Defiants and Battles deployed overseas, any merit in that?
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Battle SL Vmax with a full bomb load at max weight was 210mph at 6.25lb boost. 12lb boost would give another 20mph or so and a shallow dive would allow for the same speed as a B-25.
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Bottom line, I think 10 B-25s are going to be a hell of a lot more effictive in bombing a defended target than 10 Battles.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
B-25s skipped bombed 200 - 250 mph and mast bombed over 260 mph
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I don't doubt that, but the fact remains that the Battle could have employed the same tactics. In Malaya, the RAF was flying bombing missions with Vildebeests, and there's no doubt that the Battle was far superior as a bomber.
Here's what 17 Hudson sorties with 4 x 250lb bombs, each, accomplished:
Add 50 or 100 Battles and it's game over for the transports.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Same tactics, yes, same effectivness as a B-25? I doubt it, but they would have been a hell of a lot better than the Vildebeests.
Shortround6
Major General
It was an extraordinarily clean design for 1935-38. It's ability to carry those four 250lb internally ( same bomb load as the initial requirement/specification for the Mosquito) was an asset in achieving the performance of speed and range that it did have.
The problem is that the state of the art in aircraft design and aerodynamics does not stand still. What is a good and innovative solution in 1934/35 (when the Battle was on the drawing board) is no longer the best solution ( or even 2nd best) in 1940/41. Compare the Battle to the Firefly. Different designers but the same company. Despite the Battle being a land plane and the Firefly a carrier plane the Firefly, while weighing just about 30% more had about 78% of the wing area. First flight of a FIrefly was made in Dec 1941 which means pencil was put to paper in late 1939 or early 1940. An awful lot had been learned about wing sections, airfoils, lift and flaps in those 5-6 years between the work on the Battle and the work on the Firefly.
and look at the Barracuda (ok, squint through dark glasses
sandwiched about half way between the two. It may have taken an inordinate amount of time to get these later aircraft into service but that does not mean that the technical people were unaware of the limitations of some of these older designs, like the Whitley and the Hurricane and judged them as unworthy of further development even if they could perform some useful roles.
Shortround6
Major General
Add 50 to 100 more Hudsons or even Blenheim's and it would also be game over for the transports. And the Hudsons and Blenheims are more survivable and have a longer range for either strike or recon missions.
100 more of ANY TYPE of plane is going to need 1000-2000 more men for aircrew and ground crew, TRAINED MEN. If you have the trained men, giving them 2nd or 3rd best aircraft is wasting them.
By contemporary western standards the IJN's Val and Kate were as, or more, obsolete than the Battle.
Yeah, but they didn't have hundreds of spare Hudsons and Blenheims, yet they had Battles coming out of their ears.
Haggling over whether the Battle could carry a 500 lb bomb or at what speed/altitude it could release its bombs and indeed what number there would have been available doesn't change the inescapable fact that, although its presense might have made a difference, it would not have been able to change the outcome, even if there were 100 available to the Allies.
This is because inadequate aircraft types and numbers were only a part of the reason why the Japanese invasion proved so successful. Lack of supplies and an adequate supply train, lack of early warning, lack of sufficiently trained air and ground crew, poor facilities, lack of co-ordination between services all counted against the Allies and that's not bringing into account the abilities of the Japanese forces themselves.
The Battle was obsolete by 1941 and comparing its striking abilities to that of the B-25 is folly. The Battle had a rather lousy bomb sight and was not equipped for maritime attack at any rate; as touched on earlier it was a level bomber and attacking ships/any targets straight and level and even in a dive with the kind of resistance the Japanese would have thrown against them is asking for trouble, as it was over France in 1940. If the Battles had not been destroyed on the ground by Japanese bombers attacking thier airfields, as they did at the time, then it's highly likely they would have been mercillously attacked by large numbers of fighters en route to and over the target areas. Game over for the transports is a big stretch of the imagination.
There's no way that the British, even if they had them in numbers would have committed the Battle to action in Singapore based on the type's campaign over France, not to mention the RAF's doctrine, which hs been touched on before here. As for the Blenheim, it was still available in numbers in 1941 and the Blenheim IV and V (Bisley) was still in front line squadron service by that time.
This is because inadequate aircraft types and numbers were only a part of the reason why the Japanese invasion proved so successful. Lack of supplies and an adequate supply train, lack of early warning, lack of sufficiently trained air and ground crew, poor facilities, lack of co-ordination between services all counted against the Allies and that's not bringing into account the abilities of the Japanese forces themselves.
The Battle was obsolete by 1941 and comparing its striking abilities to that of the B-25 is folly. The Battle had a rather lousy bomb sight and was not equipped for maritime attack at any rate; as touched on earlier it was a level bomber and attacking ships/any targets straight and level and even in a dive with the kind of resistance the Japanese would have thrown against them is asking for trouble, as it was over France in 1940. If the Battles had not been destroyed on the ground by Japanese bombers attacking thier airfields, as they did at the time, then it's highly likely they would have been mercillously attacked by large numbers of fighters en route to and over the target areas. Game over for the transports is a big stretch of the imagination.
There's no way that the British, even if they had them in numbers would have committed the Battle to action in Singapore based on the type's campaign over France, not to mention the RAF's doctrine, which hs been touched on before here. As for the Blenheim, it was still available in numbers in 1941 and the Blenheim IV and V (Bisley) was still in front line squadron service by that time.
The Hudson proved to be a capable naval strike bomber despite having the same bomb load as a Battle. The Battle was not a "level" bomber and was fully stressed and designed for dive bombing, if need be.
Yes, the Battle was misused because of RAF doctrine, but no the Blenheim was not available in large numbers, and what aircraft were available were fully committed.
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
An interesting debate.
A hypothetical Battle Mk XII or XX with a corresponding Merlin XII or XX isn't really going to improve things for the aircraft vis-a-vee German fighters, although it may help against the slower Italian aircraft.
The RAF recognised the Battle's obsolescence well before the outbreak of the war, possibly as early as 1937, but definitely by 1938, when it cut back the original Battle production order by about 40%. However, with war looming, the Air Ministry and the RAF decided that they had to play with the equipment they'd brought, so Battle production continued.
Turning to the Mediterranean, I think the Battle could have been useful, but I don't believe the aircraft – even several hundred of them – would have made a tremendous impact on the war in the Western desert in 1940-1941, at least not as a strategic or strike bomber.
Firstly, I don't believe that British bombing doctrine was sufficiently developed at the time to result in a well-coordinated enough strategic campaign that could have done major damage to the Italian efforts, or to the later efforts by combined Axis forces. It takes better than 12 months of combat in the region before the British really get a proper bombing doctrine, tactical or strategic, going in the region.
Secondly, the Battle's bombload, and the bombs it carried – the early GP 250 lb and 500 lb GP bombs with their low charge to weight ratios – were just too light for the job at hand. I feel that the damage done to port areas, supply dumps and staging facilities would not have been crippling, merely inconvenient.
Thirdly, the Battle was next to useless as a maritime level bomber, largely thanks to its outdated bombsight. The CBSC Mk VII and IX bombsights fitted to the aircraft required a considerable time at straight and level flying before it stabilised (worse if the aircraft had any lateral or longitudinal instability). This pretty-much rules out everything bar high altitude bombing. I'm not sure if the Battle ever got the MK XIV.
As a dive bomber, I've never heard anything complimentary OR disparaging, which leads me to believe that the aircraft wasn't often used in such a role.
Fourthly, and finally, I believe Battle poorly suited the rapid speed and free-wheeling nature of the Western desert campaign.
If the Battle was to have a role in the MTO in 1940-1941, I'd suspect it would be as a light/nuisance bomber, reconnaissance bomber and as a general purpose patrol aircraft, rather than a front-line combat aircraft, even with an escort. Perhaps the best role would have been as a seamine-laying aircraft, but I don't think there were any mines small enough for the Battle to handle.
A hypothetical Battle Mk XII or XX with a corresponding Merlin XII or XX isn't really going to improve things for the aircraft vis-a-vee German fighters, although it may help against the slower Italian aircraft.
The RAF recognised the Battle's obsolescence well before the outbreak of the war, possibly as early as 1937, but definitely by 1938, when it cut back the original Battle production order by about 40%. However, with war looming, the Air Ministry and the RAF decided that they had to play with the equipment they'd brought, so Battle production continued.
Turning to the Mediterranean, I think the Battle could have been useful, but I don't believe the aircraft – even several hundred of them – would have made a tremendous impact on the war in the Western desert in 1940-1941, at least not as a strategic or strike bomber.
Firstly, I don't believe that British bombing doctrine was sufficiently developed at the time to result in a well-coordinated enough strategic campaign that could have done major damage to the Italian efforts, or to the later efforts by combined Axis forces. It takes better than 12 months of combat in the region before the British really get a proper bombing doctrine, tactical or strategic, going in the region.
Secondly, the Battle's bombload, and the bombs it carried – the early GP 250 lb and 500 lb GP bombs with their low charge to weight ratios – were just too light for the job at hand. I feel that the damage done to port areas, supply dumps and staging facilities would not have been crippling, merely inconvenient.
Thirdly, the Battle was next to useless as a maritime level bomber, largely thanks to its outdated bombsight. The CBSC Mk VII and IX bombsights fitted to the aircraft required a considerable time at straight and level flying before it stabilised (worse if the aircraft had any lateral or longitudinal instability). This pretty-much rules out everything bar high altitude bombing. I'm not sure if the Battle ever got the MK XIV.
As a dive bomber, I've never heard anything complimentary OR disparaging, which leads me to believe that the aircraft wasn't often used in such a role.
Fourthly, and finally, I believe Battle poorly suited the rapid speed and free-wheeling nature of the Western desert campaign.
If the Battle was to have a role in the MTO in 1940-1941, I'd suspect it would be as a light/nuisance bomber, reconnaissance bomber and as a general purpose patrol aircraft, rather than a front-line combat aircraft, even with an escort. Perhaps the best role would have been as a seamine-laying aircraft, but I don't think there were any mines small enough for the Battle to handle.
You need a lot of aircraft to stand any chance of sinking ships. One of the Luftwaffe's most successful attacks during the Kanalkamf was on convoy CW9 on 8/8/40. This was caried out with the Ju 87 which most would concede to be be one of the best and accurate dive bombers of the era,flown by well trained and experienced crews.
After piecemeal attacks in the morning it took two attacks by 57 and then 82 Stukas,heavily escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s to do the damage. In the end 7 of the eighteen freighters were sunk and only 4 were left undamaged. They limped into Weymouth,recent home of the Olympic sailing regatta.
That's 139 dive bombers ( I don't know how many actually pressed home an attack) and about 100 escort fighters (50 on each wave) to sink 7 freighters slowly butting there way up the English Channel,virtually within sight of the Luftwaffe bases.
Steve
After piecemeal attacks in the morning it took two attacks by 57 and then 82 Stukas,heavily escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s to do the damage. In the end 7 of the eighteen freighters were sunk and only 4 were left undamaged. They limped into Weymouth,recent home of the Olympic sailing regatta.
That's 139 dive bombers ( I don't know how many actually pressed home an attack) and about 100 escort fighters (50 on each wave) to sink 7 freighters slowly butting there way up the English Channel,virtually within sight of the Luftwaffe bases.
Steve
That's because the Hudson was designed as a naval strike aircraft and was kitted out for maritime ops, the Battle wasn't. Similarities in bomb load has nothing to do with it. Why are you comparing the Hudson and Battle? They were totally different aircraft operated by different commands using different tactics. The Battle was not at any stage in its career used for maritime patrol nor anti-shipping strike. Its bomber career ended in 1940 and continued in service for second line duties only from then on, finally being officially declared obsolete in these roles in 1944.
As for Blenheims, they were available in numbers in 1941 and were still operating in front line squadrons. In the Far East the following bomber squadrons operated Blenheim IVs; 11, 34, 39, 45, 60, 84, 113 and 211. Blenheim V units in the Far East were 34, 42 and 113. This list covers the duration of the war, bearing in mind that the Blenheim V did not enter service (firstly in North Africa) until November 1942. Yes, they were committed in large numbers (that's what I meant when I say 'available') at that time, remember the Blenheim was in service at home in Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands and in North Africa and the Middle and Far East as fighters, bombers and army co-operation aircraft. Blenheims served on every front in every theatre the RAF was engaged in throughout the war, despite having been superceded in key roles by more suitable aircraft.
The Battle was a level bomber, as dive bombing wasn't RAF doctrine it was expected to fulfil the role of a level bomber with the capability for dive bombing. The spec to which it was built was P.27/32; this spec was produced as a replacement for the Hart and Hind bombers and also as insurance against the Geneva Convention banning heavy bombers. Even if it was capable of dive bombing or not, it doesn't change the situation in the Far East. The same as what happened over France to the Battle would have happened over Singapore too.
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Shortround6
Major General
Yes, but they didn't have the trained crew men did they? Or if they did Bomber command was hogging them.
Shortround6
Major General
The British, like the Germans and a few other air forces in the 1930s, tried to have their cake and eat it too. They often specified a number of jobs to be performed by a single aircraft. Obviously some jobs could be performed better than others and in many cases some of the original 'specified" jobs were never undertaken by a particular aircraft, after all it can take around 4 years from Specification to squadron service. Take the original specification that lead to the Wellesley Bomber, throw in high altitude interceptor and it would have done it all from emergency transport to torpedo bomber. Common British practice of the time for "heavy bombers" (twins) was that they had to have a fuselage that could accommodate 24 troops in an emergency. Given that background it is no surprise that the Battle was stressed for dive bombing, it is not a real surprise that it's bomb racks were rigged to allow dive bombing. However they seem to have left off the dive brakes and a bomb sight for the pilot? Maybe he can use the gunsight? And then you have doctrine and training. In spite of lip service about Army co-operation and support to the treasury in order to get a bigger cut of the budget, the RAF concentrated on what would become the "strategic bombing" Mission even if it wasn't really called that at the time. Bomber command had first call on non-fixed pitch propellers and on two speed superchargers. Bomber Command wasn't really interested in dive bombing as a whole ( individual pilots or squadron commanders may have been), and they didn't want to be placed in a position subordinate to the Army. Throw in the vast over estimation of the effects of bombs or number of bombs needed to desrtoy a target( the last might be more properly the vast under estimation of bombs needed) and the vast under estimation of navigational difficulties and planes that seemed to be perfectly good "bombers" in 1937-39 were found to be near useless in their intended role in 1940-41. This goes for the Blenheim as well as the Battle. It also goes for practically every other British bomber that they tried to use for daylight bombing even if the targets were Naval and not land targets. The Blenheim was still somewhat useful as it had longer range/endurance and marginally better performance. They may have thought the power turret gave it better defense too. It may have had a bit more flexibility in bomb load too. Not only in the ability to carry 500lb bombs inside but in the carriage of the small bomb containers and incendiaries.
With the great expansion of the RAF (and the Commonwealth forces) after the war started large numbers of crew trainers were need. Using the large numbers of Battles ( the least capable RAF bomber) made sense as no other obsolete aircraft was available in such numbers and it would take too long to build a new, specialized trainer. Keeping several hundred in service in combat squadrons ties up available man power and slows down the training program.
If Bomber Command hadn't been such a hog about bombing Germany with most available planes the Far east, mid east and especial Coastal command may have had more squadrons of more effective aircraft earlier and done more for the war effort than the bombing campaign of 1940-41.
from emergency transport to torpedo bomber. Common British practice of the time for "heavy bombers" (twins) was that they had to have a fuselage that could accommodate 24 troops in an emergency. Given that background it is no surprise that the Battle was stressed for dive bombing, it is not a real surprise that it's bomb racks were rigged to allow dive bombing. However they seem to have left off the dive brakes and a bomb sight for the pilot? Maybe he can use the gunsight? And then you have doctrine and training. In spite of lip service about Army co-operation and support to the treasury in order to get a bigger cut of the budget, the RAF concentrated on what would become the "strategic bombing" Mission even if it wasn't really called that at the time. Bomber command had first call on non-fixed pitch propellers and on two speed superchargers. Bomber Command wasn't really interested in dive bombing as a whole ( individual pilots or squadron commanders may have been), and they didn't want to be placed in a position subordinate to the Army. Throw in the vast over estimation of the effects of bombs or number of bombs needed to desrtoy a target( the last might be more properly the vast under estimation of bombs needed) and the vast under estimation of navigational difficulties and planes that seemed to be perfectly good "bombers" in 1937-39 were found to be near useless in their intended role in 1940-41. This goes for the Blenheim as well as the Battle. It also goes for practically every other British bomber that they tried to use for daylight bombing even if the targets were Naval and not land targets. The Blenheim was still somewhat useful as it had longer range/endurance and marginally better performance. They may have thought the power turret gave it better defense too. It may have had a bit more flexibility in bomb load too. Not only in the ability to carry 500lb bombs inside but in the carriage of the small bomb containers and incendiaries. With the great expansion of the RAF (and the Commonwealth forces) after the war started large numbers of crew trainers were need. Using the large numbers of Battles ( the least capable RAF bomber) made sense as no other obsolete aircraft was available in such numbers and it would take too long to build a new, specialized trainer. Keeping several hundred in service in combat squadrons ties up available man power and slows down the training program.
If Bomber Command hadn't been such a hog about bombing Germany with most available planes the Far east, mid east and especial Coastal command may have had more squadrons of more effective aircraft earlier and done more for the war effort than the bombing campaign of 1940-41.
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Shortround6
Major General
Not such a dog if the fight takes place at night
Even if it is nearly the same speed as a Hurricane it can't climb as well or turn as well. Functions of it's greater weight for same power and roughly same sized wing. It might do OK against unescorted bombers, it's original mission, but against other fighters????
The trouble was not only aircraft performance but coordinating the gunner and pilot.
Even if it is nearly the same speed as a Hurricane it can't climb as well or turn as well. Functions of it's greater weight for same power and roughly same sized wing. It might do OK against unescorted bombers, it's original mission, but against other fighters????
The trouble was not only aircraft performance but coordinating the gunner and pilot.
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Against a first string opposition like the German types, the Defiant is little more than a target. Even second string opposition like the Italian monoplanes handily outclass it. Against biplane opposition it might have an easier time, but I think the British were thoroughly soured on it as a day-fighter by August 1940.
There are possibilities as a night-fighter, like there were in Europe.
There are possibilities as a night-fighter, like there were in Europe.
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