Dec 1941 RLM decision. Produce BMW 801. Cancel Jumo 222.

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U.S. submarine torpedoes were unreliable before mid 1943.
B-17 bombers weren't effective at sinking ships.

These two mistakes are about as significant as they get. Defeating IJA amphibious landings during December 1941 would have led to Japanese defeat in a few months instead of four years.
 
My point was that UK, USSR USA were able, despite early mistakes (mainly on technical tactical sides, but also some very high-up ones), to win the war. The Axis countries were not.
 
Hello Siegfried
this is way oT so a few short remarks

The German-Soviet non-agression pact was about
1 ensuring peace and normalised relations between two powerfull nations.
2 developing trade of critical raw materials for economic reasons and to bypass possible British and Fench blockades
3 developing buffer states between these potentially dangerous adversaries.
4 dividing areas into spheres of influence to diffuse tensions.
5 Allowing room for border disputes.

In fact it was mostly a try by Nazi-Germany to accomplish the partition of Poland so that France and GB would not come to help Poland and quarantee that SU would stay friendly. To SU it was a tool to get back most of territories lost in 1917-21.

You will note the treaty 1 talks of 'spheres of influence' not annexations (as the Soviets tried) and that 'spheres of influence' is not code for invasion and annexation: for instance
"the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party."

Which indicates that the Nazis were explicitly expecting at least Lithunia to remain independant.

Now what happened to Poland showed clearly that for the both treaty partners saw the "sphere of influences" mentioned in secret protocol as areas to be annexed or occupied. And in late Sep39 the secret protocol was changed so tat Lithuenia was transferred to SU's "sphere of influence", and Germany got more of Poland as compensation.

The Nazi government certainly kept to its treaty obligations 100%... As far as selling the Baltic states down the river, to an extent this is true but only to the extent of territorial realignments. The attack on Finland was the final irritation and warning.

When it was obvious that Stalins Russia could not be trusted to even comply with the spirit of the treaty the Germans invaded. Invading immediatly would not be possible, in part due to inevitalbe British and French opportunism.

Winter War had nothing to do with that, the SU actions in Rumania were the key

As far as Finns being classed as 'subhumans'; by the Nazis: here is further exaggeration and myth. It was possible however to find some extraordinarily drunkard characters in Finland, it has a rather unique drinking problem often seen in parts of Scandinavia. Presumably if a German observed this that would constitute Nazi racial theory declaring Finns as sub-human.

IIRC the reason was a simple fact that Finns were not Germanic people, only those Swedish speaking Finns living parts of the Finland's coastline were counted as Germanic/Aryans and so first class humans.

Juha
 
U.S. submarine torpedoes were unreliable before mid 1943.
B-17 bombers weren't effective at sinking ships.

These two mistakes are about as significant as they get. Defeating IJA amphibious landings during December 1941 would have led to Japanese defeat in a few months instead of four years.

IMHO US didn't have enough subs or B-17s in the area to defeat the Japanese landings, they might have been able to make them more costly but many of the B-17s were destroyed on the ground and Japanese bombers wrecked the sub base at Cavite and so made sub activities more difficult. IIRC US planing presumed that Japanese succeeded to land on Luzon and would be able to push inlands but they counted that the Pacific Fleet would be able to come into rescue.

Juha
 
Historical Events.

What will the 1943 Fw-190 mit 2,500 hp Jumo 222 engine look like? What sort of performance would it have?


I should imaginbe it would look very similar to a Fw190D-9 - but maybe with a slightly larger cowl (though the 22 is still smaller in diameter than the BMW 801).

As for performance:

PR Mosquito Pilot Report:

Encountered several Fw190As, who attempted interception but gave up when they could not close.

A new Fw190 version was spotted, with longer nose. Put the engines to the firewall but Fw190 closed quickly. He was about to get within firing range when flames erupted from engine compartment. Assume engine failure.
 
Don't know how accurate this is but the design timeframe is right. Jumo 222 engine mounted behind the pilot driving an extension shaft similiar to the U.S. P-39.

18-cc748affa5.jpg
 
Historical Events.

November 1940.
Goering personally approves production of the Jumo 222A engine.

April 1941.
Jumo 222A passes 100 hour test. Operating at 2,000 hp.

25 July 1941.
Construction begins on FMO-Flugmotorenwerke Ost engine factory.
…..Stage 1. Produce 500 engines per month.
…..Subsidiary factory at Brno, Moravia to produce Bosch fuel injection system.
…..Subsidiary factory at Marburg, Slovenia to produce propellers.
…..393 million RM total construction cost.

1 Aug 1941.
Focke-Wulf proposal for Fw-190 powered by Jumo 222 engine.

28 Oct 1941.
Junkers orders tooling for the new engine factory.
…..Ju-288 prototypes during this time frame required engine changes every 20 to 50 hours.
…..Early Jumo 222A engines produce 2,000 hp @ 2,900 rpm @ SL. 2,200hp @ 16,400 feet.

24 Dec 1941.
Milch orders Ostmark plant to retool for production of Daimler-Benz engines.

Dec 1942.
2,500 hp version of Jumo 222 engine passes 100 hour test.

Fall 1941. Point of Departure.
A year earlier Goering personally ordered the Jumo 222 engine into production. In this scenario he takes a break from art collecting to push his expensive and very important project to a successful conclusion. When Milch attempts to derail the Jumo 222 engine and Bomber B programs Goering has Milch transferred command of Luftwaffe units in North Africa. The man who replaces Milch at RLM will insure the Jumo 222 engine program continues to receive top priority, including phase II expansion to produce 1,000 engines per month.

March 1942.
Completion of Ostmark factory phase I construction.
…..Assumption. Tooling ordered by Junkers during October 1941 has arrived.
…..Assumption. Workforce for this high priority factory is at full strength.
…..Assumption. Construction for Phase II expansion begins during April 1942.

Summer 1942.
Several Fw-190 ausf ?? prototypes powered by Jumo 222 engines are flying.

Goering personally approves Dr. Tank's Fw-190 ausf ?? design. It will enter production during January 1943 powered by the Jumo 222 engine. By that date Ostmark engine production will be sufficient to free up a few for the new Focke Wulf fighter aircraft.

December 1942.
The Jumo 222 engine will be cleared for 2,500 hp after passing the 100 hour endurance test. A lucky break for Dr. Tank.

Point of departure....

Milch orders the Jumo 222 to be dropped, and orders Daimler-Benz to hand over to Jumo the DB604 design - as Daimler-Benz are too busy with the 601, 603 605 to persue development - and unlike the 222 it works.

Ostmark factory is tooled for DB603, but tooling is being readied for the DB604 so production may commence once it has been deemed ready.
 
I should imaginbe it would look very similar to a Fw190D-9 - but maybe with a slightly larger cowl (though the 22 is still smaller in diameter than the BMW 801).

As for performance:

PR Mosquito Pilot Report:

Encountered several Fw190As, who attempted interception but gave up when they could not close.

A new Fw190 version was spotted, with longer nose. Put the engines to the firewall but Fw190 closed quickly. He was about to get within firing range when flames erupted from engine compartment. Assume engine failure.

There is an artists impression of a FW 190"D" installed
with a Jumo 222 in the "Luftwaffe Secret Projects series.
It was planned and I immagine a rather straighforward
adaptation as the Jumo 222 was of lesser diameter than
the BMW 801 and I expect actually slightly shorter than the
Jumo 213.

It seems at least 1 FW 190D-9 was fitted with the plumbing that allowed its MW50 tank to be used for GM-1 (cryogenic Nitrous Oxide) however the proper anawer to high altitude performance was the FW 190D-13 with its two stage supercharger, a handfull of which entered service, Goetz's "Yellow 12" surviving to this day.

The Jumo 222, even without the Ju 288 might have added extrordinary performance to aircraft such as the Ju 188, Ju 88S, FW 190, He 219 ans likely Do 217. I see it as a sort of
equal to the Sabre/Vulture.
 
I have Luftwaffe Secret Projects, Fighters 1939-1945 which has an entry descibed as "Focke-Wulf Ta152 high altitude fighter with Jumo 222E and laminar wing", the performance estimate for which was max speed 459mpg @ 39,500ft, service ceiling 49,200ft, initial rate of climb 4320ft/min, range 1200km/801miles.

A Jumo 222 powered Fw190 project was mentioned in the page shown by davebender.
 
If Germany doesn't produce the Ju-288 they would probably produce the Do-317, which is essentially just a Do-217 powered by Jumo 222 engines. IMO that would make a lot of sense as the Do-217 was already in production and combat proven. No need to tool a factory for the entirely new Ju-288 design. It also fullfills Milch's desire to spread German aircraft production among more companies rather then allowing Junkers to dominate both engine production and airframe production.
 
NOBODY'S medium to high altitude bombers turned out to be effective at sinking moving ships
It wouldn't be a problem if the U.S. Army Air Corps recognized the issue during the 1930s as the Luftwaffe did. Then some other U.S. aircraft type(s) such as the A-20 and B-25 would have gotten the maritime bomber mission.

Gen. MacArthur expected B-17s to sink Japanese ships, burn Japanese cities to the ground, shoot down all Japanese aircraft encountered and still make it back to the Clark Army Airfield club in time for happy hour. The 29 modern long range USN submarines based at Manila were expected to mop up any Japanese ships that survived the B-17 onslaught.
 
It wouldn't be a problem if the U.S. Army Air Corps recognized the issue during the 1930s as the Luftwaffe did. Then some other U.S. aircraft type(s) such as the A-20 and B-25 would have gotten the maritime bomber mission.

Also LW used level bombers against surface ships, one of the "most successful" attacks of them was when one He 111 sank 2 KM DDs (or sunk one and the other ran onto mines while taking evasive actions)

Gen. MacArthur expected B-17s to sink Japanese ships, burn Japanese cities to the ground, shoot down all Japanese aircraft encountered and still make it back to the Clark Army Airfield club in time for happy hour. The 29 modern long range USN submarines based at Manila were expected to mop up any Japanese ships that survived the B-17 onslaught.

Now the Sargo class subs were OK but 6 of the subs were S-class, in essence WWI type, and 7 were Porpoise class, which had its share of problems, especially with its powerplant.

Juha
 
It wouldn't be a problem if the U.S. Army Air Corps recognized the issue during the 1930s as the Luftwaffe did. Then some other U.S. aircraft type(s) such as the A-20 and B-25 would have gotten the maritime bomber mission.

The whole premise of the original B-17 purchase was as a coastal defence aircraft, which could attack and sink ships at sea.

If the USAAC said that the B-17 couldn't do that and was required for other purposes the funding may have not been forthcoming.
 
Hello Siegfried
this is way oT so a few short remarks
In fact it was mostly a try by Nazi-Germany to accomplish the partition of Poland so that France and GB would not come to help Poland and quarantee that SU would stay friendly. To SU it was a tool to get back most of territories lost in 1917-21.

This is the only correct and logical assertion you make. After the failure of negotiations for access to Danzig, minority rights and offers of a Polish-German anti soviet pact Hitler went with Plan-B.

Now what happened to Poland showed clearly that for the both treaty partners saw the "sphere of influences" mentioned in secret protocol as areas to be annexed or occupied. And in late Sep39 the secret protocol was changed so tat Lithuenia was transferred to SU's "sphere of influence", and Germany got more of Poland as compensation.

This statement is a logical fallacy. The treaty explicitly refers to the repartition of Poland. This was a major objective of the treaty. Not only does it not refer to annexations or partitions of the Baltic states it explicitly refers to respect for the rights of Lithuania in-Vilnius. Berlin knew that the Soviet Union had territorial disputes with the Baltic states and expected some realignments of borders not several wholesale annexations. Berlin had no interest in seeing the Baltic states disappear, it had ancient and affectionate links with all the Baltic states through the Hanseatic league: Memmel was German in character. However the treaty guaranteed essential trade as well as military security,

IIRC the reason was a simple fact that Finns were not Germanic people, only those Swedish speaking Finns living parts of the Finland's coastline were counted as Germanic/Aryans and so first class humans.
Juha

You have accepted melodramatic Hollywood fantasy version or perhaps seek to access the proceeds of being a member of a victim group.
 
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I have Luftwaffe Secret Projects, Fighters 1939-1945 which has an entry descibed as "Focke-Wulf Ta152 high altitude fighter with Jumo 222E and laminar wing", the performance estimate for which was max speed 459mpg @ 39,500ft, service ceiling 49,200ft, initial rate of climb 4320ft/min, range 1200km/801miles.

A Jumo 222 powered Fw190 project was mentioned in the page shown by davebender.

Yes, this is what I was thinking off. The first laminar profile wing I recall the Germans using was for the Me 309 fighter which flew in June 1942. It was their own work. I believe the Jumo 222 was expected to grow to 3500-4000hp; it was simply a bigger engine than the Jumo 213/DB603
 
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It wouldn't be a problem if the U.S. Army Air Corps recognized the issue during the 1930s as the Luftwaffe did. Then some other U.S. aircraft type(s) such as the A-20 and B-25 would have gotten the maritime bomber mission.

The US coast line was (is) thousands of miles long, not including the US possessions of the time, the A-20 was too short ranged to provide the needed coverage. The B-25 is better but it is later in timing and not at all a competitor in the 1930s.
Gen. MacArthur expected B-17s to sink Japanese ships, burn Japanese cities to the ground, shoot down all Japanese aircraft encountered and still make it back to the Clark Army Airfield club in time for happy hour. The 29 modern long range USN submarines based at Manila were expected to mop up any Japanese ships that survived the B-17 onslaught.

Do you have an actual source for this??

If it is true the Doug must have been a bigger idiot than he is usually credited with even by his most strident critics.

The First B-17s don't make it to the Philippines until Oct of 1941, about a year after the daylight part of the BoB ends. Any general that believed that 30-50 4 engine bombers could do what you claim not only hadn't been paying attention, they were living in a complete fantasy land. many of the B-17s in the Philippines were the C/D model with NO power turrets and 4-6 .50 cal guns and a single .30. Again, anybody who believed that was a good defensive armament for a bomber had been studiously avoiding the combat reports from Europe and would have grossly misused ANY type of bomber they were given.
 
...This statement is a logical fallacy. The treaty explicitly refers to the repartition of Poland. This was a major objective of the treaty. Not only does it not refer to annexations or partitions of the Baltic states it explicitly refers to respect for the rights of Lithuania in-Vilnius. Berlin knew that the Soviet Union had territorial disputes with the Baltic states and expected some realignments of borders not several wholesale annexations. Berlin had no interest in seeing the Baltic states disappear, it had ancient and affectionate links with all the Baltic states through the Hanseatic league: Memmel was German in character. However the treaty guaranteed essential trade as well as military security,...

Now as I wrote this is ot but have you really not heard the resetlement of Baltic Germans in late 39-early 40? Germany sent ships to Baltic States to evacuate Baltic Germans, a significant minority there, and to resettle them into annexed areas of Poland. IIRC this evacuation/resettlement began already in Oct 39 . One wonder why???? Why agree this with SU if eHitler and co didn't know what would be the destiny of Baltic States. Maybe Hitler and co were less sentimental and much more cynical than you think and gave a damm to those "ancient and affectionate links with all the Baltic states through the Hanseatic league".

Juha
 
Now as I wrote this is ot but have you really not heard the resetlement of Baltic Germans in late 39-early 40? Germany sent ships to Baltic States to evacuate Baltic Germans, a significant minority there, and to resettle them into annexed areas of Poland. IIRC this evacuation/resettlement began already in Oct 39 . One wonder why???? Why agree this with SU if eHitler and co didn't know what would be the destiny of Baltic States. Maybe Hitler and co were less sentimental and much more cynical than you think and gave a damm to those "ancient and affectionate links with all the Baltic states through the Hanseatic league".

Juha

This is typical of European left arguement I must say, for some reason, no bad things about communism can be said, like it occupied a good number of countries while Hitler was doing same at same time. The old communist arguement was, that was only to "protect" these poor states, Finnland was only attacked to "secure" Leningrad, from Hitlerist aggression.. I may be wrong, but you seem to argue along these lines. It seems you wish to push the blame from communist Stalin to nazi Hitler for what happened to Baltic states. This is wrong, what happened to the Baltic states, Finland, Rumania was 100% the SU's doing, and long term goal. Hitler have turned a blind eye for it, for practical politics (secure two front war, strategic supplies), but this does not change the fact.

I don't quite see how resetlement of Baltic Germans plays a role here - ethnic Germans were resettled along whole Europe, I think several hundred thousend were resettled from otherwise friendly Rumania at same time, for example.

Regard your discussion on the move to against the SU, I think there was some failure of communication between you and Siegfried. Essential Siegfrid says SU move aagainst Finnland was major decision faktor in invasion of USSR, you say Winter War was not important in this decision, SU intentions with Rumania was.

I think you are both correct. The SU and Hitler Germany declaed their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, ie. parts they will not step on each other toes. However, SU increasingly violated that pact, or at the very least, showed intention to do so. In July 1940 they took much of Rumania, beyond what was agreed as acceptable terriotorial "fixing".

Worse, Molotov went to Berlin in November 1940 to further negotiate. The Soviet Union demanded free hand in Rumania, Bulgaria,Finnland and Turkey - it not very hard to figure out what this would mean. For Germans, it also would mean that they would loose oil (Romania), chromium (Turkey) and nickel (Finn) supply. This convinced Hitler and was decisive factor that he has to move against the SU asap.
 

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