Defence of Malaya, Singapore the area: how would you do it?

[timshatz]

Actually Tim, this is not correct on both counts.

The Japanese can only land on the east side of Malaya, the British Dutch contol the Sea of Malacca. Japan really only has solid control along the Thai coast on the Gulf of Siam.
After taking some serious losses at the Kota Bharu landing on Dec 8, the Japanese wouldn't attempt another landing, despite having two more planned with troops sitting in transports in Indochina.

The Japanese 55 infantry regiment (of the 18th division) was supposed to land at Kunatan at the end of December, but the Japanese air force had failed to neutralize the defending RAF, so it was unable to land. Unlike the quick establishment of air superiority in the Philippines, the RAF maintained operations in Malaya during Dec Jan.
Instead of the planned landing the 55th also had to sail to Kota Bharu, and elements of the 18th division spent 3 weeks hiking through the jungle (along the coast) to attack Kuantan.

The 114th regiment was supposed to land at Mersing to drive into the British flank and cut them off. During a Japanese conference on Jan 11 (when they captured Kuala Lumpur) the Japanese air force had still been unable to eliminate the RAF, so the landing was cancelled.



Actually not true either, the Japanese can only blocade Singapore if they gain control of the airfields in Southern Johore. The British were able to bring in resupply convoys and over a dozen ships without interference. They managed to sink the CPR Empress of Asia, (and prevent further supply) which only occurred on Feb 5, 1942. (All the previous ships had gotten through).

The last British troops had retreated onto Singapore island on the 31st of January, abandoning all of Johore (and the airfields there) to the Japanese. As long as the British halt the Japanese advance in northern Malaya and have enough aircraft to deny Japan air superiority, they can continue to supply Malaya

Freebird, thanks for the response. I'm not sold on the viability of it as it, taken as a whole, leads to the Dominion forces not losing the Penisula and Singapore. But they did. While many of your points have validity, one has to accept the history is what it is.

For instance, while the RAF was not absolutely, positively wiped out, it was no longer a viable force. The difference between Air Supremicy and Air Superiority. All the Japanese needed as Superiority. That, they attained. Later in the war, when it was the Allies turn to take ground, the same situation occured. For instance, in the Phillipines during 1944, the Japanese still aircraft operating but they were not a major factor. Nor was the RAF in Singapore after the first couple of weeks of the war. They were just worn down to the point of being an annoyance and not much of a threat.

As for the blockade, it is rare that a blockade is 100% effective. Something always gets in and out. Especially in the early parts of a blockade. The longer they last, the more effective they become. Singapore never got to that level.

As for negating the effect of having command of the seas, I agree with your premise that the Japanese never did another serious invasion after Khota (the invasion of Singapore Island notwithstanding), but they really didn't have to. The collapse on the penisula was so complete, that they got where they wanted to go on land. If the situation had been different, they could have used that command of the sea to go where they wanted and do as they wished. It never came to that, but the option, if needed to be used, was available.

 

[timshatz]

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
Singapore cannot be ignored as long as British troops continue to hold the island. RN submarines and aircraft based at Singapore would take a steady toll of Japanese shipping to the East Indies. Somewhat similiar to the role Malta performed in the central Med.

Furthermore the most important shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific oceans is within spitting distance. That would put a serious crimp in IJA operations in Burma and points further west.

Agreed. Wouldn't think of it being ignored, more worn down to the point of collapse or invasion. It would not be in the Japanese character to run a long siege but it was a possibility. Especially with the option of Singapore being a thorn in the side of the Japanese.

However, that being said, one advantage Malta had that Singapore would not is the location of major British bases in easy sailing distance. Getting a convoy through to Malta was very difficult when the Axis wanted to stop it. I would imagine the same would hold true for Singapore if a Convoy leaving Ceylon or Darwin tried to do the same thing. A long haul to disaster with the Japanese attacking it every step of the way.

 

[davebender]

Advantage Malta had that Singapore would not is the location of major British bases in easy sailing distance.

India is within easy sailing distance of Singapore.

 

[timshatz]

India is within easy sailing distance of Singapore.

About 1100 miles from Gibralter to Malta whereas Columbo to Singapore is about 1700 miles. Figure a fast convoy does about 10 knots, that is 4.5 days to Malta and and another two days ( or 7 days total) to Singapore from Columbo. Not a drastic difference. Both Convoys would start out in a relatively quiet end of the Ocean (Western Med and Bay of Bengal), once they got closer to the enemies airfields is where things got dicey.

From South of Sardinia to Malta, about 400 miles, is all open to Air and Sea Attack. Mostly from the European side, but the African side is a threat as well. About a day and a half to two days.

With the Columbo to Singapore route, the math is even worse (against a better trained enemy). Upwards of 900 miles you would be open to Japanese attack. That is over three days, close to 4. And the Japanese surface fleet units are way more effective than the Italians. Plus, if the Japanese really thought it mattered they might use a Carrier or two to attack the convoy (failing that, a Naval Air Wing). No decent air cover for the convoy once it gets to the far side of the Bay of Bengal. British Aircraft carriers weren't up to the job and the US wouldn't put it's Carriers in that sort of situation.

 

[parsifal]

14,530,000,000 yen. 1935 Japan GDP
1,042,621,000 yen. 1935 Japan military budget.
.....7.1% of Japanese GDP even at this early date.

By 1937 Japanese military spending had tripled to 3,277,937,000 yen. Taking economic growth into consideration that still works out to about 20% of Japanese GDP.

I don't have Japanese budget data for 1938 to 1941 but would guess that military spending continued to increase as a percentage of national GDP.

You will have a tough time wringing more military spending out of the Japanese economy. Eventually the population will force a new government that reduces military spending.

As a possible outcome I would rate your theory a having low probability of occurrence. What essentially you are saying appears to be in the following order

1) Early mobilization would lead to increased military spending
2) Increased military spending would be unsustainable on social grounds. There would be social unrest as a result of the increased expenditures.


Before I answer this directly, we should perhaps take a quick overview of Japanese industry in the 1930's.

From the USSBS

The orientation of the Japanese economy toward war began in 1928, and continued with increasing emphasis during the Manchurian and Chinese campaigns. By 1940, total production had arisen by more than 75 percent; heavy industrial production by almost 500 percent; and 17 percent of Japan's total output was being devoted to direct war purposes and expansion of her munition industries, as against 2.6 percent at that time in the United States. Construction of industrial facilities in these years assumed -- for the Japanese conditions -- gigantic proportions. Her aircraft, aluminum, machine tool, automotive, and tank industries were erected from almost nothing during this period.

This industrial expansion was based and depended on the availability of raw materials. Great efforts were devoted to the increase of raw material output in the home islands. In some respects, major results were achieved. Coal production in Japan rose from 28,000,000 tons in 1931 to 55,600,000 tons in 1941. Domestic iron mining made considerable progress. Nevertheless, no country could have been farther from self-sufficiency, with respect to raw materials, than Japan. The development of basic material sources on the continent of Asia constituted almost the central issue of Japan's economic policy during this period.


Clearly then, Japanese industrial output was expanding rapidly in the 1930s, and military output rose accordingly. In a general sense Japan was spending huge chunks of its gold on defence (roughly 10% of GDP whilst the US was spending just 2.6%),, however this was well within their capability. It does not follow that the expansion of the Japanese military came at a price of increased spending of GDP. Japan in the late 1930s was, like every other industrialised nation pulling out of the depression, which significantly affected government revenues, and military outputs. But in the period 1938-40 this rapidly fell away….the nation was recovering.

Neither do I see it as a valid extrapolation to say that an early mobilization would lead to social dislocation. We don't have exact figures for Japanese military outputs, but for the period 1942-5, they produced 76000 aircraft (approximate figures) with 1944 the peak year with 37000 aircraft built. In 1941, they produced about 5000 aircraft, whilst in 1940, about 2000 are thought to have been built. In 1942 about 8000 aircraft were built. In none of these years, despite an obvious ramping up of military spending, is there any evidence of social resistance. Why do you think that by going on a war footing earlier in 1941, rather than in July that this would lead to social unrest? If they went onto a war footing in January rather than July, the 1941 figure would probably have been closer to the 1942 outputs. Reasonably it could be expected the Japanese output for 1941 would be in the order of 7500-8000 aircraft. Why would producing this number of aircraft in the last year of peace be any more difficult than in 1942? Why would there be an increased risk of social upheaval as a result of this intensified effort than there was in 1942. The theory starts to fall apart when you look at it from that perspective don't you think?

 

[davebender]

With the Columbo to Singapore route, the math is even worse (against a better trained enemy). Upwards of 900 miles you would be open to Japanese attack. That is over three days, close to 4. And the Japanese surface fleet units are way more effective than the Italians. Plus, if the Japanese really thought it mattered they might use a Carrier or two to attack the convoy (failing that, a Naval Air Wing). No decent air cover for the convoy once it gets to the far side of the Bay of Bengal. British Aircraft carriers weren't up to the job and the US wouldn't put it's Carriers in that sort of situation.

Asia Map
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
If Britain intends to hold Singapore (and why else would they build it?) then Britain should also plan to hold the Amdaman and Nicobar Islands. Each of those island groups should have a well trained infantry division and some airpower. This extends British air cover most of the way to Malaya. It also makes life very difficult for Japanese ships attempting to enter the Indian Ocean. The Japanese invasion of Burma would probably be derailed.

Indian Army during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
During 1940 Britain raised 5 infantry and 1 armored division in India. I propose the following deployments:
6th Division. Amdaman Islands. Historically intended for Iraq.
7th Division. Nicobar Islands.
8th Division. Malaya. Historically intended for Iraq.
9th Division. Malaya. Historically intended for Malaya.
10th Division and the Armored Division can go to Iraq or Egypt.

An additional 5 Indian infantry divisions were raised during 1941. However those units should not be deployed until 1942. That gives them some training time.

 

[buffnut453]

If Britain intends to hold Singapore (and why else would they build it?) then Britain should also plan to hold the Amdaman and Nicobar Islands. Each of those island groups should have a well trained infantry division and some airpower. This extends British air cover most of the way to Malaya. It also makes life very difficult for Japanese ships attempting to enter the Indian Ocean.

Why? Experience of island-hopping suggested it was very easy to bypass relatively isolated but well-defended islands. Defending islands is just a waste of resources.

The Japanese invasion of Burma would probably be derailed.

The way to derail the invasion of Burma was by securing Thailand which was key to the defence of both Malaya and Burma.

 

[parsifal]

I wouldnt say it was a waste of time to properly defend islands, just that without control of the surrounding oceans and airspace it becomes well nigh impossible

And agree completely about Thailand....if the Allies had managed to occupy Thailand pre-war, the equation changes completely, as it does if the Japanese do the same.

 

[buffnut453]

And since the UK couldn't properly defend Malaya or Burma, the potential for defence of isolated islands is pretty much zero.

 

[davebender]

UK couldn't properly defend Malaya or Burma, the potential for defence of isolated islands is pretty much zero.

Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.

 

[buffnut453]

Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.

Unfortunately, the crystal ball wasn't working very well and the risk of simultaneous wars in Europe/North Africa/Middle East/Mediterranean and in the Far East was never really examined because it was recognised as being entirely unaffordable from a defensive position.

 

[parsifal]

Singapore , and the malay barrier would have been a workable defence, if france had not fallen, and Britain had not been called upon to fight the equivalent of three wars at the same time....fighting in the atlantic, in the med and in the far east. If a proper fleet properly supported could be placed at Singapore, it may have worked. As it stood, with an inadequate air force, half a fleet, and weak ground forces, there was little chance of successful defence

 

[buffnut453]

Careful Parsifal...this is twice in one thread I'm agreeing with you!

 

[Freebird]

Careful Parsifal...this is twice in one thread I'm agreeing with you!

LoL, well I'll balance it out and disagree with most everyone...

Asia Map
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
If Britain intends to hold Singapore (and why else would they build it?) then Britain should also plan to hold the Amdaman and Nicobar Islands. Each of those island groups should have a well trained infantry division and some airpower. This extends British air cover most of the way to Malaya. It also makes life very difficult for Japanese ships attempting to enter the Indian Ocean. The Japanese invasion of Burma would probably be derailed.

I'm not following your reasoning here, a full division each on Andaman Nicobar? Why?
Besides the fact that Britain didn't have enough transport for all this and these troops would be almost useless.
The islands would be useful airbases, but are not under threat of invasion unless Burma falls. Better to put an extra division (in Burma) if one is available

[/QUOTE]
The way to derail the invasion of Burma was by securing Thailand which was key to the defence of both Malaya and Burma.[/QUOTE]

The problem is that Britain had her hands tied, she couldn't be seen as the aggressor, but Roosevelt guaranteed US support IF Britian were attacked.

And since the UK couldn't properly defend Malaya or Burma, the potential for defence of isolated islands is pretty much zero.

They certainly COULD properly defend both, but this was not done.
One good way to defend Burma is to have a strong defence in Malaya.
Until the arrival of the 18th 56th divisions the attack in Burma went very slowly.

Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.

Nope, not at all.
The problem was that the British Prime Minister put a damn fool in as Defence Minister.
(Those of you who know whom I'm talking about will see the irony )

Unfortunately, the crystal ball wasn't working very well

Singapore , and the malay barrier would have been a workable defence, if... If a proper fleet properly supported could be placed at Singapore, it may have worked.

No fleet needed, nor any excuse for other commitments France, Greece etc etc.

The British should have understood that joining the embargo (and leaning on the Dutch to do the same) would result in war.
They should have either been prepared for that war, or else delay the implementation of the embargo.

Even without any fleet whatsoever, they had analysis from EVERY military commander who had looked at the problem in detail (Dobbie, Bond, Babington, Percival, Brooke-Popham etc etc)
Malaya needs about 4 properly trained equipped divisions, and about 600 modern aircraft sent, this would allow them to hold back the Japanese.

 

[buffnut453]

The problem is that Britain had her hands tied, she couldn't be seen as the aggressor, but Roosevelt guaranteed US support IF Britian were attacked.

Don't disagree. None of the Allied powers was strong enough to repulse the Japanese attacks where and when they occurred but the politicians were reluctant to get dragged into, or further into, conflict by making formal alliances. Had they made those alliances in July, it's likely the Allies would have done much better against the Japanese.

They certainly COULD properly defend both, but this was not done. One good way to defend Burma is to have a strong defence in Malaya. Until the arrival of the 18th 56th divisions the attack in Burma went very slowly.

Yes but Thailand was still the pivot-point. It afforded the Japanese forces internal lines between the 2 theatres.

No fleet needed, nor any excuse for other commitments France, Greece etc etc.

No fleet was needed if there were sufficient defences in Malaya to secure the seaward flanks. Without adequate airpower to find and interdict Japanese shipping or the ground forces to defend in depth, a fleet was vital but just wasn't there. In short, the strategy for Singapore relied on hope which is never a good planning assumption.

The British should have understood that joining the embargo (and leaning on the Dutch to do the same) would result in war.
They should have either been prepared for that war, or else delay the implementation of the embargo.

But how would that have stopped the Japanese. They were already moving into southern Indo-China. An embargo against a resource-poor nation like Japan was (and still is) a reasonable political response. London and Washington both failed to realise, however, that Japan's progression towards militaristic government was not going to promote peaceful resolution. Like Hitler's Germany, Japan's only response to a problem was to escalate. Both countries made some initial gains using such a strategy but it ultimately proved to be their undoing.

Even without any fleet whatsoever, they had analysis from EVERY military commander who had looked at the problem in detail (Dobbie, Bond, Babington, Percival, Brooke-Popham etc etc). Malaya needs about 4 properly trained equipped divisions, and about 600 modern aircraft sent, this would allow them to hold back the Japanese.

And here lies the rub. You don't remove "properly trained and equipped" divisions from ongoing theatres of conflict to reinforce a colonial outpost. Again, hope was the main strategy, coupled with an expectation that the Japanese would mount an overland offensive from Indo-China despite Percival's earlier assessment that landings on the east coast were feasible during the monsoon. It was hoped that the Japanese wouldn't attack until 1942 when the build-up of forces in Malaya would have been pretty much complete. Unfortunately, the Japanese weren't obliging and the PBI, particularly the Indian units, many of whom could scarcely fire a rifle, found themselves facing tanks with no way of combating them.

If you go back to my first post in this thread, I summarise the things Malaya Command could have done better but the bottom line is that the forces were still insufficient for the task, especially the ludicrously small number of aircraft, the lack of a balanced fleet and east-coast defence that hinged on early identification of Japanese intentions. Had British forces been able to interdict or repulse the Japanese invasion fleet and prevent them from taking Singora, then the situation would have been very different. The only option available to Yamashita would have been a long overland invasion from Indo-China which would have taken a long time and thus afforded time for further reinforcements to arrive.

 

[parsifal]

3rd time........

 

[timshatz]

Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.

Kinda. Well, maybe. The thing is, Singapore is right in a key trade route. England is a trading country so they control the space. Similar to the logic of Gibraltor, Cape Town, Aden, The Falklands, ect. Gives you presence in the area.

Part of the presence is a kind of "Don't screw with us" mentality that it projects. In that respect, it was a good move by England. Only problem is when the base moved from being a presence to actually having to defend, it was found seriously wanting. In a time of peace, it worked as a deterrent. Until a war came and somebody figured a way to knock it off.

IMHO

 

[davebender]

You don't need a crystal ball.

Military units fight the way they are trained. Infantry divisions need good training and leadership during peacetime so they will will be able to fight during wartime. If Britain is unwilling to fund adequate peacetime training for their army (however small) then it's time to start selling off the empire before someone with a properly trained army takes it away by force.

 

[buffnut453]

You don't need a crystal ball.

Military units fight the way they are trained. Infantry divisions need good training and leadership during peacetime so they will will be able to fight during wartime. If Britain is unwilling to fund adequate peacetime training for their army (however small) then it's time to start selling off the empire before someone with a properly trained army takes it away by force.

The problem was massive expansion to prepare for war. That was the same for all combatants. Priority went to those areas where fighting was occurring or most likely. The problem for Britain was that it was aligned against 3 of the 5 other largest powers in the world without combat allies and when the forces of one those powers (Germany) had a larger military and the other was the key regional power (Japan). To argue that Britain should have funded a peacetime military to be at least 3 times bigger than any likely adversary is totally impractical given the financial challenges of rebuilding the economy after WWI and the Great Depression.

 

[davebender]

1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?