So by 1944 the Ki43 improved into an aircraft that was equivalent to a 1940 Mk I Spitfire or low dash Me109E?
Effectiveness of the P-38 (4 Viewers)
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Again your making a claim based on all the advantages being with the A6M pilot, its akin to saying the Gladiator was a dangerous aircraft because of what the 3 did at Malta.
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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I mean, they shot down P-38s, P-51s, Spitfire Mk Vs, P-47s, big bombers like B-24s, and Spitfire Mk VIIIs in some numbers, so I wouldn't say this was the case.
In fact, the 1941 and 1942-1943 types did this, by and large. You seem to assume that there is one relevant criteria for evaluating an aircraft, i.e. speed. I think it's pretty clear that is not the only useful feature of a good fighter.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
OK, some details but not enough to really judge.
70 fighters sweep in and catch two Hurricanes and shoot them down and we are surprised???
Or were there 4-8 Hurricanes to start with and only two got caught?
Was the damaged Hurricane even part of this fight?
Now it may have been 6 to 2 with 64 Ki 43s standing by watching or some other combination. Maybe it was 3 to 2, I don't know.
What altitude were the Hurricanes at the start of the fight?
Japanese were in one big formation or was one Sentai flying top cover for the other two or a different formation set up?
How many Spitfires total? 16 planes or 32 planes or more?
DId the Spits gather up into one big group or did they attack piecemeal?
Did the Spits attack from above or from below or from the same height?
Did the Spits get up to high speed? it can take 1 1/2 to 2 minutes to go from best climb speed to top speed after leveling out.
Was there any radar in the area or was notification by visual spotting and telephones?
"A bad day. 81 got a completely new opinion of Japs. Reckon Me and UK squadrons would be very surprised. Most of their (81's) aircraft u/s for rippled skins and warped engine bearings! We've a bit of it too."
And yes, even Spitfires had a lot of trouble trying dogfight the Ki-43 instead of using speed.
Poor tactics. Especially in 1944.
81 squadron had been active in Italy flying Spitfire Vc until 9 Nov 1943. It was then withdrawn to Egypt to re-equip with Spitfire VIII which it then flew out to India. They arrived at Alipore near Calcutta on 8th Dec and were immediately declared operational. There was then a couple of changes of base before its first operations over the front in mid-Jan 1944.
This was the time of the Japanese invasion of India, with the IJAAF making a big push in support of its ground forces.
Not much time to absorb any local knowledge of IJAAF aircraft & tactics.
152 was another unit that made the same move and equipment change in the same timescale.
136 squadron had been in India since 1942 and had converted to Spitfire Vc in Oct 1943. It began to receive Spitfire VIII in Jan 1944. 607 was another 1942 arrival in India, converting to Spitfire Vc in Sept 1943 and beginning to receive Mk.VIII in March 1944.
Edit a number of USAAF units were also moved from the Med to the CBI around this time. I wonder how they fared in the early days in their new environment?
This was the time of the Japanese invasion of India, with the IJAAF making a big push in support of its ground forces.
Not much time to absorb any local knowledge of IJAAF aircraft & tactics.
152 was another unit that made the same move and equipment change in the same timescale.
136 squadron had been in India since 1942 and had converted to Spitfire Vc in Oct 1943. It began to receive Spitfire VIII in Jan 1944. 607 was another 1942 arrival in India, converting to Spitfire Vc in Sept 1943 and beginning to receive Mk.VIII in March 1944.
Edit a number of USAAF units were also moved from the Med to the CBI around this time. I wonder how they fared in the early days in their new environment?
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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The Hurricanes in this combat and several others were Indian Air Force TACR flights which were basically caught during the raid, they weren't really part of the fight. I think there is one toward the end of the list where there was an RAF squadron of Hurricane IICs which I believe I named, which actually was in the fight (and I think came away unscathed, which is rare for the Hurricane units). But actually IIRC he (Shores) does mention in this case it was two specific Ki-43 pilots who broke away and shot these two down. he mentions them by name. Either this combat or one of the other ones I listed I forget which one.
The Indian TACR flights were usually one or two pairs, with one camera plane and an escort flying together as a pair.
If I remember right it was 70 Hayabusa against about 20 or 25 Spitfires in this battle. But sometimes the odds were the other way.
Shores does give more details but I didn't have time to transcribe the whole page, I just put in the outcomes for a couple of weeks worth of combat. You can read it yourself in more detail if you have the book. I know several people around here have it.
I believe in that one it was a couple of formations, but again, you can check the book for yourself.
For some of these he gives more detail like that, for some he doesn't (including how many planes on both sides, sometimes he just gives squadron numbers)
In some cases the British had a numerical advantage, in some cases the JAAF did, but the outcomes were only slightly different, and were roughly even over this particular period. - I think about ten Spitfires vs nine or ten Ki-43 Hayabusas.
yes the hard won tactical lessons seemed to have to be relearned. Just like with the Corsairs and P-38s in the Solomons a few times.
But this also emphasizes (to me anyway) that dealing with a fighter like the Ki-43 or A6M2/3/5 was not such a simple matter, and 'boom and zoom' is not necessarily simple either or easy to execute. It's part of the overall impression that i get.
The JAAF had to adjust some tactical lessons as well. They learned in this period to fly in bigger formations and not to attack piecemeal, and that they couldn't count on being able to disengage at will like they apparently could against Hurricanes or even Spit Vs. Several of their losses were from the fighters which went down to strafe, apparently expecting to do so with relative impunity. This didn't seem to be safe option when fighting the Spit VIII.
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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These RAF units all seemed to transitioning to the Spit VIII during this period. But I wouldn't think it's hugely different from the Spit V? The switch from Hurricane II to Spit V which they had also done a few months before was probably a bigger deal.
P-47 and P-38 units didn't do spectacularly well, the P-51A (still in use in early 1944)) did fairly poorly, but the P-51B/C which were doing much better. Still not totally dominating but the ratio of wins to losses was definitely in their favor. The P-40 units were also still coming out slightly ahead most of the time, as they had been since 1942, but they did not have the range that the later US types had (including the P-51A, apparently) and didn't have the altitude performance for some of the missions over the high mountains.
One of the big challenges was escorting the C-47s and other transports which were in heavy use both to bring in supplies across 'the Hump' and move troops around in the land battle. They were extremely vulnerable to the Ki-43s and were getting shot down in large numbers.
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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One other thing which probably made a difference, I believe the Hurricanes and the Spit Vs operating in this area were still using the Vokes filters, based on the photos I saw, whereas the Spit VIII apparently were not and were using the newer much less draggy type.
GregP
Major
Never said it happened that way all the time.
YOU said the late -war Allied fighters wouldn't get into a medium-speed dogfight with a Zero; they'd use their speed and tactics to win. I posted a single scenario when they would get into a dogfight at JUST the right speed for the Zeros, at 180 - 280 mph, which is where a WWII radial-engine fighter generally cruises, even US fighters. If they get ambushed by Zeros (or any OTHER Japanese fighter), then they are, by definition, in the middle of the Zero's best speed range. There are many OTHER scenarios where that could also happen, but I didn't make a list.
That's all that happened in my post. You said the Zeros were useless near the end of the war. NOBODY who fought them said that. They were dangerous right up to the end of the war if competently-flown, and that's from the guys who were there and flying combat at the time.
Also bear in mind the level of detail in Shores three volume set of "Bloody Shambles"-. The first two volumes are subtitled (with my emphasis) "The first comprehensive account of air operations over south-east asia":-
Vol 1 - Dec 1941-April 1942 (to fall of Singapore) 385 pages
Vol 2 - Dec 1941-May 1942 (defence of Sumatra to fall of Burma) 477 pages.
Vol 3 titled "Air War for Burma- the concluding volume of the Bloody Shambles Series" and sub-titled "The Allied Air Forces Fight Back in South-East Asia 1942-1945". 428 pages. The author makes no claim to this volume being a "comprehensive" account.
So the author devotes 862 pages to the first 6 months of the air war in south east asia but only 428 to the next 39 months. And that during a time when the Allied Air Forces in theatre were expanded beyond anything that could have been imagined in 1942. Vol 3 therefore is clearly based on no more than highlights or snapshots of operations in the theatre. Add in the fact that in late 1943 / early 1944, the period under discussion, air operations in India / Burma stretched all the way from protecting the Hump route to China, Chinese advances in northern Burma, down through the Imphal / Kohima area to the Arakan coastal area. That covers a distance of about 450 miles.
In some ways these were being fought as separate campaigns with units being moved about as required. And the Japanese were also running a bombing campaign against Calcutta, the major point of import for all materials needed to fight the ever expanding war.
If you really want the full picture you need to delve into the Operational Record Books of the squadrons you are interested in. These are free to download from The National Archives in the UK, if you register.
Vol 1 - Dec 1941-April 1942 (to fall of Singapore) 385 pages
Vol 2 - Dec 1941-May 1942 (defence of Sumatra to fall of Burma) 477 pages.
Vol 3 titled "Air War for Burma- the concluding volume of the Bloody Shambles Series" and sub-titled "The Allied Air Forces Fight Back in South-East Asia 1942-1945". 428 pages. The author makes no claim to this volume being a "comprehensive" account.
So the author devotes 862 pages to the first 6 months of the air war in south east asia but only 428 to the next 39 months. And that during a time when the Allied Air Forces in theatre were expanded beyond anything that could have been imagined in 1942. Vol 3 therefore is clearly based on no more than highlights or snapshots of operations in the theatre. Add in the fact that in late 1943 / early 1944, the period under discussion, air operations in India / Burma stretched all the way from protecting the Hump route to China, Chinese advances in northern Burma, down through the Imphal / Kohima area to the Arakan coastal area. That covers a distance of about 450 miles.
In some ways these were being fought as separate campaigns with units being moved about as required. And the Japanese were also running a bombing campaign against Calcutta, the major point of import for all materials needed to fight the ever expanding war.
If you really want the full picture you need to delve into the Operational Record Books of the squadrons you are interested in. These are free to download from The National Archives in the UK, if you register.
Which ignores my point about 81 & 152 being new to the theatre and being thrust into action almost immediately on arrival with no time to learn to fight Japanese aircraft.
There were only 2 P-38 fighter squadrons (not groups) in the CBI in 1944. the 449th in China with 14th AF and the 459th in India with the 10th AF. These were attached to various fighter groups over time which is why you See references to other FG operating P-38s during 1944. The 33rd FG only converted to the P-38 between Nov 1944 and Feb 1945, while resting in India.
P-47D didn't begin to arrive in the CBI until Spring 1944. The 33rd FG (which had been flying P-40 in the Med) arrived in India in late Feb and equipped with the P-47D. It went to China between April & Sept 1944 before returning to India and converting to the P-38. The 81st FG followed from the Med in Feb/March 1944 equipping with the P-47D in India before going to China and flying its first combat operations in June 1944.
In 10th AF the 1st Air Commando was reorganised in May 1944 with its two fighter squadrons receiving P-47D. The 80th FG traded its P-40 for the P-47D around mid-1944.
The first P-47D for the RAF arrived in India on 29th Feb with more following until June 1945. 135 squadron re-equipped in May 1944 followed by 146 & 261 in June.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
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Acceptances, 600 P-40K-1 (export version) April (1 only) to September (again 1 only) 1942, 700 P-40K August to December 1942, 600 P-40M November 1942 to February 1943. P-40N started in March 1943 with 5,219 accepted, of those 2,588 delivered in US for USAAF.
P-40F, USAAF 1,161 out of 1,311, rest to Britain, P-40L USAAF 600 out of 700, rest to Britain.
Deliveries in US
P-40K-1/K, 537 USAAF, 44 Australia, 30 Brazil, 339 Britain, 14 China, 22 New Zealand, 314 USSR
P-40M, 115 USAAF, 96 Australia, 10 Brazil, 94 Britain, 170 Britain for USSR, 15 Canada, 15 China, 35 New Zealand, 50 USSR
The Burma/India theatre was for both sides at the end of the longest/most difficult supply lines, putting severe restrictions on operations, add ideas about what could be done during the Monsoon. For the allies it was usually the last place to receive the latest aircraft or have its numerical requirements met. Until around mid 1944 for the IJA it, New Guinea and to an extent China, were the places to send the latest equipment, as long as it was mostly the IJN fighting in the Pacific.
The P-40 was all to around two thirds the USAAF CBI fighter strength until March 1944, P-40 numbers went to second behind the P-47 in June, third behind the P-47, P-51 in September when there were 204 P-40 in theatre, down to 50 in January 1945.
One of the peculiarities is the way India received few Spitfire V, almost going straight to mark VIII, no Spitfires end June 1943, 49 Vc end August, December it was 72 Vc to 64 VIII, end May 1944 there were 61 Vc and 408 VIII.
The Allison P-51 had 180 gallons of internal fuel plus a lower drag design than the P-40 which had a maximum internal fuel of 161 gallons, not surprising the P-51 could go further.
The USAAF surge in the CBI can be seen by the way no more than 1,700 combat hours flying per month by fighters to end September 1943, jumping to 9,800 hours in December and averaging around 11,800 hours a month in 1944.
The ATC thinks the airlift lost, all causes, 184 transports in 1944 and 169 in 1945, while making 153,839 east bound trips, or about twice that sorties. The histories state non combat losses were the majority, while Japanese fighters limited the routes that could be used, rather than inflicting continual losses. The ATC says it lost 703 aircraft, mostly transports around the world December 1942 to December 1945, all causes.
The theatre received its first C-46 in December 1944, it had up to around 50 C-47/53 for a time in mid 1942, down to zero by the end of the year, back to 35 in November 1943, and a new arrival, 7 light transports, then came the big movements, to 198 C-47/53 and 56 light transports in June 1944, to a transport fleet of 540 in December.
The USAAF Statistical Digest does not give transport aircraft losses, it does say the CBI lost 101 transport crews due to combat and accident June 1943 to August 1945.
So when were transport aircraft being shot down in "large numbers" and what percentage were due to Ki-43?
P-40F, USAAF 1,161 out of 1,311, rest to Britain, P-40L USAAF 600 out of 700, rest to Britain.
Deliveries in US
P-40K-1/K, 537 USAAF, 44 Australia, 30 Brazil, 339 Britain, 14 China, 22 New Zealand, 314 USSR
P-40M, 115 USAAF, 96 Australia, 10 Brazil, 94 Britain, 170 Britain for USSR, 15 Canada, 15 China, 35 New Zealand, 50 USSR
The Burma/India theatre was for both sides at the end of the longest/most difficult supply lines, putting severe restrictions on operations, add ideas about what could be done during the Monsoon. For the allies it was usually the last place to receive the latest aircraft or have its numerical requirements met. Until around mid 1944 for the IJA it, New Guinea and to an extent China, were the places to send the latest equipment, as long as it was mostly the IJN fighting in the Pacific.
The period is supposed to be late 1943/early 1944, the MTO managed its first Merlin P-51 mission in April 1944, so when did P-51B/C turn up in India and in what strength? The Allison engine variety arrived in August 1943, from the 55 P-51 and 260 P-51A plus diversions from the RAF order, delivered in the US for the USAAF. Next is the first USAAF P-47 turned up in India in March 1944, while there had been P-38 in theatre since July 1943, it took until 1945 to have more than 100 on strength. The RAF report their first P-47 arrivals in the May 1944 census, but they arrived a bit earlier, 2 reported in January 1944, then nothing until 134 in May.
The P-40 was all to around two thirds the USAAF CBI fighter strength until March 1944, P-40 numbers went to second behind the P-47 in June, third behind the P-47, P-51 in September when there were 204 P-40 in theatre, down to 50 in January 1945.
One of the peculiarities is the way India received few Spitfire V, almost going straight to mark VIII, no Spitfires end June 1943, 49 Vc end August, December it was 72 Vc to 64 VIII, end May 1944 there were 61 Vc and 408 VIII.
The Allison P-51 had 180 gallons of internal fuel plus a lower drag design than the P-40 which had a maximum internal fuel of 161 gallons, not surprising the P-51 could go further.
The USAAF surge in the CBI can be seen by the way no more than 1,700 combat hours flying per month by fighters to end September 1943, jumping to 9,800 hours in December and averaging around 11,800 hours a month in 1944.
So what is being defined as large numbers? USAAF transport operations in the CBI were split between the ATC controlled lift to China and the 10th and 14th Air Force operations either side of the mountains. While the ATC lift had some C-47 and was a major player in the higher altitude C-47B variant it used lots of C-46 given their altitude performance.
The ATC thinks the airlift lost, all causes, 184 transports in 1944 and 169 in 1945, while making 153,839 east bound trips, or about twice that sorties. The histories state non combat losses were the majority, while Japanese fighters limited the routes that could be used, rather than inflicting continual losses. The ATC says it lost 703 aircraft, mostly transports around the world December 1942 to December 1945, all causes.
The theatre received its first C-46 in December 1944, it had up to around 50 C-47/53 for a time in mid 1942, down to zero by the end of the year, back to 35 in November 1943, and a new arrival, 7 light transports, then came the big movements, to 198 C-47/53 and 56 light transports in June 1944, to a transport fleet of 540 in December.
The USAAF Statistical Digest does not give transport aircraft losses, it does say the CBI lost 101 transport crews due to combat and accident June 1943 to August 1945.
So when were transport aircraft being shot down in "large numbers" and what percentage were due to Ki-43?
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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- Sep 29, 2025
I wouldn't say Volume 3 is just a few random episodes, the level of detail kind of moves in and out and it is certainly more abbreviated than Vol 1 and 2, but he does record what appear to be all the losses and combat actions on a day by day basis. It's just that you don't always get for example the number of aircraft of each type involved on each day, and the details are sometimes buried. And sometimes he doesn't make it clear whether claims were actually losses, such as in one of the examples I quoted where the Japanese side describes a Spitfire being forced to crash-land by two Ki-43s, but he doesn't address whether there was a corresponding record of a forced landing by the RAF. He gives you that probably 90% of the time but not all the time.
It is not as comprehensive or nearly as easy to follow as the MAW series he did, which has very helpful summaries of all the claims and losses at the end of each daily entry that you can check, plus a better index. This one is very dense, pretty hard to read through in certain parts, and it can be tricky to find the key data if you are looking for losses for example. He usually goes over the operations, and the claims, and then somewhere in the entry for a given day he gives you the actual losses for one side, and somewhere else he gives you actual losses for the other side. In both cases always with pilot names and usually serial numbers of the aircraft. I would say it's fairly comprehensive, just not down to minute detail and not organized in the most accessible way.
What is your overall point here though, are you suggesting that the by and large successful combat record against Allied fighters that Shores describes in this volume is misleading?
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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- Sep 29, 2025
I think that was also the case with some of the US units. And I think it parallels similar situations with new units in the Solomons etc.
Yes there appear to have been relatively few P-38s for a long time. I hadn't noticed that the 33rd FG was one of the units, that's interesting!
Yes the P-47s came in later, but in large numbers. Several British units were flying them too by the end, which was a bit of a surprise to me. I'm not sure if they were ideal for the Theater but definitely a big step up from Hurricane IIs.
I didnt say it was a "few random episodes". My point was that it is nowhere near a complete picture. Until you see the full picture it is not possible to tell if it is misleading or not.
How many operations in total?
How many resulted in interceptions?
How many resulted in kills or losses?
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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I don't know at what strength, but USAAF 23rd (in China) and 51st FG (China and India) apparently got some B and C model P-51s, and 311 FBG in India which went into combat in all three units apparently by May of 1944. One source I have says they were in Theater by Sept 1943 but there may have been a training period before they went into combat. I don't think any type of P-51s were in Theater in large numbers. The Sqn publication on the Mustang says that there were never more than 500 in the CBI and usually about 250 at any one time, and that includes both the Allison and Merling engined versions.
But the only Allied fighter types which seemed to be in really large numbers were the Hurricanes and later the P-47s / Thunderbolts.
I would suggest that this was due to the rather severe range limitation of the Mk V, which was otherwise fairly good and certainly a major improvement over the Hurricanes which were in the breach far too long.
I haven't been able to find actual range statistics for the P-51A but this is helpful. Might have something to do with the external tanks too, P-51 carried two on the wings while the P-40 usually carried just the one on the centerline.
This is a good illustration of the major ramp up which took place, which broke the JAAF in this period.
Shores has some helpful Order of Battle pages in the appendix. For July 1, 1944 we see the following (just listing the Wings with the non- PR fighter Sqns and some dive bombers):
106 Wing with one Hurricane Sqn (60 Sqn), one Spitfire VIII (81 Sqn) and one Vengeance (84 Sqn)
170 Wing with four Hurricane IIc Sqn, one Spitfire VIII (607 Sqn) and one with both Spit V and Spit VIII (615 Sqn)
243 Wing with two Hurricane Sqns
165 Wing with one Hurricane IIc Sqn (91 IAF), and one Spitfire VIII (152 Sqn)
166 Wing with one Spitfire VIII Sqn (136 Sqn) and one P-38 (459th Sqn USAAF)
167 Wing with three Hurricane and one Vengeance Sqns
169 Wing with one Beaufighter X Sqn (211 Sqn)
80th FG (USAAF) with three Sqns P-40N
311 FBG (USAAF) with two Sqns P-51A and B/C and 1 A-36
293 Wing with two Spitfire VIII (67 and 155 Sqns) and 1 Beaufighter NF (176)
222 Group in Colombo with 2 Spitfire VIII, two Beaufighter Sqn, and 1 RAF Thunderbolt (135 Sqn), and a bunch of bombers and flying boats
225 Group in Bangalore with 1 Hurricane IIC and a bunch of bomber and flying boat Sqns
(in addition to this US groups like the 23rd and 51st FG were active in China and sometimes got involved in the fighting around India, 51st FG was sometimes flying out of India. By this point I think both groups were transitioning from P-40 to P-51)
For 12 Dec 1944 we now have some new units:
906 Wing with two Hurricane IIc Sqns
907 Wing with one Hurricane IIc and one Spit VIII Sqn
908 Wing with one Mosquito VI Sqn
909 Wing with three Spit VIII (17, 155, and 607 Sqns) and two Hurricane IIc Sqn
910 Wing with three RAF Thunderbolt Sqns (70, 146, 261 Sqn)
901 Wing with three Sqns of Beaufighter X
902 Wing with one Sqn Hurricane IIc, two with RAF Thunderbolt (30 and 155 Sqns) and one with P-38 (459 FS USAAF) Sqn
903 Wing with two Spit VIII (67 Sqn and 273 Sqn) and two Hurricane IIc (2 IAF and 4 IAF)
905 Wing with two Sqns of RAF Thunderbolts (134 and 258 Sqns)
80th FG (USAAF) with three Sqns P-47
33rd FG (USAAF) with three Sqns P-38 and one B-25
222 Group has 81 and 136 Sqn with Spit VIII and a bunch of bomber and flying boat Sqns
And there are several 'non operational units apparently transitioning. 8 IAF is getting Spitfire VIII
He doesn't list the 331 FBG group here but I believe they were still active..? Not sure. I think 23rd and 51st FG are still in the area as well.
What I mean is that when they were engaged, which was not continuously, they typically lost a large percentage of the aircraft on the mission. More on that in a second.
I'm referring to the pretty frequent appearances of the C-47s in Shores book, by later 1943 and into 1944 and later. The JAAF seemed to move in a few times of the year to disrupt regular transport flights over 'The Hump' and then on other occasions during the ground offensives on either side, near battlefields where troops or supplies were being brought in by the transport planes. These would only last for a week or two and usually seemed to inflict fairly serious damage. This also meant in both cases that Allied and JAAF units were moved up to airfrields closer to the front lines and they also attacked each others airfields. The Allies hit airfields where the JAAF fighters (almost exclusively Ki-43s) were based sometimes with fighter bombers, or with medium or heavy bombers, which sometimes worked, sometimes ended up in confusion and no damage, and sometimes in bloody air combats in which one side or both took fairly heavy losses (by which I mean 5-6 aircraft on a single sortie). During these periods the transport planes took heavy losses (again I'm thinking in terms of a handful lost out of a dozen or two flying), but this only happeend periodically, not continuously.
To be clear, I am not nor did I make any kind of categorial claim as to specific percentages etc., because I don't know or claim to know what those are. I was just describing the impression I got from reading the book.
If you think I'm making this up I can find and transcribe a few examples later tonight maybe. If you have the book you can find them yourself easily enough.
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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- Sep 29, 2025
have you read the book? He covers operations just about every single day except during the Monsoon seasons. There are only so many units on each side and you see them in action day after day after day. It seems if not 'comprehensive' then certainly in the ballpark.
I wouldn't make a categorical statement of the exact percentage of effective sorties or air combat victories by JAAF or specifically Ki-43 units (which seem to be the main fighter over 90% of the time, though Ki-44, Ki-45 and Ki-61 also appear and very late in the game some Ki-84s as well) but day after day after day they engaged in combat and I don't really see many cases where they took heavy losses prior to say, mid 1944. There were a couple of cases, but not many and the Allies had some bad days too, so it seemed to balance out. That said i haven't done a statistical analysis of the book let alone poured through all the squadron histories.
That said, i would love to see someone else tackle the same subject. If you ever do I'll buy the book! I'm sure there are some errors and who knows, despite what seems to be pretty thorough coverage there may turn out to be a bunch of massacres of JAAF fighter units by Allied fighters that Shores just missed or ignored. My guess is that it's pretty unlikely but I admit it's only a guess!
In other words, it seems like if not comprehensive, it's certainly a very strong statistical sample, and the pattern is pretty clear.
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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A couple of things I have learned from all of the operational histories, in no particular order:
I know that nobody is interested in my guesses, but if I had to guess, I'd say these other factors matter more than the fighter type (i.e. which is faster etc.) about 2/3 of the time. That can be tightened so that the better type gains more advantage if training and tactics are fine tuned and adhered to with strong discipline. Maybe then the other factors only count 1/2 or 1/3 of the time.
The other thing I find rather amazing in all these operational histories I read, which again goes completely against what i saw in the flight Sim games (though admittedly, it's been many years since I played those) is that quite large battles often had very low losses. 60-80 planes on each side and outcome is one forced landed and 5 damaged. On the other hand, sometimes you got serious massacres in those situations, but it seems to be rarer.
- In most air combats, one side has a positional or situational advantage over the other. Sees them before they are seen coming from above, attacking while the other side is already preoccupied strafing or attacking bombers or attacking another unit etc. That side seems to usually do better in terms of losses / outcomes.
- In most air combats, one side has numerical superiority. This also makes a difference but surprisingly to me, not quite as much. This is a major difference between real combat histories and what you might see in a flight Sim, it's worth noting.
- In most air combats, one side has more experienced or better trained and more disciplined pilots, which seems to make a significant difference in outcomes.
- In most air combats, one side is using better tactics than the other side, often tailored to the enemy aircraft they are facing. For example, sometimes the Japanese would trick Allied fighter pilots into chasing a few fighters sent out as a lure, so that other fighters could bounce them. Or they would lure them into following maneuvers that the Allied fighters couldn't do - like the famous Hineri Komi. Sometimes Allied fighter units caught JAAF or IJN units by attacking out of the sun, or lured them into diving and chasing which could be a disaster. Disciplined and well trained Allied fighter pilots would correctly execute some version of a 'boom and zoom' strategy which worked, and / or rely on specific escape maneuvers which allowed them to safely disengage whenever they were in an unfavorable situation.
- The quality of the aircraft does also play a role, but it's not always decisive. Some aircraft can fight much better at altitude than others. Some can much more easily escape and extend away or disengage. Both speed and agility seem to make this possible. Weather also has a major impact - many fighters and whole units were saved by the appearance of a helpful cloud to conceal their departure.
I know that nobody is interested in my guesses, but if I had to guess, I'd say these other factors matter more than the fighter type (i.e. which is faster etc.) about 2/3 of the time. That can be tightened so that the better type gains more advantage if training and tactics are fine tuned and adhered to with strong discipline. Maybe then the other factors only count 1/2 or 1/3 of the time.
The other thing I find rather amazing in all these operational histories I read, which again goes completely against what i saw in the flight Sim games (though admittedly, it's been many years since I played those) is that quite large battles often had very low losses. 60-80 planes on each side and outcome is one forced landed and 5 damaged. On the other hand, sometimes you got serious massacres in those situations, but it seems to be rarer.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
This is a pretty good estimate in my opinion. But that 1/4-1/3 gap can make a difference in the long run (months) and that extends to the air war in general. For instance in NA it wasn't just fighter to fighter but fighter protected own force bombers and trying to shoot down enemy bombers/close support aircraft and/recon. If you are losing even by a small margin the fighter vs fighter combats over a number of months then you are also losing the bomber campaigns (for and against) unless there are other things going on.
The Fiat CR 42 did OK in fighter to fighter if the British/allied fighters slowed down and tried to turn with it. Against fast bombers in North Africa it had problems. Fast being Blenheim's as strange as that sounds. CR 42 is supposed to do 274mph at 20,000ft but most of the bombers were not flying at 20,000ft. It was rated at 248mph at 10,000ft and at only 213mph at sea level. Granted if attacking from above the CR 42s could use speed from dive to catch bombers but long stern chases are going to give poor results and the low speed difference means difficulty just getting into position. CR 42 climb was just OK. 4 min 15 seconds to 10,000ft and 9 min to 20,000ft (and not in African heat).
The actual goal for a fighter force is to deny the enemies bombers and recon aircraft access to the battle zone/s and to ensure their own bombers and recon aircraft access to the battle zones. Destruction of the enemy fighter force is just part of the goal, an important one, but not the ultimate goal.
It is not enough to shoot down just a few of the attacking airplanes (bombers), you have to shoot down enough of them so the enemy gives up, or changes to different targets.
If your enemy can build planes 50% faster than you can you have real problem, he can afford higher losses.
- Thread starter
- #280
To hell with Wikipedia and their use of the books older than me as a reference
It was supposed to do 431 km/h at 4500m (top speed; 268 mph), and 425 at 5000m. At 6km, it is perhaps 415 km/h/256 mph?
