Defiants and Battles deployed overseas, any merit in that?

[CobberKane]

Coomon sense and my natural instincts would lead me to agree. However Forum member Vincenzo provided some conclusive proof that over Malta in the very early days, the CR42 was actually somewhat effective against the Hurricane, and more effective against this type than the MC 200s that were also sent over Malta.

The problem with the CR42 and indeed all those early war italian types, is that they were in no way air superiority fighters. They were manouverable enough to stay out of trouble, and if an allied pilot was silly enough to get into a turning fight with them, could easily become a dangerous oponent. But they lacked the firepower, and the performance to force issues in the air....allied fighters could use energy and speed and usually altitude as well, to gain distinct advantage over the italians. To that extent, your comments about generational differences in performance I completely agree with




Er no, if we are talking "super Battle" not necessarily the case. At 280 mph, CR 42s cannot catch them, neither can a G-50 really. An MC200 is only 30 mph faster so will not really have time to approach from astern with any manouver in the mix. An aircraft forced to fly straight and level with in the face of 2 x HMGs is in for a tough fight. An MC 202 can catch the Battle, but the rate of closure is about 70mph. If there are any escorts about, it might be a difficult job even for them, particulalry considering that the fighters return fire is no greater than the defending Battles. And if the battles are flying in a tight defensive formation and the fighter is attacking individually, as they usually do, the defensive abilities of the "super battle" should be even more apparent.

Incidentally, in the timeline you are talking about wouldn't our MTO 'super-Battles' have been facing the Lutwaffe as well? Bf109 E, F, and Gs as well as 110s were in the desert war weren't they

In mid 1941, the majority of LW types remained Bf 109Es. From April the 109f began to supplant the 109E, but the E remained the dominant type in the MTO until about April 1942. The main fighter defending Rommel Jan-June 1942 were RA units at least numerically. LW started to really ramp up their presence in North Africa after June 1942, but not enough to make a difference.

Well, if ShortRound is on the money 'super-Battle might have struggled to make 270mph, and even if it did it would have been a clumsy mother. Regarding the trouble it might have given an MC200; how's this for a comparison? If we were to limit a Bf110 to 270mph it would surely still be better in most every other respect than 'super-Battle', wouldn't it? And if we take a MK 1 Hurricane as being approximately analogous with an MC200 performance wise, shouldn't the neutered Bf110 been a difficult target for the Hurricane? My understanding is that even with the full 350mph to use the 110 proved easy meat for the Hurricane, unless it had a significant tactical advantage. I know the MC200 had less firepower than the Hurricane, but 'super-Battle' would also be a whole lot slower than the 110. After all, Ki 43s with two .50s knocked down plenty of aircraft that were better performers than 'super-battle' could ever have hoped to have been

 

[parsifal]

Me 110s had the priceless advantage over the MC 200 of firepower and speed. An Me 110 restricted to 270 mph maximum is not as badly off as you would expect. 270 mph would be its typical enagement speed anyway, it just would lack the level speed to get out of Dodge if it needed to. A good comparison would be to look at the french Potez 631...an aircraft similar in concept to the Me110, but with severely degraded performance (max speed 275 mph). Nevertheless, this type, which roughly fits the bill of your hypothetical Me 110, still managed to shoot down 29 enemy a/c, for the loss of 93 of their own (about 30 to friendly fire and around another 30 to flak). So whilst an unmanouverable type like the Me 110 with low performance, so so armour and very limited rear firing guns might be easy meat to more agile, more heavily armed, and quicker SE fighters, it does not follow that a "Super Battle", with heavy rear firing guns and flying in a tight mutually supporting formation is going to be "hacked out of the sky". Properly defended bomber formations seldom were "hacked out of the sky" in fact (except when the circumstances are exceptional). The effects of fighters on loss rates is one of the most overblown, overrated mallarkies of the post war wash up of the war in fact.

 

[stona]

The effects of fighters on loss rates is one of the most overblown, overrated mallarkies of the post war wash up of the war in fact.

I've read dozens of documents both Allied and German that would contradict that view.

This isn't the place for that debate so,just to illustrate the effect of the mere presence of a fighter escort on attacking Luftwaffe fighter pilots here are three pages of "Excerpts from Typical German Radio Traffic Interceptions" lifted from 8th AF intelligence documents.

I could post minutes of meetings in which many senior Luftwaffe figures bemoan their inability to deal with Allied fighters escorting the bombers and half a dozen other similar examples. If the Germans thought that they were unable to deal with the USAAF offensive due to the presence of escort fighters then that is an extremely important factor in the continuation of the daylight bombing campaign. Hardly an "overblown mallarkey".

On occassions when unescorted bomber formations were caught by a well coordinated attack I think it is fair to say they suffered very heavy losses. I wouldn't use the phrase "hacked out of the sky" but they were better than decimated.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

I have read all those accounts as well, and they all sound very convincing, until the claims are compared to actual losses. This all relates back to the idea that fighters on the defensive somehow can confer a strategic advantage of decisive proportions. with one or two notable exceptions, they dont, and thats because losses to fighters are simply a statistically secondary cause of losses. far more losses are attributable to non-combat related causes, and flak is at least as significant to loss rates as were fighters.

Fighters were essential, not because of losses, but because of the threat of losses. in this way they could affect accuracy and cause other errors that decreased or eliminated the effects of the bombers. But the actual loss rates due to fighters seldom exceeded 15 of forces committed, whereas average loss rates to all causes per raid might climb, on average to 7 -10%. If your fighters are only accounting for 1/7 of total losses, they are not THE determinant of operations.

For air forces on the attack such as the US 8AF fighters were essential. thats different. for the LW, acting on the defensive, fighters were a strategic blind alley that could only end in defeat.

For most mid and small sized air forces, air defence by aircraft is all but abandoned in the post war environment. they maintain strong fighter elements for deterrent value, but if a shoooting war actually breaks out, these forces are seldom engaged. thats because of the economic realities of committing such forces and the relative unimportance of fighters in modern warfare.

 

[stona]

Now I'm confused. Are you saying that fighters in an offensive role,i.e. to prevent their bombers being "hacked out of the air" are important whereas defending such an offensive campaign with fighters is a waste of resources?

The Luftwaffe only became ineffective in its defensive role when the sheer weight of Allied numerical superiority mitigated it attempts to disrupt the bombing offensive.

We can argue about when that point was reached.The following is again from a post war US document based wartime on German documents. The Germans are being positive about developments in early 1944,we know now that this was misplaced optimism.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Vincenzo]

None MTO LW fighter unit had Emil in april '42 (same is true for march '42). imho the Emil was out to pure fighter unit in early fall '41, the Jabo staffeln probably used this some months more.

 

[stona]

None MTO LW fighter unit had Emil in april '42 (same is true for march '42). imho the Emil was out to pure fighter unit in early fall '41, the Jabo staffeln probably used this some months more.

I agree. Most had cashed in their Emils by May/June 1941.

Steve

 

[yulzari]

It is interesting to see how the discussion has developed.

The Fairey idea of a super Battle was a twin engined one though where the extra engines would come from I have no idea. Twin Daggers?

Given the original question, my earlier response was from the point of view that war involves deciding to send people to risk death and terrible injuries. Sending Battles and Defiants, even as we know them, into action against the Japanese invasion transports would have cost the lives of many aircrew and losses would probably have exceeded 50 % per mission. However, the damage they could inflict would have saved the lives of innumerable soldiers and civilians who were the victims of Japanese Imperial aggression. For example, let us not forget that not only allied troops suffered and died on the Burma railway; more civilians did so too.

Would there be there merit in so deploying them? Yes. Were they the best choice? Probably not though I still retain a respect for the Defiant when aircrew were trained fully and properly to handle them and to understand the use of the turret guns by the pilot when they were trained forwards.

When we peer through the fog of war we can see that Malaya air power needed an effective anti shipping force and an early warning system, even on the Chinese spotter/telephone level. The Battle could sink transport ships and could maintain a sea reconnaissance screen. It would do so at a fearful rate of loss but the Battles and crew could be more rapidly replaced than the japanese could organise a new seaborne assault. War involves balancing loss against benefit and loss includes human lives.

The Russians understood that the bomber was air power. The fighter is a necessary adjunct but they rated a successful bombing mission as better than victories over enemy fighters.

 

[davebender]

Every aircraft is vulnerable against proper defenses. Even a stealth aircraft can be shot down.

 

[stona]

However Forum member Vincenzo provided some conclusive proof that over Malta in the very early days, the CR42 was actually somewhat effective against the Hurricane, and more effective against this type than the MC 200s that were also sent over Malta.

A moot point. The actual score for CR42 v Hurricane over malta is generally accepted to be 1 all,despite the 16 or so Italian claims for Hurricanes.

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

To improve the defense of Malay and southeast Asia requires trained crews. Those were in short supply, probably shorter than aircraft if you count all the second or third rate aircraft available. Sending ill trained aircrews, no matter how brave and self sacrificing, out in those second and third rate aircraft is not likely to affect the out come of the battle or the after effects ( the suffering of the captured military and civilians.)

From Wiki on the Vickers Vildebeest;
" The two Singapore-based squadrons, however, were still waiting for their Beauforts when Japan invaded Malaya in December 1941, and the now obsolete biplanes had to be deployed against the Japanese attackers, attempting unsuccessfully to torpedo a Japanese cruiser off Kota Bharu on 8 December"
" The Vildebeests continued to attack the Japanese as their forces advanced down Malaya, sustaining heavy losses from Japanese fighters, particularly when no fighter cover could be provided. On 26 January 1942, the Japanese landed at Endau, 250 miles from Singapore, and 12 Vildebeests of 100 and 36 Squadrons were sent to attack the landings. Despite an escort of Brewster Buffalo and Hawker Hurricane fighters, five Vildebeests were lost. The attack was repeated later that day by eight Vildebeests of 36 Squadron together with three Fairey Albacores, resulting in six more Vildebeests and two Albacores being shot down"

Since even Kamikaze attacks cannot guarantee the destruction of one ship for one airplane expended the presence of one or two squadrons of Battles in addition to or in place of aircraft already there would make little difference to the outcome. The Vildebeest carried about the same war load as a Battle. About 1000lb worth of bombs, a fixed forward firing gun and a flexible, free swinging .303 out the back. The Battles guns were faster firing and the Battle itself was faster.

Stopping or severely crippling the Japanese invasion fleet would need scores if not hundreds of aircraft, not a few dozen. The Malaya Command had, in addition to the 24 Vildebeests, 47 Bristol Blenheim's and 24 Lockheed Hudson's and 3 PBY's.
The Hudsons belonged to the RAAF and one squadron was effectively wiped out twice during the campaign. No 8 Squadron had suffered heavy losses and handed over it's remaining aircraft to No 1 Squadron and received new Hudsons, returned to the fight, continued to suffer heavy losses as was disbanded in Batavia in Feb 1942, personnel returned to Australia, reformed later. No 1 Squadron was not so lucky, about 160 personnel being captured at the end of the NEI campaign.

If anybody really thinks that the Battle (or super Battle) was a better bomber than the Lockheed Hudson I have bridge over the East River in New York for sale.
The Battle was a barely creditable "strategic" bomber in 1937-8. It was designed for and crews trained in level bombing. Turning it into a maritime

 

[Vincenzo]

time ago i opened a thread asking what were the results of C.200 and G.50 vs Hurricane, comparing this with the around 3 loss for a 1 victory of C.R.42 in 1940/1 (this data came from JoeB/Nikademus report from best books on this fiels just now i don't remember the title). Limitating the example to Malta Nikademus report 8 42 losses for 3 Hurricane this from Shore's books on Malta

 

[stona]

time ago i opened a thread asking what were the results of C.200 and G.50 vs Hurricane, comparing this with the around 3 loss for a 1 victory of C.R.42 in 1940/1 (this data came from JoeB/Nikademus report from best books on this fiels just now i don't remember the title). Limitating the example to Malta Nikademus report 8 42 losses for 3 Hurricane this from Shore's books on Malta

Thanks for the clarification Vincenzo.
I shall look for your thread.
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

Now I'm confused. Are you saying that fighters in an offensive role,i.e. to prevent their bombers being "hacked out of the air" are important whereas defending such an offensive campaign with fighters is a waste of resources?

The Luftwaffe only became ineffective in its defensive role when the sheer weight of Allied numerical superiority mitigated it attempts to disrupt the bombing offensive.

We can argue about when that point was reached.The following is again from a post war US document based wartime on German documents. The Germans are being positive about developments in early 1944,we know now that this was misplaced optimism.

Cheers

Steve

no, fighters whether on the defensive or the offensive (ie escorting bombers, or operatinng over enemy territory) were important, They did shoot down enemy a/c, and were critical in breaking up enemy formations and downgrading accuracy. Both sides neede fighters. The problem is analysing the losses they caused and whether they achieved strategicallysignificant results. Primarily they were an attritional weapon, not so much the cavalry that rode in to save the day at some strategic point, And its very hard to find overwhelming successes for fighters when on the defensive. Even the BOB is arguable as a victory for FC, though i personally and strongly believe that it was a victory for the RAF. but not because FC was able to inflict one sided losses on its opponents, rather because it could take heavy losses and the LW could not

 

[stona]

I'm pretty much with you there....well,right up to the bit about the BoB I think that was a clear victory and not arguable at all. I really am not trying to start that debate here

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

None MTO LW fighter unit had Emil in april '42 (same is true for march '42). imho the Emil was out to pure fighter unit in early fall '41, the Jabo staffeln probably used this some months more.

weve had this discussion before and constantly disagree, because our respective sources tell different stories. from memeory the source you mostly rely on is ased on unit returns and their authorised mounts. trouble is, my sources are based on LW quartermaster returns which tell a very different story. i dont know which source is correct, though I expect your about to give me another lecture.

For the record, my source (which packed away for the moment because we are moving house soon) says that the first fredericks began to arrive in april'41...15 of them from memeory. The last emils (e-7 trop) arrived either february or march (32 of them IIRC). Frederics overtook Emils in the MTO, in terms of deliveries either September 1941. by June 1942, the dominant type arriving according to the quartermaster was the gustav.

I think we should just agree to disagree and leave it at that

 

[stona]

I wonder where they came from.
I have Regensburg production lists to hand and the last Emils (W.Nrn 3799-3824) were produced in September 1940. Regensburg didn't really get going on the F series until the end of the year which must mean that the Fs which arrived at JG 51 in October/November 1940 must have come from Wiener Neustadt,according to the C-Ampt program for fighter production of 1 Oct 1940.

The first loss report for a Bf 109 F-1 is on 11/11/40 (Georg Claus Staffelkapitan of 1,/JG 51).

I would have to check to see if Fiesler,Erla or even Arado carried on with a few Emils into 1941. .

Steve

 

[Vincenzo]

i think parsifal talking only of MTO.

Parsifal quartemaster general don't show emil in MTO after 27/09/41 report

 

[RCAFson]

Stopping or severely crippling the Japanese invasion fleet would need scores if not hundreds of aircraft, not a few dozen. The Malaya Command had, in addition to the 24 Vildebeests, 47 Bristol Blenheim's and 24 Lockheed Hudson's and 3 PBY's.
The Hudsons belonged to the RAAF and one squadron was effectively wiped out twice during the campaign. No 8 Squadron had suffered heavy losses and handed over it's remaining aircraft to No 1 Squadron and received new Hudsons, returned to the fight, continued to suffer heavy losses as was disbanded in Batavia in Feb 1942, personnel returned to Australia, reformed later. No 1 Squadron was not so lucky, about 160 personnel being captured at the end of the NEI campaign.

If anybody really thinks that the Battle (or super Battle) was a better bomber than the Lockheed Hudson I have bridge over the East River in New York for sale.
The Battle was a barely creditable "strategic" bomber in 1937-8. It was designed for and crews trained in level bombing. Turning it into a maritime

The Battle typically carried a heavier bomb load than the Hudson and it's general performance, except for range is quite comparable. 100 Battles would have been a formidable strike force, and would have greatly increase the RAF's striking power in Malaya. I would expect that a Battle would be more accurate in low level bombing than a Hudson or a Bleinheim, as it's bombs are released simultaneous rather than dropped from an internal bay.
You left off the results of the RAF/RAAF attacks; in fact they inflicted heavy damage on IJN shipping on the 7th with only a handful of sorties. A massed attack by Battles carried out with the same determination and numbers as their attacks on German held bridges would have wiped out the IJN shipping.

 

[buffnut453]

There are a couple of issues with your comments re the Blenheim's internal bomb bay and accuracy of simultaneous release -vs- serial release. Firstly, the Blenheim typically only carried a couple of bombs side-by-side in the bay so they could still be dropped simultaneously. Secondly, serial release can still result in more accurate results at low level because it helps overcome early/late pickling by the pilot.