Day or night strategic bombing?

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Unfortunately the airfields were not littered with bombers fill of oddly angled holes. It's something, angle from which bombers were attacked, that the ORS looked at frequently. Nor were crews reporting such attacks in debriefing. This is testimony to the capability of Schragemusik. Crews and aircraft simply didn't return to base following such attacks.
Cheers
Steve
 
It just wasn't experiments from the the early 30s.

Granted the mounting was supposed to allow for easy reloading.

But at least a few pilots used to fire upward, Albert Ball among them.
and

two Vickers guns in the cowl and the upward firing Lewis guns. Which could not be used to fire through the prop even if the angle could be adjusted.
A pretty standard armament fit for Sopwith Camel night fighters operating over England were two Lewis guns on Foster mountings and NO Vickers guns.

And a few other fighters also used the general arrangement.

The amount of operational knowledge from WW I lost or ignored is staggering.
 
stona said:
Bomber Command lost 1,345 aircraft to Flak (41%) and 2,278 to night fighter (59%)
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Almost on the 60/40 ratio...
The 8th Air Force lost 1,798 heavy bombers to Flak, this represents 31% of losses to all causes.
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So up to 69% were caused by fighters (as well as pilot error, mechanical malfunction): Looking at this, I'd have assumed the 69% loss rate (5800 planes) would be the result of day-fighters possessing potentially better agility, better ability to see their targets. The flak-accuracy on this alone appears to be the result of the fact that the USAAF B-17 and B-24's could fly higher (though ironically I was told that the B-24's usually flew at around 21,000-23,000 feet) and had lower odds of being hit.
The 15th Air Force lost 1,046 heavy bombers to flak, representing 44% of losses to all causes.
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Did the 15th Air Force use less B-17's, and more B-24's, B-25's, B-26's, A-20's, and A-26's?
Wait... if the crews that were attacked rarely returned: How did they determine attack angles? Other crews?
 
Zipper730 said:
Wait... if the crews that were attacked rarely returned: How did they determine attack angles? Other crews?
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No. Some damaged bombers made it back to bases in the UK and some shot down crew members also made it back (returners). Of the damaged bombers examined, most received damage from flak, but of those that had been engaged by fighters almost all had been engaged from a low angle off.
The issue with gaining intelligence on Schragemusik was its devastating effect. It was in effect a surprise attack with 20mm cannon at point blank range. Bombers simply did not survive to return damaged. If any crew returned they would have no clear idea of how they had been attacked. Other crews certainly did witness Schragemusik attacks. The Luftwaffe used very 'low glimmer' tracer in these weapons so observers saw no stream of tracer, just a sudden explosion. This was not interpreted as a bomber exploding but as some kind of pyrotechnic designed to undermine morale, it was even given an appropriate name 'Scarecrow', despite never existing.
I have read extensively the research of Bomber Command's ORS and refute absolutely the notion that
"Bomber Command were amazingly complacent about some things and seemed to have had an amazing level of corporate resistance to change."
Certainly as far as loss rates and casualties are concerned. A vast amount of effort went into understanding why and how losses were incurred and how they might be mitigated.

As far as targeting goes, that is another question altogether. Harris was convinced, and he was not alone, that a general bombing campaign was the correct use of his force and argued strongly against its diversion to a targeted campaign, which he saw as taking his foot of the neck of an opponent who was already down, but not yet out. He also had good scientific and statistical evidence to show just how much effort was required to destroy such targets, many transport targets were particularly difficult. He and his ORS had a far better understanding of such factors than Zuckermann and his 'panacea merchants', whose actual knowledge of operations was just about zero.
Did you mean Portal rather than Freeman? Portal's problem was that he too was caught on the horns of a dilemma in 1944. Did he support the Americans and go after oil (Harris and Bomber Command attacked oil targets more heavily that the 8th Air Force ever did anyway) or support Tedder and many at SHAEF and go after transport targets? Alternatively he might allow Harris to continue unmolested, but the political pressure to do one of the other two would be considerable. Policy was not always as clear as we might hope and the late war directives were always the result of compromise (an Anglo-American compromise) and were worded in ways that allowed Harris to carry on his campaign whilst conforming to the broad objectives of said directives.
Cheers
Steve
 
Zipper730 said:
Almost on the 60/40 ratio...
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Thanks for rounding off for us.



German Flak had limitations in that the, apparently, did not have proximity fuses. So they would have to estimate the altitude of the bombers and set their fuses for that altitude.

But to think that flak was ineffectual because the B-17s flew higher is mistaken. My understanding is that flak accounted for more casualties in the 8th AF than did fighters, and caused quite considerable damage to aircraft that were still able to return. Flak also had psychological effects on the air crew, as unlike with fighters they could not fight back.

The 8th AF was predominately B-17s, with most of the B-24s transferred to the 15th AF.


Zipper730 said:
Did the 15th Air Force use less B-17's, and more B-24's, B-25's, B-26's, A-20's, and A-26's?
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From what I gather, B-26s were originally assigned to the 8th AF in the ETO but were soon transferred to the 9th AF.

In the MTO the 9th and 12th AF used both B-25s and B-26s.

A-26s were assigned to the 9th AF (ETO) and 12th AF (MTO). I think the same for the A-20.

These flew completely different mission profiles than the heavies, usually shorter ranges and at low to medium altitudes.
 

The same could be said of teh 8th AF, which followed the directives but was allowed to attack other targets when not needed for the Transport Plan, or when specified targets were obscured by cloud and their preferred targets (oil) were not.
 

The very action of forcing the bomber to fly higher also reduced their accuracy, making the sort of precision bombing US doctrine had advocated, impossible to achieve.
The Americans were well aware of the problem. Attached is a page from an 8th AF Bombing Accuracy analysis which shows both the decrease in accuracy with altitude and the trend to ever increasing bombing altitudes that was forced on the bombers in an effort to reduce losses.



Cheers

Steve
 
Bomber Command scientists kept track of losses, issuing monthly summaries. Particular raids were investigated when circumstances warranted. For, example, in August 1942. Bomber Command's ORS investigates two raids on which unusually high losses were recorded, raids against Kassel (9.8% losses), and Saarbrucken/Nuremberg (11.5% losses). Various sources were used in the analyses, from the crew after action reports and bombing photographs, to signals intercepts. It was concluded that during the attack on Kassel en route losses to flak had been unusually high and conditions in the target area had been ideal for fighter interception. During the second raid it was determined that there had been a record number of controlled fighter sorties, and that again the weather conditions were ideal for fighter interceptions. There were also indications that some bombers were suffering fuel shortages.
The overall conclusion (ORS B 120 'Investigation into the Bomber Losses Sustained on the Nights of 27/28th and 28/29th August 1942') was

"on both of these nights weather was ideal for fighter interceptions"

But the increased efficiency of both radar controlled flak and fighter control was recognised.

There were any number of reports of this type, all investigating losses and trying to discover means of mitigating them, issued throughout the war. The number B 120 of the report above, in the autumn of 1942 gives a clue. There were four different series of reports (G, S, M and B. The B series alone, which included 'Interim Raid Reports' is numbered 101-237. There were 141 G reports, 243 S reports and 160 M reports). Between its establishment in September 1941 and the end of the war, Bomber Command's ORS issued 681 reports, at a rate of about one every two days, a considerable effort.

Harris would later write.

"...Bomber Command's Operational Research Section's investigations always enabled us to know exactly where we stood. In August [1942], they reported that in the previous two months between a third and two thirds of all our losses - our total losses amounted to 5.6% of all sorties - were caused by radar assisted enemy defences, which included radar assisted guns as well as ground controlled fighters. They also estimated that effective countermeasures against radar transmissions would probably cut our losses by about a third, and, because bombing accuracy was seriously diminished by the strength of enemy defences in the target area, would increase the efficiency of our attacks. In fact, there was so strong a case for the immediate use of radio countermeasures that we made another application to the Air Ministry, asking them to be provided at once; we said this was a matter of the greatest importance and urgency."

I don't see much evidence of complacency there.

Cheers

Steve
 
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stona said:
I have read extensively the research of Bomber Command's ORS and refute absolutely the notion that
"Bomber Command were amazingly complacent about some things and seemed to have had an amazing level of corporate resistance to change."
Cheers
Steve
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I would simply cite Harris's resistance to the setting up the the Pathfinders, his opposition to guidance from his superior Freeman and his opposition to providing aircraft for Coastal Command.
 
For the crews in Bomber Command it was impossible to gauge losses. They took off about a minute apart and then hoped they wouldnt see another plane until they landed. A raid could have light losses but some squadrons almost wiped out or heavy losses with some squadrons unaffected, those collecting information on a group still did not know the bigger picture. The legend of scarecrow grew in some squadrons who by chance suffered few losses but saw many explosions.
 
stona said:
No. Some damaged bombers made it back to bases in the UK
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Okay
some shot down crew members also made it back (returners).
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They were rescued...
Makes sense
The Luftwaffe used very 'low glimmer' tracer in these weapons so observers saw no stream of tracer, just a sudden explosion.
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So it was just enough for the night-fighter crews to see but little else?
This was not interpreted as a bomber exploding but as some kind of pyrotechnic designed to undermine morale, it was even given an appropriate name 'Scarecrow', despite never existing.
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Yeah, I heard of that
True, but it was doable.
Bomber Command scientists kept track of losses, issuing monthly summaries. Particular raids were investigated when circumstances warranted.
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When losses went unusually high or unexpected things happened?
The overall conclusion (ORS B 120 'Investigation into the Bomber Losses Sustained on the Nights of 27/28th and 28/29th August 1942') was

"on both of these nights weather was ideal for fighter interceptions"
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Clear sky, moonlit night, stuff like that? I do remember that they sometimes used day fighters to augment night-fighter attack.
But the increased efficiency of both radar controlled flak and fighter control was recognised.
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Sounds about right
There were also indications that some bombers were suffering fuel shortages.
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Holes in the tanks or nav spoofing?
The very action of forcing the bomber to fly higher also reduced their accuracy, making the sort of precision bombing US doctrine had advocated, impossible to achieve.
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True, and one thing that made the RAF probably able to meet accuracy similar to ours even at night
The B-24 had substantial deficiencies in accuracy at all altitudes when one looks at the ability to place the bombs within 500-feet of the aiming point; it is interesting to note that the accuracy did get proportionally less at 24,000 feet and above, and within 1000 yards of the aiming point, the B-24 actually slightly beat the B-17, though I doubt that figure is all that important.

wuzak said:
Thanks for rounding off for us.
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I see your point
My understanding is that flak accounted for more casualties in the 8th AF than did fighters, and caused quite considerable damage to aircraft that were still able to return.
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Casualties aren't actually the same as aircraft losses, there were people killed in planes that landed just fine.
Flak also had psychological effects on the air crew, as unlike with fighters they could not fight back.
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Never thought of it that way
The 8th AF was predominately B-17s, with most of the B-24s transferred to the 15th AF.
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That makes some sense, during the summer I talked to an elderly man who had a hat on with U.S.A.A.F. and 15th Air Force on it, and that started up a conversation. He was a B-24 electronics warfare guy.
From what I gather, B-26s were originally assigned to the 8th AF in the ETO but were soon transferred to the 9th AF.

In the MTO the 9th and 12th AF used both B-25s and B-26s.
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Those were all TacAir units?
A-26s were assigned to the 9th AF (ETO) and 12th AF (MTO). I think the same for the A-20.
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The A-26's were some pretty cool aircraft actually.
 
It is important to note that whilst Harris was fundamentally opposed to forming what he called an elite force, independent from the regular squadrons, he was not against the target finding concept. It was an independent path finding force to which he objected. He wanted to form a specialist squadron within each Group for 'target finding'.
He was also intensely irritated by the attitude of a handful of young officers (like Group Captain Bufton, Deputy Director of Bombing Operations), based in London who were convinced that the Command could become a precision force if only Harris would take their advice. It clearly could not, and few commanders would be inclined to take the counsel of a group so inexperienced.
The debate dragged on into June when the Chief of the Air Staff (Portal) ruled in favour of the Air Staff's proposal for an independent force and Harris was obliged to set up the PFF, under Bennett, on 11th August 1942.
The PFF quickly achieved a better concentration of bombing. Between March and August 1942 35% of bomb release photos were plotted within three miles of the centre of the bombing concentration (also called the Mean Point of Impact (MPI) ). Between August '42 and March '43 this figure rose to 50%. The problem is that the MPI and aiming point are not the same thing. The accuracy of the attack was just as important as the bombing concentration, and here the PFF was rather less successful. In the same period the percentage of bombing photos taken within three miles of the aiming point rose from 32% to just 37%. This spread between the concentration values and the accuracy values became known as the 'systematic error' (roughly equivalent to a US 'pattern error') and vigorous action was taken to improve the accuracy of the marking. Accurate marking would mean a good concentration of bombing across the target rather than the surrounding countryside.
No.5 Group developed its own PFF within the Group and developed its own tactics and techniques. This was more in keeping with Harris' concept of a target finding force, though the Group's path finding squadrons did develop into something of an elite within the Group.
It would become obvious that one specialist squadron per Group would not provide sufficient aircraft for the complicated system of marking, backing up and adjusting that became a feature of Bomber Command's raids in 1944/5; by April 1945 No 8 (PFF) Group comprised 19 squadrons.. This was NOT obvious in 1942.
Ultimately the development of more accurate and better bombing techniques went hand in hand with technological developments, better bomb sights and navigational aids, better pyrotechnics and marking systems, most of which did not exist when Harris took over and when the PFF was formed.
Automatic bomb distributors were not introduced until 1942 across the command.
It wasn't until late 1942 that the Mk XIV bomb sight was being fitted as standard to all new aircraft.
GEE was introduced from March 1942.
The first OBOE use was in December 1942, the system allowed the 'Battle of the Ruhr' to be fought in March and April 1943.
New and more reliable and accurate barometric fuses for flares were developed in 1942/3.
The first target indicator bombs would not be used operationally until January 1943.
The development of path finding and the eventual success of the force shows that Harris should probably not have argued against its formation, until ordered to concede. Any idea that its formation two or three months earlier would have had the sort of radical effect on bombing accuracy envisaged by men like Bufton is not supported by the historical facts.
We have the benefit of hindsight, we know these and any number of other advances would be made. Harris may have lacked foresight, but he didn't have a crystal ball either. It is easy, with our hindsight, to criticise decisions made in the midst of war.


As for Coastal Command, it was a shambles in the first two years of the war, under equipped, flying obsolete or obscolescent types and with low morale across the organisation. It was the Germans, making the famous 'Channel Dash' that finally concentrated British minds on the need for some sort of offensive capability within the command.
Harris simply argued for his own force, as any good commander would. He believed that any diversion of resources away from his campaign against Germany, the only one the British were fighting directly against the Reich, was a waste of resources.
The argument was not just between the two air force Commands, but was wider, between Harris representing the RAF and the Admiralty. There was merit in both sides of the argument. In the long run the war would be won by destroying Nazi Germany and Harris found it hard to accept that this would require a united effort from all three services. In 1942-3 it was the U-Boat threat that seemed to pose the greatest threat, at worst severing Britain's transatlantic lifeline with potentially war losing consequences, at best it could inhibit the build up of US forces which would eventually be required for an invasion of continental Europe.
In the long term Harris was right. Battering Germany would be Bomber Command's major contribution to victory in Europe.
In the short term the Admiralty was right. The next step in winning the war was defeating the U-Boats in the North Atlantic.
However, the U-Boats were defeated and I've never seen any sensible argument that the Anglo-American-Canadian (with a few extras) invasion could have been launched a year earlier, no matter how many troops from across the Atlantic had made it to Britain.
Harris continued to batter Germany, so in the end he was at least not wrong.

Cheers

Steve
 
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Zipper730 said:
Okay
They were rescued...
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Some may have been, but usually it meant that they had evaded capture and returned to the UK, typically with the help of one of the established Resistance networks.

Zipper730 said:
So it was just enough for the night-fighter crews to see but little else?
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That was the idea. The position of the fighter would not be given away by a stream of tracer.

Zipper730 said:
When losses went unusually high or unexpected things happened?
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The reports were standard procedure. Unusually high losses would cause further investigation to establish the cause.

Zipper730 said:
Holes in the tanks or nav spoofing?
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Poor fuel economy or navigation, unexpected adverse winds were the more usual causes, though a substantial reserve was included for all operations some aircraft did suffer fuel shortages.

Cheers

Steve
 
The RAF conducted extensive testing of no allowance shooting with upward slanting cannon apart from the recent Defiant practice so the Luftwaffe practice should have come as no surprise.
 

How many times do people have to ask you to stop quoting every post in the damn thread in one post???

Is it really difficult for you to break it down, or are you just trying to be difficult to piss people off?
 
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