Did the LW achieve air superiority over the 8th AF after the Schweinfurt missions?

[Readie]

I have had conversations with a Lancaster radio operator who was the great uncle of one of school friends.
He mourned the loss of so many lives but, was adamant that he 'did his bit' and his mates 'did theirs'. He took pride in his service and would always say he was damned lucky to survive.
The allied bombing campaign did reduce parts of Germany to rubble and it took all our countries combined resources to do that.
To be so dismissive of BC is wrong ( to put it mildly)
Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

So, in the end the USAAF won the air war (by a lot of accidents) and BC did its best to bankrupt Britain doing a lot of useless things and stopping efforts towards far, far better use of resources.

Well that makes the LW really dumb I guess. they reportedly were spending 40% of their annual LW budget on night air defences and flak, tying down a million men for the home defences and flak arm, spening a total of 67% of germany's available resouces 9in 1943) on air defences of all kinds. because "BCs efforts were a waste of time" I guess it follows the germans threw away any chance of averting defeat for nothing.......

In case you arent clear, your statement is total bollocks

 

[stona]

In case you arent clear, your statement is total bollocks

Which is another way of looking at it, a lot closer to mine

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Which is another way of looking at it, a lot closer to mine

When we agree, which is most of the time, things are good. when we dont, I would respectfully suggest we both have rather large opinions......

I agree that this does not amount to Air Superiority, which is a fairly nebulous concept and not really achievable against an opponent who has a functioning air force. By mid 1944 the Luftwaffe barely functioned and by the end of that year it didn't. American formations could usually fly unchallenged in German air space.

I would suggest that air superiority is actaully a clearly defined and well understood concept, so long as the theory is applied correctly. Difficulties arise when people try to get jiggy with the concept. Air superiority wont explain losses....losses are a by product of air superiority. Nations can take quite heavy losses and still legitametely claim air superiority (so long as the losses dont make operations unsustaianabe). What also makes it sometimes unclear are the political overtones that go with admitting the loss of air superiority, or claimimng that your guys have won it.

Quite simply, for the Germans to have won outright air superiority, they needed to undertake all manner of air opperations in all parts of the TO, including over Britain. They didnt ever achieve that air state after 1941. there is nothing ambiguous or nebulous about it....its a statement of fact. What they did achieve after Schweinfurt was a degree of air denial....the 8AF displayed a reluctance to undertake primary and vital missions in the air space that they needed to do it (bombing over Germany). Again, theres nothing ambiguous about what the Germans did achive....a state of air denial over the Americans.

 

[stona]

Well, I don't really want to argue the semantics of air superiority, at least not here. I'd also doubt that the Germans had air superiority in North West Europe at any time during the war, particularly by your own more rigorous definition.

I think that the notion that the Luftwaffe achieved a level of air denial to the USAAF is absolutely correct. It fought hard to maintain this throughout late 1943 and well into 1944 but failed for many reasons which have already been covered in other threads.

The Luftwaffe did the same thing to the RAF. Encouraged by the results of Hamburg the RAF had a preliminary and disappointing go at Berlin at around this time, mid to late August 1943. The real assault started in November and dragged on, through the long winter nights, until March. No need to crunch the numbers here but it was a defeat for Bomber Command. It is Martin Middlebrook who summed it up thus.

"The story of the Battle of Berlin is of a steady deterioration of effectiveness by the bomber force at increasing cost."

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

I'd also doubt that the Germans had air superiority in North West Europe at any time during the war, particularly by your own more rigorous definition

No I dont fully agree. If Poland is allowed to be included in the mix, the Germans had air sueriority in that TO, despite losing aircraft5 at the approximate rate of 2 for 1 enemy a/c. The Germans gained air superiority here, because despite the losses, they were never seriously impeded from completing their mission. Again, foreget tabout the losses, that a completely differnt issue, though in the same breath they feed off each other.

Over France and the low Countriesd, the story was the same. Despite losing more a/c than the allies, they were able to complete their mission and see the campaign through to its conclusion. Over Norway I would go one step further, the LW achieved total sir supremacy (have a read of the good majors account that posted to find out what thetat means). Similar air supremacy situations prevailed over both Greece, Crete and Jugoslavia.

Over Malta there was a constant see saw, and intersting dynamic. The british held sea superiority (a kind of maritime equivalnt of air superiority), but there were quite a few times when this sea superiority knocked uglies with the LW air superiority. Eventually the Sea sueriority gave malta the means to reclaim air superiority and from that point in the theatre the Germans were in trouble (in that TO).

The BoB was an intersting parrallel to 1944, but with a vitally different epitaph. The Germans had air superiority at the start, but lost it as the full effects of Dowdings air denial campaign bit in deep. Here we see the fundamentally different dynamic of the germans in 1940 versus the Americans in 1944, and it brings it sharply home as to why you cant rely on losses as to a measure of air superiority. The Germans took such heavy losses in 1940 that they had to abandon their primary objectives....thats tantamount to losing air superiority. And they never really regained it. Losses led to the loss of air superiority, but it was not the loses per se that triggered or signalled the loss of air superiority, it was the abandonment of the mission objectives that did that

For the Americans in 1943, the losses led to the pause in operations, followed by a change in tactics, but never really an abandonment of the mission objectives. They rapidly came back toresume their mission. Is that a loss of air superiority? Does a tactical setback equate to or amount to a strategic defeat? It can be certainly argued that way, with some validity, but I tend to think not. A tactical defeat does not, in my view amount to a loss of air sueriority unless it can be shown that the overall mission objectives have been abandoned, or so modified as to bear no resemblance or relevance to the prime objectives.

At least, thats the theory.....

 

[Erich]

there was NO LW air denial over the Reich ever. the US bomber force even with huge losses still came over escorted or not ............

 

[stona]

there was NO LW air denial over the Reich ever. the US bomber force even with huge losses still came over escorted or not ............

14th October was the second Schweinfurt raid. The 8th did not make another raid until 20th October and that was to Duren, close enough to be escorted all the way in and out.
This was then the pattern of operations which did not start again until November. The US bomber force did not keep coming over, unescorted, and accepting huge losses.
3rd November Wilhemshaven
5th November Gelsenkirchen
11th November Munster
13th November Bremen
And so on, all escorted. The next unescorted raid was on the 16th November and it was to Knaben, in Norway. The Luftwaffe managed to get a grand total of 20 "fighters" including 5Ju 88s of IV./NJG3 up to intercept. Hardly the hundreds flying in RLV.
26th November Bremen and Paris
29th November Bremen
30th November Solingen
There is a pattern forming!

Cheers
Steve

 

[bobbysocks]

they kept bombing but didnt venture too deep. iirc they didnt cross over dummer lake but they stayed pretty close to the escorts until december.

 

[stona]

they kept bombing but didnt venture too deep. iirc they didnt cross over dummer lake but they stayed pretty close to the escorts until december.

11th December to Emden, but escorted by the P-51s of 354th FG. This was a 9th AF unit on loan to the 8th AF. This was the first escort mission for the P-51 and a sign that things would soon change.
The 8th AF kept hammering away at Bremen throughout December.
In January (1944 now) they went as far as Ludwigshaven and Frankfurt, but so did their escorts.
The 8th AF was now area bombing through overcast as routine, though the phrase was never used. It was now acceptable except within the western occupied zone.
On 20th February "Big Week" began and the rest as they say, is history.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Erich]

according to the bomber vets I have interviewed the Bremen rads kicked Sh** out of them due to rocket firing 110's and 410's. my point is this the 8th cane over no matter what was up against them ~ I have a record of all Us missions 8th and 15th, etc night and day.

 

[Readie]

Surely we are really talking about attrition, one side has a momentary advantage then the other but, in the end its a war of grinding attrition nothing more nothing less.
Germany defended herself as you would expect top the absolute hilt just as we would have done had the tables been turned earlier in the war.
When you look at the industrial might and manpower that America could command along with the British, Canadians, NZ, Aussies and South Africa ( sorry if I overlooked anyone) That is a good chunk of the world versus Germany. The outcome was never in doubt. But, my god what a blood bath.

 

[bobbysocks]

11th December to Emden, but escorted by the P-51s of 354th FG. This was a 9th AF unit on loan to the 8th AF. This was the first escort mission for the P-51 and a sign that things would soon change.
The 8th AF kept hammering away at Bremen throughout December.
In January (1944 now) they went as far as Ludwigshaven and Frankfurt, but so did their escorts.
The 8th AF was now area bombing through overcast as routine, though the phrase was never used. It was now acceptable except within the western occupied zone.
On 20th February "Big Week" began and the rest as they say, is history.
Cheers
Steve

sorry, i should have been more clear. they always stayed with the escorts. what i meant to say is until december 11 or later they didnt go much futher than the range of previous existing the escorts....spits, 47s, 38s, etc. in december you had the 354th first followed by the 357th that took them deeper.

 

[stona]

sorry, i should have been more clear. they always stayed with the escorts. what i meant to say is until december 11 or later they didnt go much futher than the range of previous existing the escorts....spits, 47s, 38s, etc. in december you had the 354th first followed by the 357th that took them deeper.

No worries. I only posted the dates of the 8th AF raids not the 15th.

Yes, it was attrition. Take the bombers out of the equation and in March 1944 I. Jagdkorps flew 2,226 sorties and lost 240 fighters, that's 10.9%
The best estimate of USAAF sorties to the Reich is 16,612 for a loss of 302 fighters, that's 1.8%
Cheers
Steve

 

[OldSkeptic]

I always think that when people bring up 'the huge number of AA guns the Germans had to make' to justify BC's 'strategy' then they have basically conceded the argument. Their AA effort was purely a propaganda effort urged by Hitler, and they could afford it easily.

BC did a lot of good work, but far too often only when it was ordered too by someone else (eg Eisenhower) such as being forced to contribute to the oil and transportation plans. Not when it followed its own 'strategy'.

Now this strategy evolved from circumstances.

At the beginning BC wanted to attack key industrial and economic points, such as oil and ports and so on. But they technically couldn't do it.
If they went out in the day, achieving some accuracy, they got slaughtered.
Since a LR fighter was 'impossible' they were forced to night attacks, where their accuracy was zero....
So they (and Churchill and Lindemann were major players in the development of this) went for a terror strategy of mass area bombing, because that was just about all they could hit (sometimes).

And that's what they called it, they didn't mince words. On and on BC (etc) went on about affecting German civilians 'morale' .. that was the nicer term for terrorising the population.
Apart from Hamburg (an accident) they were spectacularly unsuccessful.

The tragedy was that they became wedded to this, it became an ideology.
Even when they actually develeped an impressive ability to bomb fairly accurately at night (and a LR fighter meant they could attack in the day too), they kept at it, except when forced to do otherwise (complaining all the time as they did it). When they did do other things they did some amazing stuff, their contribution to the transportation and oil plans (for example) were immense.

As for any (accidental) damage to Germany's war making capability, it wasn't until the USAAF started hitting some real industrial infrastructure that the German's even started decentralising production, which showed how little risk they felt they were under in the earlier days.

So full marks to the US, which could afford it too. Plus, though their original ideas were flawed, they quickly changed and adapted, there might have been internal opposition to a LR fighter and the Mustang in particular at first, but that crumbled quickly under the pressure of reality. They quickly changed targets too, when the results of big effort on the German aircraft manufacturing was ambigious at best, they quickly changed and realised the best way to kill the Luftwaffe was in the air.
The oil plan was their one too.

Britain couldn't afford that bomber effort, the resources consumed were immense, especially of the highest (and very scarce) technical levels and very skilled and intelligent people (in manufacturing, servicing and flying).
You could make a good argument that the resources poured into BC added 6 months to a year on the Battle of the Atlantic, to take just one example. If only some greater mental flexibility had occurred then it would have made a far greater contribution and at a far lower cost.

 

[parsifal]

Then you think wrong......

These are some quotes regarding the effectiveness and shortcomings of the british Night bomber offensive

"Without the bombing campaign, German industry would have been able to increase war production capacity many times over if required. Bombing disrupted production and held the full potential of the German industrial machine in check. Equally importantly, bombing attacks on the German homeland forced the Nazis to divert over one million men and 55,000 artillery guns to anti-aircraft defence within Germany itself. German aircraft production had to focus on fighter production for defence against bomber attack, rather than, as Hitler desperately wanted, be able to produce more bombers for offensive use. These resources were urgently needed elsewhere, particularly on the eastern front fighting the Russians, who were finally able to overcome the Germans and force them into a retreat". (Overy)

Historian Professor Richard Overy had studied the bombing campaign at length. He writes: "The critical question is not so much "What did bombing do to Germany?" but "What could Germany have achieved if there had been no bombing?"…... Bombing was a blunt instrument. It was a strategy that had a long and painful learning curve. But for all its deficiencies the 125,000 men and women of Bomber Command made a larger contribution to victory in Europe than any other element of Britain's armed services."

Albert Speer, Hitler's Armaments Minister, knew more than anyone else in Europe about the true effect of the bombing campaign. He summed it up thus: "It made every square metre of Germany a front. For us, it was the greatest lost battle of the war." Since writing that, there have been many attempts to discredit Speers assessment. Im not buying it.

The mere fact that the germans expanded their flak arm to 55000 pieces (mostly before the 8AF was an effective factor in the battle, might be glibly dismissed as a "propaganda stunt", but if it was, it was one hell of expensive stunt, that can be very forcefully argued as costing the Germans the war. If they had not enagaged in this "stunt", and bombing was so oinneffective, they could have re-equipped the artillery parks of their 500 or so division by an average of 110 artillery pieces per division, and re-invigorated their failing manpower levels on the eastern front. in 1942 alone, when there were 750000 unmet billets on the Eastern Front alone, the Germans could have restarted their general offensive on a front wide basis, rather than pursue the doomed narrow front strategy that they led to Stalingrad., they would not have been forced to rely on inferior satellite troops in critical sections of their front, and they would not have come up so short in terms of MT availability....more than a third of military transport was being used to service the interior defences, including the flak arm.

The bomber offensive can be rightly criticised for its shortcomings, but to say it had no effect was a waste of time and the like is just plain wrong and highly insulting to the intelligence and sacrifices of both sides. it was a critical part of the war, and produced tangible and critical effects on the outcome of the war, including the effects you so glibbly dismiss as unimportant (and "easily afforded") by the Germans...

 

[silence]

The mere fact that the germans expanded their flak arm to 55000 pieces (mostly before the 8AF was an effective factor in the battle, might be glibly dismissed as a "propaganda stunt", but if it was, it was one hell of expensive stunt, that can be very forcefully argued as costing the Germans the war. If they had not enagaged in this "stunt", and bombing was so oinneffective, they could have re-equipped the artillery parks of their 500 or so division by an average of 110 artillery pieces per division, and re-invigorated their failing manpower levels on the eastern front. in 1942 alone, when there were 750000 unmet billets on the Eastern Front alone, the Germans could have restarted their general offensive on a front wide basis, rather than pursue the doomed narrow front strategy that they led to Stalingrad., they would not have been forced to rely on inferior satellite troops in critical sections of their front, and they would not have come up so short in terms of MT availability....more than a third of military transport was being used to service the interior defences, including the flak arm.

Just stop and think about what even half of those 55k pieces could have done as dual purpose AT/AA guns on the Eastern Front if deployed in depth as pakfronts.

 

[JtD]

The Western Allies invested considerable resources into the strategic bombing campaigns, too. To just assume that no bombing means nothing and thus loads of undeployed German troops, is too simple.

As a simple illustration of what the strategic bombing cost, if you were to build tanks instead of the strategic aircraft, expect two M4 tanks for every fighter and eight for every 4-engined bomber built. Taking the B-17, B-24, B-29 and P-47 production will give you about another 300k Shermans in the field. And you still have the BC do the night bombing, for a similar cost.

 

[OldSkeptic]

T

"Without the bombing campaign, German industry would have been able to increase war production capacity many times over if required. Bombing disrupted production and held the full potential of the German industrial machine in check. Equally importantly, bombing attacks on the German homeland forced the Nazis to divert over one million men and 55,000 artillery guns to anti-aircraft defence within Germany itself. German aircraft production had to focus on fighter production for defence against bomber attack, rather than, as Hitler desperately wanted, be able to produce more bombers for offensive use. These resources were urgently needed elsewhere, particularly on the eastern front fighting the Russians, who were finally able to overcome the Germans and force them into a retreat". (Overy)

Historian Professor Richard Overy had studied the bombing campaign at length. He writes: "The critical question is not so much "What did bombing do to Germany?" but "What could Germany have achieved if there had been no bombing?"…... Bombing was a blunt instrument. It was a strategy that had a long and painful learning curve. But for all its deficiencies the 125,000 men and women of Bomber Command made a larger contribution to victory in Europe than any other element of Britain's armed services."

All fair points, but misses the key question ...did it cost Britain more to create and run the area bombing campaign than it cost Germany to endure and fight against it?
If it did then the bombing was a win for Germany.

Germany had a larger population, was a much larger economy and with a much larger manufacturing capability.

So did it (say) cost Germany more to build and run 55,000 pieces of AA than it did Britain to build and run 16,000 heavy bombers (and lose a heck of a lot of them and and 55,000 trained crews)?

Think not somehow, even adding in damage (mostly to houses), night fighters (and their infrastructure) then: how big a percentage of the German military capability did it use and/or destroy as compared to the percentage of military resources Britain expended on heavy bombers (noting again that in Britain's case it was a consumption of its most advanced manufacturing capability ... and many of its best people)?

I think if you crunch the numbers (ignoring the oil and transportation plans which were forced on it) it would not look too good.....

Worse if you start thinking about the opportunity costs, what if (at least some) of those resources were put into other areas, or the bombers were used for something more militarily effective than making rubble bounce? Imagine the impact of a couple of hundred bombers converted to VLR anti-sub duties in mid-late 42, heck even a few dozen ....

 

[parsifal]

All fair points, but misses the key question ...did it cost Britain more to create and run the area bombing campaign than it cost Germany to endure and fight against it?
If it did then the bombing was a win for Germany.

For th4e record, 12% of defence spending in England was spent on the bombing campaign, compared to over 50% in germany on air defence (ther is considerable variation here, some as high as 70% and some as low a 40%....but all well above 12%). I like Overy's analysis, but there are others.

In absolute terms, the RAF spent a lot on bombing. 12% of the british budget was a lot more than 12% of the german budget, because at the end of the war the german economy was collapsing around its ears. But thats not relevant. Nor can we make straight dollar comparisons. The best we can do is simply compare the proportion of military resources spent on each military effort. I know that around 40% of German air defence spending was directed against the RAF, which of course makes some assumptions (ther are the small matters like using night fighters for day interceptions, and day fighters for night interception, money spent on ammunition....was it used on the US bombers, or on the British night bombers....etc etc...but as a rough estimate its reasonably good). The important number are the proportions, and the reality is this....the germans spent a truckload more, as a proportion of their budget on fighting the bombers, than the allies ever did sending them into Germany. Some simple and basic numbers clearly show this, moreover. Britain had a comparable sortie rate to the Germans, and yet suffered les than 20% of the overall losses to the Germans. Before you go racing to say it all happened on the Eastern front, only about 14-20% of german losses occurred on the Eastern Front (depending on whom you choose to believe). Before you go racing to claim it was all the Americans....well if the Americans began in earnest from say early'44, then at maximum, if they were responsible for every shoot down for th rest of the war, they still only shot down a maximum of 37000 German aircraft. Taking both of those into account, that still leaves more than 60000 German lost aircraft unnaccounted for. For the entire war the RAF lost 24000 aircraft, of which the following were bombers lost (total losses in all TOs, not all to BC)

Vickers Wellington.
…..47,409 (Bomber Command) sorties.
…..11,460 produced.
…..1,727 aircraft lost.

Avro Manchester
…..200 produced before production halted in favor of the Lancaster.
…..76 destroyed.

Avro Lancaster.
…..156,192 sorties. 40% of RAF Bomber Command total.
…..650,000 tons dropped between March 1942 and May 1945. 68% of total tonnage.
…..7,366 built in Britain and Canada.
…..4,265 destroyed during combat operations.

Handley Page Halifax.
…..6,176 produced.
…..3,504 lost.

Short Stirling.
…..18,440 RAF Bomber Command sorties.
…..2,731 produced.
…..684 lost. Plus 11 destroyed in Luftwaffe bombing raid.

Armstrong Whitworth Whitley.
…..9,858 RAF Bomber Command sorties.
…..1,812 produced.
…..458 lost.

Handley Page Hampden.
…..16,541 RAF Bomber Command sorties. Including the first over Berlin.
…..1,453 produced.
…..633 lost.

That makes for about 11347 bombers losts on operations (Mosquito and other losses were not worth listing)

I dont know where you get your numbers from, but they dont correlate to the HMSO records tht I rely on

Germany had a larger population, was a much larger economy and with a much larger manufacturing capability.

So did it (say) cost Germany more to build and run 55,000 pieces of AA than it did Britain to build and run 16,000 heavy bombers (and lose a heck of a lot of them and and 55,000 trained crews)?

Not as a percentage of budget. If you look at NF losses as well, ammunition expenditures (around 16000 shells of HAA expended for each kill in 1944 alone....thats staggering just in itself)...around 17-20% of industrial potential lost to BC efforts alone according to post war studies, and a further 25% to the US effort

Think not somehow, even adding in damage (mostly to houses), night fighters (and their infrastructure) then: how big a percentage of the German military capability did it use and/or destroy as compared to the percentage of military resources Britain expended on heavy bombers

Around 50% of German capability (including ammunition expenditures, vehicles, fuel, aircraft and gun replacements) compared to 12% of British military spending

(noting again that in Britain's case it was a consumption of its most advanced manufacturing capability ... and many of its best people)?

And Germany was doing the same, except on a bigger scale. Until 1942, only the very best were recruite into the flak arm, the very best aircrew diverted to the night air dfences, and the best scientists hived off to design and build ever more complex radar and other equipment all designed primarily to stop the "poinltess" bomber campaign

I think if you crunch the numbers (ignoring the oil and transportation plans which were forced on it) it would not look too good.....

I have, and they are surprising. As an economic excercise, a hands down win for the RAF....

Worse if you start thinking about the opportunity costs, what if (at least some) of those resources were put into other areas, or the bombers were used for something more militarily effective than making rubble bounce? Imagine the impact of a couple of hundred bombers converted to VLR anti-sub duties in mid-late 42, heck even a few dozen

It would have been a better investment to divert a few more aircraft to CC, no argument. Diverting hundreds, or thousands would have achieved virtually nothing except increaser the supply of U-Boats by around 100-500% as German industry swung away from air defence and improve output by around 17%. Roughly 5% of the German war economy was used by the KM, compared to 50% by the Luftwaffe. Increase German industry by 20% (no bombing) and reduce air defence by around 40% (the proportion used against the british bombers), divide that surplus between the army and the Navy proportionally, and you arrive at increased U-Boat availabilities in the critical time of around 300%. So a definite additional loss for the Brits if they diverted allk their bombers to ASW patrols. Some, yes...perhaps 50-100 a/c, but all...a recipe for disaster.