Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?

[tomo pauk]

A question: how much aircraft and crewmen were lost in the ETO between January of 1941 and January 1943, on daylight operations, by RAF and LW?

 

[stona]

I was taught that the side instigating combat in a particular contact/confrontation holds the initiative. As the Luftwaffe was deciding when and whether to come up and engage any particular RAF raid it held the initiative in that sense.

I'd like to know were the figure of 73% of Luftwaffe losses in the west comes from. Between June and November 1941 the Luftwaffe lost an average of 240 single engine fighters per month in the east to all causes, damaged and destroyed. I don't believe there were equivalent losses in the west of this type.
Even total losses don't equate to that either. The only months between June and December 1942 on which Luftwaffe aircraft losses were greater on all other fronts combined than in the east were October and November, that was due to Operation Torch, not operations in NW Europe.
February 1943 was when Luftwaffe losses in the west (including the MTO) exceeded those in the east consistently and for the rest of the war.

Tomo, I will have many more figures in my various files which I will endeavour to find. I know that March-June 1942 the RAF lost 335 fighters almost all Spitfire Vs.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

In 1941-42he crucial battle in which the air war played a Major part was the Battle of the Atlantic, as has been said Germanys plans for surface raiders, u boat Blockade were eventually thwarted, If the LW had air supremacy over French ports and free reign over the Atlantic we would have lost it.

 

[parsifal]

Murray has done a lot of work i this regard, and luftwaffe atrition rates were always pretty poor. But in the context of what we are talking about, its rather harder. Ive got the data, but its spread across the pages of three fairly hefty book.

but to pick what might be termed two or three "typical days", ill t4ry and give some idea of the losses being suffered by either side.

First date 9th June 1941, ther were wild claims by either side, but according to Foreman, the RAF casualties were

7 sqn Stirling from 7 Squadron damaged, crew safe
9 sqn Wellington R1758, DNR crew lost
9 sqn wellington DNR crew lost
18 sqn Blen V 6428 DNR crew lost
18 sqn Blen V 6427 DNR crew lost

74 sqn spit W3186 DNR pilot lost
79 sqn hurri abandoned, pilot safe
222 sqn spit P7929 crash landed pilot safe
254 squadron Blen crashed at londonderry crew safe, not really related to combat ops
1 PRU Spit X 4496 DNR Pilot lost

RAF sent 9 sqn Wellingtons to the Dutch coast on an anti-shipping mission by daylight (the first time since April 1940), unescorted. BC sent 18 aircraft (Blenheims mostly) also to holland and and lost two aircraft. two Stirlings of 7 squadron were sent on gardening operations off holland and one failed to return

Over the channel and french coastal areas there were a series of short and sharp engagements, in which the RAF appears to have gained the upper hand

Luftwaffe losses on this day in the west and over germany were as follows

III/JG3 Bf109 F2 #8152 crashed aftrer combat landed, pilot killed
III/JG2 Bf109 E7 #5983 "White 15" DNR pilot lost
III/JG26 Bf109F2 #6716 Crash landed, Pilot safe, 60% damage (a write off)
Stab/JG26 Bf 109F2 12680 crash landed, 45% damage, pilot injured
I/jG 77 Bf109 E7 2669 crash landed on take off Stavanger 255 damage, no report on pilot condition (not really a combat related loss)
IV/KG53 He111H2 2787 shot down whilst on antishipping operations (cause not stated) crew killed
E/ZG76 Bf110C1 Crashed in friedland (after engaging RAF bombers) aircraft destroyed, crew killed
3.(F)/31 Bf110 C5 2291 crashed on take off in Holland (again aagainst RAF incursions aircraft written off, crew unhurt

On the 9th february there was a major operation....the famous channel dash. In this operation, according to Foreman the RAF was outnumbered 72 fighters to 90 LW defenders, nearly all Bf 109s and FW 190s. most of the RAF fighters were Spitsd although one quadron of Whirlwinds, number 137, blundered over the German ships and lost 4 of their number. The RAF lost this engagement, in every sense, but LW losses were far from one sided.

Raf claims/ admitted losses were

41 sqn: 3 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ 1DNR
65 sqn: 1 destroyed, 2 Damaged/zip
72 sqn: 3 destroyed, 4 Damaged 1 probable/zip losses
111 sqn 1 destroyed, 1 Damaged, 1 probable/zip losses
118 sqn 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 1 DNR
124 sqn 0 destroyed, 0 MIA 1 Damaged/ 1 cat E (pilot injured) 1 DNR
129 sqn 0 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ zip losses
222 sqn 0 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ 2 DNR
234 sqn 2 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 2 DNR
401 sqn 2 destroyed, 2 Damaged/ 1 Cat E
403 sqn 1 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ 1 DNR
485 sqn 5 destroyed, 1 Damaged/zip losses
Hch Wg 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged, 1 probable/zip losses

137 sqn 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 4 DNR

Other ops
19sqn 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 1 MIA

Admitted German losses were

BF109 E 1 destroyed 4 damaged,
Bf 109F 5 destroyed 7 damaged
FW190A: 0 destroyed, 2 damaged

Thats a total of 6 destroyed, 13 damaged. RAF claims were 18 destroyed, 14 damaged, 3 probable
Not sure what LW claims were.

 

[parsifal]

I was taught that the side instigating combat in a particular contact/confrontation holds the initiative. As the Luftwaffe was deciding when and whether to come up and engage any particular RAF raid it held the initiative in that sense.

Your theory was correct, your application totally incrrect. the LW was not deciding when and where engagements were occurring. they were reactibg to RAF initiatives. In that situation the RAF could, and did, break off the campaign at any time

I'd like to know were the figure of 73% of Luftwaffe losses in the west comes from. Between June and November 1941 the Luftwaffe lost an average of 240 single engine fighters per month in the east to all causes, damaged and destroyed. I don't believe there were equivalent losses in the west of this type.

It looks as if, either deliberately or inadvertently you are mixing serviceability rates up with losses. the two are different numbers and differnt concepts, though they usually point to the same general malaise of overwork, and poor logistic support, which the LW in the East certainly suffered from. Main source for my figures is Caldwell, which in turn is based on Grohler's analysis. I didnt know losses were quite that heavy in the east. According to Caldwell, LW strength was down from 2700 to just over 1000 by the beginning of December. East Front was receiving roughly 120 replacements per month, give or take. . Problem is that by the following March, LW strength was back up to 2200, and by the following June strengths were at just over 3000 with Richthofens air fleet reporting serviceability of just over 70% (this was the highest serviceability rate of any major EF formation after 1941. by November it had plummetted again to about 45%). In temporary sense, LW losses on the East front were running at about 400 per month in the east, but in a permanent sense, losses were about 1400 per year. LW is reported to have lost 5500 as complete losses June 41 to June 42. not sure of losses on the southern fron or training accidents, but significant losses were occurring over western europe

Even total losses don't equate to that either. The only months between June and December 1942 on which Luftwaffe aircraft losses were greater on all other fronts combined than in the east were October and November, that was due to Operation Torch, not operations in NW Europe.

Foreman costello Caldwell do not agree with your figures at all.

February 1943 was when Luftwaffe losses in the west (including the MTO) exceeded those in the east consistently and for the rest of the war.

Its more a case that the LW had not much more to lose in the east than losses rose above EF losses

Tomo, I will have many more figures in my various files which I will endeavour to find. I know that March-June 1942 the RAF lost 335 fighters almost all Spitfire Vs.

Does not equate to Foremans figures at all

 

[stona]

Murray has done a lot of work i this regard,

Condensed into helpful tables like this

Cheers

Steve

 

[Milosh]

Murray is available on line, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

 

[bobbysocks]

thanks for that link milosh...

 

[parsifal]

the following attachment is something I found. it is taken from the 1946 RAF post action report. this table are the LW losses and U/S aircraft lists for 1941 on the Eastern Front. Figures are based on the LW quartermaster generals returns

 

[OldSkeptic]

Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory - also, the USAAF had better recon, far greater resources and better management of the campaign on their side, things that the Germans lacked in 1940.

Nope.

 

[OldSkeptic]

.

Finally, Galland himself concedes that in the months of 1941, it became apparent to the Jagdwaffe that they no longer held the initiative, and this sapped at their very resolve. he says as much in his book. Or are we going to start dismissing Galland now as well.

Yes you can dismiss him, he wrote and said a lot of self serving crap and blamed everyone except himself. He was promoted far above his level and, if you want to pick one operational Luftwaffe leader responsible for the destruction of it, ... it would be him.

His strategy and tactics were outmoded, he didn't understand (especially in the BoB) things like logistics and communication (even later he was not really sure of it) . He, bizarrely, became a fan of the 'big wing concept in defending Germany, though he happily shot down high numbers of RAF fighters in 'big wings' because they were such easy targets.... need I go on. A Keith Park he was not.

His endless mantra, post war was 'Goering, Goering, Goering'. If Goering hadn't existed he would have had to invent someone else to blame. A very good squadron leader a good/fair wing leader, disastrous above that level.

 

[stona]

I might not go quite that far, but there is more than an element of truth in that
Cheers
Steve

 

[OldSkeptic]

I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.

Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.

What would you say are the standout points in the battle?

Would you say the poor assesment of British losses could be one? It meant the Germans believed they were causing much more damage then they were?

Read Stephen Bungey's Book, Most Dangerous Enemy and it will answer all your questions. Definitely the finest book on the BoB (though as he admits built on the works of people like Price and so on).

The Luftwaffe had no chance of winning unless:
(1) Keith Park made a mistake (as did later Leigh Mallory) .
(2) They mastered and employed tools and tactics that no one had really worked out (ie fast fighter bombers on low level accurate attacks on critical areas).

Plus they had to win quickly, their logistics were far poorer. Their aircraft production was less than the UK's, their pilot training was less than the UK's.

Though we always get the 'RAF running out of pilots thing', The Luftwaffe was running out too ... and they couldn't replace them as fast as the UK could. And they couldn't replace their aircraft either (which the UK could) .

It started out with the Luftwaffe fighters (roughly the same size as the RAF) having to shoot down Spitfires and Hurricanes at a 4:1 or even a 5:1 ratio to win....Not going to happen .. and didn't.

The RAF was set up for a war of attrition, the Luftwaffe wasn't, it could have gone on for another month or so (before the weather closed on) and the same result would have happened.
It didn't matter that the Luftwaffe attacked London (though it made the RAF's job easier, Keith Park was overjoyed at their strategic mistake), they could have just kept on doing what they did prior to that and the same result would have happened.

At no point was the RAF close to defeat, though they had taken losses, people forget the terrible losses the Luftwaffe had.. and the RAF could replace them while the Luftwaffe couldn't.

But and I say but, without Keith Park's incredible tactical leadership day to day, week after week, month after month then the RAF could have lost. One thing they did count on was the 'big mistake' by the RAF, like getting all its planes caught on the ground so the Luftwaffe could do to it what they did to the Polish (and later the USSR). Park never got caught that way.


And, by the way, the Germans, defending Germany were jokes. Tactical idiots. I can say this, because by the end of the BoB the Luftwaffe were sending over 5 fighters for every bomber a ratio the US fighters that did the final killing of the Luftwaffe never even came close to.

Park carefully 'peeled off' the fighter escorts, before sending in the bomber killers. And killed the bombers (and the fighters). Something, with better leadership than Goering and Galland could have done even more easily to the US, even after the P-15 came into play. They had hours to work things out, Park had minutes....

 

[parsifal]

Yes you can dismiss him, he wrote and said a lot of self serving crap and blamed everyone except himself. He was promoted far above his level and, if you want to pick one operational Luftwaffe leader responsible for the destruction of it, ... it would be him.

His strategy and tactics were outmoded, he didn't understand (especially in the BoB) things like logistics and communication (even later he was not really sure of it) . He, bizarrely, became a fan of the 'big wing concept in defending Germany, though he happily shot down high numbers of RAF fighters in 'big wings' because they were such easy targets.... need I go on. A Keith Park he was not.

His endless mantra, post war was 'Goering, Goering, Goering'. If Goering hadn't existed he would have had to invent someone else to blame. A very good squadron leader a good/fair wing leader, disastrous above that level.

None of this is relevant to whether Galland could accurately assess the LW state of mind or make comment about the mood and morale of his pilots If he was a "mediocre" squadron leader as you say elsewhere, but a poor logistician and tactician, that only leaves man management in his leaderships bag of tricks. As a failure in the other two areas of management, he has to, by definition need to be a great leader of men, and to do this, he needs to understand the mood of his men. This means then that his appraisal of the LWs reaction to the British offensive is correct, and accurate.

FWIW I pretty much disagree with everything contained in your assessment of him. I think he epitomised the best of the LW....tactical, professionally excellent skills, poor strategic sense, no real concept of combined arms or theatre needs. There were advantages,m and disadvantages to the german method, just as there were advantages and disadvantages to the way the RAF things, including the big, little wing, Park tactics, Mallory tactics.

 

[Njaco]

See, this is why I love this forum - you learn something new every day. So it wasn't Goering fault for the failure of the LW - it was Galland!!! Cool.

OMG. I just LOVE revisionist history.

All Galland's fault.
RAF never ran out of pilots or planes.
The LW couldn't fight it way out of a wet paper bag.
Midway never happened.
June 6 was never important.
on and on and on.........................

At no point was the RAF close to defeat, though they had taken losses, people forget the terrible losses the Luftwaffe had.. and the RAF could replace them while the Luftwaffe couldn't.

Exactly what source do you have for this comment? Everything I have ever read - some which includes stats - shows that during the first week of September, the RAF was on the ropes. I want to read the same sources you have that say this wasn't so and that in fact there never was a crisis. You make it sound like the RAF or England never needed any help from the US or anywhere else. They had plenty. "The RAF could replace them"?????? That goes against EVERYTHING I've read. What source for this do you have?

 

[Juha]

28 Sept 1940 Jagdwaffe establishment was 1132 Bf 109s and pilots but it had 920 109s and 917 pilots of which 712 109s were serviceable and 676 pilots were combat ready, so clearly Jagdwaffe had replacement problems.

Also Kesselring the CG of the most powerful LFl wanted in early Sept to shift attacks from a/fs to London in order to force FC to fight, so it wasn't that Hitler/Göring forced the shift over the military commanders heads but some militaru commanders agree with the shift.

Juha

 

[Milosh]

Especially Juha when compared to,
Single engine fighters - 29.06.40

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

also give pilot statistics

 

[mhuxt]

Exactly what source do you have for this comment? Everything I have ever read - some which includes stats - shows that during the first week of September, the RAF was on the ropes. I want to read the same sources you have that say this wasn't so and that in fact there never was a crisis. You make it sound like the RAF or England never needed any help from the US or anywhere else. They had plenty. "The RAF could replace them"?????? That goes against EVERYTHING I've read. What source for this do you have?

Well, you could start with Bungay, "The Most Dangerous Enemy".

 

[stona]

Well, you could start with Bungay, "The Most Dangerous Enemy".

For what? The RAF could replace the aircraft but, just like the Luftwaffe, not the pilots. I've covered this elsewhere with facts and figures. There are plenty of other authoritative sources which don't necessarily share Bungay's opinions. Bungay always pretty much supports the traditional 'myth' of the BoB.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Read Stephen Bungey's Book, Most Dangerous Enemy and it will answer all your questions. Definitely the finest book on the BoB (though as he admits built on the works of people like Price and so on).

The Luftwaffe had no chance of winning unless:
(1) Keith Park made a mistake (as did later Leigh Mallory) .
(2) They mastered and employed tools and tactics that no one had really worked out (ie fast fighter bombers on low level accurate attacks on critical areas).

Plus they had to win quickly, their logistics were far poorer. Their aircraft production was less than the UK's, their pilot training was less than the UK's.

Though we always get the 'RAF running out of pilots thing', The Luftwaffe was running out too ... and they couldn't replace them as fast as the UK could. And they couldn't replace their aircraft either (which the UK could) .

It started out with the Luftwaffe fighters (roughly the same size as the RAF) having to shoot down Spitfires and Hurricanes at a 4:1 or even a 5:1 ratio to win....Not going to happen .. and didn't.

The RAF was set up for a war of attrition, the Luftwaffe wasn't, it could have gone on for another month or so (before the weather closed on) and the same result would have happened.
It didn't matter that the Luftwaffe attacked London (though it made the RAF's job easier, Keith Park was overjoyed at their strategic mistake), they could have just kept on doing what they did prior to that and the same result would have happened.

At no point was the RAF close to defeat, though they had taken losses, people forget the terrible losses the Luftwaffe had.. and the RAF could replace them while the Luftwaffe couldn't.

But and I say but, without Keith Park's incredible tactical leadership day to day, week after week, month after month then the RAF could have lost. One thing they did count on was the 'big mistake' by the RAF, like getting all its planes caught on the ground so the Luftwaffe could do to it what they did to the Polish (and later the USSR). Park never got caught that way.


And, by the way, the Germans, defending Germany were jokes. Tactical idiots. I can say this, because by the end of the BoB the Luftwaffe were sending over 5 fighters for every bomber a ratio the US fighters that did the final killing of the Luftwaffe never even came close to.

Park carefully 'peeled off' the fighter escorts, before sending in the bomber killers. And killed the bombers (and the fighters). Something, with better leadership than Goering and Galland could have done even more easily to the US, even after the P-15 came into play. They had hours to work things out, Park had minutes....

I don't know where to start with that......so I won't bother

Steve