Defence of Malaya, Singapore the area: how would you do it?

[davebender]

Professional military forces make contingency plans for every possible war scenerio. The vast majority of these contingency plans are never used. Singapore was a major British military outpost in Asia so plans for defending it should be updated every year as a matter of routine.

can't gamble on sinking the transports, better to organize a proper defence on the ground

You shouldn't gamble on either one. The RN should plan to sink the IJA troop transports and the British Army should plan to send a well trained infantry corps to Malaya. If either the RN or British Army are successful then Malaya is saved. If both the RN and British Army are successful then Japan is in big trouble. Or more likely, Japan is deterred from attacking in the first place. Historical Japanese attack plans for December 1941 assumed the American, British and Dutch defenders would be poorly trained.

 

[parsifal]

Yeah, if the is such a large deterent in place, the chances of japan going to war are very slim i think

 

[timshatz]

While I realize the thread is about the British position on Defending Singapore, I'd rather take the Japanese side. Reasons are as follows:

1. Naval Strength far and away above that over Britian in that area. Not only does that give them the power on the seas, it also allows them to make landings wherever they want. Even if you stop the Japanese at one landing, they can simply move on to another. And Singapore is an island. Even if you fight the Japanese to a standstill, it can be isolated and blockaded.
2. Troops had far more combat experience than the British, both enlisted and officers. Experience really helps.
3. Aircraft were superior to British models. Pilots were way more experienced as well.

Logistics, bases, even intelligence (have read, but never could find the exact details, that there was a Japanese spy on the British Imperial staff in Singapore-but take that with a grain of salt) were better situated for the Japanese.

Also, Singapore (even the entire Asia Theatre) was something of a dumping ground for second rate officers in the British Military. They weren't the cream of the crop. And it showed when the war came. They just weren't ready for prime time.

 

[Freebird]

Professional military forces make contingency plans for every possible war scenerio. The vast majority of these contingency plans are never used. Singapore was a major British military outpost in Asia so plans for defending it should be updated every year as a matter of routine.

Sorry, I misread your post above. There were plans in place since Oct 1940 to send two more divisions, but nothing could actually be sent until after July 1941.
(Read my earlier post)

The preparations are already well in hand, unlike the USA which didn't really have a clear plan, Malaya Command has already prepared a detailed defensive plan in the fall of 1940, which upon analysis is surprisingly accurate on exactly what was needed.
The studies by Malaya staff determined that the Far East should have 4 divisions, and 566 modern aircraft to defend the Malaya, for 90 days until the fleet would arrive from the UK.

You shouldn't gamble on either one. The RN should plan to sink the IJA troop transports and the British Army should plan to send a well trained infantry corps to Malaya.
If both the RN and British Army are successful then Japan is in big trouble.

Correct on all points.

Or more likely, Japan is deterred from attacking in the first place. Historical Japanese attack plans for December 1941 assumed the American, British and Dutch defenders would be poorly trained.

Yeah, if the is such a large deterent in place, the chances of japan going to war are very slim i think

Nope, Japan is committed to war regardless.
They have no way to know exactly how well trained the troops are, nor any way way to judge how they will fight.
They just arrogantly assumed that the large Allied armies would be powerless to stop the mighty Japanese Army.
They also overestimated the effectivness of the American air power in PI and underestimated British air power effectivness.
Should the British provide tougher resistance in the air, they will of course transfer more air assets, but they cannot come close to matching Allied production of aircraft aircrew.

They sent 100,000 Japanese against 150,000 US Allied troops in the Philippines, they won't be too concerned if the British send an extra division or so to Malaya in the fall of 1941.

 

[davebender]

Experience isn't the issue. Training is what matters most.

For instance practically the entire Germany Army was newly raised during the first year of WWII. But they had just enough well trained cadre to lead and train the new conscripts. That made all the difference.

To some extent Japan was in the same boat. Most of their army remained in China throughout WWII. Consequently the primary Philippine amphibious landing was conducted by 48th Division which had been raised on Formosa during 1940. No combat experience and not much peacetime experience either. But they had good cadre who knew how to train infantry and lead them in combat.

 

[davebender]

They have no way to know exactly how well trained the troops are, nor any way way to judge how they will fight

Some of the historical IJA intelligence assessments are available on the internet and they are quite accurate.
Chapter II: Pre-war Japanese Espionage and Intelligence

 

[timshatz]

Agreed, training is important. Not saying it isn't. I was thinking of the old expression "Three minutes in combat is worth 2 years of training". I guess it supposes you survive you first three minutes.

But given two armies that are trained (and the Japanese army was well trained if it was anything- the Dominion forces in Singapore were less so), I would go with the experienced army as my odds on favorite. But that pretty much goes without saying for anyone on this board.

Getting on to the point, Japan had an experienced and well trained army, for the most part. The Army facing it at Singapore was neither. Some units were well trained in Singapore, but it was not consistent. The Dominion forces just weren't ready for Prime Time (much like the US Forces in the first year of the war). The Pacific was a backwater for everyone but the Japanese.

 

[timshatz]

Chapter II: Pre-war Japanese Espionage and Intelligence

Good link Dave.

 

[davebender]

That's true only if your pre-war training was poor. For a well trained army the situation is entirely different.

German Army after action reports from August 1914 are an obvious example. You see a lot of statements like this:
FAR25 (Field Artillery Regiment 25. Organic to 25th Infantry Division)

22 August 1914.
The course of our baptism of fire brought our batteries into the most varied situations, which were mastered in every case, so that on the evening after the battle, leaders and gunners gratefully had the complete conviction "We are the best!". All movements were executed with the exactitude of a training exercise....this brought the troops a feeling of security and confidence in our peacetime training, and created the best possible basis for the unparalleled triumphal march of the coming weeks.

I suspect After Action Reports for the well trained but inexperienced IJA 48th Infantry Division said similiar things after the Philippine invasion of December 1941.

 

[timshatz]

That's true only if your pre-war training was poor. .

Or the training wasn't useful in the circumstances that occured. I would think along the lines of the Vic V Finger Four in the Battle of Britian or early war US Tank doctrine (something of an armored calvary charge into German guns that were hidden or at least more battlewise to show less to the enemy).

Good training is a Godsend. Bad training is lethal. Experience usually seperates the two. Or, in theory, it should.

A good counter (tearing my own arguement apart but what the hell) is something like the NTC that the US Army used before Desert Storm 1 or Top Gun for the US Navy.

 

[davebender]

The German Army used somewhat similiar "Major Training Areas" 100 years ago for combined arms training. Every German Active Army regiment trained at such a facility several weeks per year. Obviously they didn't have MILES equipment. However they did have pop up targets and moving targets for the infantry to shoot at, prior to WWI.

You may have heard of the U.S. Army training center at Grafenwoehr, Germany. Prior to WWI it was one of the German MTAs.

I don't know what the IJA had for training centers. But they must have been pretty good also.

 

[Freebird]

Some of the historical IJA intelligence assessments are available on the internet and they are quite accurate.
Chapter II: Pre-war Japanese Espionage and Intelligence[/url]

Indeed, but you'll note that your link shows that they knew roughly how many troops were there, but says little about their quality or "military value". When counting bodies, Indian troops look much the same as Australian, but many of the Indian battalions just dissolved on the first day of combat, and seemed almost relieved to surrender.

Getting on to the point, Japan had an experienced and well trained army, for the most part. The Army facing it at Singapore was neither. Some units were well trained in Singapore, but it was not consistent. The Dominion forces just weren't ready for Prime Time (much like the US Forces in the first year of the war). The Pacific was a backwater for everyone but the Japanese.

The Australians actually fought very well, considering that there were only two brigades of them.
(Australia Canada were Dominions, India was not)

While I realize the thread is about the British position on Defending Singapore, I'd rather take the Japanese side. Reasons are as follows:

1. Naval Strength far and away above that over Britian in that area. Not only does that give them the power on the seas, it also allows them to make landings wherever they want. Even if you stop the Japanese at one landing, they can simply move on to another.

Actually Tim, this is not correct on both counts.

The Japanese can only land on the east side of Malaya, the British Dutch contol the Sea of Malacca. Japan really only has solid control along the Thai coast on the Gulf of Siam.
After taking some serious losses at the Kota Bharu landing on Dec 8, the Japanese wouldn't attempt another landing, despite having two more planned with troops sitting in transports in Indochina.

The Japanese 55 infantry regiment (of the 18th division) was supposed to land at Kunatan at the end of December, but the Japanese air force had failed to neutralize the defending RAF, so it was unable to land. Unlike the quick establishment of air superiority in the Philippines, the RAF maintained operations in Malaya during Dec Jan.
Instead of the planned landing the 55th also had to sail to Kota Bharu, and elements of the 18th division spent 3 weeks hiking through the jungle (along the coast) to attack Kuantan.

The 114th regiment was supposed to land at Mersing to drive into the British flank and cut them off. During a Japanese conference on Jan 11 (when they captured Kuala Lumpur) the Japanese air force had still been unable to eliminate the RAF, so the landing was cancelled.

And Singapore is an island. Even if you fight the Japanese to a standstill, it can be isolated and blockaded.

Actually not true either, the Japanese can only blocade Singapore if they gain control of the airfields in Southern Johore. The British were able to bring in resupply convoys and over a dozen ships without interference. They managed to sink the CPR Empress of Asia, (and prevent further supply) which only occurred on Feb 5, 1942. (All the previous ships had gotten through).

The last British troops had retreated onto Singapore island on the 31st of January, abandoning all of Johore (and the airfields there) to the Japanese. As long as the British halt the Japanese advance in northern Malaya and have enough aircraft to deny Japan air superiority, they can continue to supply Malaya

 

[davebender]

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
Singapore cannot be ignored as long as British troops continue to hold the island. RN submarines and aircraft based at Singapore would take a steady toll of Japanese shipping to the East Indies. Somewhat similiar to the role Malta performed in the central Med.

Furthermore the most important shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific oceans is within spitting distance. That would put a serious crimp in IJA operations in Burma and points further west.

 

[parsifal]

ive gone away and thought about this from the japanese view point for a couple of days. i must say that my wargaming group many years ago have simulated a similar scenario using SPIs "War in the Pacific' a semi pro kriegspiel style sim that depicts the whole pacific war at a scale of individual battalions, 10 plane units and individual ships down to frigate size. its a detailed laboripous sim, takes about 1 year to play through the whole war, and in my view is fairly accurate.

When we played this acccelarated buildup, it was assumed that Japan decided to go to war from january 1941, rather than from july. The war party was assumed to take control from that time.....there were a number of spinoffs arising from that assumption. The allies would see the increased belligerency of the japanese and start to respond, pretty much in the manner we have discussed. Though providing the 566 frontline aircraft was always thought to be difficult. in our estimate, the allies were given 360 aircraft in malaya, not all of them up to date, but better than were there. the airstrength basically brought forward some of the reinforcements and had them in place at the outbreak.

however the japanese benefitted also from this earlier mobilization. for a start, they start the war with an additional 12 divs, plus many more Independant brigafeeding in reserves, and adding support elements and artillery from home depots. A good proportion of these formations went straight into battle with no signs of inexperience. The Japs had a pretty military replacement system, in that raw recruits were always interlaced with experienced cadres.

This was their post december mobilzation, up to march 1942. the source for this inforamtion was 'The japanese Armed forces order of battle - vol I" a publication made commercial, but based on an edited version of by the US military intelligence division at the end of the war. it is the most comprehensive OB for the japanese available in English. The divs included 59-61, 63, 65, 69, 70, 71 and 109. They are not green formations, as most were formed around Independant Infantry brigades which had seen considerable combat in china. the Japanese fleshed out the manpower by providing reserve fillers and artillery and support echeons from their large depot system based in the home islands

With regard to air, the japanese received more than 2000 new aircraft in that first three months of the war. many of these were replacements, but our best estimate was that the army air force would have expanded by about 600 aircraft, whilst the naval air Service by about 500 frontline aircraft. This was based on an assumption that a slightly lower standard of aircrew would be accepted and the small size of the air arms recognized as a problem. Moreover, we also surmised that with a pro-war group in power, the army and navy would accelarate the entry of more modern types ...like Oscars, Bettys and Zekes.


Whilst i am sure there will be many who disagree strongly with this next point, i at least think it plausible. We thought with the accelarate militarist intervention, greater pressure would be brought to bear on the thais. There is some evidence to support that given a little more sustained pressure the thais may have thrown their lot completely in with the japanese. Phibul, the thai leader was a pragmatist....he wanted british or US gurantees for security and never got them. This eventually pushed him in the direction of the japanese, but they never quite got there...the japanese were too hasty for the thais and finished up invading thailand, before the thais switched sides. We surmised that with an additional 6 months, the japanese would work on the thais a little better and have them in the bag by the time war broke out. We made an assumption at this point....the japanese would be allowed to deploy a single Army pre-war (the equivalent of a Corps) into thailand from pre-war. after the outbreak of hostilities additional troops entered the country very quickly.

the japanese in that sim initially sent two divs down the isthmus and one div into burma, from Day1. The thais made subsidiary attacks along the thai/burma border further to the north. The british basically had an experienced corps in malaya of which one div was pushed into forward defence positions. Whilst resistance was tougher, and held out longer, the massive additionalreserves that the japanese could draw upon tipped the balance....it was allover by March.

 

[buffnut453]

Parsifal,

That sounds like a fascinating wargame. What you haven't discussed is the political impact of Japan deploying troops to Thailand. Their push into southern Indo-China in July 42 resulted in heavy sanctions from the US and UK. A move into Thailand would have been tantamount to a declaration of war. I think it highly likely that such a move would have accelerated defensive agreements between the ABCD Powers and resulted in US naval forces augmenting the defence of the Malay barrier much earlier, potentially with additional USAAF units deploying in support of the Dutch East Indies.

I also suspect that the Japanese would have attacked as soon as forces were available rather than waiting for Dec 41. Does that mean an attack on Pearl Harbor earlier in 1941?

With Japanese forces in Thailand, I think it much more likely that the Allies would have taken early offensive action against the harbour at Singora which was pivotal to Japanese success. Without that harbour, the Japanese had no option but to take the long way round from Indo-China through all of Thailand during the monsoon period. Note that, unlike the nice paved roads down the western side of Malaya, roads in northeast Thailand at that time were primarily surfaced with dirt. During the monsoon they became quagmires which would have greatly slowed any Japanese offensive, putting strain on logistics and exhausting troops before they went into combat.

One final point - the decision southward in July 1941 was based, at least in part, on Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union which effectively reduced the threat from the USSR to Japanese forces in China. It was this event that enabled Japanese redeployments to undertake the large-scale attacks of late 42/early 42 against the Western powers in the Far East. I fear that Japan was incapable of accelerating its war preparations unless there was a concomitant acceleration of Barbarossa.

Cheers,
Mark

 

[parsifal]

All true issues, in particular the comments about thailand. We did consider that, but perhaps didnt take it into account enough. In the finish we treated the move into Thailand as a "random event"...basically the more troops the japanese poured into thailand, the more likley ther would be an allied backlash...which means the allies gain the initiative, and the japanese lose the first turn surprise. It was a subjective debate, and in the finish the Japanese players got away with it. They managed to get troops into Thailand, and did not trigger an allied riposte. I agree, this is highly debateable, but to be honest, we mostly wanted to explore the military aspects over the political.

We asumed the 'strike south" group had won the debate, and also assumed that the soviets did not react. These are all big assumptions, and to a degree, unrealistic, but as i said, we were mainly about exploring the miltary aspects over the political.

Whilst the camapign in SE Asia went badly for the allies in this sim, the overall result went better. The US managed to hold Wake, and were in a position to launch their counterattack by the end of may instead of waiting till august. Japan finished up collapsingand surrendering by mid'44

 

[davebender]

Japan decided to go to war from january 1941, rather than from july.

Why would Japan do that?

It was the July 1941 U.S. military build up in the Philippines (specifically submarines and heavy bombers) which caused Japan to decide on a preemptive strike. If you want Japan to attack early then the American military build up must also begin early.

 

[parsifal]

perhaps I may be unclear in the words.....whilst japan decided to go to war in january rather than July, the actual entry point was still December.

Now as to whether it might be possible, I think it quite likley actually, provided the militarists were in control. Up until July the japanese leadership was slightly more conciliatory, and more reluctant to go to war. If you remove that, and the japanese start prepring for war earlier, the reserves and additional aircraft become a distinct possibility

 

[davebender]

14,530,000,000 yen. 1935 Japan GDP
1,042,621,000 yen. 1935 Japan military budget.
.....7.1% of Japanese GDP even at this early date.

By 1937 Japanese military spending had tripled to 3,277,937,000 yen. Taking economic growth into consideration that still works out to about 20% of Japanese GDP.

I don't have Japanese budget data for 1938 to 1941 but would guess that military spending continued to increase as a percentage of national GDP.

You will have a tough time wringing more military spending out of the Japanese economy. Eventually the population will force a new government that reduces military spending.

 

[timshatz]

The German Army used somewhat similiar "Major Training Areas" 100 years ago for combined arms training. Every German Active Army regiment trained at such a facility several weeks per year. .

I had heard about those training setups. I think it is referred to in the book "Dreadnaught". They were also used for an annual training/wargame which culminated in the Kaiser getting on a horse and leading a totally unrealistic calvary charge that swept the field. Evidently, after a lot of convincing, the German General Staff got him to stop doing it.