buffnut453
Captain
Weaver isn't listed at all, either under Canada or the US. The listing on the Battle of Britain Monument is, I believe, pretty comprehensive.
Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?
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bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
hmm let me look. my mistake....he enlisted in 41 well after the BoB. i was thinking he jumped in earlier. but he went to canada ( at 17 ) because it was easier to fly with the rcaf than it was in the usaac..it wasnt until late 43 that the us loosened up the requirments for pilots.
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Officially, but by July 1941 the RAF had formed three 'Eagle' squadrons from US volunteers, Nos. 71, 121, and 133. The State Department had quietly dropped the threat of prosecution for US citizens crossing the Atlantic to volunteer.
The first operational Eagle squadron was No. 71, made operational in February 1941, after the Battle of Britain.
Personally I'm bloody glad they came. We needed all the help we could get and these young men took a considerable personal risk just getting here and many gave their lives in a cause that, officially at least, was not yet theirs. They of course didn't see it that way.
Cheers
Steve
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bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
what i meant by this was up to late 43 you had to have a couple years of college to be eligible to become a cadet. it was a longer more drawn out process. you couldnt jump right from high school into the program. in 43 the us started testing and at that point younger cadets entered into flight training.
Not specifically the BoB but an interesting response given by General Douglas MacArthur to a request from the chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies on September 16th 1940.
"You have asked my military opinion as to whether the time has come for America to give continued and further aid to England in the fight for civilization. The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words; too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends. Victory in war results from no mysterious alchemy or wizardry but entirely upon the concentration of superior force at the critical points of combat. To face an adversary in detail has been the prayer of every conqueror in history. It is the secret of the past successes of the Axis powers in this war. It is their main hope for continued and ultimate victory. The greatest strategical mistake in history will be made if America fails to recognise the vital moment, if she permits again the writing of that fatal epitaph; too late. Such coordinated help as may be regarded as proper by our leaders should be synchronized with the British effort so that the English speaking peoples of the world will not be broken in detail. The vulnerability of singleness will disappear before unity of effort. Not too late, not tomorrow, but today."
I rarely find myself sympathetic to MacArthur, but there's not much to argue about there.
Cheers
Steve
"You have asked my military opinion as to whether the time has come for America to give continued and further aid to England in the fight for civilization. The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words; too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends. Victory in war results from no mysterious alchemy or wizardry but entirely upon the concentration of superior force at the critical points of combat. To face an adversary in detail has been the prayer of every conqueror in history. It is the secret of the past successes of the Axis powers in this war. It is their main hope for continued and ultimate victory. The greatest strategical mistake in history will be made if America fails to recognise the vital moment, if she permits again the writing of that fatal epitaph; too late. Such coordinated help as may be regarded as proper by our leaders should be synchronized with the British effort so that the English speaking peoples of the world will not be broken in detail. The vulnerability of singleness will disappear before unity of effort. Not too late, not tomorrow, but today."
I rarely find myself sympathetic to MacArthur, but there's not much to argue about there.
Cheers
Steve
Only 9 Yanks?
The USA was Neutral, it takes a special person to volunteer to fight for a cause which has nothing to do with your own motherland, respect to all of them. The big surprise to me is the French, any French pilot could have escaped via Cherbourg as many Poles Czechs and indeed RAF pilots did.
Joking aside the French air force was huge and some pilots had experience of monoplane fighters, they could have made a huge difference. However I think if your home land surrenders you are in the position of a spy when captured, not that it affected the Poles and Czechs.Someone had to fly for General Jean Romatet and the Armée de l'air de Vichy
Steve
How was this handled in China with the AVG?
Let Chennault explain.
"Planes were a tough problem. China had been a long-time, profitable customer for Curtiss-Wright, so my old friend, Burdette Wright, Curtiss Vice-President, came up with a proposition. They had six assembly lines turning out P-40's for the British, who had taken over a French order after the fall of France. If the British would waive their priority on 100 P-40B's then rolling off one line, Curtiss would add a seventh assembly line and make 100 later-model P-40's for the British. The British were glad to exchange the P-40B for a model more suitable for combat.
"The P-40B was not equipped with a gun sight, bomb rack or provisions for attaching auxiliary fuel tanks to the wing or belly. Much of our effort during training and combat was devoted to makeshift attempts to remedy these deficiencies. The combat record of the First American Volunteer Group in China is even more remarkable because its pilots were aiming their guns through a crude, homemade, ring-and-post gun sight instead of the more accurate optical sights used by the Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.
"Personnel proved a tougher nut to crack. The military were violently opposed to the whole idea of American volunteers in China. Lauchlin Currie and I went to see General Arnold in April of 1941. He was 100% opposed to the project.
"In the Navy, Rear Admiral Jack Towers, then Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and later Commander of the Navy's Pacific Air Forces also viewed the A.V.G. as a threat to his expansion program. . .
". . . It took direct personal intervention from President Roosevelt to pry the pilots and ground crews from the Army and Navy. On April 15, 1941, an unpublished executive order went out under his signature, authorizing reserve officer and enlisted men to resign from the Army Air Corps, Naval and Marine air services for the purpose of joining the American Volunteer Group in China.
"Orders went out to all military air fields, signed by Secretary Knox and General Arnold, authorizing bearers of certain letters freedom of the post, including permission to talk with all personnel . . .
SALARIES OUTLINED
" . . . Their offer was a one-year contract with CAMCO (Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company) to 'manufacture, repair and operate aircraft at salaries ranging from $250 to $750 a month. Traveling expenses, 30 days leave with pay, quarters, and $30 additional for rations were specified. They would be subject to summary dismissal by written notice for insubordination, habitual use of drugs or alcohol, illness not incurred in line of duty, malingering, and revealing confidential information. Before the end of the A.V.G., I had to dismiss at least one man for every cause except revealing confidential information. A system of fines was initiated for minor offences.
"There was not mention in the contract of a $500-bonus for every Japanese plane destroyed. Volunteers were told simply that there was a rumor that the Chinese government would pay $500 for each confirmed Jap plane. They could take the rumor for what it was worth. It turned out to be worth exactly $500 per plane. Although initially the five-hundred-dollar-bonus was paid for confirmed planes destroyed in air combat only, the bonus was soon applied to planes destroyed on the ground - if they could be confirmed."
The first contingent of pilots of the American Volunteer Group left San Francisco on July 10, 1941, aboard the Dutch ship Jaegersfontaine. Just before leaving, Chennault received confirmation of Presidential approval for the second American Volunteer Group of bombers with a schedule of 100 pilots and 181 gunners and radio men to arrive in China by November, 1941, and an equal number to follow in January, 1942.
Steve
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
i am not a huge mac fan either but i do like that quote....i think as true today as it was then. thanks for the posting it. its one i will keep...
The timing of that quote is proof positive of the significance of the BoB, he would never have said that the day after Dunkerque.
parsifal
Colonel
I dont know about that. Mac had a grasp of history that few in the US military have ever displayed. He knew, from a very early point, what was at stake, and what was needed to be done. Mac, after all was a driving force in the introduction of the Garand, and this says volumes about his grasp of military necessities.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Curious as to why there aren't Dutch pilots listed there. There were several that escaped after Germany overran the Netherlands.
The biggest "mistake" the Luftwaffe made was not building a Luftwaffe designed to attack and defeat Britain. The Luftwaffe was built for entirely different purposes, more important to German survival in event of simultaneous conflict with France and or Poland, something it did very well. The RAF on the other hand was built, almost specifically, to defeat an air attack against Britain from its very inception. So its a little misleading to speak of German strategy and tactics being flawed because the underlying hardware and organization just wasn't there. German strategy was improvised after the defeat of France and a matter of weeks. RAF strategy goes back years, at least to when Dowding had built the worlds first radar equipped integrated air defense system and probably to WW1. Luftwaffe was preoccupied and certainly not getting directives to prepare for war with Britain.
For instance if the Luftwaffe had of prepared for war with Britain it surely would have ensured its entire force of Me 109E had drop tanks. Such tanks were familiar to the Luftwaffe when they were used on the Heinkel He 51B over Spain during the intervention in the civil war. This 50 gallon fuel tank was jetisonable and some were fused to create a sort of napalm bomb.
As it was the first drop tank capable Me 109 was the Me 109E-7/N which entered service at the end of the BoB and a tiny handfull of numbers. Earlier 109's seemed to be only capable of carrying a non jetisonable ferry tank.
With drop tanks the Me 109 can escort German bombers over a much greater portion of the British Isles, moreover they can spend an additional 60 minutes at full military power over Britain. Me 109E fuel storage is slightly over 400L, the 66 gallon drop tank is 300L and fuel consumption of a DB601A at full power (1100 metric hp) is 300L/hour. Cruise consumption at 240mph is about 125L/hour.
However even this is inadequate since Britain can simply utilize ports and factories out of the range of the Luftwaffe fighters.
You will note that the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) didn't have an specialized amphibious landing craft delivered till end of 1941.
Landing Crafts so it was even less ready.
The scenario of the Luftwaffe attriting the RAF into numerical collapse and then defeating the massive Royal Navy seems remote.
To me it's surprising that the Luftwaffe had any chance at all in the period that is called the "Battle of Britain". It didn't have the right kit.
For instance if the Luftwaffe had of prepared for war with Britain it surely would have ensured its entire force of Me 109E had drop tanks. Such tanks were familiar to the Luftwaffe when they were used on the Heinkel He 51B over Spain during the intervention in the civil war. This 50 gallon fuel tank was jetisonable and some were fused to create a sort of napalm bomb.
As it was the first drop tank capable Me 109 was the Me 109E-7/N which entered service at the end of the BoB and a tiny handfull of numbers. Earlier 109's seemed to be only capable of carrying a non jetisonable ferry tank.
With drop tanks the Me 109 can escort German bombers over a much greater portion of the British Isles, moreover they can spend an additional 60 minutes at full military power over Britain. Me 109E fuel storage is slightly over 400L, the 66 gallon drop tank is 300L and fuel consumption of a DB601A at full power (1100 metric hp) is 300L/hour. Cruise consumption at 240mph is about 125L/hour.
However even this is inadequate since Britain can simply utilize ports and factories out of the range of the Luftwaffe fighters.
You will note that the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) didn't have an specialized amphibious landing craft delivered till end of 1941.
Landing Crafts so it was even less ready.
The scenario of the Luftwaffe attriting the RAF into numerical collapse and then defeating the massive Royal Navy seems remote.
To me it's surprising that the Luftwaffe had any chance at all in the period that is called the "Battle of Britain". It didn't have the right kit.
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parsifal
Colonel
I agree that the Luftwaffe was built for a different purpose and that its TO and E, as well as the general doctrine and tactics that it used were not at all suited to a prolonged strategic campaign. The LW was a tactical weapon, designed primarily to gain and hold air superiority over a battlefield, provide direct support to its armies, and dislocate communitcations and transport networks that supported that enemey battleline.
I do not agree that the LW was designed at any stage to be a defensive weapon, in response to perceived or real threats from either the Poles or the French. It was designed from an early point tp be an offensive, attacking weapon. The Germans did view Poland and france with some trepidation, but from a very early point the idea of the LW wasto destroy the war making potential of these frontier enemies by offensive action.
It is not misleading to speak of german strategty and tactics. What is valid, is that it was not very good strategy, and the germans changed their stratgy several times. And, they were at a loss as to how or what tactics they needed in order to achieve victory. this was most apparent in their muddled and sometimes contradictory targetting choices. Facts are, the germans permeated their strategy against the British several times during the camapign. At the begining, the basic strategy was to gain air superiority over South eastern England. This very nearly worked, but then there was a change in strategy, still consistent with earlier existing strategies applied by the LW at various times, but not in the case of England at the beginning, because it was felt to be counterproductive.
There were problems for the germans in their development of Drop tanks, moreover, as far as im aware, nobody possessed proper drop tanks in 1940. but i agree, that the germans did not undertake a detailed assessment of needs for an attack on Britain. they did, however uindertake a number of sandtable excercises to ascertain how best to defeat the RAF. these were undertaken in 1939, as I recall. it seems pretty cleqar that the RAFs radar detection methods and C&C capabilities were not understood very well, but that is not to say they didnt think about the issue, it says more that they failed to appraise the issue properly.
Thats a very big call, and there are a LOT of people who will not agree with you. The second part about the RN is entirely true, but Ive chosen to read the first bit. It was entirely possible for the LW, with only minor changes here and there, to win some kind of tactical victory. The LW was thwarted in this respect by a number of own goals, and also some very capable leadership decision made by the British. not only Park or Dowding.....things like the appointment of Beaverbrook, Churchills refusal to divert fighters to France and the like should also be taken into account. it turned out to be a British victory, but only by the slimmest of margins
It's probably a matter of timing, or where they were posted. Many Dutch airmen served with distinction and several Dutch squadrons were eventually established.
Cheers
Steve
The first Bf 109 found by the British, equipped with a drop tank was 'White 11', W.Nr. 4900, the Bf 109E-1 flown by Fw.H.Schmidt of 6./JG 53 which force landed at Wheelstead Farm, Old Romney on 30th November 1940.
Reference to this can be found in CEAR Serial No.33 of 2nd December 1940 which states:
'One bomb rack for 250kg bomb and usual release gear fitted. This aircraft is fitted with additional petrol tankage and also an extra 9 litre oil tank. There is a notice in the cockpit to this effect and instructions to pump over petrol after one and a half hours flying. This inscription is hanging on an oil **** and may refer to oil. The situation and capacity of the extra fuel tank is not clear and the aircraft will be further examined after lifting.'
A subsequent report on this aircraft appears in CEAR Serial No.33 No.3/179 of 20 December 1940 which states:
'Crashed on 30.11.40 at Old Romney. This aircraft was fitted with extra oil tank of two gallons capacity and pipe lines for extra fuel tankage. The aircraft has now been examined but no extra fuel tank was found. The fuel line however, runs down to the bottom of the fuselage near the external bomb rack and it is assumed that a jettisonable auxiliary tank had been carried. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that a metal, streamlined petrol tank was found in the country which could be slung to the bomb rack of a Me 109. The capacity of this tank is approximately 90 gallons (the tank is damaged and the capacity cannot be definitely ascertained). This would give an extra range to the aircraft of about 450 miles at normal cruising speed, or rather more than double the usual range. A further report will be issued if and when a tank is found in situ.'
It seems that the first operational drop tanks were being fitted in the period just after the official BoB. Dave Wadman, from whom the above reports came, also has a report, possibly describing similar installation, dating from the end of October.
Cheers
Steve
Reference to this can be found in CEAR Serial No.33 of 2nd December 1940 which states:
'One bomb rack for 250kg bomb and usual release gear fitted. This aircraft is fitted with additional petrol tankage and also an extra 9 litre oil tank. There is a notice in the cockpit to this effect and instructions to pump over petrol after one and a half hours flying. This inscription is hanging on an oil **** and may refer to oil. The situation and capacity of the extra fuel tank is not clear and the aircraft will be further examined after lifting.'
A subsequent report on this aircraft appears in CEAR Serial No.33 No.3/179 of 20 December 1940 which states:
'Crashed on 30.11.40 at Old Romney. This aircraft was fitted with extra oil tank of two gallons capacity and pipe lines for extra fuel tankage. The aircraft has now been examined but no extra fuel tank was found. The fuel line however, runs down to the bottom of the fuselage near the external bomb rack and it is assumed that a jettisonable auxiliary tank had been carried. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that a metal, streamlined petrol tank was found in the country which could be slung to the bomb rack of a Me 109. The capacity of this tank is approximately 90 gallons (the tank is damaged and the capacity cannot be definitely ascertained). This would give an extra range to the aircraft of about 450 miles at normal cruising speed, or rather more than double the usual range. A further report will be issued if and when a tank is found in situ.'
It seems that the first operational drop tanks were being fitted in the period just after the official BoB. Dave Wadman, from whom the above reports came, also has a report, possibly describing similar installation, dating from the end of October.
Cheers
Steve
