Dambusters Raid (3 Viewers)

[Boom]

Am curious what the USAAF reaction was when they heard of the Dambusters Raid.

At that time of the war the USAAF believed that they were achieving greater, more effective results in their targeted daylight precision strategic bombing approach. Rather than the indiscriminate night area bombing approach of the RAF.

Yet here was a single RAF Squadron that had carried out a devasting night precision raid that had, in one fell swoop, achieved arguably as much destructive damage as the 8th had managed in any single raid. up to that time.

Books written about the raid cover the training of 617 Squadron, it's people, the raid and the destruction wrought. Have never read of the American air force leaders reaction. Anyone know what the USAAF hierarchy reaction was?

 

[Maxrobot1]

The raid took place 16-17 May 1943 after months of secrecy. I wonder if USAAF personnel were excluded from any involvement or planing.
On the other hand, there were probably a lot of "secret" things going on at the same time.
I can imagine that, at least after the raid, USAAF staff wanted details of the mission and information on the bombs.

 

[Just Schmidt]

The raid took place 16-17 May 1943 after months of secrecy. I wonder if USAAF personnel were excluded from any involvement or planing.
On the other hand, there were probably a lot of "secret" things going on at the same time.
I can imagine that, at least after the raid, USAAF staff wanted details of the mission and information on the bombs.

I don't consider that USAAF personel was excluded from involvement more than that FAA was 'excluded' from involvement with the battle of Midway. Everybody cannot have their hands in everything.

 

[yosimitesam]

It's surprising to me that Air Marshal Arthur Harris didn't at least try to "veto" the raid. Or, maybe he did and, if so, I would like to see the documents that he wrote before the raid. He was an ardent opponent of precision bombing. He called it "panacea" bombing and made the following quote that I read somewhere: "Precision bombing is sending a bomber to pull the plug on Hitler's bath in the hope he will catch pneumonia and die." His theory of bombing was to force the residents of German cities (the factory workers, transportation workers, et al.) to devolve into a "troglodyte" existence, i.e. no water, power, sewer, heat, transport, etc. He believed this would the destroy their productive capacities and reduce their factory output to lower and lower levels, over time. The Americas wanted to do this "from the top down" (not a pun) through direct attacks on critical infrastructure while he wanted to do this "from the bottom up." One wonders if he believed this would work better or if he just wanted the Germans to "reap the whirlwind" for their bombing of England in 1940-1941. My gut feeling is he would not have wanted to waste bombers on a "panacea" target and would have fought this raid bureaucratically tooth and nail. Those documents, if they exist, would be very interesting. Of course, once the war was over he had to concede that the bombing of the fuel plants and transportation hubs was effective in reducing the Germans' productive capacity all out of proportion to the effort involved.

 

[EwenS]

Development of the Upkeep & Highball bouncing bombs was a matter between Wallis, as the inventor, Vickers, his employer, the Air Ministry (in particular the Research & Development Dept) and MAP. BC and it's CO, Harris, were not involved until a very late stage.

Harris was appointed AOC Bomber Command in Feb 1942 and had come the hate anything that detracted from the task of area bombing of cities. He also hated anything that smacked of elite special purpose squadrons, initially opposing the formation of pathfinder squadrons.

On 15 Feb 1943 a meeting at the Air Ministry which included Wallis and Mutt Summers of Vickers, but not Harris, gave the go ahead to convert a single Lancaster for trials. Harris found out about this three days later and this seems to have been his first knowledge of the project. He promptly wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff, Portal, expressing his opposition on several grounds to the whole scheme in fairly robust terms.

On 21st Feb Wallis showed film extracts of the early Tank trials and Wellington drops to an audience that included the First Sea Lord, Pound (who favoured development), Craven (Vickers chairman) and Portal. Portal, then converted to the efficacy of the weapon, then wrote to Harris stating Wallis's idea could not be dismissed out of hand but that only 3 Lancasters would be converted for trials.

On 23rd Feb Wallis & Summers visited BC HQ and made a presentation to Harris himself. While Harris, like Portal, would not then commit to setting aside a Lancaster squadron for the special Operation, he revealed that Portal had authorised conversion of the 3 trials aircraft. Subsequent conferences at MAP saw instructions issued to convert a further 27 Lancasters by 1 May 1943 to allow the operation to be carried out that spring.

While Harris wasn't keen on the idea he had his orders. He allocated the task to 5 Group. Instead of allocating a whole existing squadron to the task which would have reduced his bombing campaign, a new squadron was to be formed with Chastise to be its first but not only mission. Harris then nominated Gibson as CO just as he was completing his tour with 106 squadron.

617 squadron was officially formed on 21st March 1943. Contrary to what was portrayed in the movie, Gibson's choice of crews was limited to those in 5 Group and not the whole of BC and not all were volunteers. Some were posted from 57 squadron also based at Scampton, including the whole of that squadron's C flight.

So while Harris May not have liked the idea, he had received his orders from higher up and sought to obey them in a manner least likely to divert effort away from his area bombing campaign.

 

[gruad]

It's surprising to me that Air Marshal Arthur Harris didn't at least try to "veto" the raid. Or, maybe he did and, if so, I would like to see the documents that he wrote before the raid. He was an ardent opponent of precision bombing. He called it "panacea" bombing and made the following quote that I read somewhere: "Precision bombing is sending a bomber to pull the plug on Hitler's bath in the hope he will catch pneumonia and die." His theory of bombing was to force the residents of German cities (the factory workers, transportation workers, et al.) to devolve into a "troglodyte" existence, i.e. no water, power, sewer, heat, transport, etc. He believed this would the destroy their productive capacities and reduce their factory output to lower and lower levels, over time. The Americas wanted to do this "from the top down" (not a pun) through direct attacks on critical infrastructure while he wanted to do this "from the bottom up." One wonders if he believed this would work better or if he just wanted the Germans to "reap the whirlwind" for their bombing of England in 1940-1941. My gut feeling is he would not have wanted to waste bombers on a "panacea" target and would have fought this raid bureaucratically tooth and nail. Those documents, if they exist, would be very interesting. Of course, once the war was over he had to concede that the bombing of the fuel plants and transportation hubs was effective in reducing the Germans' productive capacity all out of proportion to the effort involved.

The area bombing was the only thing possible up to 1944. When the weather was bad even the Americans had to bomb by radar. The alternative was the UK to do nothing.

Eventually the RAF mastered a form of precision bombing using markers that may have been more precise than the USAAF "one drops, all drop" philosophy. The shame is that it was not used more after 1944. Harris should probably have been fired and the RAF used with the USAAF in attacks on Oil, Rail, Aircraft factories etc though Harris still allowed a proportion to be diverted from area bombing.

 

[yosimitesam]

The area bombing was the only thing possible up to 1944. When the weather was bad even the Americans had to bomb by radar. The alternative was the UK to do nothing.

Eventually the RAF mastered a form of precision bombing using markers that may have been more precise than the USAAF "one drops, all drop" philosophy. The shame is that it was not used more after 1944. Harris should probably have been fired and the RAF used with the USAAF in attacks on Oil, Rail, Aircraft factories etc though Harris still allowed a proportion to be diverted from area bombing.

 

[yosimitesam]

Quite correct. Harris knew that precision bombing could be weakened by production dispersal, even if this led to greater transportation burdens on the Germans. However, no matter where you place the production centers you cannot "disperse" the actual workers building the instruments of war. I've read many a history of the war containing derision of Harris' theories but his idea of area bombing definitely had merit, in my opinion. It was a strategy of attrition that could not really be circumvented. Granted it was the best that could be done by Bomber Command until the closing months of the war, but was still a viable war strategy, nonetheless. He stated that he believed in "de-housing" the German worker and later critics called this inhumane. Those critics forget (conveniently) that this was total war.

I read somewhere that Harris was quite surprised at how accurate his bombers could be after they had gained much experience. And the fact that the American daylight raids over a cloudy northern Europe, using radar, were "area bombings" in reality at least 50% of the time.

 

[wuzak]

Harris should probably have been fired and the RAF used with the USAAF in attacks on Oil, Rail, Aircraft factories etc though Harris still allowed a proportion to be diverted from area bombing.

The RAF did do attacks on oil, transportation, etc.

There were some statistics posted on the forum somewhere that showed how much it was done - it was more than most people think.

 

[EwenS]

I don't think many, especially in the USA which wasn't subject to air attack, truly appreciate the extent of the disruption to war production caused by Allied air raids on Axis towns and cities and the amount of time it took to recover. The effects can be seen in Britain particularly during the Luftwaffe Blitz raids in 1941.

Every hour that a workforce in a factory has to spend taking cover in an air raid shelter is an hour they are not producing whatever their factory contributes to the war effort. The target doesn't need to be their factory or town. Just the threat of bombs falling somewhere near to hand can be enough to stop production. I recall reading somewhere about the number of production hours at De Havilland Hatfield lost in autumn 1940 due to the threat of air raids putting the workforce into the shelters. It was out of proportion to the one raid that was spotted late and actually bombed the factory that killed and injured some 90 people.

Another example I've looked at in some detail is the Clydebank Blitz over two nights in March 1941. A town of nearly 50,000 people with multiple factories and yards adding to war production. Companies like John Brown the shipbuilders, and Singer (of sewing machine fame) producing munitions, aircraft parts as well a reduced number of sewing machines (for uniform production) and a Royal Ordnance Factory producing AT & AA guns and an Admiralty oil depot.

The Luftwaffe dropped over 400 HE bombs and some 100,000 incendiaries over those two nights using just a couple of hundred aircraft on each night. 528 people were killed and over 1,000 injured. Of 12,000 homes, 4.000 were completely destroyed and 8,000 damaged. Only 7 houses remained undamaged. It was the only town in Britain to be completely evacuated. Some 48,000 refugees left the area to seek shelter all across the Clydeside area. Gas, electricity and transport links (trains and trams) took days and sometimes weeks to restore.

In terms of production, only 10% of the John Brown workforce were able to turn up for work on the 15th March as they tried to sort out their lives, find new accomdation, food etc. That increased to 70% a week later and 80% a week after that (from the JB board minutes). But these people were having to travel much greater distances to get to work. Fortunately the yard itself escaped relatively lightly.

Blitz

West Dunbartonshire Libraries and Cultural Services Arts and Heritage

www.west-dunbarton.gov.uk

Blitz Map Clydebank

One town over two nights. Now expand that for the Allied raids on Germany with towns and cities being visited on a regular basis.


Dispersion of production only adds to the difficulties. Moving components and sub assemblies around the country costs time and money. Good examples in Britain were Supermarine after their factory was bombed in 1940.

The Dispersal Works

Introduction to the Dispersal Works established across Hampshire, Wiltshire and Berkshire to continue Spitfire production following the bombing of the Woolston and Itchen Works

supermariners.wordpress.com

And Shorts, whose Rochester, Kent factories Kentwere bombed and damaged in 1940. They opened a shadow factory on Lake Windermere to produce Sunderland components for shipment south. Eventually it built around 35 Sunderlands using additional components brought in from the southern factories.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Only the oil targets discussed here, this is long enough as it is. The bombing campaign has plenty of extreme opinions about it and Harris with his continued support of area bombing post war is an obvious target, his sayings another, often makes him look 2 dimensional. Like other commanders he made some big mistakes as well as having some big victories. People do not stay in command of war operations for over 3 years if they make consistently bad decisions. The Battle of Berlin, Bomber Command was always going to have a defeat in early 1944 given the resources the Germans poured into the defences and the RAF not having much new in the way of counter measures, Harris made the defeat bigger. This is more about the complexities Harris had to face and some of what he did, not said he wanted to do. Comparison with the 8th Air Force throws up interesting parallels.

It should be noted pre war,

Radar was unheard of,
The attacks were assumed to include chemical and biological weapons
The attacks would be launched from relatively close range, say France to Germany.

Assumptions of accuracy were too great and this included the idea few bombs would hit already destroyed structures.
Navigation was easier than it turned out.
Weather was not too big a problem.
Bombs were much more destructive than was the case.
Morale would easily collapse.
Bombers could defend themselves.

The RAF assessment of the German situation in 1940 and 1941

21 September 1940 "evidence continues to accumulate that our sustained attacks against the enemy's railway and canal communications is having the anticipated effect of dislocating the enemy's supply system both in the industrial and strategical spheres".

15 January 1941, "the latest reports and analysis on Germany's oil position reveals that the Axis Powers will be passing through their most critical period as regards their oil resources during the next six months."

Look up the USSBS reports and see how far the above were from reality. In 1940/41 Bomber Command was most often exporting bombs in the general direction of Europe and usually hitting it, a trend that slowly reduced in 1942 and 1943. Coastal targets on clear moonlight nights were the major exception. Time would show just how big an effort was required to shut down even parts of an economy. In 1940 3 Whitleys carrying 3.5 tons of bombs were considered enough to do real damage to the Wessling oil plant, in 1944 it was 200 aircraft with 1,000 tons of bombs.

For Overlord there was the debate over what role the heavy bombers should play, leading to Eisenhower's claim that he might as well go home if he did not receive the support he requested. Having achieved a measure of control over the heavy bombers Eisenhower then had to face the Bomber Baron's scepticism over whether the transport plan would work. They were not alone, a week before D Day the SHAEF G-2 reported that the whole rail bombing operation had accomplished nothing of importance. Meantime the Todt organisation was querying whether it was worth repairing rail damage. Mind you some of the sceptics went for the plan of bridge destruction, which was thought to be too hard by many, and found the bridges could be destroyed economically. So the strangulation of the German transport system was increased. The trouble would come when the allied armies need the rail lines and bridges after the breakout. Bombing bridges is part of a transport plan, the marshalling yards hurt the economy more than stopping military trains running from Germany to France and back again, they are best stopped by blowing the lines.

It took all types of airpower to seriously degrade a transport network with obvious overlaps,
1) The heavy bombers primarily after marshalling yards and their associated repair facilities, also canals
2) The medium and light bombers primarily after bridges and tunnels
3) The fighter bombers primarily after rolling stock and track.

In October 1944 the allies thought a much higher percentage of Germany's fuel was coming from small benzol (FT) plants in the Ruhr and the area attacks helped disrupt them. The allies over estimating the fuel from the Fischer-Tropsch plants by a factor of 3. The hydrogenation plant outputs were generally correct around 5% over estimates, the natural oil refineries were underestimated by around 10%, quite good. So the FT plants were said to be 20% of the total from the three methods, instead of the 8% they actually were.

USAAF/RAF differences.

In 1944/45 Bomber Command strikes sent out after a specific target but encountering bad weather are usually recorded as doing city strikes, not a strike against the original target. On 9 November 1944 Bomber Command it was the Wanne-Eickel oil refinery, the weather was so bad the master bomber ordered the force to attack whatever targets they could see, which meant around 1,433.7 short tons of bombs from the raid were classified as hitting city targets. The USAAF kept the original target in its reports.

Richard Davis: "However, the records of the U.S. numbered air forces in Europe, in spite of policy discouraging the designating of specific bombing as "city," contains numerous examples of urban strikes. The author takes the AAF at its word. If an AAF, group, wing, air division, or numbered air force report [the author has personally examined all the available mission folders for each air force] designates a raid as a city or town strike, it is counted as such. This method has unearthed many unacknowledged city attacks. American city bombing entails further caveat. The Eighth Air Force's most comprehensive target summary, prepared in May 1945, does not acknowledge a single instance of city bombing by American aircraft. It systematically changed city raids theretofore carried on Eighth Air Force books to other target categories, usually Industrial Areas (I/A). All raids on Berlin became raids on the "Military and Civilian Government area" (MCG/A). "

Richard Davis has four classifications when deciding area attacks, over and above those declared as city strikes

1) "Area like" raids, flown by the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, 100 or more heavy bombers, bomb mix of at least 20% incendiaries, and sighted by H2X.

2) City area bombing, ordered or authorised by directive or numbered air force.

3) Opportunity city area bombing, conducted by individual formations and crews following initiative granted by AAF or RAF policy.

4) City area bombing requested by friendly ground forces or partisans.

In the three months July to September 1944 he notes 4,844 8th Air Force sorties fulfilled the first criteria, 4,772 sorties fulfilled the second criteria and 1,305 sorties fulfilled the third criteria, none for the fourth, total 10,921 sorties. This is out of 56,433 sorties, of which 3,151 were supply missions, 372 leaflet drops (at night) and 1,134 Carpetbagger operations, also at night.

Mighty 8th War Diary 11 July 1944, target Munich Centre (primary), 681.8 tons of bombs, 12 July City of Munich (primary) 2,710.8 tons of bombs, 13 July two entries for Munich city 830.4 (primary) and 355.2 (opportunity) tons of bombs.

After August 1944 the USAAF relaxed its blind bombing guidelines for attacking Germany, this was a major reason weather aborts in the 8th Air Force promptly dropped from 14.4% to 5.6%. Craven and Cate (US official history), in mid November 1944, that is a year on from the initial raids, noted slightly more that 1/2 of the 8th Air Force blind bombing missions "near failures or worse".

Doolittle to Spaatz, 14 February 1944, "There is a tendency on the part of planners to measure destruction by tons of bombs dropped rather than by bombs on targets. This must be assiduously guarded against in connection with "through the overcast bombing". Our experience to date with this type of bombing technique indicates that it is closely allied with area bombing and does not lend itself to the precision bombing of pinpoint targets.

We have not been able, with regularity, to take out precision targets using Oboe, GH or H2X. On those occasions when we have hit a precision target it has been largely through luck. Ordinarily bombs are scattered over at least ten times as much area as with visual bombing..."

When confronted with the night bomber accuracy the RAF switched to making the aiming point the centre of the biggest targets around, while working on a long line of aids, GEE, H2S, Oboe, GH to help improve accuracy. In most cases the centre of the targets was largely civilian housing. Harris was continually confronted with the gap between what new equipment promised and proposed target vulnerability and reality. When confronted with the weather over Europe the USAAF turned to using the night bomber aids. The Generals in charge knew what that meant in terms of accuracy, the decision was taken to usually record the raid as aimed at a specific target,

1) Industrial area, which requires someone to explain how you can precision bomb an area as opposed to area bomb an area.

2) Marshalling yards, which were usually surrounded by built up areas, mainly residential, since most city buildings are housing, and since the railways were a 19th century invention and helped the 19th and 20th century growth of the cities. The marshalling yards could cover an area hundreds of yards by hundreds of yards, they were often attacked using methods that had accuracies measured in miles.

The USSTAF conference on bombing accuracy on 22 and 23 March 1945 noted that in the winter of 1944/45 the 8th Air Force had 42% of bombs dropped more than 5 miles from the target, there were 66% gross errors in bad weather and 29% in good weather. Where gross error is defined as more than 3,000 feet from the target. See the book Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, by Tami Davis Biddle. Either the USAAF generals were ignorant of what their heavy bombers were doing or the intention on many strikes was area bombing.

The night defences were much stronger than the day defences until around September 1944, and it was not until mid July 1944 the missing rate for night heavy bombers attacking German targets dropped below the maximum acceptable, on average, the strength of the defences denied the bombers the best, clear moonlight nights until later in the year. In autumn weather, ignoring ground fog and haze, the night bombers had around 1.8 times more chance of clear weather, in winter 2.6 times, in summer the day bombers had 1.4 times the chance of clear weather than the night bombers, in spring the night bombers had 2.7 times the chance of clear weather. Harris is supposed to have asked Eaker how often do you see the ground from 20,000 feet over Europe?

One reason Bomber Command was allocated the oil targets in the Ruhr was the persistent ground haze. In high summer many German targets were out of reach for the night bombers, in deep winter similar rules applied to the day bombers. SHAEF had control of target allocation until mid September 1944 which meant only when attacking Germany for much of 1944 we can assume the majority of the targets selected were at the discretion of the Air Forces. Bomber Command devoted a greater percentage of effort, along with the better weather needed for such raids, to invasion support until November 1944.

The German flak was more effective by day, Bomber Command found that over the Ruhr in September 1944 2.5% of night bombers came back with flak damage compared with 36.7% of day bombers for the same bombers and targets.

Similarities are both forces used the same intelligence systems, both had to cope with the same overall weather. The 8th Air Force selection of targets had influences on Bomber Command, and the directives specified targets to hit. Basically Harris picked the target for the night, but not for the month/quarter.

Early in 1944 the Germans decided to not produce any more Hydrogenation plants, the program was being hampered by a lack of manpower anyway which could not use the steel delivered, which was usually less than the steel allocated. Then add the difficulty of transporting equipment to new, distant plants. Work would concentrate on output of jet fuel. (BBSU page 143)

Harris,

Around 50% of the built up areas of the cities he hit were destroyed, Bomber Command dropped some 955,044 long tons of bombs, of this some 430,747 long tons were against towns. A graph of percentage losses when attacking Germany, per 3,000 sorties, the peak was late June to early July 1944 at around 6.5%, which makes sense given the short nights, fewer raids and intact night fighter defences. By late July it was down to around 3.5% after new jammers and window combined with radar and signals silence. By early September it is down to 2.8%, when Harris notes the capture of the Luftwaffe early warning radars, it then drops to under 1% in October before settling in the 1 to 1.7% band for the rest of the war.

Richard Davis figures, Bomber Command key targets, short tons for 1942 to 1945, (Missing some raids)
Army support 142,640.736
noball 71,010.24
oil 106,146.544
transport 112,328.556
uboat 15,207.36
city plus 485,226.412 (usually plus rail)
Out of 1,011,510.216 short tons dropped in the period Davis, has 146 different target types.

8th Air Force,
tactical targets 42,555.8
v weapon 31,055.6
oil 78,800.8
transport 248,056.4
aircraft 48,073.5
Out of 686,933.3 short tons dropped in the period

In 1942 Bomber Command's leadership was universally opposed to the creation of a pathfinder force, the RAF found in WWI keeping good people where they ended up boosted the overall effectiveness of the force compared with putting the best into elite units. After being over ruled Harris chose Donald Bennett to command the force, one of the best airmen the allies had and gave him support against the push back from the group commanders.

Harris on bombing U-boat bases in France in 1943, he protested greatly about it and was correct, but he did the bombings as per orders. More protests against the pre invasion transport plan, but then found Bomber Command better at attacking the targets. This, along with the strength of the night defences of Germany at the time meant Bomber Command did more invasion support than the 8th Air Force. Similar protests for the transport and oil strikes. Harris was bombing oil in June and into July 1944 on a "run a trial" basis, no orders. Harris was wrong in assuming the bomb accuracy attacking Germany applied to targets in France, as the pre D-day strikes showed. He raised considerable objections to Bomber Command being used for these strikes but it is interesting to note at the end of the war Eisenhower seems to have rated Harris as more co-operative than the USAAF Commanders. Harris for example flew to the weekly SHAEF meeting, Spaatz tended to send a representative.

According to the Chiefs of Staff committee report, Oil as a factor in the Axis War effort 1939-45 it found 7 nights and 3 days when oil targets could have been hit but were not in the last three months of 1944. Also the BBSU concluded that not many opportunities to attack oil targets was missed. Also using the Air Ministry publication the Bomber's Baedeker, A Guide to the Economic importance of German towns, it becomes clearer that the Bomber Command Area attacks generally conformed to the target priorities in the 1944/45 period. In late 1943 and early 1944 some area attacks were launched to help with the campaign against the German aircraft industry. The firestorm created at Kassel for example.

The 8th Air Force was initially allocated more oil targets than Bomber Command, a situation that appears to have remained unchanged until November 1944. Initially Bomber Command was given responsibility for the Ruhr plants, due to the strength of the defences, the haze over the area and the length of the night. In November 1944 it was believed all Bomber Command targets were knocked out, Harris then chose not to ask for more oil targets, Portal had to intervene and When targets were reallocated.

Harris should have appreciated the increase in accuracy over France in mid 1944 translated to an increase in accuracy over Germany once the radio guidance ground stations were set up on the French border in the final quarter of 1944. He seems to have decided Germany was simply too big to be able to really hurt a key sector of the economy. What he missed was how much bigger, in effective bombing capability terms, the allied air forces had become in the first 9 months of 1944. Harris was wrong about oil, mainly out of conviction over the many plans to "easily" stop German production, molybdenum, ball bearings, aircraft industry for example that failed so badly.

The following data ignores the attacks made on Czechoslovakian oil targets, by the 8th Air Force in May, August and September 1944 and February 1945, 5 attacks 961.5 tons of bombs, and Bomber Command in January 1945, 1 attack of 959.6 tons of bombs. It is what happened when the bombers struck targets in Germany, when the Air Forces had the most discretion as to the choice of target during the SHAEF period of control.

Table is date, 8th Air Force bombs on Germany, tons / % of those bombs on oil targets // Bomber Command bombs on Germany, tons / % of those bombs on oil targets.

May-44 19880 / 12.89 // 9479.8 / none
Jun-44 13120.5 / 34.01 // 5443.5 / 83.82
Jul-44 29838.3 / 22.33 // 14670.1 / 26.14
Aug-44 23597.4 / 26.07 // 16119.3 / 11.49
Sep-44 34818.4 / 21.12 // 22955.3 / 19.56
Oct-44 43552.2 / 11.74 // 57679.1 / 7.09
Nov-44 37798.8 / 42.39 // 58870.2 / 24.20
Dec-44 41092.1 / 7.23 // 51132.1 / 14.54
Jan-45 38551.3 / 7.40 // 33218.9 / 27.55
Feb-45 51187.2 / 11.93 // 50891.2 / 28.69
Mar-45 72951.1 / 13.06 // 74969.8 / 28.28
Apr-45 35646.1 / 4.61 // 38103.1 / 14.80

For the 8th the percentage of effort devoted to oil targets is higher if you only consider targets in Germany, compared with the total effort figures. For Bomber Command there is one major exception to this, August 1944 when it put in a major effort against oil targets in France, mainly storage and depot targets. That would raise oil target percentage to around 17.1% for the month.

While there were refineries in western Europe outside Germany the reality is almost all German oil production reachable by the England based bombers was within the 1937 German borders. So the extra effort devoted to oil targets outside Germany is not surprising.

Ignoring June 1944 as an aberration, since Bomber Command needed a very good reason to go to Germany in June, the defences were at their peak and the targets that could be attacked were at a minimum. In terms of percentage of effort the two air forces matched each other in July and September 1944, the 8th took the lead in August, October and November 1944, thereafter Bomber Command took the lead. 8th Air Force, date, percentage of visual attacks for the month / percentage of visual attacks on targets in Germany / percentage of effort devoted to targets in Germany // Bomber Command percentage of effort devoted to targets in Germany

Jun-44 60.16 / 59.38 / 22.52 // 8.5
Jul-44 58.52 / 44.43 / 66.00 // 22.84
Aug-44 92.42 / 89.41 / 49.18 // 21.69
Sep-44 44.13 / 37.29 / 86.30 // 39.24
Oct-44 22.83 / 22.81 / 99.96 // 84.20
Nov-44 12.49 / 12.64 / 93.43 // 99.38
Dec-44 34.78 / 34.65 / 99.68 // 93.45
Jan-45 32.13 / 32.50 / 98.84 // 90.65
Feb-45 25.18 / 24.61 / 99.25 // 98.93
Mar-45 43.47 / 43.01 / 98.96 // 100.00
Apr-45 78.74 / 72.17 / 75.93 // 98.63

So in the initial months the percentage of effort devoted to oil attacks on German targets by the 8th Air Force is roughly half the percentage of visual bombing of Germany. It can be seen for June, July and September 1944 the amount of Bomber Command attacks outside Germany, which were run requiring the better weather, is greater than the amount of visual bombing the 8th Air Force achieved. August 1944 is an exception and it appears part of the reason oil targets were not hit harder is SHAEF requesting a series of strikes on Motor Transport targets in Germany, Bomber Command devoted 1,758.1 tons of bombs to these targets compared with 1,852.6 tons to oil targets in Germany. The 8th had a similar request made, resulting in 8 attacks of 1,720.9 tons on AFV and Motor Transport targets, compared with 6,151.4 tons devoted to oil targets. The 8th continued the AFV and Motor transport strikes in September 5,766.7 tons of bombs versus 7,352 on oil targets in Germany and again in October 7,110.8 tons of bombs versus 5,112.2 tons on oil targets in Germany.

The figures for October 1944 are complicated by Operation Hurricane, the attempt to mount a maximum effort over the Ruhr, Bomber Command managed just over 10,000 tons on Duisburg in less than 24 hours, in two attacks. In bomb tonnage terms this represented just under 15% of the effort for the month. Trials of formation bombing using GH were also city strikes, apparently to see what sort of bomb patterns would result.

The figures for November 1944 show the 8th still taking the lead but the Bomber Command targets were assessed as non operational in the third week in November so no further attacks were done on them that month, plus the Wanne-Eikel raid being declared area. and it was not until early December oil strikes resumed, now against targets previously attacked by the 8th. The delay appears to be the result of the target allocation system and Harris being concerned about the defences of the more distant targets. So the figures for the month are really the 8th for 4 weeks versus Bomber Command for 3.

In December 1944 the need to help stop the Ardennes offensive meant oil same second, in addition the lack of daylight limited what the day bombers could do. Unsurprisingly given the weather and time of year Bomber Command was given the lead against oil targets for effectively the rest of the war.

The USSBS analysis of all the raids on the oil plants at Leuna, Zeitz and Ludwigshafen, 509,000 USAAF bombs at an average weight of 338 pounds, 264,000 RAF bombs at an average weight of 660 pounds, 27,000 tons of bombs, 3,376 tons landed within the installation fences, of this 3,376 tons 473 tons (14%) failed to explode, 2,093 tons (62%) did little damage and 810 tons (24%) did vital damage. As the sites were hundreds of acres in size it can be seen calling this sort of bombing precision is an exercise in marketing, not reality.

The final USSBS note is the bombing accuracy for these raids.

8th Air Force, visual bombing 26.8%
8th Air Force part visual/part instrument 12.4%
8th Air Force full instrument 5.4%
"Bomber Command at night 15.8%
Weighted average (by bombs dropped) 12.6%"

Another way of checking effort is to compare Bomber Commands percentage of effort against cities the amount of visual bombing done by the 8th Air Force. The USSBS European Theatre report 62, Weather factors in combat bombardment operations in the European Theater target weather table on page 8 notes for around two thirds of non visual bombing the weather was in the "blind" category, 8/10 clouds or worse.

The following table is 2/3 percentage of non visual bombing by the 8th //
Bomber Command percentage of effort against cities.

Jun-44 25.6 // 1.3
Jul-44 27.7 // 16.8
Aug-44 5.1 // 16.7
Sep-44 37.2 // 28.3
Oct-44 51.4 // 75.3
Nov-44 58.3 // 54.4
Dec-44 43.5 // 36.2
Jan-45 45.2 // 35.5
Feb-45 49.9 // 50.2
Mar-45 37.7 // 44.2
Apr-45 14.2 // 6

The above figures include the Bomber Command target classification city and rail facilities, if you use just city as the designation then the percentages change to Dec-44 26%, Feb-45 15.3%. Dresden was listed as city and rail. Any time the second figure is greater than the first is an indicator Bomber Command was doing area strikes in more than just bad weather. In August 1944 Bomber Command did a series of strikes on German ports, including 2 on Konigsberg, some 950 miles from English bases, as part of an effort to help the Red Army by disrupting Baltic sea traffic. Although some of the raids had aiming points on the docks they are all listed as city strikes. In October 1944 there was operation Hurricane, and the GH trials, in February 1945 operation Thunderclap.

Harris, as reported by Max Hastings, these two quotes are from different letters to Portal

"It has always been my custom to leave no stone unturned to get my views across but when that decision is made I carry it out to the utmost and the best of my ability. I am sorry that you should doubt this and surprised indeed if you can point to an precedent in support of your statements. I am certainly able to quote precedents in the opposite sense"

"I will not willingly lay myself open again to the charge that the lack of success of a policy [Oil] which I have declared at the outset...not to contain the seeds of success is, after the event, due to my not having tried. That situation is simply one of heads I lose, tails you win and it is an intolerable situation ... therefore I ask you to consider whether it is best for the persecution of the war and the success of our arms, which alone matters, that I should remain in this situation."

Post war Harris celebrated the 3 Group raids using GH on the small benzol plans located in the Ruhr

It would be remarkable if Harris, given his strong views, did not cause some Bomber Command sorties being shifted from specific targets, not just oil but other targets like transport, to city strikes. His views would have made it harder to propose specific strikes and would have influenced his staff's ideas of the feasible. There are thousands of sorties to choose from, though to choose any specific raid requires consideration of the weather forecast for that operation and what the intelligence was at that time. Then add operations ordered from outside of Bomber Command and the time lag in September/October 1944 in setting up the ground based radio aids in France the night bombers needed to be consistently accurate. Given the problems with picking a given strike we are left with the trends. The conclusion is Harris did divert sorties, but they were at the margin, not a major reassignment.

15th Air Force
Ploesti: 11 Major refineries in roughly a circle of 4 miles diameter around the town of Ploesti. In taking over the defence of the plants the Germans had two dummy sites built plus an outer oil pipeline connecting all the refineries together, making them a "pool" and so helping to minimise the effect on production of any damage. Given the lack of long range bombers in the Red Air Force the decision was taken to orientate the air defences against attacks from the West and South.

Strikes, all by 15th Air Force (or US forces) unless otherwise noted.

12 June 1942, 13 B-24s, Little damage.

1 August 1943, the low level attack operation Tidalwave, 177 B-24s

5 April 1944, 206 bombers Officially targeting Ploesti marshalling yards, since attacks on oil targets are proscribed by SHAEF, many bombs "accidentally" or "poorly aimed" miss the rail yards and cause "grave harm" to the adjacent oil facilities.

15 April 1944, 137 bombers Officially targeting marshalling yards

24 April 1944, 290 bombers Officially targeting marshalling yards

5 May 1944, 320 bombers officially attack marshalling yards while 198 attack oil targets

18 May 1944, 700 bombers, the first authorised attack in this series against the oil targets. Most turn back because of cloud cover, 206 attack with 493 tons of bombs, 14 bombers lost.

31 May 1944, 481 bombers attack

6 June 1944, 287 bombers attack

10 June 1944, 46 P-38s with one 1,000 lb bomb each.

23 June 1944, 139 bombers, 283 tons of bombs, 6 bombers lost

24 June 1944, 135 bombers

9 July 1944, 222 B-24s and B-17s mostly use radar bombing because of "an otherwise impenetrable smoke screen"

15 July 1944, 604 B-17s and B-24s.

22 July 1944, 459 B-24 and B-17s attack Ploesti

28 July 1944, 324 B-24 and B-17s

31 July 1944, 174 bombers attack Ploesti while over 145 B-24 bombers attack Bucharest refineries.

10 August 1944, 342 bombers

17 August 1944, 245 bombers

18 August 1944, 273 bombers

30 August 1944 Ploesti is captured by the Red Army. 15h Air Force, 3,862 heavy bombers credited with attacking targets at Ploesti, 226 bombers missing, 5.85% loss rate. Plus add write offs.

In addition 205 Group RAF mounted night strikes on 9/10 August 1944 and 17/18 August 1944. The group also laid around 1400 mines in the Danube between April and August 1944, dropping traffic to 1/3 normal level, over the course of a year 60% of the oil was shipped by river, note that for 3 months of the year ice prevented river transport. 205 Group also mounted strikes on rail transport in the area.

By around April 1944 there were some 350,000 slave labourers repairing air raid damage in Romania.

Verrier in the book Bomber Offensive notes the US Survey of Ploesti just after it was captured concluded that at the most generous estimate the plants were capable of operating at about 10% of capacity. Overall missing rate of the bombers in the attacks was put at 7%. Verrier agrees with Speer that repeated attacks were needed, given damage from isolated raids was usually quickly repaired. The book also states Ploesti was eliminated as a strategic target on 24 July, but the strike list above clearly shows raids were still launched.