Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?

[mhuxt]

For what? The RAF could replace the aircraft but, just like the Luftwaffe, not the pilots. I've covered this elsewhere with facts and figures. There are plenty of other authoritative sources which don't necessarily share Bungay's opinions. Bungay always pretty much supports the traditional 'myth' of the BoB.

Cheers

Steve

I was responding to Njaco's query re: Skeptic's statement that the RAF was at no point close to defeat, specifically the query about which source was Skeptic referring to.

I thought the traditional 'myth' of the BoB was that it was a close-run thing?

 

[Njaco]

My question is if the RAF wasn't close to defeat, if most things associated with the BoB are myths, then why is it celebrated at all? If it was just another day in the war, why all the fuss? Then 1940 after June was no different than 1941 or 1942 over Western Europe.

If its all a myth, what was the crisis?

 

[mhuxt]

My question is if the RAF wasn't close to defeat, if most things associated with the BoB are myths, then why is it celebrated at all? If it was just another day in the war, why all the fuss? Then 1940 after June was no different than 1941 or 1942 over Western Europe.

If its all a myth, what was the crisis?

I suppose it's the difference between how things are objectively, and how they're experienced on the ground.

"The strutting Nazi bully-boys swept all before them, and expected us to roll over and give in, but we took all they could give and won through in the end.

There'll always be an England."

<shrug>

Anyway, Bungay's thesis is that it was in no way a close-run thing. I don't have Overy's book to hand, will make a quick trip to the local library and pick it up, see what he says.

 

[stona]

If its all a myth, what was the crisis?

The primary premise of the myth is that 'the few', that is Fighter Command or specifically 11 Group, saved Britain from an invasion in 1940. This was propagated by the media on both sides of the Atlantic not least in an effort to cultivate US public opinion for a more active role in the war prior to Pearl Harbour. You'll find this myth on the MOD/RAF site today.

According to various polls by Gallup in October 1939 only 5% of Americans were in favour of entering the war. On 6th June 1940 this was 19% 'following Italy's entrance' In July 1940 this FELL to 14% 'following the collapse of France'. In October it rose to 17% following the 'aerial blitzkrieg on Britain'. According to Gallup if the 50 million Americans who voted in the November 1940 presidential elections were asked to take a vote on whether or not to enter the war, then only 6 million would have voted 'Yes' in December. Incidentally 87% favoured taking over British possessions in the Caribbean should the Germans be victorious in 1940, the excuse being to safeguard the Panama canal !

There was a lot of work to be done in forming American public opinion.

This was done in many ways. The 'Why we Fight' series of films are obvious. Many articles appeared in the US press explaining the importance of the RN in the Atlantic to US interests. It is no coincidence that the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal was announced in September. 'Free Trade' was often mentioned. The prospect of maintaining a large standing army in 'peacetime' was raised. It may seem strange today but this was anathema to most Americans in 1940. Conscription was mentioned. Most Americans would remember the clash between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court over his effort to force a quarter of a million young men into the 'Civilian Conservation Corps' in the 1930s.
For my own reasons I have many press cuttings from the US press at this time. To say that British propaganda was uncritically reproduced would be the kindest way of summing them up . For example on 7th September Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who also happened to be the publisher of the Chicago Daily News, confidently assured his readers that 'Britain has a better than even chance now of withstanding the blitzkrieg' attributing his confidence to 'Britain's superior navy.' Today we would call that 'on message'.
Another front page article trumpets.
'Pilots Have What It Takes. RAF Oblivious to Odds, Small Force Takes on 200 Nazis'. A captured German pilot is quoted, rather dubiously, in the article saying 'These Spitfires are really terrible. They're much to good for us'. I'm sure you get the picture.

11 Group was on the ropes, but so was the Luftwaffe. The RAF was not on the verge of defeat any more than the Luftwaffe was. The two air forces fought each other to a stalemate. This stalemate has been portrayed as a victory in Britain since 1940. It was in the sense that the Luftwaffe was denied its stated objectives, but it could still bomb London and other cities by night, at will.
The Germans did not even acknowledge that there had been a Battle of Britain. Their BoB was never fought, it would have taken place on English beaches or, more likely, in the middle of the Channel as they were massacred by the Home Fleet. For them the aerial campaign of July to September against mostly S.E. England was just part of a longer campaign stretching into 1941.

Unlike some (including IIRC Bungay) I do not believe that the Germans could have launched a successful invasion in the summer/autumn of 1940, even had Fighter Command been forced to withdraw north of London. I have given plenty of evidence for the Wermacht's own lack of confidence in such an operation, but here's one more, from General Gunther von Blumentritt.
'We knew far too little of England. We knew literally nothing of amphibious operations. At the time we were preparing 'Sealion' plans, accounts of the campaigns of Caesar, Britanicus and William the Conqueror were being read.'

None of this detracts from the determination and heroism of those 3,000 or so men who flew for the RAF in the battle, or the many thousands more who supported them, nor that of their adversaries. That is not part of any myth.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Hop]

My question is if the RAF wasn't close to defeat, if most things associated with the BoB are myths, then why is it celebrated at all? If it was just another day in the war, why all the fuss? Then 1940 after June was no different than 1941 or 1942 over Western Europe.

If its all a myth, what was the crisis?

In less than a year the Germans had conquered Poland, then Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. They had defeated the British army on the continent and driven them back across the sea. Having defeated the rest of Europe, they were launching their campaign against Britain. It's hardly surprising it was viewed as a crisis in Britain. The Germans themselves thought they had all but won.

The Luftwaffe committed everything to a short offensive. The RAF husbanded their resources to fight a long campaign. The result was not a foregone conclusion at the start.

The myth isn't that Britain was in no danger. If the RAF had made as many mistakes as the Luftwaffe, the result could have gone differently. The myth is that the Germans were close to winning in early September. They weren't. The result was a foregone conclusion by early September. The Luftwaffe had squandered their advantage in July and August. By early September the RAF was beginning to suffer. By early September the Luftwaffe was at its last gasp. The RAF was short of pilots. The Luftwaffe had less fighter pilots. They were more exhausted. They were short of aircraft. They were short of spare parts. The Luftwaffe could not continue on the same scale as they had before.

To the men on the ground fighting the battle it appeared a lot closer than it did to the men at the top who could take a longer view. To the post war historian, with accurate figures for the Luftwaffe, it wasn't close at all.

 

[stona]

At the time there was no appreciation of something called the Battle of Britain, note the capitalisation. Overy mentions that Park referred to the Battle of London. The night time blitz heralded what the C-in-C Sothern Command considered the Battle of England.
One of the few things almost all narratives do agree on is that there was no clear idea in September/October 1940 that a battle had been won. The Germans never came to see it that way.
In Churchill's June 1940 speech in which the phrase 'battle of Britain' was used it was not capitalised, unlike the 'Battle of France', which was over. The myth of the Battle of Britain was really cemented in March 1941 with the publication by HMSO of the infamous pamphlet, the one that didn't even mention Dowding or Park. A more realistic story was told in Dowding's August 1941 account 'Battle of Britain Despatch' but this was not published.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

To the men on the ground fighting the battle it appeared a lot closer than it did to the men at the top who could take a longer view. To the post war historian, with accurate figures for the Luftwaffe, it wasn't close at all.

There are many quotes posted here from Dowding Park and others from both sides. I cannot question a man like Park but his opinion at the time was based on what he knew or assumed. He didnt know the size of the LW prior to the BoF, he didnt know their losses in France, he didnt know how many A/C they produced. If he had this info he would have been much more comfortable with the situation.

On the British side it was a war of attrition on the German side it had to be a complete white wash leaving the LW fully able to support an invasion with no opposition. The RAF had hundreds probably into thousands of aircraft capable of strafing a beach, without sweeping all RAF SE fighters out of existence a landing couldnt be considered, which is one of many reasons it was called off.

 

[stona]

There are many quotes posted here from Dowding Park and others from both sides. I cannot question a man like Park but his opinion at the time was based on what he knew or assumed. He didnt know the size of the LW prior to the BoF, he didnt know their losses in France, he didnt know how many A/C they produced. If he had this info he would have been much more comfortable with the situation..

Of course there were intelligence failures on both sides but I don't think that is relevant to Dowding, Park or anybody else's assessments of Fighter Command's position. Quotes are almost invariably lacking context to some extent, particularly within the constraints of a forum posting, but these men were expressing concern at the situation of their own forces and not in relation to the strength of the enemy. In everything Dowding wrote and said, and what I know of Park's writing, neither man ever made any assumptions about Luftwaffe strength, rather they concentrated on what they saw coming across the Channel, day by day.
I do not believe that the critical lack of operational pilots expressed by Dowding in early September would have been made any less serious to him by the knowledge that the Luftwaffe was also struggling. Park was very worried about attacks on Sector airfields, later confiding in Jonnie Johnson that although there were many other airfields in Southern England they were not equipped to communicate with his headquarters and that 'Without signals the only thing I commanded was my desk at Uxbridge'. This concern has nothing to do with the relative strength of the enemy.
On the afternoon of 7th September, around the time these concerns were being expressed, the Luftwaffe made an attack on London with 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters. Those are the numbers that Fighter Command had to deal with, along with a force of 200 bombers that came along, unescorted, after dark, to wreak more havoc that night.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

On the afternoon of 7th September, around the time these concerns were being expressed, the Luftwaffe made an attack on London with 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters. Those are the numbers that Fighter Command had to deal with, along with a force of 200 bombers that came along, unescorted, after dark, to wreak more havoc that night.
Cheers
Steve

Those figures tie up with the figures of available fighters. To some extent commanders are always a bit in the dark, however Dowding /Park were not aware that that was all LW fighters available while the LW were concentrating forces to deliver the final knock out blow.

There were some very dark days and 11 group was severely tested but as far as being wiped out I dont think that was ever a possibility. If they had continued and lost more planes they would posibly be in the position of not being able to defend themselves against attack.

 

[stona]

Those figures tie up with the figures of available fighters. To some extent commanders are always a bit in the dark, however Dowding /Park were not aware that that was all LW fighters available while the LW were concentrating forces to deliver the final knock out blow.

There were some very dark days and 11 group was severely tested but as far as being wiped out I dont think that was ever a possibility. If they had continued and lost more planes they would posibly be in the position of not being able to defend themselves against attack.

I actually agree with you about the intelligence short fall. It was probably worse for the Germans than for the British during the battle, but most British appraisals of Luftwaffe strength were way off the mark.

I don't think that 11 Group was ever going to be 'wiped out' but I think, even with the Luftwaffe's woeful tactics, it might have been forced North of London despite Dowding's insistence that he would only do this IF an invasion was actually launched.

Dowding was very keen on the concept of 'forward interception'. It was a system which had roots in the earliest radar experiments, the so called Biggin Hill experiments, of 1937. Dowding was keen to intercept many rather than annihilate a few as he rightly felt that the disruption of the bomber formations would lead to at worst inaccurate bombing and at best a failure of the bombers to bomb at all. He was directly asked to clarify this by Leslie Gossage, Park's predecessor at 11 Group on its formation in 1936, later Inspector General of the RAF.
Dowding wished to match machine with machine but cautioned that if too many fighters were sent up they could be caught on the ground re-fuelling and re-arming by a second wave of bombers, too few risked defeat.
He did not wish to lose this advantage, afforded him by the technology (something else Luftwaffe intelligence never grasped).

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

I actually agree with you about the intelligence short fall. It was probably worse for the Germans than for the British during the battle, but most British appraisals of Luftwaffe strength were way off the mark.

I don't think that 11 Group was ever going to be 'wiped out' but I think, even with the Luftwaffe's woeful tactics, it might have been forced North of London despite Dowding's insistence that he would only do this IF an invasion was actually launched.

Dowding was very keen on the concept of 'forward interception'. It was a system which had roots in the earliest radar experiments, the so called Biggin Hill experiments, of 1937. Dowding was keen to intercept many rather than annihilate a few as he rightly felt that the disruption of the bomber formations would lead to at worst inaccurate bombing and at best a failure of the bombers to bomb at all. He was directly asked to clarify this by Leslie Gossage, Park's predecessor at 11 Group on its formation in 1936, later Inspector General of the RAF.
Dowding wished to match machine with machine but cautioned that if too many fighters were sent up they could be caught on the ground re-fuelling and re-arming by a second wave of bombers, too few risked defeat.
He did not wish to lose this advantage, afforded him by the technology (something else Luftwaffe intelligence never grasped).

Cheers

Steve

Steve I dont think it has yet been declared a crime to agree, much hinges on the definition of victory I think, you are obviously better informed than me and I dont have any books with me.

 

[stona]

Steve I dont think it has yet been declared a crime to agree, much hinges on the definition of victory I think,

I hope that it hasn't

I think the problem with the definition of a victory was more that one side didn't think that the battle (or campaign more realistically) was over and the other didn't appreciate that they had won !

I do think that the outcome of the battle of Britain was a victory for Fighter Command. I don't think that the numbers game is useful, better to look at what the two sides were trying to achieve.

Dowding set out with the express intent of not being defeated before the weather turned irrevocably in November. He achieved this, not easily but with time to spare.

The initial German objective was officially to defeat the RAF and obtain air superiority over a potential invasion area. The Luftwaffe never came close to this.

A more realistic German objective was to force Britain into a 'negotiated', read 'imposed', settlement. I contend that the switch in targets away from Fighter Command and the Royal Navy was part of this plan. Again the Luftwaffe never came close to achieving this.

Everyone knows that Hitler famously postponed 'Sealion' "until further notice" on 17th December, but Raeder, using the failure of the Luftwaffe as an excuse, had already reported on the 13th

1. The present situation in the air battle is not conducive to implementing Operation Sealion, as the risks are too great.

2. Failure of the operation would result in a prestigious victory for the British, which would diminish the effects of the air raids.

3. It is vital that Luftwaffe strikes on Britain, particularly on London, continue unabated. These raids should be intensified given good weather and without regard to Sealion. These attacks could be decisive in achieving a final victory.

4. Operation Sealion must not be cancelled. The British must be kept insecure. Cancellation of the landing would take a great deal of pressure off England.

Despite the last point everyone in the Wermacht seems to have understood that Hitler's postponement 'until further notice' actually meant 'for ever' as most knew, particularly in the Kriegsmarine, that no matter what the Luftwaffe did, a cross Channel amphibious operation was beyond the Wermacht's ability. Raeder really wanted the threat of an invasion maintained, but it wasn't to be.

Within a week of Dowding reporting that Fighter Command was 'going downhill fast' the Germans had effectively conceded what they saw as round one.

To me that adds up to a significant victory for the RAF, but not the victory of the myth propagated in 1940/41 and prevalent ever since.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

Steve...agreed as long as it isnt against forum rules

 

[stona]

There are many things that could be written about Dowding and the outcome of the Battle of Britain. The inscription on his statue outside the Church of the Royal Air Force, St.Clement Danes, does a pretty good summing up.

"Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding was Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, from its formation in 1936 until November 1940, he was thus responsible for the preparation for and the conduct of the Battle of Britain.
With remarkable foresight, he ensured the equipment of his command with monoplane fighters, the Hurricane and the Spitfire, he was among the first to appreciate the vital importance of R.D.F. (radar) and of an effective command and control system for his squadrons. They were ready when war came.
In the preliminary stages of that war, he thoroughly trained his minimal forces and conserved them against strong political pressures to disperse and misuse them. His wise and prudent judgement and leadership helped to ensure victory against overwhelming odds and thus prevented the loss of the Battle of Britain and probably the whole war.
To him the people of Britain and of the free world owe largely the way of life and the liberties they enjoy today."

It is strangely appropriate that the church, designed by Wren and completed in 1682, was gutted during the blitz and restored in 1958 to become the RAF church.

Steve

 

[stona]

I'd just add that thousands of highly trained and dedicated young men and women manned Fighter Command and made it ready to fight the Battle. Dowding was one of only two men, Park being the other, who could have lost it.

Writing after the release of the Battle of Britain film Al Deere (now Air Commodore) also summed up Dowding's plan and the nature of the victory.

"His plan was simple. To use an analogy, it was based on the premise that as the light weight in the contest he could not expect to knock out his heavier opponent. He could only hope to win either by a technical knock out or on a points decision. To knock out the Luftwaffe was indeed never possible, it had too much in its armoury. A technical knock out was possible but not probable in the expected time available. A points decision seemed, therefore, the most likely solution and this meant staying the distance. In effect this is what Fighter Command achieved."

The details were worked out by Deere's fellow Kiwi, Park. During the filming of the afore mentioned film, in 1968, at Hawkinge, Dowding sat with the actor Trevor Howard (who portrayed Park) and watched closely as two Spitfires made their landings. He then turned to Howard, saying. "If it hadn't been for Keith Park's conduct in the battle, and his loyalty to me as his Commander in Chief, we should not be here today."

One for the album. Lord Dowding and Trevor Howard, Hawkinge 1968.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

I'd just add that thousands of highly trained and dedicated young men and women manned Fighter Command and made it ready to fight the Battle.

Entirely agree...and recognize that the Battle of Britain wasn't just a British victory. It was a victory for all free-thinking people, as evidenced by the highly cosmopolitan make-up of Fighter Commend. Yes, British personnel made up the majority but more than 20% of Fighter Command's pilots came from other nations. Airmen came from the following countries:

Great Britain - 2,342
Australia - 32
Barbados - 1
Belgium - 28
Canada - 112
Czechoslovakia - 88
France - 13
Ireland - 10
Jamaica - 1
Newfoundland - 1
New Zealand - 127
Poland - 145
Rhodesia - 3
South Africa - 25
United States - 9

I find the number from New Zealand to be particularly significant - the second largest non-Brit contributors (after Poland) and yet such a small country so far away from Europe.

 

[gjs238]

Only 9 Yanks?

 

[stona]

Only 9 Yanks?

To be fair the US wasn't committed as part of the Commonwealth/Empire and neither had it been invaded and occupied by the Germans.
The Americans had to circumvent their countries neutrality in order to join up. At least one (Fiske, KIA 16th August '40) pretended to be Canadian, a ruse that the British must have seen through, but to which they turned a blind eye in true Nelsonian fashion.
Theoretically at least these Americans risked their citizenship and prosecution, should they return to the USA.
Cheers
Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Only 9 Yanks?

Yeah but Ben Affleck was one of them and he won the Battle single-handed, so we really didn't need any more!






I'll get me coat!

 

[bobbysocks]

pretty much all of the other countries look like CW or were terrritories of countries that had been invaded. the number of americans may be a little a little off....the 9 could be the americans that went to england to join the raf like gentile and may not take into account the ones who went to canada and flew in the rcaf like claude weaver. but even then i would venture to say the number was very small maybe another half a dozen or so.