To bring some reality back into the discusion:
Again, if we place USN destroyers into the same situation - will they do better? We know that they have HA main armament, but we also know that the Mk 33 is a very slow and clumsy FC system, that was generally hopeless against surprise attack, and we know that USN destroyers have a much lighter CIWS than RN Tribal-JKMN destroyers. It is also apparent that the RN was subjected to a scale of attack unlike anything seen in the Pacific in 1942.
SECRET
CYPHER MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL Received S.1 (Tele. 1735 hours – 8/5/40
To: C.in C. Mediterrean 927. C.in C. East Indies 900
C.in C. China 849. C.in C. South Atlantic 933
C.in C. America and West Indies 668. F.O.C. North Atlantic 716
R.A. South America Division 508. F.O. Narvik, R.A. 3 601.
C.in C. Portsmouth 569. C.in C. Nore 971. C.in C. Western Approaches 51.
C.in C. Rosyth 808. V.A. Dover 723. A.C.O.S. 147
N.O. Melbourne 767. N.O. Wellington 361. N.S. H.Q. Ottawa 950
Repeated C.in C. Home Fleet 769.
From: Admiralty
The following is a summary of the experience so far as it can at present be ascertained, against aircraft during three weeks off the Norwegian coast. Technical improvements are in hand, but there is wide recognition of the imperative need to make the best use of the experience of those who had had to conduct operations and meet strong and persistent air attacks, for it is only by this means that our present equipment can be used to the best advantage.
2. It has been necessary to operate ships within easy reach of enemy shore based aircraft working from Stavanger, Oslo, and from Danish aerodromes. Ships have been constantly bombed at sea, also when approaching the Trondheim area with convoys and whilst in the fiords where anti aircraft ships, destroyers and sloops have had to remain for A/A protection of the bases. No base could be established for operating own shore based aircraft in support.
3. It is difficult yet to estimate the scale of attack but it appears that between 9th April and 3rd May well over 1400 shots were made at ships, many of which were sticks of bombs. It is estimated by the Air Ministry that the enemy used 470 Long Range Bombers and 40 Dive Bombers of which approximately 300 long range bombers and all the Dive bombers were used against the Fleet, convoys and ships in the fiords. The initial landings in the Trondheim area were affected without interference from the air and it has to be recalled that enemy did not usually fly over the areas concerned before 0500 or after 2100, apparently because the aerodromes available were unsuitable for night flying.
4. As a result of this air effort the Allied suffered the following casualties:
(a). Sunk, four destroyers and one sloop, of which two destroyers were sunk whilst escorting convoys returning from the evacuation. One of the destroyers was sunk at Narvik. Ten trawlers were also lost, nearly all beached as a result of near misses.
(b). Damaged, two cruisers, three destroyers, two sloops, nearly all in inshore operations.
(c). There has been minor damage to RODNEY by a direct hit and to other ships by near misses.
(d). The F.A.A. lost about 18 aircraft, but fortunately many of the crews are accounted for.
(e). No transports were appreciably damaged at sea or in the Norwegian bases.
5. During the same period the gunfire of the Fleet destroyed at least 30 enemy aircraft at sea or near the bases whilst the F.A.A. show down at least 9 aircraft and destroyed 8 on the ground.
6. Generally speaking when an A/A ship or sloop was able to cover the base the enemy flew high, concentrated on the warship and the intensity of the attack on the base was reduced. The more serious damage to the bases was done in each case when no A/A ship was present.
At sea the enemy has shown marked preference to attack ships with the weaker A.A. armament.
7. As a result of attacks on ships at sea it appears that about 75% of the hits and near misses have been from dive bombers and that about 75% of these were unfired at mainly due to surprise gained by cloud or sun or to attention being directed to other aircraft.
8. Before 3rd May when returning from the evacuation dive bombing was generally shallow and at about 35 degrees and the enemy rarely attempted to synchronize attacks, usually attacking independently using clouds and sun to screen approach. On 3rd May steep dive bombing at 65 degrees by about 30 JU 87 (b) was experienced. AFRIDI and BISON were damaged by these attacks which seem to have developed as soon as Trondheim aerodrome became available for these shorter range aircraft after damage done by the F.A.A. attacks which delayed its use during a vital period. On this day the attacks were greater in strength and consequently appeared more concerted.
9. It appears that enemy aircraft wait about overhead where they are impossible targets for destroyers and difficult for any ship. Steps are being taken to strengthen the short range armament of destroyers who have to operate within the range of dive bombers. It is to be recalled however that except for special aircraft for steep dive bombing and level bombing from considerable heights enemy aircraft must come within the envelope of a 40 degree gun when approaching for an attack.
10. In High Level attacks enemy generally turn away when fired at and may repeat this procedure 10 or 20 times, apparently hoping to gain an unfired at approach. This results in great expenditure of A/A ammunition an the only answer is to place the first salvo so close to him that he dare not repeat the procedure. Experience indicates that if this result can be obtained the enemy takes an early chance to complete his bombing run, or unloads his bombers harmlessly at once, or sheers off to attack a less menacing target. There is general agreement that our material and training can produce such a result, and that it can only be ensured by frequently testing height finders and practicing control personnel against aircraft; careful attention to the ballistic adjustment for wear of guns and other factors being also essential. Accuracy of fire has often been greatly improved by occasional flank marking reports.
11. A four cornered ship like VALIANT, RENOWN, or ARK ROYAL is particularly disliked because of her ability to watch simultaneously the more dangerous directions of approach and the consequent rapidity with which the enemy can be engaged by weapons whose shell burst he can see.
12. Against Dive Bombers, it is essential, with our present equipment, to fire immediately even if only with approximate accuracy, because the enemy is inclined to pull out early and thus reduce his accuracy. When cloud and sun conditions favour dive bombing it is therefore of first importance, that in addition to using short range weapons to the best advantage all ships should try to emulate the four cornered ship and develop the ability to fire rounds bursting ahead of the enemy within, say 5 degrees or 10 degrees, immediately he appears in the dive. Enemy aircraft except the JU 87 (b) have generally tried to attack within about 30 degrees of the fore and aft line in a dive of about 30 degrees.
The above remarks also apply to low level bombing (2 to 3000 feet) in conditions where surprise can be effected.
13. Experience confirms that where practicable the course and speed should be shaped to favour development of gunfire and so that the related wind is high and if possible across the probable direction of the dive. It follows that if a ship is stopped she is a more favourable target for dive bombers.
14. It is a frequent experience that on the first occasion of being bombed, particularly if a heavy attack, excitement causes a loss of accuracy, reduction of fire discipline and wastage of ammunition. If this likely result is widely known its effect may well be reduced.
15. Although some attacks have been well pressed home this has not so far been the case generally, neither have they usually been synchronized. To prevent such development by the enemy particular attention is necessary to the points referred to in paragraphs 10 to 14.
16. R/DF which has already given valuable warning at sea should go far to militate against surprise when fitted generally, and other developments should contribute much to effective long and short range A/A fire. Meanwhile it has to be recalled that on the Norwegian coast ships have been working at great disadvantage, in most arduous conditions where fatigue has been a serious factor and after a period when it has been particularly difficult to afford facilities for practices.
Copies to:
C.A.S.
V.C.A.S.
D.C.A.S.
A.C.A.S. (G)
A.C.O.
D. of Plans
D.H.O.
D.N.O.
D.D. Plans Ops
D.M.C.
D.D.W.O.
F.O. 6 Sigs 1.a.(S/L Weston)
F.O. 7 (Action) A.I.1 (W)
F.O. 2.b (3)
Again, if we place USN destroyers into the same situation - will they do better? We know that they have HA main armament, but we also know that the Mk 33 is a very slow and clumsy FC system, that was generally hopeless against surprise attack, and we know that USN destroyers have a much lighter CIWS than RN Tribal-JKMN destroyers. It is also apparent that the RN was subjected to a scale of attack unlike anything seen in the Pacific in 1942.
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