Defiants and Battles deployed overseas, any merit in that?

[RCAFson]

Compare the Battle to the SBD. They have similar ranges on internal fuel, but no one has ever claimed that the SBD was a strategic bomber.

 

[Vincenzo]

Which confirms that only a fraction of the fighter units in the med were equipped with F subtypes. Think about it. over 550 of that 704 were deployed to the Eastern Front. (There were just under 300 Es allocated to the East Front incidentally, one source mentions 245). There were over 100 Fs allocated to the west, and then we have wastage and losses to account for. Whichever way you cut the allocation of resources there are less than 70 friedrichs on the Southern Frint in June and far more likley about 40-50. I know that over 50% of LW forces by June on the southern Front were fighters, some of which will be Me 110s but the lions share just has to be E subtypes. your unit based information sources may be saying that they were Fs, but in june this is simply a physical impossibility. They may be authorised to use Fs, but not yet received that equipme nt...a common failing for axis records. Try that excercise on some RA units, you will find the same problem

as i already writed in my previous reply in june '41 there were no friederichs ih fighter unit in MTO, but there were not emils in october (with possible exception a jabo informal staffel)

 

[stona]

Compare the Battle to the SBD. They have similar ranges on internal fuel, but no one has ever claimed that the SBD was a strategic bomber.

I am not particularly familiar with the doctrines relating to air power in the United States during this period.

I am reasonably familiar with the RAF doctrine and the men who instigated it and attempted to enact it. The bomber was perceived,in the 1930s,as a strategic,war winning tool. Some of the more optimistic proponents of the strategic bomber force imagined that it might not even be necessary to commit an army to the field in a future war.The method but not the doctrine changed throughout the war.

Close air support was eventually provided by the RAF but rarely by Bomber Command. Even intedictory attacks on French infrastructure in the lead up to Overlord were seen as a distraction from the real task,that of flattening German cities and dehousing (killing) as many German workers as possible. Hardly a tactical objective!

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Compare the Battle to the SBD. They have similar ranges on internal fuel, but no one has ever claimed that the SBD was a strategic bomber.

Ok, I will bite, how many SBDs were flying in 1937?
How many in 1938?
How many in 1939?

And then you have the rather different purpose of a carrier SCOUT/BOMBER compared to a single engine strategic bomber.
The SBD was supposed to provide the long range SCOUT or reconnaissance function for the carrier and have fuel allowances to get back the moving carrier (which may be moving away from the aircraft at 30kts in order to avoid a threat.)

Range alone does not determine the intended role but just what features did the Battle have (aside from being stressed for dive bombing, as it was understood in the early 30s) to suit it for the tactical role?

Even the Lysander had two forward firing guns for flak suppression. The Lysander entered Squadron service about one year after the Battle and shows what the RAF thought the Army needed for a tactical aircraft. And it really isn't that far off from the Hs 126 used by the Germans except the Lysander has about double the firepower and a much bigger bomb load.

 

[stona]

The Lysander was an Army co-operation aircraft. In the context of the 1930s this meant an almost WWI role,reconnaissance and artillery spotting. It was not designed to support the Army in anything resembling CAS.

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

I am not particularly familiar with the doctrines relating to air power in the United States during this period.

We also have the confusion of doctrines of naval air power and land based air power intruding here not to mention the doctrine of a country who's potential enemies are only 200-400 miles away (in part) and a country who's potential enemies are many hundreds if not thousands of miles away.

A rough check on Google maps shows that Norwich is a little over 300 miles from Bremen. Or Hull is 366 miles from Bremerhaven. 416 miles From London to Karlsruhe.

And in 1933-36 it was not a certainty that Germany would be the Future enemy. If the English were allied with the French and based in France so much the better, if it turned out that France was the enemy in 1940------413 miles from Portsmouth to Bordeaux. Or pretty much anything much north of a line from Bordeaux to Geneva.

A rather ridiculous radius for a mid 1930s tactical bomber.

 

[RCAFson]

Ok, I will bite, how many SBDs were flying in 1937?
How many in 1938?
How many in 1939?

And then you have the rather different purpose of a carrier SCOUT/BOMBER compared to a single engine strategic bomber.
The SBD was supposed to provide the long range SCOUT or reconnaissance function for the carrier and have fuel allowances to get back the moving carrier (which may be moving away from the aircraft at 30kts in order to avoid a threat.)

Range alone does not determine the intended role but just what features did the Battle have (aside from being stressed for dive bombing, as it was understood in the early 30s) to suit it for the tactical role?

Even the Lysander had two forward firing guns for flak suppression. The Lysander entered Squadron service about one year after the Battle and shows what the RAF thought the Army needed for a tactical aircraft. And it really isn't that far off from the Hs 126 used by the Germans except the Lysander has about double the firepower and a much bigger bomb load.

Take a look at Gibraltar, Alexandria, Malta, Scapa flow, Singapore, Hatston on the Orkney Islands, etc, etc and then draw a 300-400 mile circle around those bases. Now imagine the consequences of the RAF having Battles deployed from these bases; having the range to strike at potential targets from these bases doesn't make the aircraft a strategic bomber, anymore than the Skuas were when they sank the Konigsberg and if the Skua could sink the Konigsberg from Hatson, then so could the Battle, with it's even better range and payload. The Battle was designed as a multipurpose attack bomber, that could deliver it's bomb load with a variety of attack profiles. It was tragically misused and it's potential wasted by throwing it against nearly unbeatable air and FLAK defenses, and then when it predictably failed, the failure was then blamed on the aircraft and not the impossible situation.

The Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda all had a single .303mg as as their forward armament.

 

[Shortround6]

Well the provision of 3 , yes 3, light bomb racks might argue different. One on each stub wing outboard of the landing gear (which could also take a 250lb bomb each) and one under the fuselage for four 20lb bombs. The Stub wing bomb racks were also the attachment points for the "emergency" armament of two 20mm Hispano cannon for tank or barge busting in case Operation Sea Lion was ever started. Granted the 20mm were a late addition (thankfully never used) and not part of the original requirement.

The Hs 126 could carry six 22 lb bombs inside I beleive and/or a single 110lb bomb under the port fuselage.

It was quite common for early/mid 30s "Army co-operation aircraft" to be equipped as "light bombers". Much like the WW I two seaters. The provision of more machine guns and light automatic canon for AA use made this rather unattractive even by 1939-40 however. But in evaluating 1933-37 aircraft and their intended uses it has to e take into account.

 

[RCAFson]

As has been noted the RAF did not like the idea of supporting the army directly, even though they claimed they could do it in order to get a larger share of the budget sometimes.
The Army found itself in France with niether proper air support OR modern heavy artillery ( why spend money on heavy artillery when you have bombers?) .

When looking at the Battle a lot of little things begin to add up, perhaps they are all circumstantial, but judge for yourselves.

1. I keep harping about the 1000 mile range. In 1934-37 why else would a plane have a 1000 mile range unless for strategic use?
A. The Boulton Paul's Sidestrand ( a re-engined modified Sidestrand) only went into squadron service in 1936, this bi-plane could carry 1500lbs of bombs and had a range of 545 miles (Wiki).
B. The Avro Anson went into service in 1936, 360lb bomb load and a range of 790 miles, Sept 1939 saw 10 Coastal Command and 16 Bomber Command squadrons flying Ansons.
C. At the end of 1936 the British had 9 squadrons of Handley Page Heyford night bomber biplanes. 3500lb max bomb load, 920 mile range, there are others.
D. as to the Battle, a range of 500 miles could be achieved on roughly 1/2 the fuel. The Battle carried just over 200 imp gallons. Taking out even 67 gallons let alone 100 could have increase the bomb load to 1500lbs over 500 miles (or more) .
E. OR Cut fuel tankage by 100 imp gallons, fuel alone (without tanks) is 750lbs. at a wing loading of 25.6lbs per square foot the Battle is using just under 30 sq/ft of wing for this fuel. As a very rough guess wing weight might be 3lbs a square foot so the wing could be made another 3 sq ft smaller. The Battle was paying a penealty for it's long range if it was intended to use it as a tactical or even interdiction bomber.
F. Why the bomb aimer? with the Mk. VII Course Setting Bomb Sight? Unless bombing was to be done from medium to high (for the time) altitude. The RAF had been bombing troops/trenches in WW I and in the middle east for years without such a bomb sight.
G. Why use a Merlin III engine? RR had built Kestrels without superchargers and with moderate and full supercharging. The Merlin X with two speed supercharger was shown at the Paris airshow in 1938 and the first production engine built in DEC 1938, if a low altitude bomber is what was wanted a Merlin with a lower supercharger ratio (even if not two speed) giving over 1100hp at 5,000ft on 87 octane fuel could have been had fairly early in the production run. Instead they kept the Merlin III with it's 16,500ft critical altitude. Cruising at 15,000ft will give longer range than cruising at 5-8,000ft.

The Battle has too many things pointing to it being optimized for a long range role for me to believe it was ever intended for a non-strategic role as understood in the early/mid 1930s.

You've proven that the Battle could deliver 1500lb over a useful distance and that it had the range for a variety of missions.

Why did the TBD and TBF have a bomb aimer? Were they strategic bombers, or was it to suit them for a attacking a variety of tactical targets and/or to attack strategic targets when the opportunity arose? Giving aircraft multipurpose capabilities doesn't make it a strategic bomber.

 

[stona]

It was quite common for early/mid 30s "Army co-operation aircraft" to be equipped as "light bombers". Much like the WW I two seaters. The provision of more machine guns and light automatic canon for AA use made this rather unattractive even by 1939-40 however. But in evaluating 1933-37 aircraft and their intended uses it has to e take into account.

True enough,if little better than those chaps lobbing bombs from the observer's position in WWI.

I think that Lysanders may actually have dropped some bombs in France before being withdrawn. I know for sure that they made supply drops.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Take a look at Gibraltar, Alexandria, Malta, Scapa flow, Singapore, Hatston on the Orkney Islands, etc, etc and then draw a 300-400 mile circle around those bases. Now imagine the consequences of the RAF having Battles deployed from these bases; having the range to strike at potential targets from these bases doesn't make the aircraft a strategic bomber, anymore than the Skuas were when they sank the Konigsberg and if the Skua could sink the Konigsberg from Hatson, then so could the Battle, with it's even better range and payload. The Battle was designed as a multipurpose attack bomber, that could deliver it's bomb load with a variety of attack profiles. It was tragically misused and it's potential wasted by throwing it against nearly unbeatable air and FLAK defenses, and then when it predictably failed, the failure was then blamed on the aircraft and not the impossible situation.

The Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda all had a single .303mg as as their forward armament.

Draw your circle and then imagine Handley Page Hampdens attacking with torpedoes or 500-1000 lb bombs.
The Battle was obsolete in 1939 and more so in 1940. Yes, it was tragically miss used, but given the numbers used and the lack of escorted no other attack profile offered any better chance of success. The chances of a hit level bombing from 8-12,000ft were pretty dismal, while giving the defense even more warning and the fighters shots at the belly. The dive bombing profile was also useless as it to gave to much warning and oppertunity to the fighters and flak

The Battle needed better protection, both armorial and Tankage, more firepower, more enginepower, lower drag (smaller size). In other words it needed to be replaced by a new airplane. There was a British specification for a "tactical" bomber after the Battle, it resulted in the Fairey P.4/34 and Hawker Henley, so for give me for thinking that the RAF didn't think of the Battle as a "tactical" bomber.
For sinking major war ships you need more than just bombload, you need bombs of a size/type that can do the job. The Battles wing bomb cells were to restrictive in bomb selection.

 

[parsifal]

as i already writed in my previous reply in june '41 there were no friederichs ih fighter unit in MTO,

Sorry, I thought you were saying the F was the dominant type from April

but there were not emils in october (with possible exception a jabo informal staffel)

This doesnt cut it either. Looking once again at the eastern Front, and the losses being sustained there, it is immedialtely apparent that Emils had to be substituted on the southern front as the 6 fighter groups transferred from the east to the Southern TOs were put into effect ((II,III/JG 27, I,II,III/JG 53, II/JG 3).

On the Eastern Front attitional losses for the LW were very heavy. In the first three weeks of the campaign alone there were 189 unrecoverable losses to the fighter groups. Thats a whopping monthly attrition rate of 35% per month of the total force structure being lost each and every month. By October the Luftwaffe had lost 1005 SE fighters on the Eastern Front, and by the beginning of December this figure had risen to 1600. These are unrecoverable losses...losses that dont get repaired. This trend continued through to December, yet the LW managed to maintain a daily serviceability average of about 740 fighters at the beginning of the campaign, before slipping to 650 in September and finally plummetting to about 450 in November. With such a high wastage rate, yet maintaining a high serviceability rate, the Germans simply had to be pouring everything they could into the Eastern Front. Since AFAIK, there were no FW 190 deployments as yet to the East and Emils were out of production, the reinforcements being sent to the East had to be Fredericks. Since there were only 1000 Frederics produced in that period (or about 166 per month) and the Germans were sending more than 200 SE fighters per month to the East in that period, plus replacing losses in the west, there simply is no capacity to explwin the claim that Fredericks were sent south in that period. My source says that a few (about 30 in Septmeber, and then gradually increasing each month thereafter) were sent to the MTO, and that the units mentioned above arrived in theatre with Emils (in the East they had been equipped with Freferics, perhaps they were initially Frederics, but more likley they drew Emils from the reserve depots in Germany enroute, leaving the F mounts in the East, as reserves for other formations....that would be consistent with what the LW usually did at least) .

So, I can only repeat, even though your unit based sources might tell you the newly arriving JGs were F equipped, and that ther were no E units in the TO, there is simply no other exaplanation other than these sources are wrong, given the emergency faced by the LW in the East at this time. Thats certainly what Berg in his book claims

 

[RCAFson]

Draw your circle and then imagine Handley Page Hampdens attacking with torpedoes or 500-1000 lb bombs.
The Battle was obsolete in 1939 and more so in 1940. Yes, it was tragically miss used, but given the numbers used and the lack of escorted no other attack profile offered any better chance of success. The chances of a hit level bombing from 8-12,000ft were pretty dismal, while giving the defense even more warning and the fighters shots at the belly. The dive bombing profile was also useless as it to gave to much warning and oppertunity to the fighters and flak

The Battle needed better protection, both armorial and Tankage, more firepower, more enginepower, lower drag (smaller size). In other words it needed to be replaced by a new airplane. There was a British specification for a "tactical" bomber after the Battle, it resulted in the Fairey P.4/34 and Hawker Henley, so for give me for thinking that the RAF didn't think of the Battle as a "tactical" bomber.
For sinking major war ships you need more than just bombload, you need bombs of a size/type that can do the job. The Battles wing bomb cells were to restrictive in bomb selection.

What bombing profile would you suggest?

...and it didn't have a HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar...this is 1940/1 that we're talking about. The Battle could carry 2 x 500lb bombs for attacking larger ships including CVs while the 250lb bomb was still effective against any unarmoured ship. Imagine 50 Battles accompanying the Bleinheim strike against the IJN carriers on April 09 1942; it would have been Midway two months earlier.

The later designs such as the P.4/34 were improved, but they didn't exist and the Battle did, and in relatively large numbers (the UK probably had more Battles in 1940 than the IJAAF or USAAC had in total aircraft)

 

[Vincenzo]

II/27 in MTO from late september with friederichs
III/27 in MTO from early december with friderichs
II/3 in MTO from january '42 with friederichs
I/53 in MTO from december '41 with friederichs
II/53 in MTO from december '41 with friederichs
III/53 in MTO from very late november '41 with friederichs

this for Fighter units unit report

for quarterly report 27/9/41 Single engine fighters - 27.09.41
II/27 40 F-4
III/27 22 E
II/3 21 F-4
I/53 37 F-4
II/53 29 F-4
III/53 22 F-12

for quarterly report 27/12/41 Single engine fighters - 27.12.41
II/27 22 F-4
III/27 20 F-4
II/3 40 F-4
I/53 40 F-4
II/53 39 F-4
III/53 no fighters

Osprey publication LUFTWAFFE FIGHTER UNITS MEDITERRANEAN 1941-44 and Bf 109 aces in north africa and mediterranean are agree that after the first (7/26 and I/27) the others fighter unit came with friederichs

 

[parsifal]

Vincenzo

I glanced at the source material you provided, and it simply confirms what I am saying. they are unit based reports, looking from the "ground up", but they cannot be reconciled with what was happening "from the top down". German losses on the est front and in the west were exceeding re-supply of new aircraft, 35% of the force structure lost in the first month of operations alone. Slowed down a litle in the following months, but still outstripping proiduction. Maximum effort was being applied in the east. It is possible that the units transfering to south tok their equipment with them, but not according to Berg. Neither wouold that be consistent with standard LW procedure. Units transferring out of the East would (usually) draw new equipment from the reserve depots then move to the new deployment. Not always but usually.

So, once again, there are simply no airframes available to equip on a wholesale scale firstly those units already in the MTO, and then to re-equip 6 full gruppen that transferred in Septemeber. The unit histories may tell you that, but the stratgegic situation categorically says its not possible.

Lets move on, we have had this discussion so many times and it does the thread, nor either of us any good to keep going around in circles

 

[Shortround6]

What bombing profile would you suggest?

The one they used, fighter escort would help though.

...and it didn't have a HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar...this is 1940/1 that we're talking about.

Yep and by late 1940 most fighters and combat planes in the western Nations HAD armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort. While the "HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar" might be lacking ANY plane WOTHOUT armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort were considered little better than training aircraft.

The Battle could carry 2 x 500lb bombs for attacking larger ships including CVs while the 250lb bomb was still effective against any unarmoured ship.

Could the Battle carry two 500lb bombs? or could it carry a single 250lb under each wing? And if you can get a 500lb bomb under each wing what does it do to performance?

A Hurricane IIB lost about 33mph carrying a pair of 500lb bombs. A Mosquito lost about 15-18mph, A P-51D cruising at 2700rpm and 46in MAP lost about 36mph with two 500lb bombs. Can the Battle afford to loose even 20mph?

Imagine 50 Battles accompanying the Bleinheim strike against the IJN carriers on April 09 1942; it would have been Midway two months earlier.

You do have an imagination. I take it you are also imagining another 24 or so Battles going in at low level to lure the CAP out of position and getting almost wiped out doing it? The US got very, very lucky at Midway. Taking nothing away form the skill or courage of the Flyers, it was in large part due to the unplanned sequence of events that Midway turned out so well for the Americans. Without the same measure of luck/fate many of the Battles in such a strike force would suffer the same fate as the Blenheims, around 40% losses over the Japanese fleet. Especially if they don't have the armor and self-sealing tanks of the Blenheims.

The later designs such as the P.4/34 were improved, but they didn't exist and the Battle did, and in relatively large numbers (the UK probably had more Battles in 1940 than the IJAAF or USAAC had in total aircraft)

While it is true they didn't exist in numbers I didn't bring then to say that they did, but to point out that the RAF had other ideas about what made up a tactical bomber than the Battle and they had those ideas before the Battle even flew. Please note the smaller Fairey bomber was a good 25mph faster than the Battle using the same engine. The Fact that the RAF choose to buy twin engine and 4 engine bombers instead of tactical bombers doesn't really mean they were happy with the Battle as a tactical bomber, It means they were concentrating on what they thought was their primary Missions. Defense of the British Isles with fighters and an independent offensive force, Bomber Command, not tied to the army.

 

[stona]

The Battle was a dog's dinner from start to finish.

Specification P.27/32 was issued by the Air Ministry in April 1933 having seen some theoretical designs,one offered by Fairey for a single engined bomber to be powered by the Prince V-12 engine which hadn't left the drawing board. That specification was issued in paralell with specification B.9/32 for a replacement for the Boulton Paul Overstrand which eventually led to the Hampden and Wellington.

Fairey wanted to build an aircraft for P.27/32 which would have two engines but the AM refused. Fairey now offered three designs,the least favoured was a single engined two cockpit monoplane but this is the one the AM selected.

Marcel Lobelle made his initial design around the Prince engine but when no government support was forthcoming for that engine was forced to redesign around the Rolls Royce PV 12. He would not consider a radial engine for which he seems to have had considerable dislike. At this time he did away with the twin cockpits and adopted the long "glasshouse" canopy. This was fortunate as the AM now moved the goal posts,insisting on a third crew member,specifically a bomb aimer.
Incidentally,though the 1000lb bomb load was achieved it comprised four 250lb bombs which may have been of limited use against shipping as proposed by some above.

The prototype first flew on March 10th 1936 and was later tested by the A+AEE at Martlesham Heath during July and August. There were no major crticisms of the aircraft but the performance,even in 1936,was described as disappointing.

The type was named "Battle" on 2nd April 1936. The story goes that the name was given as a result of C.R.Fairey's constant "battles" with the Air Ministry to get them to accept the twin engined design which he favoured.

The RAF was totally disinterested in the type by this time. It was only under strong political pressure for new squadrons to be equipped that the Battle was identified as a candidate for the task under "Expansion Scheme C" of 1935 and "Expansion Scheme F" of 1936.

The first order for 155 aircraft was placed in mid 1935 and a new specification P.23/35 was drawn up to cover the new canopy,equipment,variable pitch propeller,external stub exhausts etc. Under specification P.14/36 the order was increased by 500 in May 1936 (under scheme F) and another 400 in August 1936.

By the end of production on 2nd September 1940,2,201 Battles had been built. 1 prototype Battle was built by Fairey at Hayes,1,155 at Stockport and 1,029 at the Austin satellite factory in Longbridge,Birmingham. A further 16 built by Austin for Belgium make up the grand total.

It is commonly asserted that the Battle was withdrawn from front line service in 1940 but as late as July 1941 98 Sqn. was flying reconnaissance and anti submarine patrols in its Battles,from Rekyavik,for Coastal Command.

Cheers

Steve

 

[RCAFson]

The one they used, fighter escort would help though.

Yep and by late 1940 most fighters and combat planes in the western Nations HAD armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort. While the "HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar" might be lacking ANY plane WOTHOUT armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort were considered little better than training aircraft.

The Battle had armour added as stated earlier in this thread, and more was added prior to the BofF. I don't know whether bullet proof windscreens were added, but certainly it could have been and I don't know the state of protection to the fuel tanks. The USN/USAAC didn't begin to fit self sealing tanks and armour to their aircraft until late 1941.

Could the Battle carry two 500lb bombs? or could it carry a single 250lb under each wing? And if you can get a 500lb bomb under each wing what does it do to performance?

(from Fairey Battle,by Huntley, p36. )

I don't know what carrying 2 x 500lb bombs externally would do to the performance, but it would have still been comparable to an SBD or even a TBF.

A Hurricane IIB lost about 33mph carrying a pair of 500lb bombs. A Mosquito lost about 15-18mph, A P-51D cruising at 2700rpm and 46in MAP lost about 36mph with two 500lb bombs. Can the Battle afford to loose even 20mph?

The Ju-87B could barely stay in the air with a 500kg bomb, yet it did great execution when Allied fighters were absent.

You do have an imagination. I take it you are also imagining another 24 or so Battles going in at low level to lure the CAP out of position and getting almost wiped out doing it? The US got very, very lucky at Midway. Taking nothing away form the skill or courage of the Flyers, it was in large part due to the unplanned sequence of events that Midway turned out so well for the Americans. Without the same measure of luck/fate many of the Battles in such a strike force would suffer the same fate as the Blenheims, around 40% losses over the Japanese fleet. Especially if they don't have the armor and self-sealing tanks of the Blenheims.

No, I was actually imagining the Battles coming in, unobserved, just as the Blenheims did, but attacking the IJN carriers with a low altitude pull-out diving attack, rather than at ~12000 ft. Yes, there would be losses, but the IJN CVs would have suffered hits as well, with possibly fatal results. In any event, the Battle has almost identical performance to the Blenheim and the entire IJN CAP only knocked down 4 or 5 of the 9 Blenheims, so it's hard to see how they would be able to increase their score.

While it is true they didn't exist in numbers I didn't bring then to say that they did, but to point out that the RAF had other ideas about what made up a tactical bomber than the Battle and they had those ideas before the Battle even flew. Please note the smaller Fairey bomber was a good 25mph faster than the Battle using the same engine. The Fact that the RAF choose to buy twin engine and 4 engine bombers instead of tactical bombers doesn't really mean they were happy with the Battle as a tactical bomber, It means they were concentrating on what they thought was their primary Missions. Defense of the British Isles with fighters and an independent offensive force, Bomber Command, not tied to the army.

As has been stated earlier, the Battle was a light bomber that was built to replace earlier biplane light bombers. I've been arguing that the Battle was misused and properly used it could have been a decisive factor in secondary theatres.

 

[merlin]

Names for RAF bomer aircraft of the 30s 40s were usually after towns/cities - there is a town in the south east of England called Battle. The other factor with the Battle was the Geneva Disarmament conference - there was a large anti-bomber lobby that was campaigning to ban them - unrealistic n.b many of the Lw bombers were disguised as passenger aircraft. There was a proposal to restrict the weight of bombers - although it was relaxed with the Wellington design, it was broadly kept with the Battle e.g. single-engine.

 

[stona]

Names for RAF bomer aircraft of the 30s 40s were usually after towns/cities - there is a town in the south east of England called Battle.

True,but the story that circulated in Fairey Aviation,at the time,was that it related to C.R.'s battles with the Air Ministry.

To sink unarmoured ships you want something like the Luftwaffe's SC 500. They did a special version filled with Trialen 105 (15% RDX,70%TNT,15% Aluminium powder). Being thin walled the relative amount of explosive was high,over 50%, at 295 Kg. This gave a good "mining effect" that is it worked well when it exploded underwater.
Unfortunately the Battle couldn't have carried a 500Kg bomb to attack the Japanese fleets.
I've got a picture somewhere of one such bomb with "Nur Gegen Handelschiffe" (only against merchant ships) stencilled on the side and a ship's silhouette rather than a yellow band on the tail cone. As a complete aside that bomb also formed the warhead of the first generation,anti ship, smart bombs,noteably the Hs 293 "glide bomb".

Cheers

Steve