Day or night strategic bombing?

That has to be taken with a huge dose of hindsight as at the time it was firmly believed that the combined effort was being of enormous benefit despite losses suffered. Any psychological sea change was not going to happen in a hurry as the structure to carry out the bombing raids was enormous for all involved, not to mention there were many in powerful positions who actively endorsed that policy, so even after WW2 heavy bombers continued as the norm. Alternatives, such as smaller high speed bombers like the Mosquito as the principal means of strategic bombing could not be enacted in the time scale, also Mossie builders had issues with delivery since everyone wanted them and not enough could be built fast enough to supply everyone's needs.

But Le May stripped guns gunners from his B-29s to achieve the same result, as did some LW Do 217 units attacking Britain.
The fact that Mosquito units showed much lower loss rates ought to have spurred more effective/efficient responses in real-time - rather than push-on relentless horrific attrition of your best brightest aircrews.

Tante Ju said:

You are quoting Speer selectively. Speer's note of 'this type of attack' was said in the context of this scale - the same scale of Hamburg firestorm. Mass destruction of six major German cities on the scale of Hamburg with tenthousends laying dead would have very seriously effected German production no doubt, but the RAF was incapable of such regular attacks, general area bombing was another matter.

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I'm only quoting Speer regarding the Hamburg raid because that is what my original post pertained to. That is hardly "selective" quotation. Why would I quote his opinion of a Schweinfurt or Berlin raid in the specific context of the Hamburg raid?
You accused me of misquoting him,which I did not,and further maintained that he said the exact opposite,which he did not.

I am well aware of Speer's fear of allied attacks on critical industries and choke points but that is hardly relevant to Hamburg. I originally said that Speer thought we should have repeated the Hamburg treatment on other German cities and he said exactly that. It was you that then rather rudely accused me of misquotation,now modified somewhat ungraciously to selective quotation.

The fact that the RAF could not repeat such raids successfully on other German cities is not relevant.

Cheers

Steve

Shooter8 said:

First, Losses to AAA were greater at night than in the day time. I know this sounds fatuous, but the British bombers were not capable of flying high enough to minimize losses and the radar made the AAA very much more effective. .

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It sounds fatuous because it is
Bomber Command lost 1,345 aircraft to Flak (41%) and 2,278 to night fighter (59%)

Total USAAF losses, not just bombers, in Europe were again more than 50% to flak, 5,400 as opposed to 4,300 shot down by fighters.

The 8th Air Force lost 1,798 heavy bombers to Flak, this represents 31% of losses to all causes.

The 15th Air Force lost 1,046 heavy bombers to flak, representing 44% of losses to all causes.

Flak had very similar success rates by day and night, for aircraft destroyed it had a very roughly 60/40 ratio.

If you want the 'hidden' effects of flak the principle two were forcing the bombers to attack from greater altitudes which dramatically decreased their accuracy (and I have the statistics to back up this contention) and damaging the bombers without necessarily shooting them down.
Between December 1942 and April 1945 flak damaged a total of 54,539 aircraft of the 8th Air Force, which represents 20% of sorties dispatched.

Do you actually look at any data or statistics before you express an opinion?

Cheers

Steve

Shooter8 said:

Two parts in answer to your question;
First, Losses to AAA were greater at night than in the day time. I know this sounds fatuous, but the British bombers were not capable of flying high enough to minimize losses and the radar made the AAA very much more effective. IIRC, the Brits lost 5-6% to AAA while we lost less than 1% to AAA because we flew so much higher than they did.
Second, while their fighters shot down more of us plane to plane, we shot down more of them than they did us, while the Brits shot down almost none of the Nazi fighter planes.
You make the choice as to which trade off was worth more to the total war effort.

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First, you have to define what your losses mean? Is it a percentage of losses to all causes, losses per mission, or something else? Otherwise it is quite meaningless.

In the case of the daylight campaign, it stands to reason that a lower percentage is lost to flak than fighters, because the latter are far more effective during the day.

But, at the end of the war the losses of USAAF bombers were around 50:50 flak and fighters [edit: see Stona's post above]. This ratio changed throughout the war, the flak having a relatively high proportion at the start of the 8th AF campaign, this reducing as the campaign intensified and the Luftwaffe moved more fighters west to defend and increased again after the US fighters had decimated the Luftwaffe defenders by early/mid 1944.

One thing flak did was injure more US aircrew than did fighters. And it had a psychological effect because the crew couldn't shoot back - they had to sit and ride the flak out. At least with fighters they could try to shoot them down.

The RAF didn't have to deal with as many fighters, but the ones that were there could shoot down the RAF bombers, sometimes without being seen. Using upward firing cannons to shoot into the bomber's belly from beneath.

The night bomber war was quite different to the day bomber war. For one thing it relied more heavily on electronics. The RAF would introduce a radar to detect attacking nightfighters. The nightfighters would introduce a system where they could track a bomber by its radar, etc.

You are right that radar directed AA guns were very effective at night. Except when the radar was being jammed. Which happened a few times during the war, using systems such as "Window".

The biggest down side of German AA fire was common for day and night - the lack of proximity fuses. The fuses had to be set for an altitude (flight time?). If they were too much out they weren't very effective at all.

There is also another difference between the night and daytime attacks regarding the flak. The night attacks were in a loose bomber stream. The day attacks were in massive formations and flew steady and straight for many minutes in the run up to a target. The formation was in place before and after the bombing run.

Shooter8 said:

One reason why they suffered such low loss rates is because the Germans thought they were little more than a nuisance and made very little effort to shoot them down as evidenced by the near total lack of very high performance night fighters to counter the 3-4000 bombers. They also flew much higher than the typical Bomber Command mission and that made them much less vulnerable to AAA.
Then there is the weight of bombs dropped per mission. 2-4000 pounds depending on target and range for the Mossy and 8-14000 for the big bombers which also carried radar and other Avionic aids which made them much more effective. So all in all, the Mossy was a side show of very limited utility.

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Yes, Mosquito raids were often nuisance raids. Often diversionary raids.

But that is not to say that the Luftwaffe did not expend any effort to shoot them down. On the contrary the reverse may have been the case (incentives for shooting down Mosquitoes).

Mosquitoes formed a significant part of the Pathfinder Force (PFF) in the latter half of the war. In this role they were used to guide the bombers to target and/or mark the target. They did this using those very "radar and other avionic aids", chief among them was Oboe. And the Germans knew that disrupting the target marking aircraft would go a long way to disrupting the bombing mission.

I believe that, until later in the war, most main force bombers aimed visually at the target markers laid down by the PFF, with corrections called by the Master Bomber.

Radar bombing was not the most accurate during WW2. Oboe was quite accurate, but had range limitations. But the higher altitude at which the Mosquito flew increased teh effective range, and that is why they were used.

Mosquito B.IX LR503 F for Freddie was an Oboe Mosquito which flew 213 missions during the war. Note the painted over nose.

Shooter8 said:

Second, while their fighters shot down more of us plane to plane, we shot down more of them than they did us, while the Brits shot down almost none of the Nazi fighter planes..

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from wiki
The Mosquito also proved a very capable night fighter. Some of the most successful RAF pilots flew the Mosquito. Bob Braham claimed around a third of his 29 kills in a Mosquito, flying mostly daytime operations, while on night fighters Wing Commander Branse Burbridgeclaimed 21 kills, and Wing Commander John Cunningham claimed 19 of his 20 victories at night on Mosquitos. Mosquitos of No. 100 Group RAF were responsible for the destruction of 257 German aircraft from December 1943 to April 1945. Mosquito fighters from all units accounted for 487 German aircraft during the war, the vast majority of which were night fighters.[105]


and the mosquito was not the only night fighter just the best.

The bombers themselves also shot down night fighters, though the rules of engagement varied from Group to Group. Some were encouraged to be more aggressive, but this led to an increase in friendly fire incidents. Others were encouraged to evade. Firing guns in the dark gives one's position away to any night fighter within at least two to three miles.
Cheers
Steve

Another 'elephant in the statistical room' for different kinds of Bomber Command losses by night is the huge number of aircraft lost to no known cause. Very often there were no survivors and witnesses who saw a burning aircraft plummet to earth could rarely know what had caused it to do so.

1943 night losses. Fighter 964 Flak 574 Not by Enemy Action 26 Unknown Causes 691.

1944 night losses. Fighter 940 Flak 489 Not by Enemy Action 53 Unknown Causes 867.

1945 night losses. Fighter 205 Flak 89 Not by Enemy Action 26 Unknown Causes 187.

For the three years quoted above losses to fighters were 2,105 and to Flak 1,152, which appears to be a 2 to 1 advantage to fighters. However another 1,745 aircraft were lost to unknown causes.
Losses to Fighters were therefore 42%, to Flak 23% and to unknown causes a huge 35%, often ignored in quoted figures.

Another important figure is the number of aircraft damaged by Flak as opposed to shot down. This is a much larger figure for Flak than for fighters. In 1944, by night, 2,555 aircraft were damaged by Flak, 625 by fighters. A bomber was four times as likely to be damaged by Flak than by a fighter.

Cheers

Steve

Steve - is it known when the people at RAF BC found out about the 'Shraege musik'?

The important thing about bailing out of an aircraft was how much it was under control. For the pilot to get out of a Lancaster and many other types it had to fly pretty straight which a damaged aircraft didnt generally do. I have read of crews staying with the bomber because the pilot was fighting to keep the plane level and couldnt get out himself, it has even been depicted in the movies. The crews that get home have a tale to tell but the crews that didnt are an unknown cause. If a plane is hit in the bomb bay and the bombs explode there is nothing recognizable as an aircraft to find on the ground

stona said:

Another 'elephant in the statistical room' for different kinds of Bomber Command losses by night is the huge number of aircraft lost to no known cause. Very often there were no survivors and witnesses who saw a burning aircraft plummet to earth could rarely know what had caused it to do so.

1943 night losses. Fighter 964 Flak 574 Not by Enemy Action 26 Unknown Causes 691.

1944 night losses. Fighter 940 Flak 489 Not by Enemy Action 53 Unknown Causes 867.

1945 night losses. Fighter 205 Flak 89 Not by Enemy Action 26 Unknown Causes 187.

For the three years quoted above losses to fighters were 2,105 and to Flak 1,152, which appears to be a 2 to 1 advantage to fighters. However another 1,745 aircraft were lost to unknown causes.
Losses to Fighters were therefore 42%, to Flak 23% and to unknown causes a huge 35%, often ignored in quoted figures.

Another important figure is the number of aircraft damaged by Flak as opposed to shot down. This is a much larger figure for Flak than for fighters. In 1944, by night, 2,555 aircraft were damaged by Flak, 625 by fighters. A bomber was four times as likely to be damaged by Flak than by a fighter.

Cheers

Steve

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Germany have had, in 1944, more than 10000 (ten thusand) of 88+ mm Flak that was supposed to prevent the bombing raids. Compared with how much night fighters - 500?

BTW:

tomo pauk said:

Steve - is it known when the people at RAF BC found out about the 'Shraege musik'?

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I will have to dig out the exact time, but I remember some initial reports of some kind of upward firing armament following the Peenemunde raid in August 1943. Bomber Command does not seem to have been unduly concerned. It was aware that many night fighter attacks took the bomber completely by surprise, and Schrage Musik was just one more method of achieving that surprise. To be honest I can't remember any reference to Schrage Musik in the official history, nor in Harris' 'Despatch'. Neither do I remember any major concern from Bomber Command (like an ORS report). I think that maybe we give the system more attention today than was given to it, at least by the British, at he time.

In August 1943. Bomber Command's ORS estimates from analysis of strikes on aircraft that survived, a sample of 69, showed that only 14 (20%) were attacked from more than 10 degrees below the horizontal. This directly contradicted the Command's assertion that most attacks were being made from 75-90 degrees below the horizontal. This was not a reference to Schrage Musik, but to steep climbing attacks, described by Harris as a 'new and deadly tactic' nearly a year earlier.This is important because it impacted on how bomber armament might be developed. Of course aircraft subject to a competent attack with upward firing armament were unlikely to survive.
Around this time the ' extended corkscrew' evasive manoeuvre was formalised. This is often mentioned but rarely described, it was the standard tactic to evade a fighter, so I will take this opportunity to quote 'Tactical Countermeasures to Combat Enemy Night Fighters, A.A. Searchlight and Gun Defences'

"The extended corkscrew commences with a straight dive which is converted into a turn of about 60 degrees, losing height by about 1800 ft. This is followed by pulling out of the dive and climbing as sharply as possible in the opposite direction with full power, regaining as much height as possible. The whole manoeuvre is then repeated exactly as before."

Again, this could only work if the fighter was seen in time.

You can't compare numbers of flak guns and fighters in a meaningful way. The guns are more or less immobile and have to wait for the targets to come to them. It's why they concentrate around likely targets. An attacking force will go to great lengths (just look at some of the routes into Berlin) to avoid such concentrations.
Fighters can obviously go and look for their targets.



Steve

stona said:

I will have to dig out the exact time, but I remember some initial reports of some kind of upward firing armament following the Peenemunde raid in August 1943. Bomber Command does not seem to have been unduly concerned. It was aware that many night fighter attacks took the bomber completely by surprise, and Schrage Musik was just one more method of achieving that surprise. To be honest I can't remember any reference to Schrage Musik in the official history, nor in Harris' 'Despatch'. Neither do I remember any major concern from Bomber Command (like an ORS report). I think that maybe we give the system more attention today than was given to it, at least by the British, at he time.

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Interesting bit from here: A Failure of Intelligence

I later applied the same method of analysis to the question of whether experience helped crews to survive. Bomber Command told the crews that their chances of survival would increase with experience, and the crews believed it. They were told, After you have got through the first few operations, things will get better. This idea was important for morale at a time when the fraction of crews surviving to the end of a 30-operation tour was only about 25 percent. I subdivided the experienced and inexperienced crews on each operation and did the analysis, and again, the result was clear. Experience did not reduce loss rates. The cause of losses, whatever it was, killed novice and expert crews impartially. This result contradicted the official dogma, and the Command never accepted it. I blame the ORS, and I blame myself in particular, for not taking this result seriously enough. The evidence showed that the main cause of losses was an attack that gave experienced crews no chance either to escape or to defend themselves. If we had taken the evidence more seriously, we might have discovered Schräge Musik in time to respond with effective countermeasures.

- Freeman Dyson

Let's just say that Dyson had his issues with Dickins whom he categorised as "a career civil servant. His guiding principle was only to tell the commander in chief things that the commander in chief liked to hear." This is palpably and demonstrably untrue.

It's not a subject I'd care to go into at length, but many of Dyson's assertions are provably false. In this case it is probably true that Bomber Command didn't take Shrage Musik seriously, it was just seen as another way of surprising a bomber.

As early as July 1943 Dickins wrote a letter in which the ORS intention to find out what was going on and how bombers were being attacked is obvious.

"It is hoped in due course to obtain further information covering tactics of Enemy Aircraft which shoot down our Bombers from cases in which some of the Bomber crew succeeded in returning..."

This rather contradicts Dyson's later assertions. It is also worth remembering that these survivors/evaders often had no idea how their bomber had been attacked, precisely because they were taken by surprise.

We, with hindsight, should also remember that relatively few Luftwaffe night fighters were equipped with upward firing weapons.

Anyone interested in Dyson's side of the story should read 'Disturbing the Universe', his, shall we say, cathartic memoir.

Cheers

Steve

From Harris' ' Despatch'.

"Mention has already been made of the fact that from about September, 1944, onwards, the individual enemy fighters were almost entirely deprived of the use of their aids to interception. This was most fortunate, since an unorthodox type of offensive armament, designed for use in conjunction with homing devices, is thought to have come into much greater use about this time. Information was received from Intelligence sources in August, 1944, that some of the enemy fighters were equipped with cannon, fitted above or in the fuselage, and fixed to fire upwards at a steep angle to the horizontal. The evidence obtained from bombers previously damaged by fighter attack was re-investigated and the results suggested that the weapon had probably started to come into use in January, 1944 and had subsequently been used probably in 10 per cent of non lethal fighter attacks. Considerable apprehension was felt as to the danger of any extended use of this weapon, since MONICA had already been withdrawn and no effective provision against it could be made in the case of aircraft equipped with H2S, constituting the bulk of the bomber force. These aircraft could not be fitted with downward firing guns and FISHPOND was not able to detect fighters at close range.A tactical note was issued recommending the execution of a diving turn following any FISHPOND indication or of a banking search every 5-10 minutes for all non-FISHPOND aircraft and modifications to FISHPOND were put in hand to reduce its minimum range to the order of 300 yards. Trials carried out by B.D.U. showed the corkscrew to be the most effective form of combat manoeuvre against fighters equipped with upward firing guns and this therefore continued to be the recommended manoeuvre.
The proportion of damaged bombers showing strikes from upward firing armament increased considerably towards the end of 1944 and 1945, and it is probable that, but for the general difficulties of the fighters effecting interception, the extended use of this weapon might have been much more serious."

My bold.

Cheers

Steve

Harris must have been well aware that the RAF had developed a whole range of oblique armament bomber interceptors up until the 30's. Specialised airframes designed to take heavy bore weapons - particularly the Coventry Ordinance Works 37mm cannon!



So I find it very hard to believe that any senior RAF officer could be surprised by Shrage Musik. The surprising thing is that they did so little about it!

ChrisMcD said:

Harris must have been well aware that the RAF had developed a whole range of oblique armament bomber interceptors up until the 30's. Specialised airframes designed to take heavy bore weapons - particularly the Coventry Ordinance Works 37mm cannon!



So I find it very hard to believe that any senior RAF officer could be surprised by Shrage Musik. The surprising thing is that they did so little about it!

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I'm rarely surprised by bureaucrats -- and senior military officers are bureaucrats -- being less than cognizant of technological developments that didn't directly impinge upon them, if for no other reason than that somebody in Harris' position would be so busy with day-to-day operational issues that he'd either not notice or not remember a failed experiment ten years prior, unless he was something like the project manager.

Knowing something existed and that the principle is established is not the same as knowing that the enemy has developed and deployed it operationally. That knowledge came from the intelligence referenced above.
Cheers
Steve

stona said:

Knowing something existed and that the principle is established is not the same as knowing that the enemy has developed and deployed it operationally. That knowledge came from the intelligence referenced above.
Cheers
Steve

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You are of course correct. But to quote a comment I read years ago - "airfields across the UK must have been littered with bombers riddled with strangely angled bullet holes and yet nobody seems to have drawn the obvious conclusions" - all I was pointing out was that any armaments officer with more than 10 years service in the RAF would have been able to work out that the Luftwaffe were attacking from underneath. Apart from anything else I believe it it was a favourite tactic of the Defiant night fighters as well.

Bomber Command were amazingly complacent about some things and seemed to have had an amazing level of corporate resistance to change. Wilfred Freeman - as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff regularly told Harris to do things and Harris simply refused to do them! Go figure!