Did the US miss an opportunity in 1940?

[parsifal]

some issues about the Pacific. I see there being two possible entry points for the US, with some intersting implications to consider. The first would be in September '39 and the second might be June or July 1940.

In the case of a September '39 entry, compared to the IJN, the USN would enter the conflict with 5 fleet carriers, no fast Battleships, 15 unmodernized Dreadnoughts, 18 Heavy Cruisers, 7 modern Light Cruisers, and just 62 modern destroyers. Under those circumstances they would have been unable to release the excess four stackers until much later.


The Japanese would have had 6 Carriers, 4 fast Battleships, 6 modernized Dreadnoughts, 14 Heavy cruisers, 18 Light cruisers (all old), 74 modern Destroyers.

In the period 9/39-12/41, the US would have received as reinforcements 2 Carriers, 2 fast Battleships, 1 Heavy Cruiser, 4 Light Cruisers, 4 AA Cruisers, about 50 Destroyers and 12 Gato Class Subs (the only subs with the range to attack Japanese trade routes from Pearl).

The Japanese would have received 4 carriers (and probably 6, with the Hiyo and Junyo conversions moved forward), 1 fast BB, 4 Heavy Cruisers, 3 small minelaying cruisers, 2 ex-chinese coastal cruisers, 14 Destroyers, 2 AA Destroyers. About 25 new subs would be added to their force pool.

There is little that either side could do to speed up their naval reinforcements for the first two years. There will be vigorous debate about who would hold the advantage in the air. I personally think it would be the Japanese qualitatively. Quantitatively the US/Japan would receive 3086/4176 combat a/c in 1940, and 9790/4480. In 1942 when the US historically entered the war, the ratio of frontline combat aircraft received, was 26848/6685. The ratio of reinforcement is much closer in 1939-41 than it was in 1942.

There are a number of factors that will upset the rate at which the Pacific can be reinforced. With no transfer of Four Pipers to britiain, shipping losses in 1940 will be much heavier, so logistics in the Pacific will be much harder. Moreover there are no viable escorts (no DEs) under development, and no escort carriers. This will mean a greater proportion of US carriers and Destroyers will have to be retained in the ETO.

There will be no Pearl Harbour, but I wonder if this might not be a liability. The Americans will immediately implement their war plan orange, with their battlefleet steaming out from San Diego at their best speed of just 17 knots. At anything less than 21 knots, and with thinned out ASW defences, Japanese Fleet subs will be much more effective. Japanese MS losses will be modest at best, which may well allow them to increase their warship and aircrafdt production. The chances of a Midway are more remote, because the US does not yet have access to the Japanese military codes. Ther is no radar advantage for the US surface navy, and the US ground forces are negligible and likley to expand only slowly for at least a year.

Its all very sobering.....I am not yet convinced that an early entry would have been the best way for the allies....

 

[michaelmaltby]

Very thoughtful, Parsifal. Useful analysis. Personally, I don't think the Japanese were in any mind-set for war in September, 1939. Nomonhan (Kulgin Gol) was 'resolved' just in time for Molotov-Ribbentrop to be signed then implemented in Poland and the Baltics, starting September 1939. And with that, Japan's expansionist dream of "resources in Siberia" ended, turning their focus to Plan B - Malaysian oil, rubber, ores from Australia, etc, etc.

Is US-Japan war automatic - in your view, Parsifal - if the US moves against Hitler after the Fall of France (June, 1940) ...? Curious.

MM

 

[parsifal]

The more time that passes, the more the balance tips against the japanese. There were good reasons why the US was reluctant to go to war....mostly they wanted time to mobolize their industry....your point about not gaining expereince is well taken, and if at war they would mobolize more quickly, but then, losses would have been heavier as well.

I will give this issue a bit more thought I think....

 

[davebender]

US National Guard units on 16 September, 1940

In the U.S., the first call up of National Guard units occurs today, Monday, 16 September 1940. Inducted into Federal service are 4 divisions, 12 brigades, 50 regiments and 4 observation squadrons from 26 states. These units, sorted by state, are listed below along with the unit's headquarters location.

The U.S. Army had over a year to conduct post-mobilization training prior to December 1941. Unfortunately it appears most of that time was wasted.

IJA 48th Infantry Division was raised from scratch (on Formosa) during 1940. Despite being green as grass this Japanese Army division sliced through more experienced U.S. Army units on Luzon during December 1941. That's the difference good training makes.

More training time won't make any difference for the WWII era U.S. Army. Unfortunately we needed some serious battlefield defeats to force changes in leadership, operational doctrine and training methods.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Interesting analysis, davebender

".... we needed some serious battlefield defeats to force changes in leadership, operational doctrine and training methods."

The earlier one learns the hard lessons the easier it becomes to avoid the large mistakes.

MM

 

[Freebird]

I suggest that if the US had been active (no later than) the fall of France, the US would have learned some valuable lessons that would have saved US lives and shortened the war in Europe:

Absolutely disagree.
Not to mention the fact that FDR couldn't just drag the US into war, if he had he would likely have lost the 1940 election.

Look what happened when the US did actually go to war.

1.) They were unable to provide any significant ground forces until Torch.
2.) By the fall of '42 they had basically one carrier left in the PTO (Enterprise vs Japan) and had to ask the British to lend them one.
3.) In Dec 1941 there was a shortage of aircraft, trained pilots they had no MBT's
4.) Despite the oppertunity to "learn some valuable lessons" about ASW defence of the US or prepare for war in the PTO, they were sadly lacking.

The US needed the extra time in 1940 1941.

A.) With the introduction of Selective Service in Sept 1940, began the draft of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors airmen that would equip US divisions by mid-42 later.
B.) The huge influx of British aircraft orders gave a tremendous boost to the US aircraft industry, as well as battlefront data about modern warfare. This allowed the US to ramp up production in 41-42 without a long build up.
C.) The US's naval building program was given time to build up as well. 11 "Essex" class were ordered Feb-Sept 1940, the first was commissioned in Dec 1942. Without the 18 months lead up to war while the USN was building they would run out of replacement ships long before new ones were available.


Not to mention that an earlier entry into war would likely be worse for Britain.

 

[davebender]

Unfortunately were were still making a lot of dumb mistakes right up through the 1944 Anzio invasion. During 1950 (in Korea) our army was performing as almost as poorly as it did during December 1941.

So I wouldn't hold my breath hoping to improve the U.S. Army in time for WWII.

 

[Shortround6]

AS far as US aviation goes Here is FDRs speech of May 16 1940.

FDR

Asking for an Appropriation of 896 million dollars to gear up for defense just 6 days after the Germans attack France and a full Month before the French ask for terms does not sound like they the US was sitting around for the next year and half.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Good FDR post. Thanks.

MM

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... an earlier entry into war would likely be worse for Britain."

Expand on this a bit, please, Freebird.

MM

 

[parsifal]

US National Guard units on 16 September, 1940


The U.S. Army had over a year to conduct post-mobilization training prior to December 1941. Unfortunately it appears most of that time was wasted.

IJA 48th Infantry Division was raised from scratch (on Formosa) during 1940. Despite being green as grass this Japanese Army division sliced through more experienced U.S. Army units on Luzon during December 1941. That's the difference good training makes.

More training time won't make any difference for the WWII era U.S. Army. Unfortunately we needed some serious battlefield defeats to force changes in leadership, operational doctrine and training methods.

What!!!!!!! You need to do some serious research I would suggest. The 48th Division was indeed raised in 1940, but with 2/3 of its personnell coming from units that had seen at least 6 years arduous service in China. It did have some local levies, but these were spliced onto battle hardened veterans with a wealth of experience.

Moreover, they were not pitted against US Army to any significant extent. The army they facxed in the PI was the filipino army, mostly raised in 1941. The only US unit that I know of in the PI campaign was the Phillipine Scouts, and they were never defeated directly by 48 Div

 

[davebender]

What's so unusual about that method? That's the way most military forces create new units. Including the Philippine Army. New recruits received 22 weeks of initial entry training - comparable to the modern day American Army. Most officers were ROTC graduates - also comparable to the modern day American Army. These new officers and recruits were spliced onto veterans of the U.S. Army and Philippine Constabulary.

IJA 48th Infantry Division was created in a similiar manner. However Japanese Army training was far superior to 1940 American Army training.

 

[parsifal]

Your right about the similarity in unit creation, but the differences from there are fundamental. Your initial post, and it continues here, is that the unit was a green unit, officered by green units, with green recruits. on every count these are wrong assumptions. Even the unit I thought was a new levy turns out to have had experience in China. This was the 1st Formosan Infantry Regt. Every other unit, from the cooks and cleaners, to the CO were seasoned veterans with years of combat experience. The officers were, in the majority experienced career soldiers, and not raw recruits out of ROTC.

The Japanese Army went to war in 1937 with 41 divs. These were all the old square Divs, or "A" series in the Japanese system. Between 1937 and 1941 they raised a further 15 divs but these were mostly comb outs of existing formations, as the army divs were triangularized and armoured divs were begun to be formed. They did raise new formations, but these hardly ever were attached to new Divs. Mostly they were formed into Independant Brigades, with fairly junior and inexperienced officers in command. They were given basic training, then sent to quiet sectors of either the China Expeditionary army or the Manchurian army area. They were often given anti-partisan and occupation duties for some years, before being committed to frontline combat operations.

Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese raised another 63 divisions, of which 12 were mobilzation division raised from existing trained manpower and reserve officers. That meant they raiseed another 51 or so divisions, with the cadres for these coming from existing non-divisional assets, mostly the Ind Inf Bdes.

By comparison the US started the war with just 8 Divs, all of them at cadre strength. The US had no recent combat experience, moreover every Division they raised was a green unit. They simply lacked the combat base to build their army effectively. Training was good however, and their recruit material was far better educated and thus easier to train in most respects. Every time they worked up a division or regiment to operational status, they would have to break it up and use it for cadres. This explains why it took them nearly two years to buidl their army to full strength. However, the expansion of the US army was several orders of magnitude greater than the japanese. In the same time as the Japanese raised 50 Divs from a starting base of 64 divs, with an existing cadre separate to that divisional base to work with, the US built close to 100 Divs, with no real cadre to work with.

The Filipino army was not created that way. There was no way to build a cadre system, so units wholesale were given basic training by the US contingent, some small arms of questionable value and little or no artillery. AFAIK there were no MGs no armour and no AA. They were little better than a bunch of tribesman with rifles. Doesnt mean they didnt fight hard, and at times effectively, but they were in no way comparable to either the US regulars stationed in the PI, or the Japanese 48th Div that attacked them

 

[hawkeye2an]

One HUGE item no-one has brought up is the tremendous effect of 'remember Pearl Harbor'. We were attacked and that galvanized the nation. If we would have entered the war earlier, I don't believe we would have been able to focus almost EVERYONE the way that attack did. The U.S. had never been more focused on a single objective and needless to say, will never be again.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"..... We were attacked and that galvanized the nation"

This point cannot be underestimated. But the American propaganda machine was very persuasive Hollywood. There was no PH in 1917 but when America decided to enter WW1 - they got rolling big time. And industrially, it had been good for them since August, 1914.

MM

 

[hawkeye2an]

When somebody TELLS me I should be kicking someones ass I hesitate. When someone kicks my ass I KNOW what to do. This is about as American as it gets. Propaganda is powerful, I don't believe it is as powerful as REALITY.

 

[hawkeye2an]

industrially, it had been good for them since August, 1914.

MM

What industry are you talking about? I'm not familiar with all production for WWI but not one American fighter aircraft saw action and only the British designed DH-4 light bomber with an American engine did see action.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... What industry are you talking about? I'm not familiar with all production for WWI but not one American fighter aircraft saw action and only the British designed DH-4 light bomber with an American engine did see action."

Perhaps I should have said "economically ... it had been good since 1914" I wasn't thinking of fighter planes or such - but just about everything America produced from pork bellies, to steel.

MM

 

[Mustang nut]

If the USA had entered the war in 1940 maybe Adolf would be dissuaded from attacking France and Russia but then Stalin may have over run Europe in 1942

 

[michaelmaltby]

"..... If the USA had entered the war in 1940 maybe Adolf would be dissuaded from attacking France and Russia but then Stalin may have over run Europe in 1942."

.... or some such scenario.

If the US had entered in 1940 - the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and "division" of Poland and the Baltic Republics was already in place.

Hitler knew that the ultimate economic challenge for Nazi Germany was the USA - and to overcome the USA he needed the resources of Eastern Europe.

Stalin knew that the ultimate economic challenge for the USSR was the USA - and for Communism to triumph over Capitalism(militarily) he needed the technology, discipline and industry of Germany. It was only a matter of time before Hitler and Stalin went "at it".

Had Russia attacked Germany in 1942 I doubt that the west would have intervened.

MM