D DAY

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

RAF Bomber Command inability to hit a target measuring 640m x 460m in size during daylight by mid 1944 is another matter....

To be brutal yes thats bad accuracy but to be fair it wasnt what BC was trained for. Whoever used a strategic force to try and hit a tactical target should get the blame.
 
Battleship main guns are inherently poor for bombardment because most battleship main guns cannot elevate high enough to deliver plunging fire to targets located immediately behind a ridge. It doesn't help that artillery fire bases such as Maisey are relatively small and naval guns are firing from a moving platform.

Depends on the range and the ridge. British 15 in guns fired at an elevation of 30 degrees and using standard charges have a decent angle of about 40 degrees at max range. They have a decent angle of about 20 degrees at 20,000yds range. American 16 in guns plunged a bit more, 14 in guns a bit less. A 40% slope is 21.8 degrees. 40% slope is a 40 foot change in elevation for every 100ft of horizontal distance.

Battleship guns were intended to hit ( at least a small percentage of the time) targets that were 200-250 meters long and 25-35 meters wide that were moving 240-400 meters between shots. a stationary target 640-460 meters is a piece of cake given
an observer.
 
To be brutal yes thats bad accuracy but to be fair it wasnt what BC was trained for. Whoever used a strategic force to try and hit a tactical target should get the blame.

Which was Harris' argument.
Actually Bomber Command showed in the lead up to D-Day that they could be much more accurate than that but a large average error (several hundred yards) was always going to mitigate against any kind of precision bombing by a typical squadron. Specialist squadrons,some with a more accurate sight,could reduce that average error to 125-175 yards.
A lot of the pre invasion bombing by both air forces left a lot to be desired. Statistically the USAAF was at least as innacurate having been bombing in day light for years.
Cheers
Steve
 
I was pretty sure that a BB should be able to hit a large complex like the shore batteries - as explained by Shortround. In Sicily Naval gunfire was used to stop a German counterattack by some Tiger tanks that threatened the US beach head. So, given some decent spotting, they should be able to drop some heavt ordnance on them guns!
I had thought that their should have been some dive bombing on these complexes on the day of the landing?
If it had been done before, it may have tipped off the point of the landings?
 
IMO Maisey Battery was important enough to warrant dropping one of our two airborne divisions on it. However it won't make any difference if the drop is as inaccurate as what happened historically.
 
The Battleships were a valuable strategic asset during the landings, but the Destroyers did by far thye lions share of gunfire support. by 1944, the allies had very advanced ship to shore support. Specific fire support units were allocated to eacxh battlaion as it went into action. a battalion that got into trouble, such as at Gela, could call in immediate support. within a few minutes 1 but more often two destroyers would move to a couple of hunred yards offshore and direct fire to a grid point as requested by the FOO. The direct allocation of fire support units greatly increased the firepower and immediacy of Naval fire support for each units committed to battle. Moreover, because it was at such close range, it was deadly accurater as well.

The Germans really had no answer to this combination. As a gunfire support system, it remains in use even today.
 
Direct fire against visible targets. It's impossible for a 2,500 ton destroyer to deliver accurate indirect fire in rough seas such as those during the Normandy invasion.

Speaking of shore bombardment.....
I think Cleveland class cruisers deserve some respect.

Despite being officially labeled "Light Cruisers" these ships were in fact 12,000 ton heavy cruisers armed with 6" main guns. Large enough that they didn't bounce around in rough seas like a destroyer.

6" is an ideal size for for use against army targets. Hence the reason most armies have employed howitzers 149mm to 155mm in size for the past 100 years.

Cleveland class guns could elevate to 40 degrees. Later increased to 60 degrees. If directed by a spotter aircraft they could deliver accurate plunging fire on targets such as Maisey Battery which could not be reached by most battleship main guns.
 
HMS Belfast was a 6 inch cruiser that did her share of fire support missions. I have heard that she put a shell through the fire slit of one gun emplacement - luck or accuracy ? Who cares it did the job!
 
Britain 6"/50 (15.2 cm) BL Mark XXIII
Another good ship class for shore bombardment. The triple 6" gun turets could elevate 45 degrees.

WNBR_6-50_mk23_Belfast_pic[1].jpg
 
Direct fire against visible targets. It's impossible for a 2,500 ton destroyer to deliver accurate indirect fire in rough seas such as those during the Normandy invasion.

Speaking of shore bombardment.....
I think Cleveland class cruisers deserve some respect.

Despite being officially labeled "Light Cruisers" these ships were in fact 12,000 ton heavy cruisers armed with 6" main guns. Large enough that they didn't bounce around in rough seas like a destroyer.

6" is an ideal size for for use against army targets. Hence the reason most armies have employed howitzers 149mm to 155mm in size for the past 100 years.

Cleveland class guns could elevate to 40 degrees. Later increased to 60 degrees. If directed by a spotter aircraft they could deliver accurate plunging fire on targets such as Maisey Battery which could not be reached by most battleship main guns.

What sources are you relying on to make this starment? I suspect....none, because it is exactly the opposite to what most reputable sources provide.

Fore example William Kirklands "Destroyers At Normandy", commenting on the events at Omaha he states "This story reports the events at Omaha Beach as seen from afloat and ashore, integrated as well as the unit records permit, and illuminated by eyewitnesses. The purpose is to show the intimate relationship between the soldiers of the 1st and 29th Divisions and DESRON 18, a relationship that helped make victory possible at this key landing beach called Omaha". he then goes on to give a virtual blow by blow account of the days events, and I can assure you, it was the Destroyers that saved the day, and no-one else.


Cruisers and Battleships are useful, but they were (and are) nowhere near as useful as DDs. NGS generally sucks at indirect fire, whether it be battleships or whatever. it is the direct fire support that is overwhelmingly important. and rough weather, at least the rough weather off Normandy did not significantly afect accuracy or rate of fire.


Destroyers at Normandy: Naval Gunfire Support at Omaha Beach
 
I respect everyone's opinion here in this thread but are we really gonna argue the merits of what ship did the most for D-Day? I'm stunned..................
 
Maisy Battery
Naval vessels did not "save the day" at Omaha Beach. Maisey battery continued dropping 155mm shells on the landing beach for three days until over run by U.S. Army infantry.

The battery had 180 tons of ammunition remaining when captured so it's a good thing ground troops got the job done. Otherwise Maisey Battery would have kept firing on Omaha Beach and surrounding region, ratcheting up the American body count even further.
 
Which just underlines the fact that NGS could not do a lot in terms of indirect fire. they to see what they were firing at. And in terms of the immediate first 24 hours, the beachead at Omaha was a very touch and go affair. Without effective NGS it would have collapsed. i agree that it was the Infantry in the finish that extended the beachhead and consolidated it to the point of being viable. but for those first hours of the first day, the Infantry was completely vulnerable and needed a lot of support. they got it mostly from Desron 18
 
I respect everyone's opinion here in this thread but are we really gonna argue the merits of what ship did the most for D-Day? I'm stunned..................

I admit our debating technique might leave a bit to be desired, but Im unsure apart from that as to what you are surprised at chris. Arent we forever arguing whether this plane or that had 5mph more speed at 20 or 21000 feet. how different is this argument to that kind of argument....

Can you clarify please before i upsert anyone more than I already have
 
No worries Parsifal. It just struck me as a little redundant and somewhat callous to say that one type of ship did more for D-Day than another. And you are right about all the other threads with all the other arguments. Its tiresome. And maybe I'm just too tired. Sorry if this rant is disrupting the thread.
 
Found a reference to some information on another site :
Theodore Roscoe's "United States Destroyer Operations in Word War II" (USNI Press, 1953, has an excellent overview of the American destroyer operations during the Normandy invasion, beginning on p. 343. P. 346 has a table of the ships involved and their units, some 39 American destroyers in all divided into four fire-support groups. It was said that some destroyers had almost run their bows on the bottom they were in so close, and I believe it was destroyer Corry which was noted as maneuvering in reverse, still shooting, although she subsequently struck a mine and was lost, as was destroyer Meredith. The gallant RN destroyers Melbreak, Talybont and Tanatside were also mentioned in this account.

Yves Buffetaut's "D-Day Ships: The Allied Invasion Fleet, June 1944" (also USNI Press, 1994) has short accounts of the major ships of the invasion fleet, some good write ups on the battle action and a useful index of the Allied ships involved.
 
Thanks for the tip, I will try and find that as a reference i think. Its not that the bigger shipos were not critical, but they were there for a slightly different, more strategic purpose.
 
I disagree. It would be more accurate to state NGS was largely ineffective without proper weapons and operational doctrine.

WWI Austria-Hungary created vessels armed with army howitzers for NGS in the Adriatic and they worked just fine. Out of the box thinking like that wins battles. Unfortunately for Austria-Hungary such thinking was an exception. Otherwise they would still exist.
 
specially developed equipment might well improve that capability, but it is a relatively expensive process, because it produces vessels that are really only suitable for that purpose. During the war, it was necessary to adopt expedients, like using the older obsolete battleships which generally had lower mv armament and hence some capability for plunging fire......a reasonable substitute for indirect fire registration. The allies also used rocket firing LSTs and LCTs to deliver large amounts of firepower just beyond the beaches.

After the war, nearly all ships were given a secondary role of NGS. But it was secondary to their other functions, so indirect fire was not a priority. Today, the role is sort of filled by cruise missiles.

However in the context of WWII, the first priority was the battle on the beaches. That was the time when the landing forces were most vulnerable and the time when immediate and rapid fire support was needed. It was amply demonstrated on the beaches of Omaha. Once off the beach and heading inland, the battleships and cruisers continued to provide support, but the immediate crisis of getting ashore and staying ashore was over. So it is entirely appropriate to make the primary mission of the NGS forces the delivery of timely firepower at line of sight targets rather than worrying about attacking secondary or support targets in the rear areas of the beach defences. An amphibious assault is not a breakthrough battle....it is primarily an excercise in lodgement.

As for innovation, im all for it, but indirect fire rather misses the point of NGS, and I think a dangerous distraction from the primary initial mission. Its at the initial landing stages that a landing force is at its most vulnerable, and the point where all the supporting fire that can be had is most needed. Moreover that fire, despite the chaos that the unitiated might think, is actually highly organized and targetted. that was the problem....the difference between what was happening at Tarawa and what was happening at Normandy. By the latter part of the war, it was realized the fire support mission had to be intrinsically linked to the immediate action and units committed on the ground, rather than blindly firing at anything. Thats because, unless the fire was directed or brought about by requests at the front line, it usually wasnt hitting anything. Getting distracted to relatively unimportant (in the sense of the imediate threats to the landing force) side issues, or not remaining focussed on the task at hand is the kind of fuzzy thinking that actually loses battles and causes nations like Austria Hungary to disappear into history.

Lastly, what ampohibious operations of any importance did the Austrians ever undertake during WWI? Supporting river crossings or coastal operations is a completely different problem to blue water amphibious operations into the teeth of an enemy defended coastline.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back