Day or night strategic bombing?

[stona]

I can see your point Steve, but the German assault on London in particular continued with the V flying bombs.

Yes,but both they and the occasional bombing raids amounted to little more than a nuisance compared with the night blitz of 1940/41. It wouldn't feel that way if your street was one of those hit but that was the reality.
The first V-1s were not launched at London until June 1944 so they were hardly a continuation of the "Blitz".
Cheers
Steve

 

[CobberKane]

'Most positions in a bomber crew would be enlisted, not officers. Enlisted goes where they're told to go, there's not much asking where you want to be assigned'.


If I had to...I would fly at night as darkness gives some element of cover.
Cheers
John

...and in a Mosquito!

 

[Readie]

...and in a Mosquito!

Absolutely CK.
I would take my chances in a Mossie....or a photo recon Spitfire.

'The first V-1s were not launched at London until June 1944 so they were hardly a continuation of the "Blitz".'

Map Charts Every WWII Bomb Strike in London - Yahoo! News UK

This is an interesting map Steve.

Between 8,000 and 9,000 V1's were launched against Southern England, primarily London. After the initial shock of the first ones, their impact was limited as V1's could be shot out of the sky by anti-aircraft fire as these guns could lock onto the trajectory of the incoming V1. The Royal Observer Corps gave an early warning of incoming V1's. Fighter planes were also used to tip over the 'wings' of the V1 so that it continued to fly but off course. Over 50% of the V1's fired at Britain were destroyed before they crashed to the ground and exploded.

Quite an assault.

Cheers
John

 

[Gixxerman]

Proximity fused AAA moved to the coast did much to nullify the V1 threat, the aircraft taking care of the few that got through.
The Americans had a lot of success againt the V1 attack on Antwerp for the same reasons (prox fused AAA aircraft screens).

 

[drgondog]

Depends. In fall 1943, daylight bombing wasn't working and for first time 8th AF was attaining loss levels of RAF. After April 1944 the loss rate of 8th AF dropped enormously because of escorts. The RAF never developed the night escort effectiveness and continued to suffer heavy losses right through March 1945.

By the end of the war, the USAAF dropped as much as RAF in tonnage with half or one third of the operational load per sortie but the RAF lost twice the number KIA reflecting the incredible pressure on RAF from the beginning of the war to the end. The RAF BC was staffed by incredibly dedicated crews (as were USAAF) but IMO Night bombing from day one to the end was more dangerous.

 

[stona]

Proximity fused AAA moved to the coast did much to nullify the V1 threat, the aircraft taking care of the few that got through.
The Americans had a lot of success againt the V1 attack on Antwerp for the same reasons (prox fused AAA aircraft screens).

I'd cite three factors that came in time to increase the effectiveness of British AAA. They all came courtesy of the Americans. First,as you say,the proximity fuse. This,in conjunction with the SCR 584 gun laying radar and the No 10 Predictor system which effectively utilised the flow of information from the new radar,increased the ability of British guns to shoot down V-1s considerably.
British 3.7 inch guns thus equipped were able to average a mere 156 shells per V-1 destroyed. That is a remarkably low figure.
The AAA combined with the standing fighter patrols and balloon barrage meant that only about 1/3 of V-1s launched fell in the Greater London area.
Cheers
Steve

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... ...and in a Mosquito!"

Absolutely:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLdVIKyx7RE

MM

 

[Readie]

Depends. In fall 1943, daylight bombing wasn't working and for first time 8th AF was attaining loss levels of RAF. After April 1944 the loss rate of 8th AF dropped enormously because of escorts. The RAF never developed the night escort effectiveness and continued to suffer heavy losses right through March 1945.

By the end of the war, the USAAF dropped as much as RAF in tonnage with half or one third of the operational load per sortie but the RAF lost twice the number KIA reflecting the incredible pressure on RAF from the beginning of the war to the end. The RAF BC was staffed by incredibly dedicated crews (as were USAAF) but IMO Night bombing from day one to the end was more dangerous.

RAF USAAF Bomb Tonnages on Germany 1939–45

RAF Bomber
Command (tons) US 8th Air Force (tons)

1939 31 —
1940 13,033 —
1941 31,504 —
1942 45,561 1,561
1943 157,457 44,165
1944 525,518 389,119
1945 191,540 188,573
Total 964,644 623,418

Bombing Effort,entire European Theatre

Tons Percent
8th Air Force (including fighters) 692,918 25
9th Air Force 225,799 8.15
12th Air Force 207,367 7.5
15th Air Force (including fighters) 312,173 11.27
1st Tactical Air Force 25,166 0.91
Total USAAF 1,463,423 52.8
Bomber Command 1,066,141 38.48
Fighter Command 3,910 0.14
2nd Tactical Air Force 69,138 2.5
Mediterranean Air Command 167,928 6.06
Total RAF 1,307,117 47.2
Overall Total 2,770,540 100.0

RAF Bombing Sorties Losses 1939–45
Sorties Losses
Night 297,663 7,449
Day 66,851 876

More stats.
The night missions cost Bomber Command dearly. Which is why its a disgrace that it has taken till 2012 for a memorial to the crews to be erected in London.
Cheers
John

 

[Tenaces]

"It makes me furious when I see the Mosquito. I turn green and yellow with envy. The British knock together a beautiful wooden aircraft that every piano factory over there is building, and they give it a speed which they have now increased yet again. There is nothing the British do not have. They have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops."
----Herman Goering, 1943

That quote always makes me chuckle. I have to research if they tried to use the Mosquito as a night bomber escort. Does anyone else know?

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... I have to research if they tried to use the Mosquito as a night bomber escort."

I think they (Mosquitos) were only used as Intruders - interdicting German night fighters over night fighter airbases.

MM

 

[mhuxt]

"... I have to research if they tried to use the Mosquito as a night bomber escort."

I think they (Mosquitos) were only used as Intruders - interdicting German night fighters over night fighter airbases.

MM

Bomber Command's 100 Group used radar-equipped Mosquitos at high level to support raids by the heavies from December 1943 onwards. The initial attempts at Bomber Support came with Bob Braham's Beaufighter-equipped 141 Squadron from mid-1943.

Neither the Beaus nor the Mosquitos flew "close escort" as such - their radar screens would have been swamped by returns from the heavies and Window, instead they patrolled either sideof the bomber stream, around known night-fighter beacons, etc.

Incidentially, the three FB.VI-equipped squadrons of 100 Group (23, 169 and 515 Squadrons) flew more conventional escort sorties on daylight raids by the RAF heavies.

As for relative loss rates, I'll try to dig out an updated graph I did recently - loss rates for BC and 8th RAF from various sources.

 

[mhuxt]

The BC numbers come from Martin Middlebrook and from the Davis study of Allied bombing ops. I believe they differ in the way they treat early returns / "credit sorties" Main % differenc is '42.

The 8th AF numbers come from Davis and from the Williamson Murray book on the Luftwaffe. He cites a USAAF study, the numbers from which I also transcribed, but now can't find. IIRC there were a few minor differences at various times, not sure why that should be.

 

[J.A.W.]

The strategic bomber offensives against Germany were shown by the post-war US survey to be another allied example of wasted effort, one that also blotted the moral high ground claims of the democracies, given the level of blatant atrocity involved, such as Operation Clarion, for example, but then I guess the US had its General Sherman doctrines as established war-waging principles, ol`Butch Harris got his RAF career made-man status - bombing Bedouins back into the stone-age pre-war..

 

[stona]

The strategic bomber offensives against Germany were shown by the post-war US survey to be another allied example of wasted effort, one that also blotted the moral high ground claims of the democracies, given the level of blatant atrocity involved, such as Operation Clarion, for example, but then I guess the US had its General Sherman doctrines as established war-waging principles, ol`Butch Harris got his RAF career made-man status - bombing Bedouins back into the stone-age pre-war..

You're not expecting a serious answer to that are you?
Steve

 

[Readie]

The strategic bomber offensives against Germany were shown by the post-war US survey to be another allied example of wasted effort, one that also blotted the moral high ground claims of the democracies, given the level of blatant atrocity involved, such as Operation Clarion, for example, but then I guess the US had its General Sherman doctrines as established war-waging principles, ol`Butch Harris got his RAF career made-man status - bombing Bedouins back into the stone-age pre-war..

You are obviously trying to provoke a reaction with your absurd post.

 

[J.A.W.]

Well, who was correct about the right way to snuff Adolf, Harris or Stalin?
It is true that certain specific strategic targets were worth destroying, but the truly wasteful, needlessly awful methods applied were not something to be proud of..
Getting dirty is expected from megalomaniac ideologue dictators, but the democracies didn`t HAVE to climb into the sewer too.

 

[tyrodtom]

Give us a good example of some nice wars.

 

[airminded88]

Yeah, I'm all ears too.

 

[J.A.W.]

Well, setting an example could be a fine thing, rather than "He started it, so we`ll show em what its like X 10" that's schoolyard-level stuff, - 55,000 [ RAF Bomber Command alone!]casualties to burn ~600,000 civilians..

Here's what Chuck Yager thought..

"Atrocities were committed by both sides. That fall our fighter group received orders from the 8th AF to stage a maximum effort [Operation Clarion].

Our 75 Mustangs were assigned an area of 50 x 50 miles inside Germany ordered to strafe anything that moved. The object was to demoralise the German population.

Nobody asked our opinion about whether we were actually demoralizing the survivors or maybe enraging them to stage their own maximum effert on behalf of the Nazi war effort. We weren't asked how we felt zapping people. It was a miserable, dirty mission, but we all took off on time did it.
If it occurred to anyone to refuse to participate [nobody refused, as I recall] that person would probably have been court-martialled. I remember sitting next to Bochkay at the briefing whispering to him: 'If we`re gonna do things like this, we sure as hell better make sure we are on the winning side.' That's still my view."

"I'm certainly not proud of that particular strafing mission against civilians. But it is there,on the record, in my memory."

 

[tyrodtom]

I'm still waiting for that example.