Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?

[parsifal]

The raid on Berlin in June which spooked the Luftwaffe was probably the raid of 7th June 1940 when a single French Farman F220 bombed the city in retalilation for a Luftwaffe attack on Paris, there were certainly no RAF raids that far into eastern Germany during June and July.

Correct. Raids on Berlin were not athorised until late August. Churchill had given limted freedom of attack to attack other cities in germany, specifically port cities and cities in western germany, mostly the ruhr, on the 15 May, and as far as I know, that order had not been expoanded until later in August. The britsh did have concerns about terror attacks, despite the bravado, and attacking berlin was sure to put pressure on hitler to unleash revenge attacks.

 

[redcoat]

Churchill had given limted freedom of attack to attack other cities in germany, specifically port cities and cities in western germany, mostly the ruhr, on the 15 May, and as far as I know, that order had not been expoanded until later in August. The britsh did have concerns about terror attacks, despite the bravado, and attacking berlin was sure to put pressure on hitler to unleash revenge attacks.

It should be noted that all the intended targets of RAF raids in this period including the attacks on Berlin, were either military or military related, and if they were unable to find any targets of this nature they were to return to the UK with their bombs.

 

[Hop]

What, he misunderstood a request from the OKL for anti aircraft units to be transferred from the Army to the Luftwaffe and moved to protect Berlin? This request came as a result of British bombs falling on Berlin on 22nd June IIRC.

No, I think he understood the request but misunderstood "bombs falling on Berlin". Without knowing the exact wording of what he was told it's impossible to say, of course, but "as far as Berlin" could mean targets north, south or east of the city, or "the RAF are flying over Berlin" could mean recce and propaganda sorties.

22 June was also the end of the battle of France, so it's natural the Germans were discussing redeploying anti aircraft guns.

It is entirely possible that these bombs were not intended for Berlin. I would suggest that the forces on the ground had a firmer grasp of where ordnance was landing than those dropping it in mid 1940, particularly at night.

William Shirer was in Berlin. His diary was contemporaneous, too. Berliners seemed unaware of any previous attacks on the city. The German press announcements were contemporaneous, they seemed unaware of any earlier attacks.

It's not just that the RAF didn't order any earlier attacks, it's that no one else in Berlin seemed to have noticed any earlier attacks either.

 

[abaddon1]

One critical fact, often overlooked, is that, during the Battle of France, although the RAF had already lost almost one thousand aircraft... (almost half of which were fighters)... by June 1940; Churchill, at the request of the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, demanded more aircraft be sent even though it was clear the battle for France was lost and Britain would be left standing alone against Germany.
Despite immense political pressure; at the insistence of Sir Hugh Dowding commanding Fighter Command, the RAF refused to release any further squadrons; Dowding's argument being that the service possessed insufficient fighters to defend against the coming assault on Britain; and that if he obeyed Churchill's edict, and the current rate of losses continued, there would be no fighters left within two weeks to defend the UK.
Air Vice Marshall Keith Park agreed with Dowding; forcing Churchill to back down.

Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

 

[pbehn]

Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

I dont know about that, when Churchill visited France his impression was that the French had given up long before they surrendered, they were burning documents in the courtyards while demanding more aircraft. I was under the impression that it was Leigh Mallory that poisoned his mind to Dowding and Park. I may be wrong though.

 

[parsifal]

One critical fact, often overlooked, is that, during the Battle of France, although the RAF had already lost almost one thousand aircraft... (almost half of which were fighters)... by June 1940; Churchill, at the request of the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, demanded more aircraft be sent even though it was clear the battle for France was lost and Britain would be left standing alone against Germany.
Despite immense political pressure; at the insistence of Sir Hugh Dowding commanding Fighter Command, the RAF refused to release any further squadrons; Dowding's argument being that the service possessed insufficient fighters to defend against the coming assault on Britain; and that if he obeyed Churchill's edict, and the current rate of losses continued, there would be no fighters left within two weeks to defend the UK.
Air Vice Marshall Keith Park agreed with Dowding; forcing Churchill to back down.

Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Reynauds request is all the more galling when one remebers that already the FAF was evacuating key units out of metrolpitan france at the time the request was being made.

 

[eWildcat]

Only if we suppose that the Armée de l'Air didn't resist some orders and didn't play any political game itself. Things were pretty messy at the time.

 

[stona]

Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Much more complicated than that. Churchill still backed Dowding long after the BoF, during what I think of as the second round in the fight by some at the A.M. and in the RAF to remove him.

In January 1942 Park went to Egypt as Air Officer Commanding, not some training command, and thence to Malta where he pulled the rabbit out of the hat for a second time. In 1944 (can't remember when) he was made AOC-in-C, Middle East Command.

Park was probably one of the best tactical commanders that Britain and its Commonwealth has ever produced. Dowding always credited him for the way he handled 11 Group and effectively managed the BoB from hour to hour and day to day.

I'd have renamed Auckland as Parksville

Cheers

Steve.

 

[redcoat]

Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

It was internal RAF office politics which saw Dowding retired and Park transferred, not Churchill.

 

[stona]

Reynauds request is all the more galling when one remebers that already the FAF was evacuating key units out of metrolpitan france at the time the request was being made.

Six Hurricane squadrons were in France on day one of the invasion. On May 10th Dowding expressed the view that the efforts of 'every modern fighter in the service' would not effect the outcome in France and the Low Countries and that their absence from their home bases might seriously effect the issue there. Nonetheless Dowding lost another six squadrons to France with a further four making cross channel sorties on a daily basis.
Dowding described the pressure for more assistance as 'relentless and inexorable'

On 15th May Dowding attended a cabinet meeting at which Newall spoke up resisting sending more fighters to France. Dowding did NOT confront Churchill on his own as some have since written. Newall made the case for retaining the fighters at home but Churchill explained that the BEF was still in position, near Brussels, and that it was preparing to attack German lines of communication and could not be denied support.

The next day, with the Germans clearly winning the battle, Dowding set out his case against sending more aircraft to France in a letter to the Air Ministry. This is probably the most famous letter written at any time, by any airman, to any recipient. It now hangs framed at the RAF college at Cranwell and I don't feel I need to reproduce it here.

On this day (16th) the Air Ministry ordered Dowding to prepare to send a further eight half-squadrons across the Channel. Dowding now only had thirty six squadrons of the fifty two he believed he needed for home defence. Incidentally, Churchill claimed in his memoirs that Dowding told him he only required twenty five (not fifty two) but in this he was mistaken.
Churchill then flew to France and telegraphed London asking for an additional six squadrons for France.
At 11pm on 16th May the cabinet agreed to this request. On 17th Churchill returned and said, with typical hyperbole, that the decision to send fighters to France had been 'the gravest decision that a British cabinet had ever had to take'.

Now Newall, not Dowding, stepped in again saying that there were not enough French airfields for these six squadrons so they stayed in Kent and undertook cross Channel operations. Dowding, in a letter to Park, described this as 'a notable victory on the "Home Front".

Dowding now sent Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton to France to assess the situation. He spent three days (17-19 May) in France before reporting that the Germans were winning and any fighters sent to help the Allied Armies would be lost for no good reason.

On 19th May Churchill ruled that no more fighter squadrons were to be sent to France, confirmed by the cabinet the next day. On 19th and 20th May all but three of the fighter squadrons returned to the UK. On 24th May Dowding wrote that this had 'converted a desperate situation to a serious one.'

Harold Lander, in charge of the Bawdsey research group which became the 'Stanmore Research Section' at the outbreak of the war, produced the graphs and figures which convinced Churchill that Dowding had been correct in the first week of June (not 15th May as some historians seem to think). Much later Lander wrote.
'There seems little doubt that, had Dowding not won his little battle with Churchill in May [actually June], he would have lost the Battle of Britain in September.'
Well, maybe.

It was a dramatic scene.
Dowding, armed with Lander's data, attended a cabinet meeting on 3rd June. Dowding did not feel he was convincing Churchill.
He later wrote that Beaverbrook, who was also at the meeting, had since told him that, 'He saw me throw my pencil down on the table and said to himself "he's going to resign". Luckily, I had realised that one can often convince a person through his eyes when it is not possible to do so through his ears, and I had armed myself with a graph showing the balance of Hurricane wastage against replacements. I got up from my seat and walked around the table to the PM's chair. I laid the graph on the table before him and said, "If the present rate of wastage continues for another fortnight, we shall not have a single Hurricane left in France or in this country." That did the trick.'

He retained Churchill's confidence and respect.

When the Battle of Britain pamphlet was published in March 1941 it failed even to mention Dowding or Park. It was written 'anonymously' by a certain Hilary St. George Saunders who later acted as Leigh-Mallory's diarist and co-wrote a slightly skewed (in my opinion) three volume history of the RAF.
Churchill wrote to Sinclair on Dowding's behalf asking for an explanation.

'The jealousies and cliquism which have led to the committing of this offence are a discredit to the Air Ministry and I do not think any other service department would have been guilty of such a piece of work. What would have been said if the War Office had produced the story of the Battle of Libya and had managed to exclude General Wavell's name, or if the Admiralty had told the tale of Trafalgar and left Lord Nelson out of it! It grieves me very much that you should associate yourself with such behaviour.'

Despite this, it was not until August 1943 that an illustrated version of the pamphlet was published which not only named and credited Park and Dowding but also carried photographs of the two men.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

In August 1942 Dowding had written an article for (I think but can't find my source) the Evening Standard which the censor had rejected. It pertained to the current day fighter situation. Dowding did not then detail his grievances to the Air Ministry but rather wrote directly to Churchill, explaining that.

'My opinions are known, but they are not accepted [at the AM] and my despatch on the Battle of Britain has been withheld even from the Commanders in Chief and service members of the Air Council. The clear lead in performance and hitting power of our day fighters has been allowed by slovenly thinking and lack of development work to degenerate into a state of inferiority in both respects."

Churchill initially asked Tedder to respond to Dowding's article but Tedder suggested that Dowding address his concerns to Portal. Eventually Churchill replied himself. After suggesting that publishing such an article which might give useful information to the enemy would have been a 'reckless step' he assured Dowding that 'You knew well from our relations that you had only to write to me to ensure that immediate attention would be given to what you say.'

As we study the relationships between the various 'players' in these dramas we discover that nothing is black and white. Everyone, including Dowding, was playing the political game, some better than others.

Politics?

In May 1945 Sinclair wrote a letter to Dowding commending his 'inspired leadership' which had helped preserve 'our island citadel'.. It was however impossible to recognise this by promoting him Air Marshall. That rank retains a half salary until death and was really the least that should have been done. In January 1946 both Sholto-Douglas and Harris did receive this promotion.

Three weeks later Sinclair wrote more honestly to Sholto-Douglas. 'I felt as though I had won a battle when I got Fighter Command into your hands, and, looking back, how right I was.'
The many pilots killed in mostly pointless operations over France in 1941 might not have agreed.

When Douglas sent Dowding a copy of the second volume of his memoirs (Years of Command......good luck if you want to read it, seriously boring) Dowding wrote to 'My dear Sholto' to thank him for the book and 'for the kindly things which you have said about me.'

Dowding never publicly expressed any ill feeling about his treatment, he played the game. Park was a different matter. He wrote in 1968. 'To my dying day I shall feel bitter at the base intrigue which was used to remove Dowding and myself as soon as we had won the battle.' Leigh-Mallory had been least generous. According to Park 'He did not even bother to attend the usual formality of taking over from me, so I handed over to my senior staff officer.'

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

The many pilots killed in mostly pointless operations over France in 1941 might not have agreed

.

These operations could better be described as just costly, not pointless. there were very real and valid points to their operation. The way they were executed was pretty poor, but again, thats different to "pointless". Foreman brings this out failry well.

The "point(s)" were, control of the channel, pushing back the bombers that were left in the west after June, both sucessful. The RAF wanted to force the LW up for a full showdown, and this never happened. Most importantly the RAF wanted to lessen the pressure on the Russians and regain the initiative. Like anything, some elements were successful, some were not. What is unarguable was the very heavy cost, and this does make the whole idea dubious, but not pointless.

 

[Koopernic]

Correct. Raids on Berlin were not athorised until late August. Churchill had given limited freedom of attack to attack other cities in germany, specifically port cities and cities in western germany, mostly the ruhr, on the 15 May, and as far as I know, that order had not been expoanded until later in August. The britsh did have concerns about terror attacks, despite the bravado, and attacking berlin was sure to put pressure on hitler to unleash revenge attacks.

The first RAF raids on Berlin were in August. The targets were Berlin Tempelhof Airport and Siemensstadt which was an industrial suburb known for the Siemens electrical engineering firm, in other words both "civil targets". I expect there was militarily related manufacturing operations there. Hitlers subsequent decision to switch from Luftwaffe attack on RAF bases to industrial, power and dockland targets in and around London (and other cities) was influenced by this RAF bombing of Berlin and perhaps it was seen as a reprisal . Other factors seem to have been that the campaign against the RAF did not seem to be working and the attacks on the docks, their where-houses, nearby offices and the adjoining suburb (where break bulk cargo had to be laboriously sorted) fitted in with the u-boat campaign.

There were no Luftwaffe "terror raids" until the so called Baedecker raids, which were themselves Reprisals for RAF raids on Lubeck and Rostock which were both picturesque Medieval coastal towns though certainly with some industry. These two cities were the first use of the RAF's "area bombardment" with the medieval town center itself targeted by the RAF rather than saturation bombing of specific targets or the area around them. Bath, one of the targets, had then and does now have impressive industry.

The initial excuse for RAF attacking Military targets in Germany was given as a reprisal for the Luftwaffe bombardment of Rotterdam during the German Army Siege of Rotterdam, when ultimatums were pronounced, however the RAF decision to bomb German targets had in fact already been taken and propaganda exploited opportunity.

There seem to have been a few attacks on each others naval bases preceding this.

It's fairly obvious that both sides attempted to restrain themselves, some from genuine ethical concerns, some from attempts to prevent escalation, but also for the sake of not appearing to be the first to "bomb civilians" for the sake of moral or propaganda lever edge. To this extent any inevitable navigation error could be used as an excuse. The Butt report lets us know how ridiculously easy it was for crews to bomb way off targets they thought they had positively identified. Only seemed to work on coastal targets on moon lit nights. For the Germans, as as soon as a city was under direct siege by their Army and in the way of Army objectives the Luftwaffe would be called in, even then at Rotterdam they did negotiate.

The French Air force raid on Berlin seems to have been a reprisal for Operation Pauli, the Luftwaffe operation to destroy the remaining French air-force by attacks on air bases around Paris.

Hence the decision to Bomber Tempelhoff Airport and Siemensstadt in Berlin may have saved Britain to the extent that the Germans may have reacted by switching their attacks to targets in London.

Personally I find the destruction of so much cultural heritage revolting however I am also not happy to use the word "terror". The formal, non emotive and more accurate term to use is "demoralization".

 

[stona]

.

These operations could better be described as just costly, not pointless. there were very real and valid points to their operation. The way they were executed was pretty poor, but again, thats different to "pointless". Foreman brings this out failry well.

The "point(s)" were, control of the channel, pushing back the bombers that were left in the west after June, both sucessful. The RAF wanted to force the LW up for a full showdown, and this never happened. Most importantly the RAF wanted to lessen the pressure on the Russians and regain the initiative. Like anything, some elements were successful, some were not. What is unarguable was the very heavy cost, and this does make the whole idea dubious, but not pointless.

They were ill advised at the very least, particularly after the experiences of the Luftwaffe over Britain. You can learn from your enemy as well as your own experience. By late 1941 the Luftwaffe also had a fighter in the Fw 190 which was markedly superior to the current Mark of Spitfire in almost all respects and a second in the Bf 109 F which was at least its equal. These two latter points were what worried Dowding so much, though Fighter Command was no longer his responsibility he retained his empathy for the pilots who flew for it.

It is no accident that the Air Staff stepped in on 13th November 1941 with a directive limiting all but essential RAF operations over Northern Europe. As early as March 1941 Evill had contended that 'Circus' operations were ineffective and should be curtailed. It was Douglas who, whilst conceding that more training was needed, argued that the offensive gave Fighter Command the opportunity to 'lean forward into France'.
He was lucky that plans for combined operations, culminating in the Dieppe raid supported the need for offensive operations. Douglas was more or less ordered to maintain these in a directive of 13th March 1942. He was also ordered to "press forward as rapidly as possible with training and preparation for combined operations." .

There are very often considerations above those of any individual service or command that influence how it operates.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Steve you need to read about Robert E lees seven days campaigns to understand why it was absolutely imperative for the RAF to continue its forays into France, regardless of the costs.

I hope I am not insulting you by explaining, but on the assumption you may not get the point im trying to make, I will give my explanation

When Mclelland made his move on Richmond in 1862, he held all the aces, and the confederate capital was his for the taking. but he was cautious. Lee arrived, and fought seven battles in seven days, each one was technically a defeat, but stretegically it made Mclelland think he was being outflanked and in imminent danger of being surrounded and outgunned. He became ever more cautious and eventually pulled back away from Richmond. Tactically he had won every battle yet strategically he had lost.

In the case of the germans, the RAF campaigns of 1941 and 1942 gave them no rest, and this affected loss rates. as foreman shows, whilst losses in combat were quite low, mostly because of the vast experience of the german aircrews, but also because of the superior types committed (it was mostly Hurricanes being flown over france incidentally, at least in 1941), but most of all, because the germns chose only to rise for those fights where they were not too badly outnumbered, in terms of overall losses, the Germans were losing more aircraft as a proportion of their force structure in comparison to the RAF losses. German losses are a sad story of "failed to return" or "crashed on landing" , and other similar non-combat losses. When you consider these losses, there was a steady attrition on the LW.

The offensives over france were necessary to gain control of skies, and gain the initiative over the LW, as well as giving it no rest. It took time to do this, and it has to be said, the operations themselves were very poorly thought out and not very inspiring in terms of delivery. It was a cost that had to be paid, and it was paid, but I am of the view, that in a strategic sense at least, it was worth it. by the latter part of 1942, not thanks to the USAAC which was still miniscule in Europe, the LW was firmly on the defensive and firmly losing the fights for the French coastal areas. There were very sound reasons why the LW abandoned the coastal area in the finish, though it took a while to achieve that outcome. FC lacked aircraft with much range, and this prevented it from extending that control of the air even deeper into German held territory. without absoloute control of the skies over Britain, and its littoral waterways, the bomber offensive was really unable to get into full swing. Without that total control the LW could provide too much information as to what the british were up to. Challenging for air superiority over the continent was one of those thankless and unsung tasks carried out by the RAF and something for which it receives scant praise even today.

 

[gjs238]

<SNIP> it was mostly Hurricanes being flown over france incidentally, at least in 1941
<SNIP> FC lacked aircraft with much range, and this prevented it from extending that control of the air even deeper into German held territory

Sounds like a job for P-40's and later, Mustangs

 

[stona]

The RAF tried to push too far, too soon. It should have confined it's operations closer to the French coast, particularly after it was noticed (very early) that the Luftwaffe only reacted to RAF raids (whether bombers were present (Circus) or not) on its terms. More imaginative means and tactics needed to be used.

In April 1942 Fighter Command losses were such that Leigh Mallory was once again reigned in. He was ordered:

(a) To pick targets right on the coast, and not try to penetrate.

(b) To carry out a proportion of…operations without bombers at all, since the Hun [was] apparently ready to react even though no bombers [were] present.

(c) To employ large numbers of squadrons with a view to out-numbering the Hun.

From March 1942 the need to maintain air superiority over the Channel and French coast was an explicit requirement for the combined operations. But even this was conditional. Douglas was ordered to resume Circus operations and supplement these with fighter sweeps in order to attrite Luftwaffe strength, though he was to conserve strength where possible until the introduction of more effective aircraft. Somewhat contradictory orders to be polite.

Until 'Dynamo', which can be seen as a combined operation in reverse, as noted by Air Vice-Marshal James Robb, deputy chief of combined operations, and then 'Archery' (Vaasgo, Norway) any sort of combined operation involving air power was entirely theoretical. Air Vice-Marshal Richard Peirse, deputy chief of the air staff, noted that "If the enemy has a powerful air force, we must prevent him somehow or other from interfering with our landing and our lines of communications."

From early 1942 this was the real reason why the RAF was allowed to operate further into NW Europe. DCAS informed Douglas on 1 May that his priorities were:

(a) The intensification of the day fighter offensive which calls for reinforcement of 11 Group with Spitfire squadrons.

(b) Maintenance of a proper state of readiness of squadrons ear-marked for operation "Region"

(c) The training of fighter squadrons in rotation in Combined Operation.

Despite this in June 1942, after just three months, operations inland were once again strictly limited by the Air Staff.

Fighter Command was simply not up to the job its commanders were asking it to do.

The origins of all this lay in Anglo-American discussions in early 1942 to increase the scale and frequency of raids. On 18 April, the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved a memorandum that stated that raids were "to be undertaken in the summer of 1942 on the largest scale that the available equipment will permit." These discussions fell under what proved to be premature and optimistic decisions concerning Operation Sledgehammer/Roundup and the debate over the invasion of Europe in 1942.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

As far as operations to fight a war of attrition over France I would say it was theoretically impossible. There was nothing in France worth throwing the LW away on or for as far as Germany was concerned. Without a beach head the Germans would conserve their forces.

 

[stona]

As far as operations to fight a war of attrition over France I would say it was theoretically impossible. There was nothing in France worth throwing the LW away on or for as far as Germany was concerned. Without a beach head the Germans would conserve their forces.

The Luftwaffe certainly seems to have agreed with you. They didn't rise to the 'bait', usually a few bombers, on Circus operations. It came up and fought as and when it decided to, regardless of the RAF formation. The RAF was undertaking offensive operations into NW Europe (when the Air Staff wasn't limiting these, something it did whenever it got cold feet over the losses) but it certainly didn't have the initiative.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

The RAF was undertaking offensive operations into NW Europe (when the Air Staff wasn't limiting these, something it did whenever it got cold feet over the losses) but it certainly didn't have the initiative

.

The RAF certainly DID have the initiative. you need to read Foreman. The RAF was bombing KM ships in harbours, preventing free movement in the channel and use of the French ports. they successfully curtailed mining operations almost to a standstill, sank nearly 250000 tons of axis shipping in 1941 alone in the channel. Eventually they forced the withdrawal of KM Heavy ships, no mean feat, and then drpped the ball by failing to sink those ships. but they never again posed much threat to Britain as they did in the opening months of 1941. RAF attentions on the Uboat bases forced the expenditure of millions of Reichmarks on the construction of securee berthing facilities, and diverted huge respources away from the construction of anti invasion defences. moreover, losses , overall losses , were only about 1.5 to 2:1 against the RAF, which were acceptable, given the range limitations faced by the RAF and the nature of the RAF operations. the LW had no such freedom of action, even over the skies nominally under their control. they picked and sniped where they could, sometimes effectively, but this is not holding the initiative, and it is not controlling the skies. its opportunistic air denial. Effective, but no strategy for holding the initiative, and does not lead to any effective usage of the skies. And in the end, quite costly for the germans to maintain....too costly as it turned out

The operations of the RAF curtailed the construction of the Atlantic wall, and made possible the destruction of french indusry, something the Germans had at least considered as incorporating into their own industrial infrastructure. It wasnt death from the sky, but it was significant, and it made a difference, in that it made possible the more substantial gains that came later on.

During this period, the RAF was accounting for about 73% of total LW losses. The Eastern front was taking another hit on the German bomber forces, particulalry due to the heavy wear and tear attrition this front caused, but the really big LW losses did not occur in the fair weather months of 1941 or 42. Without the activities of the RAF, the LW would have had opportunity to rest and recover. The RAF offensive was not successful in diverting a single fighter unit west, but neither were the germans given much opportuinity to replace losses they were sustaining on that front, and constatnt maintence demands in both the west and south kept the supply of spares to the east constantly on a slow drip feed. It was anything but a waste of time. it was a critical part of preventing defeat actually. as it was, they (the LW) went through enough aircraft to re-equip their entire air force twice over in that two year period.

Sometimes, holding the initiative is not about fancy tactics, slick fighters and poster boy pilots. sometimes it gets down to the dirty numbers, dogged determination and courage. the RAF showed all these things in spades, and it paid dividends for them in the finish. In the finish the LW lacked the reserves to really give the Russians what for, and further lacked the reserves to sustain their air defences in the west. that came from the combined efforts of all the allies, but a big part of the load was shouldered by the RAF in 41-2, and a big part of that effort were these blunt and unimaginative operations over France. not pretty, not clever, but determined, and certainly, in the end, effective.

Finally, Galland himself concedes that in the months of 1941, it became apparent to the Jagdwaffe that they no longer held the initiative, and this sapped at their very resolve. he says as much in his book. Or are we going to start dismissing Galland now as well.