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The Americans were actually far worse. They had the examples from over 2 years of war showing quite clearly that bombers were sitting ducks. Even after their own experiences they were still delisional.
You beat me to the punch. Actually the US was far worse. They had observed over 2 years of war which clearly showed that the bombers needed escort and yet they convinced themselves that their aircraft and tactics were superior and they that would succeed where everyone else had failed. Even after several spectacular failures they continued to delude themselves that success was just around the corner. "The cornered wolf fights hardest." Of course believing your own BS was a big help in that regard. 6 Me 109s shot down for very B17 lost. The magic number of 300 bombers per would solve the problems, etc.
And of course we should never forget the YB-40 escort "fighter" which was an idea that never should have seen the light of day.
I would agree with many of your sentiments. The visceral animosity within the USAAF between the "bomber boys" and anyone taking an interest in pursuit caused no end of problems, including the loss of some quality senior leaders (everyone knows about Chennault but there were others). It could be argued that the internal squabbles had a significant impact on fighter aircraft development, hence in 1941 the USAAF's most modern fighter was the P-40C which couldn't even get close to the altitudes that B-17s could fly at...hence self-reinforcing the pre-war view that "the bomber will always get through".
The most-modern US fighter in 1941 was P-38, followed by P-43. Both capable flying & fighting at B-17 altitudes.
Both those types only entered service in 1941...that doesn't make them operationally ready. Let's jump back to 1939 so we're comparing apples to apples as regards the RAF entry into combat. What was the front-line USAAF fighter then? Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, the refusal to require installation of engines with 2-speed superchargers being but one glaring example..
My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.
Faults of USAAF or any other air service/force do not mean that other air services/forces are exempt from analysis.
I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.
. To this day it still hasn't been established that a population can be bombed into surrender.
Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, not least by refusing to require 2-speed supercharger being but one glaring example.
The Toyko raid of March 9/10 was the first that might have forced a surrender. It destroyed more square miles and killed more people than either atomic raid.I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...
Cheers,
Biff
You can make an argument for that, but there were many in the Japanese military who wanted to fight on, I don't believe the civilian population were demanding surrender. The fire bombings of Tokyo actually killed more people and that didn't provoke surrender. As I understand it the Emperor intervened on behalf of his people, but that requires a man with some sense, Adolf wouldn't have done the same, he didn't.I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...
Cheers,
Biff
On many of the islands taken by US forces men women and children would commit suicide rather than surrender, crouching around the last grenade or just jumping off cliffs. The notion of bombing a nation into surrender is a throwback to European siege warfare, but in many sieges almost all the residents of a city died without opening the gates.I would argue that once the word gets out that a single bomb from a single plane did the damage associated with an atomic bomb, and he general population would get involved or start raising their collective voices.
Cheers,
Biff
I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.
I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...
Cheers,
Biff
My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.
Except this was after four years of war, including a submarine campaign, augmented by minelaying, that radically impaired Japanese imports of food, fuel, and raw materials. Japan was also being defeated at sea and heavily pressured on land. The bombing campaign, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly contributed to Japan's defeat, but could not have done so alone, which was the pre-war position of many advocates of strategic bombing.
It depends how far back you want to go. After WW1 the Americans, separated by two oceans from potential enemies and after that war more determined than ever to stay that way, took a far more complacent view of developments in aviation. They could afford to. Their perspective on bomber aircraft and the future of air war was more distanced and far less visceral than that of their British colleagues. Unlike the British they were not going to be bombed themselves in a future war.
The Americans did see the bomber as an offensive weapon, but the official American national security posture was distinctly defensive in orientation and bomber aircraft were given a defensive role; to find and attack naval threats to the US Coastline. This did not stop American airmen from posing and discussing hypothetical scenarios for strategic bombing, but it was a very, very, long road from the early inter-war position to attempted implementation and failure of a precision bombing doctrine in N W Europe, the fire bombing of Japanese cities and, ultimately, the dropping of the ultimate 'area' weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (using, with supreme irony, the 'precision' sight developed by the USN).
Cheers
Steve
I think the problem for the Americans related to the weather conditions of Western Europe. While precision high altitude bombing may have worked fine in practice in the continental US, over here we have something called clouds, which you can't see through at any altitude. You will always get a few clear days but not many. The RAF tried a few high altitude bombing runs with Flying Fortresses before the USAAF arrived but they still got intercepted, and by high altitude, I mean 30000 feet plus or 10000 feet higher than the 8th Air Force was flying.Noble Frankland argued (to an American audience, after the war) that there were three reasons why the US clung so tenaciously to the daylight bombing of selected targets.
1. They believed that the B-17 was better suited to daytime operations than to night time.
2. They were unimpressed with the British effort.
3. They were determined to operate their own forces independently.
He was right on all three counts. Also, the Americans had developed a precision daytime doctrine in the inter-war years, which they were hardly likely to abandon because the British told them that it wouldn't work.
Cheers
Steve