Effect of Operational Fw 187s on British Production Plans

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The Merlin XX historically entered production around July 1940 (someone else will have to check that,or rather my memory!)
I think with altered priorities with the advent of the Fw 187 in the Luftwaffe's 1939 campaigns it is quite feasible to have a sort of Spitfire III (along Tomo's lines) armed with eight Brownings in July/August 1940.
We might be able to bring the Merlin 45 forward a little too,maybe to late 1940?

Everyone keeps telling me that one side will react to any advantage the opposition might gain

Cheers
Steve
 
A public revelation of a single seat Fw 187 in 1939 might have resulted in a higher priority for the Whirlwind, or the Gloster. The Beaufighter was sort of an answer to the Bf 110, or at least a greatly improved Blenheim fighter which was an emergency adaptation to perform some of the roles of the Bf 110 as interpreted by the British air staff. The Beaufighter never performed at altitude quite like it was hoped.

There was an awful lot of "if they have one_______ (insert type) then we need one________(insert type)" going on in the lead up to the war. It didn't always happen but it was pretty common since nobody had any real idea of how things would actually work in combat and nobody wanted to get caught short, without an aircraft for that particular role/s.

What might actually be the best counter ( a better short range fighter if you are on the defensive) doesn't seem to have received the same attention.

From wiki for what it is worth

"Since the "Beaufort Cannon Fighter" was a conversion of an existing design, development and production could be expected far more quickly than with a completely fresh design. Accordingly, the Air Ministry produced draft Specification F.11/37 written around Bristol's suggestion for an "interim" aircraft pending proper introduction of the Whirlwind. Bristol started building a prototype by taking a part-built Beaufort out of the production line. This conversion would speed the process - Bristol had promised series production in early 1940 on the basis of an order being placed in February 1939".
 
Shortround6 said:
What might actually be the best counter ( a better short range fighter if you are on the defensive) doesn't seem to have received the same attention.
Click to expand...

Was there a better option than the Spitfire available as a short range interceptor for the British in this period?

Cheers

Steve
 
Not really but air staffs (as a whole, individuals might) didn't seem to think that way or thought that what ever short range interceptors on hand would work against escort fighters. The Appearance in peace time of a potential enemy escort fighter would call for an escort fighter of their own, not an improved interceptor. Even with the coming of the war and the apparent success of the Bf 110 in Poland as an escort fighter or "sweep" fighter the British continued on with the defiant as a "bomber" interceptor.
 

It would make yet another thread!

I don't think that the British would have gone with a comparable escort fighter. The "destroyer" concept and doctrine was very German and quite alien to RAF doctrine.

Shortly Chamberlain became Prime Minister in May 1937 he told the service ministries to work out the cost of completing their current programmes and to postpone plans for further expansion. This resulted in the Air Ministry putting forward plan J,to be completed by the end of January 1939. It was a direct response to latest estimates of Luftwaffe strength. There were to be no fewer than 1,442 bombers,all capable of bombing Germany from bases in Britain.They would not need continental bases and no British soldier need cross the Channel (memories of 1914-18 here).
Only 532 fighters,in 34 squadrons were required.
Many,notably Inskip and Hankey and of course Dowding,thought that the bomber deterrent theory was unproven and that far more should be spent on fighters but their arguments did not prevail.

Even after Scheme M was precipitated by the Munich crisis the requirement was still for 1,360 "heavy" bombers. The Air Staff were prepared to spend £175 million on bombers and only £45 million on fighters. Nonetheless 53 squadrons of fighters were to be formed.
The fighters to be produced now,luckily,were the Spitfire and Hurricane.

Cheers

Steve


Edit The Defiant was indeed a bomber interceptor and was used to make up the numbers in plan J. To the protagonists of the bomber as the ultimate defence it looked like a single engined fighter,which I suppose it was.
 

The British had 48 ( or 47 and a fraction) Squadrons deployed at home as of Jan 1 1940, 6 in France, 6 in the middle east and 5 with the fleet air arm.

Of the home squadrons 13 were equipped with Hurricanes as were 4 in France.
13 were equipped with Spitfires (Plus one flight of 266 squadron)
18 squadrons were equipped with Blenheim IFs + one squadron in the middle east.
2 squadrons had Gladiators + 2 Squadrons in France + 4 in the middle east + 2 in the FAA
1 squadron had Defiants.
3 FAA squadrons had Skuas
1 Middle east squadron had Gauntlets.

24 British squadrons at one time or another used Blenheim fighters, either IFs or IVFs.

4 British Fighter squadrons received their first Blenheim's in Dec of 1938 ( but not full compliments?) with 3 Auxiliary Squadrons following in Jan 1939. Due in large part to the Munich crises and the shortage of any sort of modern fighters in the RAF at the time the Blenheim conversion was pushed through in just few weeks. Initial discussions on Nov 7 1938 and airframe L1424 arriving at Martlesham Heath on the 28th of Nov 1938 for testing. Southern Railway workshops eventually built more than 1300 gun-packs.

Granted the Blenheim fighter was an emergency stop gap, but it was converted/built in large numbers and used for several years. Unfortunately the gun pack created enough drag that when Blenheim fighters tried to escort Blenheim bombers the bombers (loaded) could often outrun the fighters. The Blenheim IVF kept the extra fuel tanks in the wings of the IV bomber and had a rather respectable range even if both performance and firepower were lacking.
 
Everyone keeps telling me that one side will react to any advantage the opposition might gain
Click to expand...

You mean to say they wouldn't, Steve? Yep, Tomo's suggestion of a modified Mk.III stop gap (Mk.II and a half) sounds like the swiftest option and I do suspect that had the Fw 187 demostrated good performance the Air Ministry wouldn't have sat on their hands. Sure, tactically things might not have been that different in the Luftwaffe, but the introduction of a single-seat twin engined fighter would have been a change of tactics in any event. (Remember, this is make believe)

As for Inskip, Hankey and Dowding wanting more fighters, I would say that their arguments did indeed prevail, Chamberlain saw the value in this; one of the decisions made was that Gloster built a big factory specifically to build Hurricanes, when originally the firm was to build Wellingtons. This decision ticked off Bomber Command C-in-C Cyril Newall; it resulted in large production orders for the Hawker fighter.

There's no doubt Rolls would have put a higher priority in getting a more powerful variant of the Merlin in service as quickly as they could to meet any new threat, as for the cancellation of the VUlture, yes, in 1939-40 they couldn't have known of the difficulties they would face with it, but let's face it, once they did the decision would be as it was made; compared to the Merlin, demand for the Vulture just wasn't as great, also the Griffon was undergoing development, which promised more than the Vulture could offer power wise. Yep, in hindsight we can say this, but why would it be any different.
 
some good debate, some entrenched views, some snarling dogs in the street. A lot of navel gazing and wishful thinking, and equally unreasonable rebuttals.

Not good I suppose. but no open bar room brawling as yet IMO
 
nuuumannn said:
As for Inskip, Hankey and Dowding wanting more fighters, I would say that their arguments did indeed prevail,
Click to expand...

In the sense that Inskip's argument prevailed over the Air Ministry's (or should that be Newall's representing the Trenchardists?)in December 1937 I agree.
The Trenchardist lobby at the Air Ministry never went away,just look at plan M. The vast majority of resources still went to the bombers.
Inskip,Hankey et alter were effectively arguing that the RAF's job was not to deliver a knock out blow to the enemy but rather to resist one which the enemy would attempt to deliver. Hindsight is a wonderful thing,and we now know that they were right.
The Trenchardists feared that the "Inskip Doctrine" would demote the air offensive,which they believed was the real raison d'etre of the RAF,to a secondary role,supporting the naval blockade on the long haul to victory. In a way their fears were realised.
Cheers
Steve
 
some good debate, some entrenched views, some snarling dogs in the street. A lot of navel gazing and wishful thinking, and equally unreasonable rebuttals.
Click to expand...

Welcome to the WW2aircraft.net Forum!

On a more serious note, we had a power cut last night and my computer went down so I didn't get to add that regarding the RR Vulture, aside from the Manchester, and the Tornado, the original Vickers Warwick was also due to be powered by that engine, making a pretty average aeroplane even worse...
 

Fixed that for you
 
While I'm a fan of the single-seater Fw-187's potential, I have a hard time believing that revelations that the plane was in squadron service would have much impact on British procurement policy until it was actually met in combat and its advantages and disadvantages became apparent. Since for the first several years of the war, Fighter Command was largely fighting a defensive campaign, I don't see why the British would respond to the Falke as a long range escort or intruder any differently than they did the Bf-110. They needed short range interceptors like Spitfires and Hurricanes. Later, if it became apparent the Fw-187 proved to have a lot of stretch and versatility, you might see increased Whirlwind production. But maybe not.
 
Very often military procurement was driven by "what do they have?" rather than "What do we NEED?"

If a number of countries had twin engine fighters then (everybody have little war experience in 1939), not wanting to be left out or behind, other countries ordered twin engine fighters.
 
Hurricane was made of steel tubing covered by fabric.
Whirlwind was made of aluminum.

1930s Britain had a shortage of aluminum. If more becomes magically available then build more Spitfires. Otherwise Britain must build fabric covered Hurricanes to bulk up fighter aircraft numbers.
 

The Hurricane was not built of Steel tubes and fabric. The fuselage aft of the cockpit was built this way but the rest of the plane (apart from the 1st batch with fabric covered wings) is built of Aluminium.

There was no shortage of Aluminium in Britain high quality Steel was in very short supply but Alu was available for aircraft manufacture.
 
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