specially developed equipment might well improve that capability, but it is a relatively expensive process, because it produces vessels that are really only suitable for that purpose. During the war, it was necessary to adopt expedients, like using the older obsolete battleships which generally had lower mv armament and hence some capability for plunging fire......a reasonable substitute for indirect fire registration. The allies also used rocket firing LSTs and LCTs to deliver large amounts of firepower just beyond the beaches.
After the war, nearly all ships were given a secondary role of NGS. But it was secondary to their other functions, so indirect fire was not a priority. Today, the role is sort of filled by cruise missiles.
However in the context of WWII, the first priority was the battle on the beaches. That was the time when the landing forces were most vulnerable and the time when immediate and rapid fire support was needed. It was amply demonstrated on the beaches of Omaha. Once off the beach and heading inland, the battleships and cruisers continued to provide support, but the immediate crisis of getting ashore and staying ashore was over. So it is entirely appropriate to make the primary mission of the NGS forces the delivery of timely firepower at line of sight targets rather than worrying about attacking secondary or support targets in the rear areas of the beach defences. An amphibious assault is not a breakthrough battle....it is primarily an excercise in lodgement.
As for innovation, im all for it, but indirect fire rather misses the point of NGS, and I think a dangerous distraction from the primary initial mission. Its at the initial landing stages that a landing force is at its most vulnerable, and the point where all the supporting fire that can be had is most needed. Moreover that fire, despite the chaos that the unitiated might think, is actually highly organized and targetted. that was the problem....the difference between what was happening at Tarawa and what was happening at Normandy. By the latter part of the war, it was realized the fire support mission had to be intrinsically linked to the immediate action and units committed on the ground, rather than blindly firing at anything. Thats because, unless the fire was directed or brought about by requests at the front line, it usually wasnt hitting anything. Getting distracted to relatively unimportant (in the sense of the imediate threats to the landing force) side issues, or not remaining focussed on the task at hand is the kind of fuzzy thinking that actually loses battles and causes nations like Austria Hungary to disappear into history.
Lastly, what ampohibious operations of any importance did the Austrians ever undertake during WWI? Supporting river crossings or coastal operations is a completely different problem to blue water amphibious operations into the teeth of an enemy defended coastline.