FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
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Doolittle Raid - Short and Long Term Ramifications
- Thread starter gjs238
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- #22
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_balloon
Fire balloons launched against US Canadian west coast were another result.
Fire balloons launched against US Canadian west coast were another result.
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- #23
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood
I believe the 1st Japanese submarine attack on the Continental US predated the Doolittle Raid.
So perhaps the Doolittle Raid was actually a revenge attack?
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Yes, it was a revenge attack.So perhaps the Doolittle Raid was actually a revenge attack?
For Pearl Harbor...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood
I believe the 1st Japanese submarine attack on the Continental US predated the Doolittle Raid.
So perhaps the Doolittle Raid was actually a revenge attack?
I think the movie "1941" treated the incident as shocking as Pearl Harbor or the Battle of Los Angeles but it was not our Japanese impression. Sub attack prior to the Doolittle Raid was on the prolonged line of Pearl Harbor. It was renewed after the raid as revenge.
Japanese did not know how effective the balloon bombs were at all as Washington published no reports until the war ended.
Any attempts merely looked better than doing nothing.
Interesting difference of viewpoints.
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oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
One negative consequence of the raid may be the negative impact on the combat readiness of the new Hornet and its air wing. It's been argued that Hornet's horrible performance at Midway was a direct result of the 31 days spent with its flight deck locked by the presence of the B-25's (March 20 thru April 18). I expect carrier ops were curtailed for longer by time spent testing the concept and in port. A time line is revealing:
1. 2 September 1941: VF-8 is commissioned with about 17 pilots (8 are nuggets). Lt Cdr. 'Pat' Mitchell is assigned as CO, despite having no time in CV fighters and little CV ops experience, none recent.
2. 6 October 1941: Hornet Air Group os established consisting of VF-8, VB-8, VS-8 and VT-8.
3. 20 October 1941: Hornet CV-8 is commissioned:
4. Early November, 1941: VF-8 has 10 F4F and an SNJ-3 in which 17 pilots will train.
5. Mid December 1941: First CV air operations for VF-8
6. 23 December 1941: VF-8 embarks on Hornet with 19 F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A, VS VB were equipped with Curtiss SBC-4 Biplane dive bombers, number unknown. Apparently even VT-8 had some biplanes along with its TBD-1s.
7. 28 December 1941: departs Norfolk for one month shakedown cruise in Gulf of Mexico.
8. 2 February 1942. The first two B-25's launched from Hornet's flight deck in a feasibility test
9. 4 March 1942: Hornet departs for San Diego,
10. 20 March 1942: arrives in San Diego where all biplane types are exchanged for more modern a/c.
11. 23 March 1942: departs San Diego for carrier qualifications.
12. 25 March 1942: Hornet returns to San Diego:
13. 30 March 1942: Hornet departs for Alameda NAS to collect B-25s.
14. 31 March 1942: Hornet arrives Alameda NAS
15. 1 April 1942: 16 B-25s loaded aboard Fight deck.
So, it looks like the air wing had extremely limited operational-type flight training prior to departure for the west coast and little opportunity for much training in transit until it returned to PH after the Doolittle raid.
(above info from Lundstrom, First Team)
Here is VB-8 Pilot Clay Fisher's account of the Hornet air group's lack of training.
The Roundtable Forum
"It takes a lot of time to properly train an air group--carrier qualifying each individual pilot in specific aircraft, etc. Due to our accelerated deployment to the Pacific Fleet and the Doolittle mission, most of the dive bomber pilots received only 8 to 10 hours familiarization time in the SBDs at NAS North Island. We didn't get to try field carrier landing practice in the SBDs until the Hornet returned to Pearl Harbor after the Doolittle mission. The wind was very gusty and too dangerous to do simulated carrier landing and we had to stop the operation. Also, no dive bombing practice. The Doolittle mission robbed the air group of our "spring training."
Within days after the Hornet arrived back at Pearl, we deployed to the south Pacific. On that deployment the fighter pilots got to fly a few CAP flights and the SBD pilots flew just some 200-mile single plane searches. To my knowledge, the torpedo pilots never flew on that deployment. Only a few of the older dive bomber pilots had any experience diving the SBD."
Here is a photo of the Hornet just prior to its deployment to the west coast:
from: USS Hornet Photo Gallery
1. 2 September 1941: VF-8 is commissioned with about 17 pilots (8 are nuggets). Lt Cdr. 'Pat' Mitchell is assigned as CO, despite having no time in CV fighters and little CV ops experience, none recent.
2. 6 October 1941: Hornet Air Group os established consisting of VF-8, VB-8, VS-8 and VT-8.
3. 20 October 1941: Hornet CV-8 is commissioned:
4. Early November, 1941: VF-8 has 10 F4F and an SNJ-3 in which 17 pilots will train.
5. Mid December 1941: First CV air operations for VF-8
6. 23 December 1941: VF-8 embarks on Hornet with 19 F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A, VS VB were equipped with Curtiss SBC-4 Biplane dive bombers, number unknown. Apparently even VT-8 had some biplanes along with its TBD-1s.
7. 28 December 1941: departs Norfolk for one month shakedown cruise in Gulf of Mexico.
8. 2 February 1942. The first two B-25's launched from Hornet's flight deck in a feasibility test
9. 4 March 1942: Hornet departs for San Diego,
10. 20 March 1942: arrives in San Diego where all biplane types are exchanged for more modern a/c.
11. 23 March 1942: departs San Diego for carrier qualifications.
12. 25 March 1942: Hornet returns to San Diego:
13. 30 March 1942: Hornet departs for Alameda NAS to collect B-25s.
14. 31 March 1942: Hornet arrives Alameda NAS
15. 1 April 1942: 16 B-25s loaded aboard Fight deck.
So, it looks like the air wing had extremely limited operational-type flight training prior to departure for the west coast and little opportunity for much training in transit until it returned to PH after the Doolittle raid.
(above info from Lundstrom, First Team)
Here is VB-8 Pilot Clay Fisher's account of the Hornet air group's lack of training.
The Roundtable Forum
"It takes a lot of time to properly train an air group--carrier qualifying each individual pilot in specific aircraft, etc. Due to our accelerated deployment to the Pacific Fleet and the Doolittle mission, most of the dive bomber pilots received only 8 to 10 hours familiarization time in the SBDs at NAS North Island. We didn't get to try field carrier landing practice in the SBDs until the Hornet returned to Pearl Harbor after the Doolittle mission. The wind was very gusty and too dangerous to do simulated carrier landing and we had to stop the operation. Also, no dive bombing practice. The Doolittle mission robbed the air group of our "spring training."
Within days after the Hornet arrived back at Pearl, we deployed to the south Pacific. On that deployment the fighter pilots got to fly a few CAP flights and the SBD pilots flew just some 200-mile single plane searches. To my knowledge, the torpedo pilots never flew on that deployment. Only a few of the older dive bomber pilots had any experience diving the SBD."
Here is a photo of the Hornet just prior to its deployment to the west coast:
from: USS Hornet Photo Gallery
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oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Forgot to mention, AFAIK, Hornet missed the initial phase of Watchtower (Guadalcanal operation) due to its being retained in the vicinity of PH for long-overdue air group training. I've also heard that at least one CV would have been held back by Nimitz King in any event. They evidently wanted to keep one in reserve at that stage of the war. Hornet arrived in the Solomons area near the end of August.
parsifal
Colonel
wouldnt Enterpise have been affected in the same way?
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Nothing like the truncated experience of the new Hornet.
Commissioned 12 May 1938, Enterprise squadrons had long past integrated with the ship. Like her sister Yorktown (CV-5) and distant cousins, (Ranger CV-4, sisters Sara CV-3 and Lex CV-2 and even relatively new Wasp CV-7) sea trials and work ups were a distant memory. Big E had been operating in the Pacific since May, 1939. For VF-6, transition from the F3F-2 to the F4F-3A had occurred in May 1941. Pilots of VF-6 were generally experienced with few nuggets aboard. Transition to the SBD from BT-1 had apparently also taken place before December 7. Once the war started, the air group had the experience of the raids on the Marshall Islands, Marcus and Wake Island in which to practice their trade. Even during the Doolittle raid, Enterprise air group was operating continuously launching and recovering various air patrols (CAP, ASW) and the usual surface search missions. Unlike Enterprise, Hornet had little opportunity to engage in these most basic carrier operations, let alone experience combat during similar experience-building raids.
Commissioned 12 May 1938, Enterprise squadrons had long past integrated with the ship. Like her sister Yorktown (CV-5) and distant cousins, (Ranger CV-4, sisters Sara CV-3 and Lex CV-2 and even relatively new Wasp CV-7) sea trials and work ups were a distant memory. Big E had been operating in the Pacific since May, 1939. For VF-6, transition from the F3F-2 to the F4F-3A had occurred in May 1941. Pilots of VF-6 were generally experienced with few nuggets aboard. Transition to the SBD from BT-1 had apparently also taken place before December 7. Once the war started, the air group had the experience of the raids on the Marshall Islands, Marcus and Wake Island in which to practice their trade. Even during the Doolittle raid, Enterprise air group was operating continuously launching and recovering various air patrols (CAP, ASW) and the usual surface search missions. Unlike Enterprise, Hornet had little opportunity to engage in these most basic carrier operations, let alone experience combat during similar experience-building raids.
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buffnut453
Captain
Minor diversion to the thread - the IJAAF had a track-record of taking prototypes into combat situations. They took half-a-dozen Ki-44s into Malaya in January 1942 - the Ki-44 being the replacment for the Ki-43 which had, itself, only just entered service.
Normal programming will now resume...
parsifal
Colonel
Yes of course, id forgotten how recently before the outbreak of war hornet had been commissioned.
The Japanese had similar experiences. Both Shokaku and Zuikaku had only been commission a couple of months before the outbreak of war. During the raids on Pearl, it was these two carriers (CarDiv 5) that were tasked with the airfield attacks, as they were considered not experienced enough to be given the more demanding roles of attacking battleship row. These attacks were thought to be exceptionally difficult, because launch angles and heights had to be exceptionally fine, the attacks incredibly co-ordinated and for the Divebombers, the placement of bombs on specific parts of each ship had been carefully worked out. Cardiv 5 lacked the skills to deliver such levels of accuracy.
Shoho was even less experienced, having been commissioned in early 1942. Zuiho had been commissioned at the beginning of 1941, but by the outbreak of the war, her air groups were still incomplete. In the months leading up to Pearl, Zuiho and Rujo had both been combed out to beef up the fleet carriers, along with a comb out of the training schools to make up the CAGs of CarDiv 5. Just prior to the war, CarDiv 4 an 11 (consisting of Ryujo, Zuiho, Shoho and the Seaplane carriers Chitose, Chiyoda, Mizuho, and the merchant seaplane ships Sanuki Maru, Sanyo Maru, and Kamikawa Maru ) were provided with CAGs from yet another comb out, which basically wrecked the ability to train replacements for many months. The air groups that were embarked on these smaller carriers were not equipped with Zekes, and lacked many basic combat skills. it was fortunate for them they were not immediately exposed to heavy combat, although Shoho never got the chance to work up properly before being lost.
The massive and rapid build up of the Japanese CAGs had decimated the training elements of the IJN, and then this was fatally affecte by the decision just before the war, not to make good the massive drains to experienced instructors that had occurred. Japan wanted a short war, and put everything into the shop front to do it. it wasnt until after Midway that the IJN realized they were in for a longer war, and started to divert some resources back to training. by then it was far too late, and Japans downward nose dive for its air crew was well under way.
The Japanese had similar experiences. Both Shokaku and Zuikaku had only been commission a couple of months before the outbreak of war. During the raids on Pearl, it was these two carriers (CarDiv 5) that were tasked with the airfield attacks, as they were considered not experienced enough to be given the more demanding roles of attacking battleship row. These attacks were thought to be exceptionally difficult, because launch angles and heights had to be exceptionally fine, the attacks incredibly co-ordinated and for the Divebombers, the placement of bombs on specific parts of each ship had been carefully worked out. Cardiv 5 lacked the skills to deliver such levels of accuracy.
Shoho was even less experienced, having been commissioned in early 1942. Zuiho had been commissioned at the beginning of 1941, but by the outbreak of the war, her air groups were still incomplete. In the months leading up to Pearl, Zuiho and Rujo had both been combed out to beef up the fleet carriers, along with a comb out of the training schools to make up the CAGs of CarDiv 5. Just prior to the war, CarDiv 4 an 11 (consisting of Ryujo, Zuiho, Shoho and the Seaplane carriers Chitose, Chiyoda, Mizuho, and the merchant seaplane ships Sanuki Maru, Sanyo Maru, and Kamikawa Maru ) were provided with CAGs from yet another comb out, which basically wrecked the ability to train replacements for many months. The air groups that were embarked on these smaller carriers were not equipped with Zekes, and lacked many basic combat skills. it was fortunate for them they were not immediately exposed to heavy combat, although Shoho never got the chance to work up properly before being lost.
The massive and rapid build up of the Japanese CAGs had decimated the training elements of the IJN, and then this was fatally affecte by the decision just before the war, not to make good the massive drains to experienced instructors that had occurred. Japan wanted a short war, and put everything into the shop front to do it. it wasnt until after Midway that the IJN realized they were in for a longer war, and started to divert some resources back to training. by then it was far too late, and Japans downward nose dive for its air crew was well under way.
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Minor diversion to the thread - the IJAAF had a track-record of taking prototypes into combat situations. They took half-a-dozen Ki-44s into Malaya in January 1942 - the Ki-44 being the replacment for the Ki-43 which had, itself, only just entered service.
Normal programming will now resume...
Well maybe not… for half a mo.
Another instance at Midway of deploying the Yokosuka D4Y Judy 'Prototype' is reported to have been used on the Soryu as a recce-bird possibly as a replacement dive bomber on Hiryu, is another example.
based on wikipedia's description, this A/C might actually have been an early production variant and not a prototype.
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Interesting background info Pars… Hadn't known that before. Thanks!
Yes indeed. Two pre production D4Y1Cs were embarked aboard the Soryu as reconnaissance aircraft, but went down with the ship at Midway. These were fitted with a recon camera in the rear fuselage. The recon variant was ordered into production in June 1942, but production was slow; by March 1943 only 25 examples, including pre-production machines had been built. It wasn't accepted as a dive bomber until March '43 also. By contrast, between 1943 and March 1944, some 589 D4Y1s and D4Y1Cs were built by Aichi and were principally the dive bomber variant. This info from Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War by Rene Francillon.
