the presence of American fighters, to which Goering refused to believe (1943).
Galland was a proponent of the Me262 as a fighter and not a bomber. He pushed for the Sturmbock conversion, and was relieved of command due to his protest of Operation Bodenplatt, which he insisted was a useless waste of men and machines.
He instituted several policies that allowed the Luftwaffe some margain of success against overwhelming odds...
Hardly an idiot.
As for penny packets! In "the most dangerous enemy" this was discussed at some length. For the RAF pilots there is a limit to how far you can see. A squadron attacking a formation could not see another squadron that had engaged only a few minutes earlier. In all pilots accounts I have read there is the phenomena of being on your own suddenly. One moment the sky is full of aircraft the next it is empty. Travelling at 350MPH with a sky 25,000 ft deep its easy to understand.
I have no doubt Park could have done better, I have no doubt Park would have done better given a re run of the BoB, Park has said in certain situations maybe he could have done better. But I doubt any airforce leader faced with his problems on the practical and political front actually could have done better. The actions in the BoB are one of the first and few where his every descision could be analysed. Leigh Mallory took part in a re enactment using his big wing tactics (I read somewhere here) he got trounced.
I have no doubt Park could have done better, I have no doubt Park would have done better given a re run of the BoB, Park has said in certain situations maybe he could have done better. But I doubt any airforce leader faced with his problems on the practical and political front actually could have done better. The actions in the BoB are one of the first and few where his every descision could be analysed. Leigh Mallory took part in a re enactment using his big wing tactics (I read somewhere here) he got trounced.
Quirk is that the USAF escorts were, well, escorted by shorter range fighters. In case one does not have an equal number of fighters as his opponent, he basically has no options. Attack the escorts early - shorter ranged fighters will get you. Attack escorts when those are deep in your territory - the chance for 'stripping the escorts' is lost; at best, you still have enemy bombers roaming free.
Toss there that LW fighters were significantly outperformed above 20-25000 ft (where it mattered in the ETO) from mid/late 1943 on, there was hardly any chance the LW would gain the upper hand against the USAF and RAF.
People at the head of LW were not stupid - while they did make mistakes (everybody else did, too), their main problem was that they were outproduced and outnumbered by other 3 major powers, and even the slightest mistakes were augmented by that.
Toss there that LW fighters were significantly outperformed above 20-25000 ft (where it mattered in the ETO) from mid/late 1943 on, there was hardly any chance the LW would gain the upper hand against the USAF and RAF.
People at the head of LW were not stupid - while they did make mistakes (everybody else did, too), their main problem was that they were outproduced and outnumbered by other 3 major powers, and even the slightest mistakes were augmented by that.
If the Luftwaffe used its fighters to intercept USAAF escorts further out, forcing them, maybe, to drop tanks, then they would have been playing in to the hands of the Americans. They would not be able to attack the bombers and the escorts would be doing their job in a different way. They would still be shooting down Luftwaffe fighters, just nowhere near the bombers.
The 8th AF history makes it clear that both sides understood this.
Just as for the RAF during the BoB the bombers were the targets for the fighters, a point made time and again by both Park and Dowding.
Cheers
Steve
The 8th AF history makes it clear that both sides understood this.
Just as for the RAF during the BoB the bombers were the targets for the fighters, a point made time and again by both Park and Dowding.
Cheers
Steve
After Rotterdam the gloves started to come off. It was a convenient excuse.
The idea that the German switch to bombing London in September was in retaliation for the bombing of Berlin is absolute nonsense. It is part of the myth of the BoB, not the history. Halder wrote in his diary on the 22nd JUNE 1940, nearly three months earlier, shortly before France surrendered.
'The raids of the British Air Force at home are becoming bothersome. Now they are extending their attacks to Berlin and ObdL therefore wants us to transfer Army AA units. Lengthy discussion of subject over the telephone.'
My italics.
Incidentally, though some find it hard to believe that the Wermacht could be amateurish enough to view crossing the Channel rather like crossing a wide river it was Halder, following an invasion conference on 22nd July who summed up, under the heading 'Method', how it would be done.
'Similar to large scale river crossing on line Ostend-Le Havre'.
Remember that this man was chief of the OKH General Staff
Cheers
Steve
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parsifal
Colonel
no, it is not nonsense. hitler directive 17 issued 1 august 1940, was very explicit and is unequivocal in what it was to do:
In this order Hitler explicitly prohibited attacks on London and against civilians. Any airmen who, deliberately or unintentionally, violated this order were to be punished. Its unequivocal what german intent was at that stage, and that continued for some time. NO ATTACKS ON LONDON WERE AUTHORISED. Hitler's No. 17 Directive, issued 1 August 1940, established the conduct of war against Britain and specifically did not authorise any terror attacks or attacks aimed directly at the civilian population. . The Führer declared that terror attacks could only be a means of reprisal, as ordered by him alone.
Fuhrer Directive 17
Hitler's instructions were echoed in Hermann Göring's general order, issued on 30 June 1940 (before fuhrer directive 17, which reinforces the point that terror attacks against London was a co-rdinated thought out policy move by the Germans)
"The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population".
All this changed after September. completely.
On 24 August, fate took a turn, and several off-course German bombers accidentally bombed residential areas of London. The next day, the RAF bombed Berlin for the first time, targeting Tempelhof airfield and the Siemens factories in Siemenstadt. It was not seen so much as a reprisal raid by the British, more as an attempt to try and ease the pressure on FC by forcing the LW to divert some resources to home Defence. this was nothing new, the RAF had attempted the same thing to try and ease the pressure on the French as early as 15 May 1940, when the first bombings of German cities were authorised. However, the attacks on the german capital by the RAF were seen by Hitler as indiscriminate due to their inaccuracy. Flying into one of almost uncontrolled rage, he ordered that the 'night piracy of the British' (as he referred to it) be countered by a concentrated night offensive against the island, and especially London. This is simply an historical fact, beyond any interpretation or historic revisionism. Its exactly how the blitz began and im staggered that we would even be sitting here arguing about how it transpired
The proof that the bombing of berlin caused the change in German strategy is simply irrefutable, simply by the speech hitler gave on 4 September. no other piece of evidence that might be scrounged out of the dark corners of historical revisionism can match what he said.
In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler ranted and raged , announcing that:
"The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany"
How can you say that the bombing of Berlin did not cause that change of heart. its there, plain as day, for all to see. What is not so clear, is whether the british deliberately bombed Berlin as a direct reprisal to the bombing of London on the 24 August.
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Hitler always intended to attack London. Also from directive 17:
London was the largest port in the world, and had the largest food stores.
Hitler issued similar orders as early as November 1939, about his plans if the Germans succeeded in conquering part of the channel coast opposite the UK.
The Germans always had an eye on public opinion. When they attacked Poland, they first staged a fake Polish attack to claim they were simply defending themselves. When Jodl set out his plan for attacking Britain in June 1940, he called for "terror attacks, announced as reprisals".
As early as 19th August Goering ordered a "great" attack on Liverpool, calling for more than 100 bombers to hit the city in one night. It wasn't actually launched until a week later, and was an utter failure, but it was part of the Luftwaffe progression from attacking the RAF to attacking British port cities that Hitler had been calling for.
And the talk of one "accidental" bombing of London is simply wrong. The Luftwaffe hit London in daylight a couple of times in mid August. From about the 20th they bomber London almost every night. Notes on captured Luftwaffe pilots told them that if they couldn't find their targets at night, they could jettison bombs over London because "something of value" was likely to be destroyed.
London was the largest port in the world, and had the largest food stores.
Hitler issued similar orders as early as November 1939, about his plans if the Germans succeeded in conquering part of the channel coast opposite the UK.
The Germans always had an eye on public opinion. When they attacked Poland, they first staged a fake Polish attack to claim they were simply defending themselves. When Jodl set out his plan for attacking Britain in June 1940, he called for "terror attacks, announced as reprisals".
As early as 19th August Goering ordered a "great" attack on Liverpool, calling for more than 100 bombers to hit the city in one night. It wasn't actually launched until a week later, and was an utter failure, but it was part of the Luftwaffe progression from attacking the RAF to attacking British port cities that Hitler had been calling for.
And the talk of one "accidental" bombing of London is simply wrong. The Luftwaffe hit London in daylight a couple of times in mid August. From about the 20th they bomber London almost every night. Notes on captured Luftwaffe pilots told them that if they couldn't find their targets at night, they could jettison bombs over London because "something of value" was likely to be destroyed.
I did not say that it was nonsense that initially the Luftwaffe was very constrained in what it could or could not attack. I said it was nonsense that the switch of targets from the RAF to London was a retaliation for an air raid on Berlin. These had already been going on for three months. Read my post properly.
The RAF did not first bomb Berlin in August following an error by some German aircraft which bombed London. THAT is part of the myth. As Halder made clear the RAF extended its raids to Berlin (or at least the area of Berlin) in June 1940 which was why the Luftwaffe wanted Army AA units moved to that area. The RAF was probably aiming at a specific target when they too 'erroneously' bombed the city. Incidentally Halder had no objections to the request.
I don't notice Hitler or anyone else raging about these attacks in June, July or August 1940 when plan A, defeat the RAF, was still in place.
What caused the change of targets was a change of strategy. In early September the Germans realised that they were not going to gain any kind of air superiority over the Channel and Southern England. To them, largely due to bad intelligence, the RAF seemed stronger than ever. In any case it was not defeated. Even the bluff of an invasion was untenable and some other way to 'persuade' the British into some kind of negotiations was needed. This was at the root of the intentional change from attacking the RAF to attacking London.
It is important to remember that in the planning for 'Sealion' number one on the list of 'things to do' is almost invariably to gain air superiority over the Channel and invasion area. This applies to documents, diaries and orders from all three services.
This was all part of an increasing escalation.
Martin Van Creveld has written.
"The day before Nazi Germany started WW2 on ist September 1939, Hermann Goering, as Hitler's deputy and commander of the Luftwaffe, ordered his pilots to observe the laws of war and make sure they only attacked military targets, broadly defined as anything that is important for the enemy's conduct of the war. Less than six years later, an American aircraft dropped the most powerful bomb in history until then on Hiroshima, a city devoid of any major military significance, killing an estimated 75,000 civilians and bringing the greatest war of all to an abrupt end. What had happened to air power in the meantime, and how did it make the transition from the one to the other?"
A very good question, maybe for another time.
Cheers
Steve
The RAF did not first bomb Berlin in August following an error by some German aircraft which bombed London. THAT is part of the myth. As Halder made clear the RAF extended its raids to Berlin (or at least the area of Berlin) in June 1940 which was why the Luftwaffe wanted Army AA units moved to that area. The RAF was probably aiming at a specific target when they too 'erroneously' bombed the city. Incidentally Halder had no objections to the request.
I don't notice Hitler or anyone else raging about these attacks in June, July or August 1940 when plan A, defeat the RAF, was still in place.
What caused the change of targets was a change of strategy. In early September the Germans realised that they were not going to gain any kind of air superiority over the Channel and Southern England. To them, largely due to bad intelligence, the RAF seemed stronger than ever. In any case it was not defeated. Even the bluff of an invasion was untenable and some other way to 'persuade' the British into some kind of negotiations was needed. This was at the root of the intentional change from attacking the RAF to attacking London.
It is important to remember that in the planning for 'Sealion' number one on the list of 'things to do' is almost invariably to gain air superiority over the Channel and invasion area. This applies to documents, diaries and orders from all three services.
This was all part of an increasing escalation.
Martin Van Creveld has written.
"The day before Nazi Germany started WW2 on ist September 1939, Hermann Goering, as Hitler's deputy and commander of the Luftwaffe, ordered his pilots to observe the laws of war and make sure they only attacked military targets, broadly defined as anything that is important for the enemy's conduct of the war. Less than six years later, an American aircraft dropped the most powerful bomb in history until then on Hiroshima, a city devoid of any major military significance, killing an estimated 75,000 civilians and bringing the greatest war of all to an abrupt end. What had happened to air power in the meantime, and how did it make the transition from the one to the other?"
A very good question, maybe for another time.
Cheers
Steve
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Halder is completely wrong on this. The first RAF attack on Berlin was on the 25th August. The majority of the aircraft involved didn't bomb because of poor visibility in the Berlin area. The next attack a few nights later was described in the war diary of the Wehrmacht high command as "the first attack on Berlin".
Steve Im confused here, I thought the change was because the LW believed the RAF was down to its last 50 fighters, to deliver a knock out blow.
If Halder is wrong then the OKH and ObdL are wrong. It seems to me that the men running the war for Germany,including the Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the Luftwaffe, would know where bombs were falling. Whether the bombers took off with the intention of bombing Berlin I very much doubt but bombs did fall on Berlin.
This is what led to a telephone conference and was a serious enough situation to get a mention in Halder's war diary. It was an unwelcome distraction at a time when he was more concerned with sorting out the mess in France and the Low Countries in the days immediately prior to the French surrender.
Cheers
Steve
I think the Luftwaffe had found out the hard way in late August and early September that their intelligence analysis, which did indeed suggest that the RAF was seriously depleted, were not quite correct. I've said time and time again that pilots were becoming a problem (for the Luftwaffe too) but there were still enough to give the Luftwaffe a bloody nose. In a way the Luftwaffe blinked first.
The Kriegsmarine war diary makes it clear that the change in target let them of the hook. It meant that they would never have to attempt 'Sealion', an operation that almost no naval officers believed was possible in any case. It was also understood to be a change in tactic with the express intention of forcing Britain out of the war by forced negotiation.
Cheers
Steve
I suspect Halder misunderstood. RAF aircraft were no doubt flying night recce and leaflet operations over Berlin. They didn't drop bombs, though.
From Karl Klee's translation of the war diary of the Wehrmacht High Command:
*British records show bombing over the Midlands with no one aware the Luftwaffe was actually trying to hit Liverpool. From the RAF campaign diary "Main objective of the night was industrial Midlands up to Liverpool and as far as Bradford and Leeds"
William Shirer was living in Berlin. From Rise and Fall:
The Air War by Janusz Piekalkiewicz uses newspaper stories and press releases to document WW2. From that:
What, he misunderstood a request from the OKL for anti aircraft units to be transferred from the Army to the Luftwaffe and moved to protect Berlin? This request came as a result of British bombs falling on Berlin on 22nd June IIRC.
Halder's war diary is not a retrospective account. It is a contemporary account of events more or less as they happened.
It is entirely possible that these bombs were not intended for Berlin. I would suggest that the forces on the ground had a firmer grasp of where ordnance was landing than those dropping it in mid 1940, particularly at night. The raids later targeted Berlin. Targeting Berlin and bombing Berlin are two different things.
I know that the raids on London were couched in terms of retaliation for British raids on Germany. It's called propaganda, something the Nazi state, with its iron control of its media was particularly good at. If we are to believe everything coming out of Berlin then we should believe this.
'This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory. Since 5.45 A.M. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met by bombs. Whoever fight with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever departs from the rules of humane warfare can only expect that we shall do the same. I will continue this struggle, no matter against whom, until the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured.'
Today I am in Chemnitz (Karl Marx Stadt). If you want to see the effects of British bombing, combined with an attempt to build a socialist city you should come here. It's not pretty
Cheers
Steve
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Hitler intended to attack London.
The Luftwaffe intended to attack London.
What they needed was an excuse. Up to that time London was not "officially" a target but bombs were dropped here and there - nothing on the scale that happened when the Luftwaffe put its full weight into it (like 7 September).
But these pin-prick attacks are what Hitler needed as an excuse to fully commit to London.
The Luftwaffe intended to attack London.
What they needed was an excuse. Up to that time London was not "officially" a target but bombs were dropped here and there - nothing on the scale that happened when the Luftwaffe put its full weight into it (like 7 September).
But these pin-prick attacks are what Hitler needed as an excuse to fully commit to London.
This would be fine and dandy if London was the only town or city in the UK, it isn't.
The Luftwaffe was attacking military related targets within civilian areas in the UK from the start of the battle, as was the RAF on Germany.
The raid on Berlin in June which spooked the Luftwaffe was probably the raid of 7th June 1940 when a single French Farman F220 bombed the city in retalilation for a Luftwaffe attack on Paris, there were certainly no RAF raids that far into eastern Germany during June and July.
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parsifal
Colonel
The Germans had been thinking about how to defeat the Britsh in air warfare since before the war, and Hitler did favour direct attacks on the british population in the various discussions that transpired. The germans had succesfully employed terror bombing as a technique since Guernica, and had employed it as a technique to soften enemy resolve at least a dozen times since the outbreak of the war. It was a technique that had yielded some pretty good results for them. In 1939 the use of such techniques had been discussed and developed in a general sense for use against the british.
I get all that, and accept it, but from the beginning of June to the end of August there was a fundamental change in German policy initiated by none other than the fickle Adolf Hitler. After the fall of France (actually before that), Hitler believed that the British would be amenable to making peace with germany. he had no real desire to destroy Britain, as he thought the break up of the British empire would not be in Germany's interests. His strategy changed as a result of that, and terror bombing was removed from the list of possible attacks on the british. Hitler deduced that terror attacks on attacks on british might not be conducive to convincing the British of the need to make terms. So, he forbade them, except on his express orders. He was prepared to try targetted attacks in an effort to induce them to the peace table. He never gave up or permanently removed terror attacks as a technique, and in the lead up to war had preferred it over more conventional means of attack. But for that critical perior June to August, it was off the table....for the moment.
We dont actually know the thought processes that were in Hitlers head from late August through to early September, but what we do know is that by the 4th september, he was angry, really angry. I dont believe that anger was staged, or fake. But the reason that we need to consider is why he was angry. In his speech he states that it was a retalitory motive that led him to unleash terror attacks. Maybe, but I dont buy that. he had always thought direct attacks on civilian poulation was an effective means of attack, it was a form of warfare that he had successfully used earlier, and in the lead up to war he had advocated its use aginst the british. he had deviated from that path after June, allowing conventional attacks a chance to deliver the result he was looking for. It didnt deliver (though some now believe it was close to achieving some sort of result. Hitler wasnt interested in tactical victories over FC however, neither did he really believe in the viability of a cross channel attack, what he wanted, was a negotiated peace with Britain), I believe that when confronted with an attack by the british on his capital, he realized the British were not being brow beaten to the peace table by conventional attacks on their air force, and decided to move to the next level of his strategy....a reversion to his previous thinking of direct attacks on the British population. this is entirely consistent with his previous and subsequent form. Ever the gambler, when faced with a reverse, Hitler tended to become stubborn and obstinate, casting aside all rationality (something in short supply in Hilters mind at the best of times) and cling to things he believed to be known winners, at least in his mind. his "no retreat" decision in front of Moscow was based on that innate conservatism, and his subsequent adherence to that concept 1942-5 clearly his nature when struck with adverity. so what did he do when faced with a reverse against the British? He reverted to what he believed was a known winning strategy. terror attacks.....
All this is true, so from the longer viewpoint, the germans did plan to carry out direct attacks on the british population. but in that period June to September, for reasons not related to the rules of warfare or any sense of right and wrong, but for reasons of achieving a certain strategic outcome, Hitler forbade direct attacks on the British except with his express orders. These are all clearly on the record. When confronted with that failure, hitler firstly got angry, and then unleashed what he believed would be the second stage of his attack, and a more effective strategy against the British. he upped the ante, to put even more pressure on the british 9or so he thought...actually he lost the battle because of that decision) I dont believe that was a calculated decision, as such, I believe it was a decision borne from the expedients that confronted him, and that, is a world of difference from what you guys are claiming
I get all that, and accept it, but from the beginning of June to the end of August there was a fundamental change in German policy initiated by none other than the fickle Adolf Hitler. After the fall of France (actually before that), Hitler believed that the British would be amenable to making peace with germany. he had no real desire to destroy Britain, as he thought the break up of the British empire would not be in Germany's interests. His strategy changed as a result of that, and terror bombing was removed from the list of possible attacks on the british. Hitler deduced that terror attacks on attacks on british might not be conducive to convincing the British of the need to make terms. So, he forbade them, except on his express orders. He was prepared to try targetted attacks in an effort to induce them to the peace table. He never gave up or permanently removed terror attacks as a technique, and in the lead up to war had preferred it over more conventional means of attack. But for that critical perior June to August, it was off the table....for the moment.
We dont actually know the thought processes that were in Hitlers head from late August through to early September, but what we do know is that by the 4th september, he was angry, really angry. I dont believe that anger was staged, or fake. But the reason that we need to consider is why he was angry. In his speech he states that it was a retalitory motive that led him to unleash terror attacks. Maybe, but I dont buy that. he had always thought direct attacks on civilian poulation was an effective means of attack, it was a form of warfare that he had successfully used earlier, and in the lead up to war he had advocated its use aginst the british. he had deviated from that path after June, allowing conventional attacks a chance to deliver the result he was looking for. It didnt deliver (though some now believe it was close to achieving some sort of result. Hitler wasnt interested in tactical victories over FC however, neither did he really believe in the viability of a cross channel attack, what he wanted, was a negotiated peace with Britain), I believe that when confronted with an attack by the british on his capital, he realized the British were not being brow beaten to the peace table by conventional attacks on their air force, and decided to move to the next level of his strategy....a reversion to his previous thinking of direct attacks on the British population. this is entirely consistent with his previous and subsequent form. Ever the gambler, when faced with a reverse, Hitler tended to become stubborn and obstinate, casting aside all rationality (something in short supply in Hilters mind at the best of times) and cling to things he believed to be known winners, at least in his mind. his "no retreat" decision in front of Moscow was based on that innate conservatism, and his subsequent adherence to that concept 1942-5 clearly his nature when struck with adverity. so what did he do when faced with a reverse against the British? He reverted to what he believed was a known winning strategy. terror attacks.....
All this is true, so from the longer viewpoint, the germans did plan to carry out direct attacks on the british population. but in that period June to September, for reasons not related to the rules of warfare or any sense of right and wrong, but for reasons of achieving a certain strategic outcome, Hitler forbade direct attacks on the British except with his express orders. These are all clearly on the record. When confronted with that failure, hitler firstly got angry, and then unleashed what he believed would be the second stage of his attack, and a more effective strategy against the British. he upped the ante, to put even more pressure on the british 9or so he thought...actually he lost the battle because of that decision) I dont believe that was a calculated decision, as such, I believe it was a decision borne from the expedients that confronted him, and that, is a world of difference from what you guys are claiming
