Effectiveness of the P-38 (3 Viewers)

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If you're going to say that Zeros and Ki-43s shot down a significant number of better aircraft, you may as well turn the table and say that the P-40, often reckoned as an obsolescent aircraft by 1942, and certainly afterwards, shot down plenty of Zeros, Ki-43s, even Me-109s and Ki-84s even though those aircraft often has significant advantages over a P-40s. P-40s could even win or at least escape unscathed from mock dogfights against Merlin powered P-51s and later Spitfires if the P-40 pilot knew how to play his cards right.

If one wants to go to absurd limits, a Fiat CR 32 or 42 biplane could defeat or at least survive an encounter with a Me-262 if the Fiat pilot did things right and/or the 262 pilot screwed up. A Po-2 in Korea "shot down" a F-94 by making it fly so slow it stalled and crashed. A F-111 did something similar to an Iraqi MiG during Desert Storm--getting the MiG pilot to engage in maneuvers that the -111 could, but the MiG couldn't do successfully.

It's more often than not pilot skill, awareness and tactics that dictate the outcome of a dogfight. Put two pilots of equal skill in different planes, it could be interesting, Put two pilots of wildly differing skills in the same plane, one will get curb stomped.
 
The only way a A6M was dangerous to any 1945 Allied fighter was if they were silly enough to get into a slow turning fight, even then a Spit 14, Tempest, FW190 etc could simply break away and re attack at their choosing. A A6M could neither dictate a fight or run away.
Sounds like you've been reading Martin Cadin.

Even 450 mph fighters cruised about 250 - 280 mph, especially if they were radials, as were ALL US Navy fightrers that flew off carriers in the war. So, if they ever got bounced without seeing the enemy, the enemy could close and fight right in the heart of the Zero's best envelope. And that's only ONE scenario.

In an ideal world, yes, the US Navy fighters were better in their best envelopes. but they weren't always there and didn't always have the opportunuty to GET there before fighting stared and they found themselves in a medium-speed dogfight. I'd go so far as to say that likely half or more of the pilots who were shot down in WWII never saw their attacker becasue they were ambushed.
 
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Did you mean Spitfire XVI, which was a IX with a Packard engine?

The XVIII was a very late war Griffon powered Spitfire.

No. He means the Spitfire VIII.

The first Spitfire IXs arrived with the 31st & 52nd FG in the MTO around April 1943 to be followed by the VIII around July. These were operated alongside Mk.V for some time.

We had a discussion about this four years ago. How time flies!!!

The first Packard Merlin engined Spitfire XVI flew in Dec 1943, but it was Oct 1944 before production of that model began in earnest.
 
Fleshing this out a little:
Actually I would more characterise it as avoiding "So what were the percentage losses of the reconnaissance aircraft, and what qualifies for them for "doom prone" and "die like flies"?"

P-38 pilots (1st FG, 14th FG, 82nd FG) claimed 1431 victories in the Med, (mostly in Italy)
If Italy is Italian mainland, not Sardinia, 1st FG arrival around 8 December 1943, 14th FG 12 December, 82nd FG 3 October. The list I am working from indicates the half way point for P-38 claims was reached in September 1943.

I dont' know the claims by type in Theater for the British fighters flown by British units, maybe you have that?
To obtain the RAF claims I would need to process a large number of pages from daily sortie/loss/claim files.

The problem with the P-38 was that losses were bad enough that one whole fighter group (14th FG) had two squadrons almost completely 'reduced' and had to be pulled out of combat for three months.
28 January 1943, the 2 (not 3) squadron 14th FG is withdrawn from combat given the strain on pilots and general lack of P-38 replacements, it will stay out of combat until May 1943, before being withdrawn it claimed 57 enemy aircraft, while the 1st claimed 33.5 to end January.

These were at the time using early P-38Fs which were IMO not suitable for the Theater. 1st and 82nd FG also took crippling losses initially. During the fighting in North Africa the role of the P-38 units was shifted so that they were mainly using P-38s to escort B-24s on long range missions, rather than fighting for air superiority over the front lines like the P-40 and Spitfire units (and later P-47s), though this gradually changed as the newer / better model P-38s started arriving.
As for why the USAAF was losing so many aircraft in and around Tunisia,

21 November 1942, 14th FG, 6 P-38 lost attempting night landings.

6 January 1943, 350th FG P-39 fly from Britain to Morocco, 62 P-39 sent, 2 missing, 10 interned in Portugal, 1 in Spain.

15 January 1943, 33rd FG took a heavy bombing raid, it had arrived with 71 operational fighters, now down to 30.

23 January 1943, 1st FG, 6 P-38 lost when bounced while strafing German troops. There are no doubt other examples of heavy USAAF losses on ground support missions or not to enemy aircraft in the air.

With the army under pressure the air units were switched more to ground support, which made the aircraft more vulnerable, add the quality of airfields and it is not surprising the losses went up beyond the replacement rate. Now add combat debut by inexperienced units, the general quality of the axis units, crews and machines, which were operating from good airfields with probably better supply lines. All the USAAF fighters were in trouble in air combat but such losses were only part of the overall casualties. It went a long way to making the air force view that continual effective ground support required suppressing the enemy air force first.

The USAAF had expressed doubts about the RAF supply and equipment requirements for units in active combat, it was now learning for itself.

When it came to enabling long range bombing raids the P-38 were a requirement, that in turn required the long range bombers with enough supplies.
Not disagreeing with this but they did have Bf 110s and Ju-88C-6 operating in the Med, and in one incident a squadron of Ju-88C-6 actually shot down several (I think 5 or 6?) P-38s over the sea near Spain when the latter were being ferried to North Africa from England (during the day). I don't remember the date off hand but I could look it up. The P-38s were being ferried with minimal ammunition, I think 50 rounds, and were caught by surprise.
23 December 1942, 82nd FG, Bay of Biscay, 51 P-38 plus an A-20B as navigator. Four Ju88 from 14./KG40, the A-20B and 1 P-38 shot down, one P-38 forced back to Britain, 1 force landed in Portugal, 1 force landed in Spain, 2 Ju88 crash landed due to lack of fuel, a fifth Ju88 that joined the fight was lost. The P-38 pilots claimed 1 Ju88 shot down, some references say 2.

Please stop relying on inaccurate anecdotes.

The Ministry of Aircraft Production reports first Spitfire IX exports as 52 in the 4 weeks to 1 January 1943, another 38 in the 4 weeks to 29 January, another 55 in the 4 weeks to 26 February, no report by mark for March, for the 4 weeks to 30 April another 28 IX plus 8 VIII.

End February 1943 the Middle East reports 3 mark IX on strength after losing 1. Another 87 reported en route. End March 1943 there were 49 mark IX in the Middle East, 53 in North West Africa and possibly some with USAAF units, 84 IX and 3 VIII on way.

The air combat situation over Tunisia was bad enough the RAF went against its principles and formed as elite unit, the Polish Fighter Flight, gave it the best equipment and told them to hunt axis fighters.
 
Did you mean Spitfire XVI, which was a IX with a Packard engine?

No. He means the Spitfire VIII.

You gentlemen are correct, Thank you.
My point was that in Oct 42 through the summer of 1943 the P-38 was the best day fighter the USAAC had available, even including reverse lend-lease British aircraft.

How they were used can be different.
Operational planning can be quite different to actual combat because the enemy has their own play book.
For Operation Torch, the US knew the P-39s were not up to "European" (against 109s and 190s) standards and the P-40F, while better, still wasn't up to snuff.
If you have to send planes and trained units thousands of miles on transport ships you have to plan for the enemy to change things up (change the altitudes at which they fight).
P-38 was the best high-altitude fighter the US had. Maybe not ideal (inter cooler was too small) but since there was nothing better it was the P-38.

P-38s could be flown from England without stopping at Gibraltar or needing to be ferried on aircraft carriers allowing for faster build-up of fighters in theater. P-38s had a longer operational radius than another allied fighter (or axis) in North Africa allowing for greater flexibility.
US Generals wanted more P-38s but could not get them and the P-47, rightly or wrongly, was viewed as 2nd best for much of 1943. Which leaves the P-39 and P-40 where?
The P-39s and P-40s did a lot of good work but the Generals wanted a fighter that was higher performing in case the enemy came up with something better.
 
Ki-43-I Two blade variable pitch prop, no armor no self sealing tanks, Ha 25 940 hp with pair of exhaust stacks, single speed supercharger, typically two 7.7mm machine guns (sometimes one 7.7mm and one 12.7mm) and a periscope gunsight. 308 mph. This was only gradually replaced from mid 1942.
Power of the engine is subject to quibbling but what is not is that the engine was good for 970hp at 3400 meters, single speed supercharger. Gradual replacement is correct. Last Ki-43-1 was completed in Feb 1943. There was cross over in production
Ki-43-II Three bladed prop, Ha 115 1,130 hp engine with two stage supercharger, pilot armor, two 12.7mm machine guns, reflector gunsight, larger canopy. 330 mph This version appeared in later 1942.
Constant speed prop and a two speed supercharger, not two stage. Going from one 7.7mm + one 12.7mm to two 12.7mm is an improvement but hardly the improvement the A6M got when they went to the longer barreled 20mm guns and more ammo. Making the jump all the way from 308mph to 330mph in late 1942 is hardly cause for parades.
The extra power of the engine did not turn into extra climb performance due to increased weight.
Ki-43-III as the -II but Ha 115-II 1,230 hp engine with water methanol and individual exhaust stacks, better self sealing tanks. 358 mph. This version appeared in 1944.
It appeared in May 1944 in very small numbers. Accounts vary and perhaps I have old books. 10 or even 100 such planes spread through the 2nd half of 1944 is not enough to do anything. A6M wasn't quite as fast (5-10mph slower?) at this point but it had about 3 1/2 times the fire power of the Ki-43-III and some rudimentary protection.

Now if everybody else was using 1941-42 fighters in 1944 the Ki-43-III might not look so bad but since they weren't (FM-2 Wildcat excepted) the Ki-43 series was well past it best use by date. It could still cause damage but the materials and labor and pilots should have been used in better aircraft.
 
If you're going to say that Zeros and Ki-43s shot down a significant number of better aircraft, you may as well turn the table and say that the P-40, often reckoned as an obsolescent aircraft by 1942, and certainly afterwards, shot down plenty of Zeros, Ki-43s, even Me-109s and Ki-84s even though those aircraft often has significant advantages over a P-40s. P-40s could even win or at least escape unscathed from mock dogfights against Merlin powered P-51s and later Spitfires if the P-40 pilot knew how to play his cards right.

If one wants to go to absurd limits, a Fiat CR 32 or 42 biplane could defeat or at least survive an encounter with a Me-262 if the Fiat pilot did things right and/or the 262 pilot screwed up. A Po-2 in Korea "shot down" a F-94 by making it fly so slow it stalled and crashed. A F-111 did something similar to an Iraqi MiG during Desert Storm--getting the MiG pilot to engage in maneuvers that the -111 could, but the MiG couldn't do successfully.

It's more often than not pilot skill, awareness and tactics that dictate the outcome of a dogfight. Put two pilots of equal skill in different planes, it could be interesting, Put two pilots of wildly differing skills in the same plane, one will get curb stomped.

The thing is, it's just not as simple as you are implying. We aren't talking about one-offs. The Japanese fighters didn't just win an occasional fight, they held their own repeatedly and over time, they shot down as many as they lost far longer than the cliche tells us. This is what the operational histories reveal.

Why this is could be down to a variety of reasons. My conclusion is that speed, high altitude capability and firepower were not the only significant merits to combat aircraft. Both the A6M and Ki-43 achieved parity in combat outcomes with ostensibly superior Allied aircraft from 1942-1944, while also often having superior range to boot, and a relatively high "mission capable" rate, giving them some strategic and operational advantages.

Rather than the CR 32 vs Me 262 or Po-2 vs a F-9 in Korea, a better analogy is probably the F-86 vs the MiG 15 in Korea. The MiG 15 was faster. climbed better, had a higher ceiling, and was more heavily armed. But the F-86 had it's own advantages (roll and effectively turn, dive, especially below 30,000 ft, and a better gunsight), and they achieved maybe a bit better than parity with the theoretically superior aircraft.

P-40s also improved a lot between 1942 and 1943. They were one of the most agile (roll and turn) Allied fighters, and had very good dive speed. A P-40K or F was much more capable than an early P-40 B,C, D or E. The F in particular proved capable of contending with the Bf 109 in the Mediterranean well into 1944. The bigger question for me is how the F4F did so (comparatively) well against the A6M, probably at least as well as early P-38s and F4Us on average. A lot of that was probably down to pilot training (especially gunnery), some was down to radios and some probably to the two stage supercharger, which while not exactly potent did give them some boost at altitude. F4F was also a very agile aircraft.
 
Power of the engine is subject to quibbling but what is not is that the engine was good for 970hp at 3400 meters, single speed supercharger. Gradual replacement is correct. Last Ki-43-1 was completed in Feb 1943. There was cross over in production

I've seen various estimates as to the power of all three engines, so i went with the more conservative numbers.

Constant speed prop and a two speed supercharger, not two stage. Going from one 7.7mm + one 12.7mm to two 12.7mm is an improvement but hardly the improvement the A6M got when they went to the longer barreled 20mm guns and more ammo. Making the jump all the way from 308mph to 330mph in late 1942 is hardly cause for parades.
The extra power of the engine did not turn into extra climb performance due to increased weight.

It did have better altitude performance though, due to the improved supercharger, which was the real advantage. The constant speed prop did also allegedly improve acceleration and climb speed somewhat, if not the rate. I believe the guns got more ammunition but I didn't have time to double check so I left that out. Bottom line though is that the Ki-43-II did seem to be a marked improvement over the -I. Maybe the real advantage was the gunsight, I don't know. But it did better in combat.

It appeared in May 1944 in very small numbers. Accounts vary and perhaps I have old books. 10 or even 100 such planes spread through the 2nd half of 1944 is not enough to do anything. A6M wasn't quite as fast (5-10mph slower?) at this point but it had about 3 1/2 times the fire power of the Ki-43-III and some rudimentary protection.

Now if everybody else was using 1941-42 fighters in 1944 the Ki-43-III might not look so bad but since they weren't (FM-2 Wildcat excepted) the Ki-43 series was well past it best use by date. It could still cause damage but the materials and labor and pilots should have been used in better aircraft.

It seems like the Ki-43-IIIs did show up in much larger numbers than you are implying here, anyway they appear in Vol III of Shores Burma book a fair bit. But I would agree that they came too few and far too late. This is the same pattern with the A6M5. To really make a difference both of these improved types needed to have arrived in combat units a year or a year and half earlier. I'm not sure about the top speed issue either, by the way. Ki-84 didn't have that spectacular of a combat record, anecdotes about shooting down Hellcats notwithstanding. The Japanese themselves rated the Ki-100 much higher, even though it was probably 60-80 mph slower (about the same speed as the A6M5 and Ki-43-iii)

And the Ki-43 did not seem to suffer for firepower, even though it only had two guns. If anything it had a better record against US heavy bombers including both B-17s and B-24s than the A6M did. USAAF continued to send B-17s especially on unescorted (recon and bombing) missions near Japanese bases in the Solomons, New Guinea and New Britain etc. well into 1943. These were very risky and often took losses, but the loss rate was considered sustainable. On the contrary, they stopped that pretty quickly with the B-24s in Burma because the Ki-43s were slaughtering them. They needed escorts, which limited how they could be used. The JAAF even shot some down at night.
 
P-40s also improved a lot between 1942 and 1943. They were one of the most agile (roll and turn) Allied fighters and had very good dive speed. A P-40K or F was much more capable than an early P-40 B,C, D or E. The F in particular proved capable of contending with the Bf 109 in the Mediterranean well into 1944.
The break points in capability are the P-40, P-40B, P-40C and then the P-40D,E,K and then the P-40F/L. The M was slightly better than the E/K and most Ns were about the same as a E/K.
Some of this depends on over boosting and some of this depends on what altitude the combat is at.
Fighting 109s depends on which 109 and the German pilots. US pilots got better, on average, from Torch to 1944 Italian campaign and German pilot quality was falling, now how much is subject to question.
The early P-40s, the D/E and the Ks all used basically the same supercharger and the same supercharger gear (I am not going to worry about 8.77 vs 8.80). There were differences in construction that meant that the early engines were never officially OKed for WEP. Better construction meant that the Ks were allowed to use 1325hp for take-off but they made the same amount of power at 12,000ft as the D/Ks. Arguing about 1150hp at 11,700ft vs 1150hp at 12,000ft seems rather pointless. The Ks were allowed tp use 60in of WEP instead of 56 on the D/E but since many of the pilots exceeded these limits difference in combat was???? Also the 60 in was at 2500ft while the 56in was at 4300ft. Trying to pull 60 in at 4300ft while climbing in a P-40K wasn't going work.
The F&L had the two speed Merlin and was in a different category as far as altitude went.
The M&N got the 9.60 supercharger gear and the 1150hp went down to 1125 but at 15,500ft instead of 12,000ft. Unfortunately by the time it shows up the Germans have shifted to 109Gs. The M&F were restricted to 57in of boost for WEP so performance down low was less than the K.
The bigger question for me is how the F4F did so (comparatively) well against the A6M, probably at least as well as early P-38s and F4Us on average. A lot of that was probably down to pilot training (especially gunnery), some was down to radios and some probably to the two stage supercharger, which while not exactly potent did give them some boost at altitude. F4F was also a very agile aircraft.
You are right, a lot did depend on training. A lot depended on some of the attack profiles. Radar gave the F4Fs time to get up to 20,000ft +, not always but a fair amount of the time.
Over Guadalcanal in the early fighting many of the A6Ms were the early ones with single speed superchargers. Japanese liked to come in at over 20,000ft which was the F4Fs sweet spot.
Again, not always but often enough to show up in the averages. F4F was also a tank and the heavy construction meant a number of them survived (written off after landing?) getting hit.
F4Fs were also operating closer to base not often trying to fly the length of the slot to get home damaged.
There is no one thing but a number of things added together. But the F4F had had it's day in 1942 and was used in the support role in 1943 and 1944.
Perhaps it could have been in the 1st line longer but nobody on the allied side could guess about the fall-off in Japanese pilot quality in 1943/44 or the lack of improvement in the A6M? Why did it take 3 years to fit the Kinsei engine into an A6M airframe? Or why didn't the Japanese build an airframe for a carrier plane (or land plane) using the Kasai engine in 1943?
 
Comparison by types -

P-39 short range, medium-low altitude, 288 victory claims and 1 Ace in PTO Theater. P-400 was the same as P-39 but with (maybe better?) 20mm cannon instead of the 37mm, but no oxygen equipment available so very limited capability above 10,000 ft or so, therefore it was low altitude only. This was a huge blunder IMO, it baffles me why they couldn't get some British oxygen equipment in Theater. No Allied nations really used the P-39 in combat, except of course the USSR.
F4F medium range, medium-high altitude (but very slow climb), 986 claims, 58 Aces in PTO Theater. Flying both as carrier fighter and from islands by both USN and USMC. The F4F-3 was arguably better than the later F4F-4, being much faster climbing and having more ammunition, but the F4F-4 had the folding wings. Arguably they should have made an F4F-3 for land based operations but they eventually got the FM-2 (albeit a little too late).
P-40 (various types) medium range, medium altitude (slow climb), 660 US claims in PTO, 973 in CBI (1633 US claims vs Japanese) plus another ~ 130 claims by RAAF and 99 by RNZAF P-40 units (so 229 for ANZAC and 1862 overall if you count ANZAC). 21 US Aces in P-40 units in PTO and 40 US Aces in the CBI so 61 vs Japanese. Plus 18 RAAF Kittyhawk aces (probably at least half of these in the MTO though) and 6 RNZAF Kittyhawk aces.
P-38 initially medium and then long range, medium-high altitude (with issues), 1700 claims in the PTO plus 157 in Burma, so 1857 US claims vs Japanese, over 100 Aces.
F4U medium tp medium / long range, medium-high altitude, 2140 claims in the PTO, 123 Aces in USN and USMC. There are also I think a few Corsair claims by the British FAA in the Burma / India area but I couldn't find the data.
P-47 medium range, high altitude (slow climb initially, very good altitude performance), 696 claims in the PTO, couldn't find the total number of Aces. There are also some British claims in the Thunderbolt in the CBI but I couldn't find the data.
P-51 long range, high altitude, 297 claims in the PTO (arrived a little late to the party) and 345 in CBI (includes early P-51A etc.) so 642 vs Japanese total. 74 Aces.
F6F medium range, high altitude, 5,163 claims in PTO, 305 Aces. There are also at least a handful of British FAA claims with the Hellcat in Burma area but I couldn't find the data.

Claims and Aces don't tell the full story but it gives you a baseline idea. So for the Americans against the Japanese, it was Hellcat, Corsair, P-38, P-40 and Wildcat that made the most difference, followed by P-47, P-51 and P-39 last. The P-39, especially the later types, wasn't as bad as it's rep, but the short range was a big problem and the whole debacle with the oxygen on the P-400s was a major problem. Initially I think the USAAF really thought the P-39 was going to be a big step up, and they did shoot down some Japanese aircraft (including one one glorious day six Tainan Ku Zeros over Lae in a suprise raid just as they were taking off). But as far as I know, no P-39 unit ever achieved parity with Japanese fighters, and they had to step away from it, while the P-40 moved back into place with improved types. I'm just learning about the history of the P-40F/L in Theater which gave this type a boost in the Solomons thanks to improved altitude performance, and apparently they had some in New Guinea for a short while too, though only in small numbers.

The P-38 and F4U respectively gave the Allied commanders both range and climbing ability. The biggest problem with both the earlier P-40 and (especially) the Wildcat was climbing ability which prevented some important interceptions. The P-38 and F4U could intercept much better, and the P-38 especially had the extended range and loiter time that was really needed. Having an extra engine for long flights back to base after taking damage was also very helpful.

The F4U also had the extra speed which made it (along with some Seafire types) the go-to plane against the Kamikaze when that era started up. The Wildcat got a second wind with the superior FM-2, which had a much better rate of climb though at the expense of the altitude performance due to losing the two stage supercharger.

I don't know the number of aces or claims by type for British and Commonwealth types in the Pacific or CBI but it would be interesting to see if anyone has them.
 
The Wildcat got a second wind with the superior FM-2, which had a much better rate of climb though at the expense of the altitude performance due to losing the two stage supercharger.
Thank you and the other contributors for the very informative posts.
About the FM2 - while it did lost the 2-stage supercharged engine, the R-1820 that powered it have had barely less power above 20000ft, talk 5-6% less. The FM2 have had also the better layout of the exhaust stacks, that on itself added perhaps 10% to the propulsive power? The drag was also lower due to the oil coolers relocated in the fuselage, and the weight was down for same payload - all of the prerequisites for it to do better in the performance department than the F4F-4.
 
The break points in capability are the P-40, P-40B, P-40C and then the P-40D,E,K and then the P-40F/L. The M was slightly better than the E/K and most Ns were about the same as a E/K.
Some of this depends on over boosting and some of this depends on what altitude the combat is at.

The K really seems to stand out in a lot of pilot anecdotes and was the version flown by a seemingly disproportionate number of Aces in both the PTO and CBI. It did not really seem to be quite good enough as a fighter in the MTO however, where the merlin engined types were relied on a lot more in the fighter role.

Fighting 109s depends on which 109 and the German pilots. US pilots got better, on average, from Torch to 1944 Italian campaign and German pilot quality was falling, now how much is subject to question.
The early P-40s, the D/E and the Ks all used basically the same supercharger and the same supercharger gear (I am not going to worry about 8.77 vs 8.80). There were differences in construction that meant that the early engines were never officially OKed for WEP. Better construction meant that the Ks were allowed to use 1325hp for take-off but they made the same amount of power at 12,000ft as the D/Ks. Arguing about 1150hp at 11,700ft vs 1150hp at 12,000ft seems rather pointless. The Ks were allowed tp use 60in of WEP instead of 56 on the D/E but since many of the pilots exceeded these limits difference in combat was???? Also the 60 in was at 2500ft while the 56in was at 4300ft. Trying to pull 60 in at 4300ft while climbing in a P-40K wasn't going work.

No, but in an escape or in a combat where fighting had descended to that altitude the P-40K was a beast. And it had the 60" Hg / 1570 hp WEP setting in the manual. Overboosting was as we have discussed before, not without risks. In the K it was proabably relatively safe to boost to the 60" level.

There is a long anecdote in Claringboulds book (the one noting limitations of F4U and P-38 victories that was under discussion here a few weeks ago), where an RNZAF pilot and future ace was describing in detail his extended engagement in a P-40K with a half dozen zeros. He pointed out that he was able to disenage more or less at will at the (low) altitude tof the engageemnt and then was confident enough to return to attack them several times. There are a lot of anecdotes like this for that variant, though of course the plural of anecdote is not statistic, as they say. I can post this in more detail if anyone wants to see it.

I suspect there was also a big difference between the early P-40K with the tail fin and the later long tailed version of it. The Canadian Ace James Edwards makes a big point about the longer tail version being much better due to improved stability when diving etc.

The F&L had the two speed Merlin and was in a different category as far as altitude went.

Definitely agree.

The M&N got the 9.60 supercharger gear and the 1150hp went down to 1125 but at 15,500ft instead of 12,000ft. Unfortunately by the time it shows up the Germans have shifted to 109Gs. The M&F were restricted to 57in of boost for WEP so performance down low was less than the K.

The M and N seemed to have almost exclusively been used as fighter-bombers in the MTO, but in the Pacific the M was an important type for a while both for the US and ANZAC units. I've been trying to get a good sense of the M, on paper it looks heavier and less powerful, but the pilots seemed to rate it, maybe just the boost in effective combat ceiling from around 12 - 16,000 ft to 16-18,000 feet was enough of a difference.

The P-40Ns really seemed to have a lot of build quality issues when they first arrived, and there was a kind of teething period while some of the 'improvements' were replaced. The lighter aluminum wheels cracked, the external starter was a dumb idea, the gun charging system needed to be put back in. On the other hand the lighter radiator was an improvement and the oil cooler armor didn't seem to be missed. The stripped vs not stripped status though is a bit more complex as it seems like the manufacturers stripped version was partly just adjusting to field changes (especially removing 2 of the guns) when units had to fly a lot of fighter missions vs bombing missions. They also loaded them down in the field with extra radio direction finders and such (which no doubt paid for themselves many times over as getting lost was a real problem in both the PTO and CBI).

You are right, a lot did depend on training. A lot depended on some of the attack profiles. Radar gave the F4Fs time to get up to 20,000ft +, not always but a fair amount of the time.
Over Guadalcanal in the early fighting many of the A6Ms were the early ones with single speed superchargers. Japanese liked to come in at over 20,000ft which was the F4Fs sweet spot.

I suspect this was in fact a significant factor

Again, not always but often enough to show up in the averages. F4F was also a tank and the heavy construction meant a number of them survived (written off after landing?) getting hit.

They lost a lot of them though, 20mm cannons could overcome that heavy construction, it seems

F4Fs were also operating closer to base not often trying to fly the length of the slot to get home damaged.

Good point

There is no one thing but a number of things added together. But the F4F had had it's day in 1942 and was used in the support role in 1943 and 1944.

I would say the F4F was still largely carrying the burden for the USN especially, and somewhat the USMC too, all through 1943. The FM-2 kind of breathed new life into the type from escort carriers in 1944. If only it had come a year earlier.

Perhaps it could have been in the 1st line longer but nobody on the allied side could guess about the fall-off in Japanese pilot quality in 1943/44 or the lack of improvement in the A6M? Why did it take 3 years to fit the Kinsei engine into an A6M airframe? Or why didn't the Japanese build an airframe for a carrier plane (or land plane) using the Kasai engine in 1943?

The improvements to both the Ki-43 and A6M came at least a year too late, and replacements were either never made or came too late (the IJN got better fighters but they couldn't fly from carriers! The JAAF got better fighters a bit earlier but with serious flaws). There seems to be a somewhat similar problem (albeit to a lesser extent) with the Bf 109, they were almost too good initially, the urgency to replace / upgrade didn't seem to be there sufficiently.
 
To figure effectiveness we have to know not only the claims but the number of aircraft involved.
Like squadrons or groups.
We can also look at the times (months) such units were the theater/s or, if possible the number of missions flown which is probably the best measure.
In the Pacific and CBI the P-38 was often one of the scarcer types.
Of course this changes with time but the P-38s out of the total production of 10037 planes, over 5800 were built in 1944/45. By the end of 1943 only 4184 had been built compared to over 11,000 P-40s and over 7800 P-39s.
P-38s effectiveness in the Pacific was high when you figure in the amount of planes in the theater. Number of P-38s that were sent to NA and Italy in 1943 really cut into numbers available in the Pacific.
 
IJAAF units using the Ki 43-III were

13th Hiko Sentai - Oct 1944 to Spring 1945. Ki 84 began to be received in Jan 1945. Re-equipped in Japan Oct/Nov 1944 before being spread across Luzon, Formosa, Singapore, and Cambodia until May 1945.

20th Hiko Sentai - started receiving the Ki 43-III in Feb 1945, initially alongside the -II until March. Formosa & Sakishima Gunto (Mar-Jun)

23rd Hiko Sentai - Nov 1944 to the end of the war alongside the -II. Japan & Iwo Jima.

24th Hiko Sentai - from Spring 1945. Mainly Formosa with detachments to Hong Kong, Canton & Southern China Canton(Feb-Mar) and Sakishima Gunto (Mar-May).

25th Hiko Sentai - Nov 1944- Mar 1945. Central China, Nanking & Shanghai. Re-equipped with Ki 84.

26th Hiko Sentai - Jan 1945 to end of war alongside -II. Japan to Mar 1945 then Formosa with detachment at Singapore (Mar-Jun).

30th Hiko Sentai - summer 1944 to 30 May 1945 when it disbanded. Philippines to March 1945 then to Thailand.

31st Hiko Sentai - used Ki 43 (models unidentified) from late 1943 to Mar 1945. Disbanded 30 May 1945. Philippines from July 1944.

33rd Hiko Sentai - Nov 1944 to end of war. Philippines to Jan 1945. Then to Betung, Sumatra until July and then Medang.

48th Hiko Sentai - from Aug 1944 to end of war alongside -II. China.

54th Hiko Sentai - from Oct 1944 to end of war alongside -II. Part re-equipped with Ki 84 in Jan 1945. Japan with dets to Philippines & Ki 84 in Sumatra (Jan - July 1945) and then Formosa.

64th Sentai - Sept 1944 to end of war alongside -II. Burma to April 1945 then Thailand and then Cambodia from May with det in northern Malaya in Aug.

204th Hiko Sentai - from Dec 1944 to end of war. Japan to Feb 1945. Then Indochina to July with dets on Formosa. Then Formosa from July.

71st IF Chutai - used some amongst1945 Ki 43 (earlier models) Ki 44 & Ki 84 from late 1944 to end of war. Sumatra.

Data from "Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units And Their Aces 1931 - 1945" by Hata, Izawa & Shores.

Bar 10 prototypes all the Ki 43-III were built by the Tachikawa Company. They built 2,629 Ki 43-II and Ki 43-III between May 1943 & Aug 1945. Given that the prototypes didn't begin flying until May 1944, Tachikawa production of the Ki 43-III cannot have exceeded about 1,700 aircraft. That was out of a total Ki 43 production of 5,919 per Francillon.

I've also read somewhere that one problem Allied pilots had was recognising the difference between the Ki 43 and the later Ki 84, particularly as the latter was being introduced during 1944. While an experimental unit took the latter into combat on a trial basis from Oct 1943, it was March 1944 before it became more generally available, with 22nd Hiko Sentai taking it into combat in China in Aug 1944. That is about the same time as the Ki 43-III began to appear.
 
P-40s are all over the place:)
The K really seems to stand out in a lot of pilot anecdotes and was the version flown by a seemingly disproportionate number of Aces in both the PTO and CBI. It did not really seem to be quite good enough as a fighter in the MTO however, where the merlin engined types were relied on a lot more in the fighter role.
Some of this is timing. The P-40Ks start showing up in the summer of 1942. (1st left the factory in May the last in Nov?) So into the 3rd year of the NA campaign. Tactics and experience are different than the earlier years. Ks also replace Es in Pacific and CBI as supplies allow. The US kept most of the Fs, 1311 compared to 250 to lend-lease.
The M and N seemed to have almost exclusively been used as fighter-bombers in the MTO, but in the Pacific the M was an important type for a while both for the US and ANZAC units. I've been trying to get a good sense of the M, on paper it looks heavier and less powerful, but the pilots seemed to rate it, maybe just the boost in effective combat ceiling from around 12 - 16,000 ft to 16-18,000 feet was enough of a difference.
In theory the US got 5 P-40Ms and 595 went to lend-lease. In practice it worked out a bit different or some Ms were given to US units in theater.
Also by the spring of 1943 when the Ms and Ns started to show up the need for P-40 fighters was diminishing. Once we get into the summer and fall of 1943 there are not only the P-38s helping with the fighter duties but more Spitfires.
 
P-40s are all over the place:)

Some of this is timing. The P-40Ks start showing up in the summer of 1942. (1st left the factory in May the last in Nov?) So into the 3rd year of the NA campaign. Tactics and experience are different than the earlier years. Ks also replace Es in Pacific and CBI as supplies allow. The US kept most of the Fs, 1311 compared to 250 to lend-lease.

P-40K and F also had the new ammunition storage which made the guns much more reliable, and I think that mattered a lot.

In theory the US got 5 P-40Ms and 595 went to lend-lease. In practice it worked out a bit different or some Ms were given to US units in theater.

I know that some of the RAAF and RNZAF units were flying M, and the 44th FS, one of the units that was flying P-40Fs in the Solomons, switched over to P-40Ms as the Fs and Ls ran out toward the end of 1943.

Also by the spring of 1943 when the Ms and Ns started to show up the need for P-40 fighters was diminishing. Once we get into the summer and fall of 1943 there are not only the P-38s helping with the fighter duties but more Spitfires.

In the Med there was definitely demand for Fs / Ls in the MTO through Anzio. In the Pacific it also seemed to last through the end of 1943. In the CBI well into 1944 (for P-40K, M, N).
 
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A brief look at some combat in the CBI from Shores Air War For Burma / Bloody Shambles Vol III. If you have the book you can follow these yourself by the dates. I literally just opened the book in the middle and found a few examples involving Spitfire VIII, though some of these also involved Spit V and Hurricanes as well.

15 January 1944
64th Sentai sent three successive waves of Ki-43-II to sweep through and strafe Maungdaw area bases. They come in piecemeal one Chutai at a time, and are intercepted by Spitfires of the 136 and 607 Squadrons. Total losses are 5 Ki-43s and 2 Spitfire VIII, plus one IAF Hurricane II (a recon flight) damaged and force-landed. Flt Officder D.E. Fuge killed. This was the best victory I found in this part of the book for the Spitfires.

20 January 1944
607 and 136 Squadrons engaged a large Japanese formation (which turned out to be 204 Sentai) over Maungdaw at 18-24,000 ft. British claimed 5 destroyed and 5 probables and several damaged, JAAF claimed ten destroyed and 10 probables. Actual losses were 2 Spitfires and 1 Ki-43 which was damaged and force-landed but the pilot was rescued. Spitfire of Flt Sgt P.F. Kennedy was shot down and he was killed while trying to bail out, Wt officer G. Sole was also killed, two other Spitfires damaged with Sql Ldr P.J.T. Stephenson DFC being wounded in the arm. A Hurricane also crashed but it may have been due to a maintenance issue. The 136 Sqn Spitfires included some Mk V.

4 February 1944
70 Ki-43-II from 50th, 64th and 204th Sentais made a major fighter sweep and strafing / light bombing raid against the Taung Bazaar area. Two 6 IAF Hurricanes on a TACR mission were caught and shot down. Spitfires of 607 and 136 Sqn scrambled , they reported running low on fuel during their attack. Flt Sgt F.D. Irving was hit and forced to crash landed. JAAF claimed 15 confirmed. Actual losses were 2 IAF Hurricane II and one Spit VIII crash landed, no losses for JAAF. Another Hurricane was damaged by ground fire.

9 February 1944
Ki-43-IIs from 204th and 64th Sentais went on a sttafing mission against Jumchar and Rheindeer. They were intercepted by 5 Spitfires from 136 Sqn, an unknown number from 607 and 615 Sqns, and six Hurricanes from 261 Sqn, with combat taking place over the Buthidaung area from altitude down to sea level. One Ki-43 was shot down by AA, another piloted by Cpl Teizo Yamamoto joined a wingman in chasing a Spitfire down to a forced landing at Cox's Bazaar but took hits which sent fuel into his cockpit, partly blinding him, but he was able to make it back to base at Akyab. Actual losses appear to be 1 Spitfire shot down, another one may have force-landed but the entry isn't clear, and 1 Ki-43 shot down (though it says it was by AA, who knows). Some of the Spitfires in this one may have been Spitfire Mk V it's not clear. Flt Sgt PR.R. Mann was shot down and killed.

13 February 1944
12 Spitfire Mk VIII from 81 Sqn and 10 Spitfire Mark V from 136 Sqn intercepted two Chutai of 64th Sentai sent on a bombing and strafing mission aat Sinzeywa. One Ki-43 Shot down.

15 February 1944
A large fighter sweep of Ki-43s was intercepted by Spitfires of 81 and 607 Sqns near Buthidaun and Mungdaw, then 8 more Spitfire V from 136 Sqn . Flt Sgt J.B. Dodds was shot down and killed and Lt Eric Brown failed to return. Actual losses were 2 Spitfires and 1 Ki-43 from 204 Sentai. Pt Officer Battachharji of 6 IAF was also shot down and killed in a Hurricane II on a TacR mission in the area.

RAF pilot Dudley Barnett wrote in his diary:

"A bad day. 81 got a completely new opinion of Japs. Reckon Me and UK squadrons would be very surprised. Most of their (81's) aircraft u/s for rippled skins and warped engine bearings! We've a bit of it too."

Flight Commander Gordon onway noted in his diary:

"We had two hard fights on the 13th and 15th., and the second fight left us poorer for we lost Flt Sgt Dodds who was found dead in the wreckage, and my splendid friend Eric Brown whose luck had at last run out."


Overall, my impression is that the Spit VIII did have an advantage over the Ki-43, the Spit V was about even except for range limitations. The JAAF pilots noted the superiority of the Spit VIII and in particular were upset that it could out climb and out-run them. However, there is commentary in the book by several Spitfire VIII pilots noting that they had to be very careful about the tactics they used, basically stick to the old hit and run albeit with high speed climb now being an option for the extend away part. I would not say combat was easy for the RAF even with the Spit VIII. This is just a wild guess but I would say that the Spit VIII was about 1.5 -1 vs the Ki-43 at this point in the war (early 1944) which improved to maybe 2.5 -1 later in 1944 as pilot quality for the JAAF started to fall off.
 

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