Effectiveness of the P-38 (3 Viewers)

[Shortround6]

The issue is whether you could hit anything with said bombs. One bomb which hits on or close to the target is better than four which hit too far away

Not sure why fighters have better accuracy than bombers?
Gun sights are not bomb sights (not the British bomb sight was much good below 3000ft).
Dropping by eye means very good judgement and higher speed hurts 'accuracy'.
As mentioned earlier Early P-40s with drop tanks had a separate release for the center rack which required taking one hand off either the stick or the throttle and reaching down.

The fighters could also do fairly effective strafing after they dropped the bombs.

They found that making repeat passes in an area increased losses.

Hurricanes were carrying bombs a few months earlier than that I believe, carrying two 250 lb bombs.

First use and common use were months apart.

Using the fighters as escorts for the Blenheims was considered very hazardous for the fighters, partly because the Blenheims flew at such a low cruising speed, and often seemed to get shot down anyway

They needed to figure out how to escort. Fighters flying at the same speed as the bombers are just more targets. Took quite a while for that to sink in, even over France.
But flying faster and using S bends reduced range.
And now we are back to target selection. RAF often wanted to bomb stuff behind the front lines, well behind. Complaining the Bostons didn't have enough range than then using Hurricanes with a bomb hanging off each wing or a P-40 with a bomb replacing the drop tank seems like they are not solving the problem.
Early escorting often did not have the fighters and bombers in visual sight of each other. Putting fighters into the same area of the sky as the bombers 10 minutes before or later is not escorting the bombers. If the bombers get hit they are going to suffer.
British only had two fighter bomber squadrons in England in the Spring of 1942 so the DAF was pretty much on it's own for tactics/technique.
I will also note that the "self-escorting" thing didn't actually work very well. It may have cut losses but bombs dropped off target to keep losses of aircraft down is a mission kill and needs a new mission mounted to try and get desired results.

 

[EwenS]

Notably after the capture of Okinawa and Ryukyu Islands , B-24s from the 5th and 7th Air Forces as well as B-25s and A-26s could reach targets in Japan.
B-29s could then concentrate on strategic bombing and anti-shipping mine laying.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DRk7H9fzECYo&ved=2ahUKEwi6oPymgf2RAxX1UaQEHVYpK_o4ChC3AnoECCkQAg&usg=AOvVaw1yUE7qNGqapWTGIUMnbbtj

The efforts of the B-29s of XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas were only diverted away in part from attacks on strategic targets and burning out cities for a relatively short period from late March to mid-May 1945, with the greatest effort being applied to the airfields on Kyushu in the second half of April to try to destroy kamikaze bases. But the strategic effort never really stopped.

The first 7th AF units arriving on Okinawa were at the beginning of June 1945 - B-25s of the 41st BG(M). and the P-61s of 548th NFS on 7 & 8 June. Other BG followed - 494th BG(H) on 24th June, 11th BG(H) and the A-26 equipped 319th BG(M) on the 2nd July.

5th AF fighter units moved to Okinawa between 28 June and mid-Aug. The bomber units moved in starting with the 345th BG(M) on the 20th July, the 38th BG(M) on 25th and the first B-24 equipped unit, the 43rd BG(H) on the 26th with other bomber units continuing to arrive from the beginning of Aug.

13th AF had still to begin its move north to Okinawa when the war ended.

But the effect of these moves was not to allow the B-29s to concentrate on strategic targets because they already were. Instead they added to the pressure on Japan. Operations from Okinawa stretched not only out to southern Japan but across the East China Sea to the Chinese coast, up into the Yellow Sea and across the southern part of Korea that had until that time been virtually untouched.

All the minelaying carried out by the B-29s of XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas was carried out by aircraft of the 313th BW (6th, 9th, 504th & 505th BG) which devoted a considerable proportion of its time between 27th March and 14th Aug 1945 to the task. 46 missions, 1,528 sorties of which 1,424 were successfully carried out to lay 13,102 mines (12,053 on target) for the loss of 15 aircraft (6 to enemy action & 9 to other causes.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Not sure why fighters have better accuracy than bombers?
Gun sights are not bomb sights (not the British bomb sight was much good below 3000ft).
Dropping by eye means very good judgement and higher speed hurts 'accuracy'.

Basically because they did shallow angle dive bombing (45 degrees or so). Why this (usually) worked better than level bombing with a bomb sight I don't know but it seems to be a constant across all Theaters in the war.

As mentioned earlier Early P-40s with drop tanks had a separate release for the center rack which required taking one hand off either the stick or the throttle and reaching down.

They found that making repeat passes in an area increased losses.

This is definitely the case. The typical strategy seemed to be one sudden bombing pass which turned into a single strafing run followed by rapid departure. The strafing was often more dangerous part of it. A second pass was considered extremely reckless and a third pass basically suicidal.

First use and common use were months apart.

Common use for the Kittyhawks seemed to start immediately at least with a couple of squadrons once they tested it.

They needed to figure out how to escort. Fighters flying at the same speed as the bombers are just more targets. Took quite a while for that to sink in, even over France.
But flying faster and using S bends reduced range.

All true, but this was the strategy they worked out for the faster Baltimores, Bostons and Marylands.

And now we are back to target selection. RAF often wanted to bomb stuff behind the front lines, well behind. Complaining the Bostons didn't have enough range than then using Hurricanes with a bomb hanging off each wing or a P-40 with a bomb replacing the drop tank seems like they are not solving the problem.

Fighter-bombers were more often used for tactical strikes closer to the front line, obviously - tanks and artillery, AA or AT guns especially during major battles, enemy airfields, supply dumps, and 'motor transport' / MT most often. The Hurricanes had particularly short range with bombs. The level bombers were indeed used to attack 'deeper' targets, Boston was somewhat limited depending on the exact type (Boston III was arguably the most important type for the DAF early on, later types had better range) with Maryland and Baltimore having comparatively good range but still light bomb loads (especially the Maryland which often just carried four 250 lb bombs like the Blenheim). The more vulnerable but much longer ranged planes like the Wellingtons were used to interdict ships far out to sea, or at night against dock facilities etc.

Later when the US arrived in force much heavier raids with B-25s, B-26s and B-24s were made against Axis air bases which is a big part of what broke the back of the Luftwaffe in North Africa. They lost more planes to bombs while parked on the ground than they did in the air. One important role for the P-38 was in escorting B-24s to much more distant targets. The B-24s were very effective at attacking these kinds of 'operational' targets.

Early escorting often did not have the fighters and bombers in visual sight of each other. Putting fighters into the same area of the sky as the bombers 10 minutes before or later is not escorting the bombers. If the bombers get hit they are going to suffer.

in the Western Desert by 1942 they seem to have been a few thousand feet above but still in sight of the bombers until they reached the target. After that it seems like the bombers were on their own, and same for fighter bombers. They also did fly circuitous routes which reduced range, as they flew around known flak concentrations. One thing about this Theater is that visibility was often very good for long distances so it helped the escorts keep tabs on the bombers, until fighters showed up. Then they got preoccupied.

British only had two fighter bomber squadrons in England in the Spring of 1942 so the DAF was pretty much on it's own for tactics/technique.

yes they worked out tactics slowly and painfully. It was very rough going in the Spring of 1942 in North Africa. By second El Alamein in the Fall however their tactics were honed pretty well.

I will also note that the "self-escorting" thing didn't actually work very well. It may have cut losses but bombs dropped off target to keep losses of aircraft down is a mission kill and needs a new mission mounted to try and get desired results.

Self escorting definitely didn't work well, fighter bombers were often slaughtered even with escorts. The normal thing was for the merlin engined P-40s, P-38s or Spitfires to escort the fighter bombers, the latter being mostly older type Kittyhawks and Hurricanes. The South Africans did also for a while escort Hurricane squadrons with their Tomahawks, which apparently had a bit better altitude performance than the early Kittyhawks.

But until the merlin-engined P-40s showed up the 'top cover' (which in early days was sometimes a single flight of four fighters) was often the most vulnerable to being shot down. later they worked out the 'Big Wing' tactics with an entire squadron which would turn into the attack, guns blazing. This worked a lot better.

 

[PAT303]

That's all that happened in my post. You said the Zeros were useless near the end of the war. NOBODY who fought them said that. They were dangerous right up to the end of the war if competently-flown, and that's from the guys who were there and flying combat at the time.

I will admit I as wrong, Zero's weren't useless at the end of the war, they were useful in killing off hundreds of pilots and as suicide planes.

 

[GregP]

I will admit I as wrong, Zero's weren't useless at the end of the war, they were useful in killing off hundreds of pilots and as suicide planes.

Methinks thou art a fawning, beef-witted malt-worm. Such utterings are clear cognitive dissonance. Think it out and you may yet become more than a padawan. There is still hope.

Yes, we still won the war.

Cheers.

 

[PAT303]

Methinks thou art a fawning, beef-witted malt-worm. Such utterings are clear cognitive dissonance. Think it out and you may yet become more than a padawan. There is still hope.

Yes, we still won the war.

Cheers.

The score count backs up what I said, Japanese aircraft were made to a doctrine totally the opposite to everyone else and the pilots paid the price.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I will admit I as wrong, Zero's weren't useless at the end of the war, they were useful in killing off hundreds of pilots and as suicide planes.

I have to admit - you had me for a second! For a brief instant, I thought you'd actually learned something here on this forum, until I finished the sentence

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yes, we still won the war.

Cheers.

I think this is one of the key factors that kind of govern how we perceive the war, and particularly air power. We always focus on the top fighters of the war as those flying in 1945 for example. P-51K, P-47M, P-38L (bringing it back on topic), F2G Corsair, Hawker Tempest, Spitfire Mk XXI, Ki-84, J2M and N1K2 for the Japanese, Fw 190D-9 and Ta-152, Bf 109K, and Me 262 for the Germans, La 7 for the Soviets etc.

Those are the aircraft every kid wants to fly on War Thunder or whatever, these are the popular model kits that are easiest to find in the hobby stores. These are the ones you'll see in paintings and art the most often. Everybody wants "the best".

But most of those types were not really very relevant to the war. Ironically, vis a vis the thread subject, the P-38L was one of the later modernized types which did make it (albeit in limited numbers) to the front in time to be useful. The P-38L was a very formidable fighter, really a triumph of aviation technology. But it wasn't as fast as a P-51K or a Spit XXI or a Ta 152 so it has a comparatively small fan base.

There is also an odd bias - everyone rates the Germans, even though they too lost. Their aircraft were good but had serious flaws just like everyone else's. The Japanese actually lasted longer in the war. but their kit is generally dismissed. This despite the fact that their ships and aircraft proved just as superior against Allied types as the Germans did in the early part of the war, and they held on just as tenaciously. Germany may have had a more formidable military machine overall but the Japanese had the best navy and naval air forces in the world in early 1942. They took all the major far eastern colonies from both the US and British (and other European powers) with a shockingly swift wipeout- Malaya, Philippines, Java / DEI, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma, Indochina etc.

During the war, and not just in 1942, the Allies were quite afraid of the Empire of Japan. Facing them on in combat, whether in the sky, on the seas, or in the jungles of those islands, was extremely perilous. It's a weird fetish to focus only on the end, the latest and last, but I guess that's something in our culture, we think in linear terms.

One of the things I've come to be much more interested in though is what aircraft were really doing most of the fighting, especially when the outcome of the war still seemed to be very much in doubt. Over El Alamein and Guadalcanal. During the Battle of Bismark Sea and in New Guinea, over Stalingrad and Sicily.

Looking at these engagements, and reading the operational histories, when it comes to air combat it's very clear that there is more than one way to skin a cat. We have really allowed mythology and nationalist propaganda to conceal the realities. We came to the conclusion that the features emphasized in those 1945 uber planes - high speed, high altitude capability and firepower, were the only things that really mattered. This came back to haunt the US during the Vietnam war when MiG 17s were shooting down F4 Phantoms that had twice the top speed. We saw in South Asia India - Pakistan wars 'obsolete' and 'slow' (but agile!) Folland Gnats defeating F-86s and MiG-21 shooting down theoretically faster and more sophisticated F-104s.

My guess is that we will keep being surprised.

 

[andy1967]

I think this is one of the key factors that kind of govern how we perceive the war, and particularly air power. We always focus on the top fighters of the war as those flying in 1945 for example. P-51K, P-47M, P-38L (bringing it back on topic), F2G Corsair, Hawker Tempest, Spitfire Mk XXI, Ki-84, J2M and N1K2 for the Japanese, Fw 190D-9 and Ta-152, Bf 109K, and Me 262 for the Germans, La 7 for the Soviets etc.

Those are the aircraft every kid wants to fly on War Thunder or whatever, these are the popular model kits that are easiest to find in the hobby stores. These are the ones you'll see in paintings and art the most often. Everybody wants "the best".

But most of those types were not really very relevant to the war. Ironically, vis a vis the thread subject, the P-38L was one of the later modernized types which did make it (albeit in limited numbers) to the front in time to be useful. The P-38L was a very formidable fighter, really a triumph of aviation technology. But it wasn't as fast as a P-51K or a Spit XXI or a Ta 152 so it has a comparatively small fan base.

There is also an odd bias - everyone rates the Germans, even though they too lost. Their aircraft were good but had serious flaws just like everyone else's. The Japanese actually lasted longer in the war. but their kit is generally dismissed. This despite the fact that their ships and aircraft proved just as superior against Allied types as the Germans did in the early part of the war, and they held on just as tenaciously. Germany may have had a more formidable military machine overall but the Japanese had the best navy and naval air forces in the world in early 1942. They took all the major far eastern colonies from both the US and British (and other European powers) with a shockingly swift wipeout- Malaya, Philippines, Java / DEI, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma, Indochina etc.

During the war, and not just in 1942, the Allies were quite afraid of the Empire of Japan. Facing them on in combat, whether in the sky, on the seas, or in the jungles of those islands, was extremely perilous. It's a weird fetish to focus only on the end, the latest and last, but I guess that's something in our culture, we think in linear terms.

One of the things I've come to be much more interested in though is what aircraft were really doing most of the fighting, especially when the outcome of the war still seemed to be very much in doubt. Over El Alamein and Guadalcanal. During the Battle of Bismark Sea and in New Guinea, over Stalingrad and Sicily.

Looking at these engagements, and reading the operational histories, when it comes to air combat it's very clear that there is more than one way to skin a cat. We have really allowed mythology and nationalist propaganda to conceal the realities. We came to the conclusion that the features emphasized in those 1945 uber planes - high speed, high altitude capability and firepower, were the only things that really mattered. This came back to haunt the US during the Vietnam war when MiG 17s were shooting down F4 Phantoms that had twice the top speed. We saw in South Asia India - Pakistan wars 'obsolete' and 'slow' (but agile!) Folland Gnats defeating F-86s and MiG-21 shooting down theoretically faster and more sophisticated F-104s.

My guess is that we will keep being surprised.

Totally agree with the later war fighters weren't really very relevant. The P40 kittyhawk/Warhawk and Spitfire MkV whilst not being the best fighters in any theatre of operation did most of the donkey work especially for the RAF in the 41-43 time period. .The Spitfire Mk V is estimated to have achieved approximately 2500 kills and the P40 had over 100 Allied pilots achieve Ace status.

 

[MikeMeech]

Not sure why fighters have better accuracy than bombers?
Gun sights are not bomb sights (not the British bomb sight was much good below 3000ft).
Dropping by eye means very good judgement and higher speed hurts 'accuracy'.
As mentioned earlier Early P-40s with drop tanks had a separate release for the center rack which required taking one hand off either the stick or the throttle and reaching down.

Hi
The RAF had about three main low level bomb sights during WW2, the 1940 Low Level Mark I (Hand Held), the Mark II (O) and its variants, and the Low Level Bombsight Mark III which started to come into service at the end of 1942 and was used by Coastal Command and by (light) bombers for low level attacks. This last one was considered very accurate. Full details can be found on the RAF Air Historical Branch website in 'Armament Volume I 'Bombs and Bombing Equipment', Chapter 19, as a free download.

Mike

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Totally agree with the later war fighters weren't really very relevant. The P40 kittyhawk/Warhawk and Spitfire MkV whilst not being the best fighters in any theatre of operation did most of the donkey work especially for the RAF in the 41-43 time period. .The Spitfire Mk V is estimated to have achieved approximately 2500 kills and the P40 had over 100 Allied pilots achieve Ace status.

Add to that the Wildcat for the US (and Royal) Navy, and the Yak-1 in the Soviet German War. And the A6M and Ki-43 for the Japanese...

 

[Shortround6]

I think this is one of the key factors that kind of govern how we perceive the war, and particularly air power. We always focus on the top fighters of the war as those flying in 1945 for example. P-51K, P-47M, P-38L (bringing it back on topic), F2G Corsair, Hawker Tempest, Spitfire Mk XXI, Ki-84, J2M and N1K2 for the Japanese, Fw 190D-9 and Ta-152, Bf 109K, and Me 262 for the Germans, La 7 for the Soviets etc.

One of the things I've come to be much more interested in though is what aircraft were really doing most of the fighting, especially when the outcome of the war still seemed to be very much in doubt. Over El Alamein and Guadalcanal. During the Battle of Bismark Sea and in New Guinea, over Stalingrad and Sicily.

It is here that the P-38 slips in. The P-38F, G, and H were the best US Army fighter from Nov 1942 to Nov 1943.
However it was in short supply and needed support from the P-40s, and early P-47s. It's low production rate is a major problem in 1942 and 1943.
Nov/Dec 43 and Jan 1944 saw the changeover in Europe to the Mid P-47s and the P-51B/C.
But the changeover was slow.
In the Winter/spring of 1944 the P-38 was fighting NW Europe, Italy, China, India, and in many parts of the Pacific. Operations in Europe do not go well for the P-38s
It was April 1944 when the First Air commando group in Burma got their first 5 P-51Bs. It was April 16th 1944 when the first P-51Bs went into combat in Italy.
It was Dec 1943 when the P-47s got a large boost in performance with Paddle blade props and water injection and a lot of this was done at squadron level.
The P-38Js had 4 versions before the Ls showed up.
J, new props, better engine cooling
J-10, Better cockpit heating and two generators.
J-15, leading edge fuel tanks
J-25, underwing dive flaps and power boosted ailerons.
Some Js got upgraded in the field or in theater modification centers.

The P-38 became the most common fighter in the Far East Air Force in Aug 1944. Granted the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt but the range of the P-38s allowed for a more rapid campaign in the Philippines.

At times perception was as important as reality and the Allison powered P-40s were often viewed as 2nd rate by the high command in late 1942 and 1943.. Useful but not up to snuff if faced by 109s in NA or better Japanese aircraft (which turned out to rather late in showing up). Turns out the P-39 was even lower rated and was first on chopping block when better aircraft showed up. When P-47s showed up in Italy it was usually the P-39s that got replaced (and given to the French or Italian allies).

In Europe it took quite a while for the P-51 to take over. The P-47D-25 with the extra 65 gal of internal fuel only started to show up in April/June of 1944 so it took quite a while for the 8th Air Force to become mostly P-51 equipped. The P-47s an P-38s were shuffled over to the 9th Air Force for tactical duties.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

It is here that the P-38 slips in. The P-38F, G, and H were the best US Army fighter from Nov 1942 to Nov 1943.

I would say, it had capabilities - especially for the Pacific, that no other US Army Fighter had (which meant basically just P-40, P-39 at that point, maybe P-36 and P-43 around the margins). But I think it was a while before the P-38 was consistently having better outcomes in combat than the P-40 or the Wildcat.

However it was in short supply and needed support from the P-40s, and early P-47s. It's low production rate is a major problem in 1942 and 1943.

Low production rate and the many problems with fighting at altitude, diving, general maintenance etc.

Nov/Dec 43 and Jan 1944 saw the changeover in Europe to the Mid P-47s and the P-51B/C.
But the changeover was slow.

The time stamps here are helpful,

In the Winter/spring of 1944 the P-38 was fighting NW Europe, Italy, China, India, and in many parts of the Pacific. Operations in Europe do not go well for the P-38s

They had trouble with the early models. The original missions in the Med were being flown by P-38Fs, which was certainly not ready to deal with German or Italian fighters at that time. This improved incrementally until they were in fact capable. But it took a while to address each problem.

It was April 1944 when the First Air commando group in Burma got their first 5 P-51Bs. It was April 16th 1944 when the first P-51Bs went into combat in Italy.

Seems to be around when the 23rd FG got them as well

It was Dec 1943 when the P-47s got a large boost in performance with Paddle blade props and water injection and a lot of this was done at squadron level.

Helpful to know the timeline there

The P-38Js had 4 versions before the Ls showed up.
J, new props, better engine cooling
J-10, Better cockpit heating and two generators.
J-15, leading edge fuel tanks
J-25, underwing dive flaps and power boosted ailerons.
Some Js got upgraded in the field or in theater modification centers.

This sounds almost like all the improvements, what changed with the P-38L?

The P-38 became the most common fighter in the Far East Air Force in Aug 1944. Granted the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt but the range of the P-38s allowed for a more rapid campaign in the Philippines.

The P-38 gave range, and by 1944 altitude capabilities that the older USAAF fighters didn't have, though the P-47s and P-51s especially were competitive.

At times perception was as important as reality and the Allison powered P-40s were often viewed as 2nd rate by the high command in late 1942 and 1943.. Useful but not up to snuff if faced by 109s in NA or better Japanese aircraft (which turned out to rather late in showing up).

I would agree with the perception part, but I'd put a different spin on it. The P-40 looked like it was already obsolete as an aircraft in early 1942. It wasn't just the altitude limitations. They were not holding up to either Japanese or German fighters (or were just barely doing so). After the initial shock however, as training improved and tactics were fine-tuned (and successful tactics that were worked out by certain units spread around) and and as the incrementally improved variants arrived, the P-40 turned out to be the fighter that looked like it wasn't capable but kept holding up against enemy fighters, and shooting down enemy bombers better than expected. In New Guinea, in the Solomons, in Burma and China, in North Africa and Sicily and even in Italy, from the second half of 1942 into early 1944, it was the fighter that underpromised and overdelivered, consistently. Plus it turned out to be a good fighter-bomber so that every P-40 fighter unit was like also having a half squadron of SBDs or something at the same time.

The P-40 looked like it was on it's way out in early 1942 but then by the second half of that year it was coming back into the breach, with the US forces in the Med and Pacific, with the British and South Africans in the Med, the Aussies and the Kiwis. Even the Canadians. And the Soviets of course though they were the rally market for the P-39.

But the Allison was a real limitation in some important ways. It meant that P-40s couldn't escort B-24s or B-17s at their optimal altitudes, and that meant they were unsuitable for the real mission of the USAAF as many of it's generals saw it. And this wasn't just about Strategic bombing from England, it was a real issue in the Pacific and in Burma as well. P-40s could escort light and medium bombers like A-20s and B-25s and B-26s, but they were not suitable to escort the heavy bombers. It was also a real issue for some of the fighting in all the Theaters when enemy bombers came in at higher altitudes, as the Japanese in particular sometimes did. The merlin engined P-40F/L didn't really have this problem to the same extent, but they were available in very limited numbers and in high demand during their hey day from mid 1942 through mid 1943.

All versions of the P-40 also lacked the range of the later fighters, I think partly because they only carried one external tank, whereas P-38, P-51, and eventually P-47 all carried two. The Corsair and even the Wildcat eventually carried two external tanks when enough arrived in Theater for them.

Turns out the P-39 was even lower rated and was first on chopping block when better aircraft showed up.

Slight disagreement here as well. I have the impression that the USAAF went in for the P-39 in a big way. After all, it looked good ... it was faster than a P-40 or even a Spit V (at least on paper), climbed fast (again, at least on paper?). P-39s were all over the place in the Pacific. They were taking over from US and Aussie P-40 units, I think they were meant to be the next thing. They used them in large numbers in the Solomons and New Guinea, and they held the line for a while next to the Wildcats. At some point the USAAF realized that they were not working out like they seemed like they should. They had fairly poor outcomes in air combat and also quite limited range. Then they started pulling them out right and left but I think it took a while, you still had squadrons in some of the islands in 1944. They found a role for them as fighter bombers in Italy too.

When P-47s showed up in Italy it was usually the P-39s that got replaced (and given to the French or Italian allies).

Like I said, they brought some back in for Italy to be used as fast fighter-bombers.

In Europe it took quite a while for the P-51 to take over. The P-47D-25 with the extra 65 gal of internal fuel only started to show up in April/June of 1944 so it took quite a while for the 8th Air Force to become mostly P-51 equipped. The P-47s an P-38s were shuffled over to the 9th Air Force for tactical duties.

Well, there was still glory to be had ... and the big show was about to start in June, after which tactical missions were increasingly important.

 

[PAT303]

The 308th records say 3 planes lost (60%) and that they were attacked by 50+ fighters (over-estimate by Americans?).

Posted on here not long ago was some reports that stated that all the Japanese fighters would focus on one bomber so that the accumulative effect of 5-6 individual fighters two machine guns made up for their lack of individual firepower, if you where in a B24 with Ki 43's slashing past you one after the other it would be easy feel like 50 plus fighters are in the attack.

 

[EwenS]

One problem with understanding heavy bomber operations in the Far East is the perception that they mirrored the 8th & 15th AF in Europe in size and scale. They didn't. Far fewer units in each AF and smaller formations being dispatched on raids over longer ranges often unescorted. So much less requirement for escort fighters.

CBI -
10th AF - 1 Group (7th)
14th AF - 1 Group (308th)

Plus of course RAF Wellingtons & Liberators in India / Burma.

Pacific
5th AF - 4 Groups (90th, 380th, 43rd & 22nd). The last only became a heavy bomber group in Feb 1944. Started operations from Australia moving up through New Guinea to the Philippines. The 380th only left northern Australia in Jan 1945. Some of its operations overlapped with 13th AF.

Then from July 1945 the 312th began to convert from light (A-20) to heavy (B-32), but this was incomplete at end of WW2.

7th AF - 3 groups

13th AF - 2 groups + a specialist LAB squadron. It was this AF that was based in the Solomons in 1943/44.

11th AF - 1 squadron.

1942/43 saw units moving around between the numbered AF in the Pacific to confuse things.

Heavy bomber operations in the PTO were augmented by USN PB4Y-1 squadrons from early 1943.

Then consider geographical spread of basing within each air force.

Also add in RAAF Liberator units from mid/late 1944. 5 squadrons became operational before the end of the war.

 

[MikeMeech]

Using the fighters as escorts might have worked better? Close Support took a while to sort out. Bombing enemy airfields close the front may have been considered close support? From the army's point of view, if the front-line troops could not see the bombs falling it was not close support. This led to a lot of arguing between the RAF and the Army.

Hi
Troops seeing the bombs falling may have been a morale boost but was not always the best use of air power. It also can cause problems of marking the 'bomb line' and avoiding 'friendly fire' incidents. it is interesting to note that in the various Theatres of war that artillery is mentioned being used to mark targets for CAS aircraft by firing 'smoke shell markers' so well in range of artillery fire! There is an impression that 'Allied' troops sometimes became 'over reliant' on air CAS instead of using there own organic fire power. This was not a new argument as it was being discussed during WW1, for example this letter (TNA, AIR 1/919/204/5/882) from Lt Col J A Chamier (15th Corps Wing, RAF) and Lt Col T W C Carthew (81st Corps Wing):

Worries about upsetting the gunners! However, during WW2 we see AOP aircraft doing similar work as the CAP aircraft of WW2 calling for both artillery/CAS or a mixture of both depending on the target. I have mentioned some of these problems in my chapter (for those interested) in Helion's:

Also for those interested in bomber casualties, from all causes, in the ME Theatre there is the following that have been published:

Mike

 

[drgondog]

Hmm, The reasons for longevity of the P-40 in 1942 and 1943 and at least midway through 1944 for US operations:
1. It was in high production, and significant commitments to continued production included allocation agreements with Commonwealth air forces. The Russians not so much, the preferred the P-39.
2. Performance, particularly the F and L with the Packard 1650-1, was not as dismal as often portrayed. It was capable medium to low altitude fighter because of outstanding roll rate, good top speed and very good dive speed. Against Axis fighters it was outclassed in climb by the 109 and 190 and A6M. It was outclassed in top speed by the 109 and 190 but 109 not so much at low altitude. Lessons learned - don't get into dogfights on the deck where you can't extend by diving.
3. Tactical flexibility - it was decent middle altitude escort, which was a significant requirement in all theatres for medium and heavy bombardment save ETO. EwanS touched on the CBI/Pac theaters paucity of heavy bombardment squadrons but there were major doctrinal differences compared to ETO. The bombing altitudes were largely 12-18000 feet which enabled a wider range of aircraft types suitable for bomber escort, including P-40s, but P-40s limited by range. It was mediocre, but serviceable as a CAS fighter due to single 500 pound bomb limit and limited range with bomb.
4. Replacement/Production ramp up to US units for P-51B, P-47D was hampered by the same production allocations to a lesser extent, to Commonwealth air forces.

The P-38 issues limiting its full usefulness in 1942 and 1943:
1. High altitude issues are dominantly discussed but the real issue in MTO/ETO/SWPA was early pilot experience and knowledge. A pilot transitioning from singe engine P-40 and P-39, even a combat vet, was in deep trouble counting on roll rate and dive and turn against the top Axis fighters, including the A6M. In N.Africa, the P-38 fighter groups were mauled by experienced LW pilots, particularly in CAS missions when the only advantage was rate of climb. Ditto in SWPA until the P-38 pilots learned to not dogfight the A6M or Ki-43.
2. Limited production capacity for Lockheed combined with producing a very big and costly and complicated 'system' effectively yielded half the production delivery rates of North American and Republic in mid-1943. The result was very slow population of fighter squadrons across all theatres despite huge demand because of its range (Compared to P-39, P-40 and P-47C/D before wing pylons added).
3. Added required maneuverability features slow to produce and deliver. Dive recovery solved by adding dive flaps took two years to introduce between the P-38F and the P-38J-25. Ditto boosted ailerons. The mid 1944 P-38J-25 and P-38L were finally the fighter that Kelly Johnson envisioned in 1939.

Design Objectives:
1. P-38 - High Altitude Bomber Interceptor/Coastal Defense per US Army and AAC doctrine in 1938-1940.
2. P-39 - Same, but limited range, point interceptor for US base defense. High altitude mission abandoned because of supercharger issues. Mission relegated to point interceptor for low to medium altitudes and battlefield air superiority. It was successful when theater doctrine permitted the mission to those parameters. Examples VVS application and SWPA as short range CAS.
3. P-40 - Pursuit, battlefield air superiority.
4. P-47 - same mission as P-38 but with new R-2800 piston engine. Limited range, but greater than P-39, until conventional bomb racks installed to accept US standard bombs and drop tanks in mid 1943 (belly rack) and late 1943 (wing pylons) for application as long range escort fighter. By WWII interceptor standards of 1942, only the P-47M could have operated as an interceptor by 1945.
5. P-51/Mustang I - Pursuit, better than P-40, more range, higher speed, better climb - but Low to medium altitude due to Allison engine.

Reality:
1. Early war requirements for US were point interception at medium to high altitudes, close escort at low to medium altitudes and battlefield (low altitude) tactical support including attack and air superiority.
2. None of the US fighter inventory was suited for all three roles save perhaps the P-38 with dogfight limitations and perhaps the Mustang I with limitation as escort at high altitudes. But the Mustang was not in US inventory until the NA-91 P-51-NA and its introduction was as Recon in 1943.
3. None were a superior match for A6M or Bf 109F or FW 190 in a maneuvering dogfight at low to medium altitudes, given equal pilot skill and tactical engagement parity.

Result:
1. Change the game, change the mix, add features to otherwise capable designs. Replace obsolete as production ramps based on global priorities.
2. Increase 'matching high performance inventory' to dominant theater mission.
3. Overwhelm with numbers of A/c and trained pilots.

FWIIW to the above discussion:
1. Delivery of P-51B/C in squadron operational quantity:
a.) ETO late November 1943 to 354th FG
b.) CBI early April 1944 to 23rd FG. Tex Hill achieved his first VC in P-51B in May 1944. His first P-51A victory was November 1943.
2. Delivery of P-38J-5/-10 in squadron operational quantity:
a.) ETO late November 1943.
b.) MTO March 1944.
c.) SWPA February 1944.
All retrofitted to P-38J-15 status with 55gal Leading Edge tanks by February 1944.
Delivery of P-47D-15 in squadron operational quantity. Include P-47C through D-11 with depot mods for wing pylon.
a.) ETO mid-March 1944
b.) SWPA late February 1944.
c.) MTO mid-March 1944.

 

[Shortround6]

I would say, it had capabilities - especially for the Pacific, that no other US Army Fighter had (which meant basically just P-40, P-39 at that point, maybe P-36 and P-43 around the margins). But I think it was a while before the P-38 was consistently having better outcomes in combat than the P-40 or the Wildcat.

P-38 had two capabilities in the Pacific in 1942. Range and altitude. P-36 was out of production at the end of 1940 and was not coming back. Numbers in US service are under 100 after Dec 7th 1941. P-43s had some of the same problems the early P-38s had except there was no 2nd engine to get home with. Very few made to combat service with the US. They had problems with the fuel tanks leaking even without getting shot.

Low production rate and the many problems with fighting at altitude, diving, general maintenance etc.

A lot of this is true but they were complicated machines with green crews, both pilots and ground crew. The P-40 and P-39 crews in Torch were also green.
Fighting at altitude needs a careful look. It means different things in different theaters and flying at 25,000ft in NA is different than flying in Northern Europe in the winter.
A P-38F if running right, had 1150hp per engine at 25,000ft.
A P-38G if running right, had 1150hp per engine at 25,000ft. It had more power at lower altitudes. Up to 1325hp at 15,000ft.
P-40F had 1120hp at 18,500ft.
P-39K & L had 1150hp at 12,000ft.
Now who had trouble at high altitudes?

They had trouble with the early models. The original missions in the Med were being flown by P-38Fs, which was certainly not ready to deal with German or Italian fighters at that time. This improved incrementally until they were in fact capable. But it took a while to address each problem.

German fighters were varied at the time. Italians were flying pretty much Macci 202 for fighters at the time of Torch in NA with just a few other types in just a few squadrons. Macci 202s were not hi altitude (over 20,000ft) fighters. P-38 pilots may have used bad tactics.

The P-38 gave range, and by 1944 altitude capabilities that the older USAAF fighters didn't have, though the P-47s and P-51s especially were competitive.

The P-38s had range and had altitude capabilities many other planes did not have even in Jan 1943. P-38F could climb at around 2000fpm from 20,000ft to 26,000ft and do it at 2600rpm.

I would agree with the perception part, but I'd put a different spin on it. The P-40 looked like it was already obsolete as an aircraft in early 1942. It wasn't just the altitude limitations. They were not holding up to either Japanese or German fighters (or were just barely doing so). After the initial shock however, as training improved and tactics were fine-tuned (and successful tactics that were worked out by certain units spread around) and and as the incrementally improved variants arrived, the P-40 turned out to be the fighter that looked like it wasn't capable but kept holding up against enemy fighters, and shooting down enemy bombers better than expected.

Part of the bomber busting was the six .50s and the fact that most Axis bombers were not all that tough. A P-40 had around 3 times the fire power of Ki-43 or most Macci 202s.
However the six .50s meant the P-40 couldn't turn or climb as well as most of it's opponents.

In New Guinea, in the Solomons, in Burma and China, in North Africa and Sicily and even in Italy, from the second half of 1942 into early 1944, it was the fighter that underpromised and overdelivered, consistently.

Sounds like Curtiss press release

But the Allison was a real limitation in some important ways. It meant that P-40s couldn't escort B-24s or B-17s at their optimal altitudes, and that meant they were unsuitable for the real mission of the USAAF as many of it's generals saw it. And this wasn't just about Strategic bombing from England, it was a real issue in the Pacific and in Burma as well. P-40s could escort light and medium bombers like A-20s and B-25s and B-26s, but they were not suitable to escort the heavy bombers. It was also a real issue for some of the fighting in all the Theaters when enemy bombers came in at higher altitudes, as the Japanese in particular sometimes did. The merlin engined P-40F/L didn't really have this problem to the same extent, but they were available in very limited numbers and in high demand during their hey day from mid 1942 through mid 1943.

P-40 didn't have the range to escort the B-17/B-24 at any altitude. It didn't have the range to escort either the B-25 or the B-26 on longer missions.
Ability to escort A-20s is marginal, The P-40s better have washed and waxed their aircraft

All versions of the P-40 also lacked the range of the later fighters, I think partly because they only carried one external tank, whereas P-38, P-51, and eventually P-47 all carried two. The Corsair and even the Wildcat eventually carried two external tanks when enough arrived in Theater for them.

For escort it is not the external fuel. The problem is the internal fuel once the escorts have to drop tanks in combat. How far can they fly home? P-40s sometimes carried 75 gallon tanks. Using two external tanks sometimes means the fighters can go deeper into enemy territory than they get back out of.
Standard procedure for escort fighters was to start, warm up and take off on one of the main tanks, 12-18 gallons for the smaller fighters, R-2800 powered fighters could use up a lot more just getting off the runway. Getting home you have to figure two more things. One is about 20-30 minutes of flight at max endurance, 160-190mph at near sea level hunting for an airfield because of bad weather. P-40 needs 10-15 gallons of fuel. 2nd is the combat allowance. How many minutes at what power levels? 5 minutes WEP and 15 minutes military or 20 minutes military or only 15 minutes? At these power levels the P-40 could burn 2 to 2.5 gallons a minute. You want to use WEP at 5,000ft? you might need 3 gallons a minute.
Take those the 3 things out of the under 150 gallons in the early (non P-40M & N) and that is the fuel you have to get home with. under 100 gallons at best and possibly closer to 75 gallons. Lugging in two tanks and just dropping the fuel doesn't extend the range any.

Slight disagreement here as well. I have the impression that the USAAF went in for the P-39 in a big way. After all, it looked good ... it was faster than a P-40 or even a Spit V (at least on paper), climbed fast (again, at least on paper?). P-39s were all over the place in the Pacific. They were taking over from US and Aussie P-40 units, I think they were meant to be the next thing. They used them in large numbers in the Solomons and New Guinea, and they held the line for a while next to the Wildcats. At some point the USAAF realized that they were not working out like they seemed like they should. They had fairly poor outcomes in air combat and also quite limited range. Then they started pulling them out right and left but I think it took a while, you still had squadrons in some of the islands in 1944. They found a role for them as fighter bombers in Italy too.

P-39 was a screw up of the 1st order. But it was all the US army had aside from the P-40s.
Production
plane....................1941............................1942..........................1943
P-38.......................207.............................1479..........................2497
P-39.......................926.............................1932..........................4947
P-40.....................2248*...........................3854*........................4258
P-47..........................1................................532...........................4428
* a lot of British and Lend lease.
British got smart real quick on the P-39 and sent many of their initial order to Russia.
The US sending a lot of P-40s to the British and to Russia and needed something/anything to fill in the squadrons and that was the P-39. Bell lied about the speed and climb. It needed a longer runway than the P-40. and it held about 80% of the fuel of the 1941/42 P-40s so it was useless for any type of escort except short range tactical. It was avialable and it was faster than P-36

US also got somewhat stuck when a few of the planned replacements did not work out. Summer of 1942 saw the cancelation of the Curtiss P-60 (P-40 with laminar flow wing and trick engine/s) and ordering 1000-2000 more P-40s as substitutes.

With turbo.
They wound up sticking R-2800s in them for a sort of P-47 Junior except they weren't as fast, carried 1/2 the guns and had a few other problems.
This P-60 thing pretty much ended Curtiss as an airplane manufacturer.

P-39s were available and were better than nothing but only just.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The British did have a couple of other fighter types - the Mohawk was pretty important fighter from 1942 and until early 1944, flying in two squadrons IIRC

The try to say something meaningful waffle

Yes there appear to have been relatively few P-38s for a long time.

The British sent 85 Mohawks from the UK September 1941 to June 1942, another 1 in June 1943, then come the 9 or 10 taken in Iran and the various claims about Chinese production. The two squadrons mimic the 2 squadrons of P-38 present, with P-38 reported on strength from July 1943.

As of February 1943 India reported it had 63 Mohawks, down to 54 in July when the USAAF reports its first 23 P-38, in October 1943 it is 52 Mohawk to 58 P-38.

Mohawks gather lots of mentions in a book and are liked better than the lesser mentioned P-38. This gives a solid opinion, safe from facts, adjectives as history.

Yep, I think it was May 42 right? I really don't get why y'all were so excited about it.

Hardly excitement to note someone unwilling to learn and still peddling their opinion as fact, more a judgement on how to proceed.

Hurricanes were carrying bombs a few months earlier than that I believe, carrying two 250 lb bombs.

The unwillingness to learn being instantly proven. 80 squadron flying Hurricane I fitted with locally improvised bomb racks for 40 pound bombs was used to test fighter bomber operations, first practice 1 November operations starting 20 November 1941, lasted about a month, being re-equipped with Hurricane IIC in January.

Now we go back to Britain for a while. The Hurricane mark IIE is reported in many published references as being the designation of early production mark IV. A memo in AIR 20/4572 dated 30 August 1942 notes the mark IIE is the Hurribomber with sixty built to end June 1942, but a signal to the Middle East dated 31 October 1942 states the IIE was not an official designation that had been used at times for IIB and IIC fighter bombers. There are 98 Form 78 aircraft cards marked IIE between September and December 1941, and another 7 in March and April 1942, but nothing in the Contract Cards and Serial Registers. There are one hundred and sixty eight mark IIE in the monthly production reports from March to October 1942, with mark IV production starting in December. As the RAF stops marking aircraft cards IIE the MAP figures start recording IIE production. In October 1943 the cumulative total production of mark IIE is adjusted from one hundred and sixty eight to two hundred and seventy. The designation mark IIE does not appear in the RAF aircraft census, instead the February 1943 census reports two hundred and sixty eight mark IIBB (the second B is for bomber) had been ordered with two hundred and twenty nine delivered, plus others that had been converted. Then in June 1943 the census is amended to one hundred and sixty eight IIBB ordered and delivered, agreeing with monthly reports. In November 1943 the census adjusts the figures to two hundred and thirty IBB and forty IICB ordered and delivered, agreeing with the new mark IIE total. The conclusion the IIE in the monthly reports are 128 IIB and 40 IIC, and the IIE was an unofficial designation for mark II factory fitted with under wing racks, they were not early mark IV. The aircraft census as of June 1944 reports only a nett (that is conversions to less conversions from) sixty six to IIBB but three thousand one hundred and thirty two conversions to IICB.

30-Oct-41 Fighter Command first fighter bomber sortie 30 October 1941, number 607 squadron, attacking Tingray transformer station.

The page Hurricane marks gives a link listing the 296 IIBB serials, the only ones available until mid 1942, which you can then use to figure out when they actually arrived in the Middle East with their ability to carry 250 pound bombs. For example Takoradi reports flying out 11 IIBB in July 1942, first mention of the type in unit records.

Using the fighters as escorts for the Blenheims was considered very hazardous for the fighters, partly because the Blenheims flew at such a low cruising speed, and often seemed to get shot down anyway.

The steamed banana opinion, such a low cruising speed, and gets shot down anyway. In fact we are back at square minus 1. Blenheim IV, rated top speed 266 mph, fast cruise 230 mph which gave a range of 678 miles. Steam a banana, watch it wilt.

he advantage of the Maryland and Boston, and later especially the Baltimore, from the point of view of the DAF commanders, is that they had a high cruising speed and could go into an even higher 'sprint' speed over the target area, notably during egress, depending on the range of the mission. This meant they were over the target area for a shorter time and could leave it much more quickly. Which meant, in turn, that with fighter escort, these types had quite a low loss rate. This is particularly true for the Baltimore which could reach a particularly high speed in a dive, and often left the battle area in a high speed dive after dropping their ordinance.

The Baltimore and Boston were about 40 mph faster than the Blenheim. Short time in target reducing casualties usually means lots of flak, so who was doing the shooting? Or were the German fighters tied to the target area? To give an idea of losses, NOT loss rates, which requires sorties, which apparently are known, Sortie breakdown by month by type is now required and will no doubt be provided to justify "quite a low loss rate" etc. opinions.

RAF losses to enemy action, Egypt
November 1941 were 47 Hurricane, 29 Tomahawk, 19 Blenheim, 13 Maryland, 4 Boston
December 1941 were 65 Hurricane, 49 Tomahawk, 14 Blenheim, 9 Maryland, 7 Boston
January 1942 were 34 Hurricane, 13 Tomahawk, 13 Kittyhawk, 3 Blenheim, 1 Maryland
February 1942 were 21 Hurricane, 2 Tomahawk, 23 Kittyhawk, 4 Blenheim, 1 Boston
March 1942 were 14 Hurricane, 4 Tomahawk, 14 Kittyhawk, 3 Blenheim, 4 Boston
April 1942 were 16 Hurricane, 12 Tomahawk, 17 Kittyhawk, 3 Blenheim, 1 Boston
May 1942 were around 90 of the above types, page out of focus, June similar numbers
July 1942 was 10 Spitfire, 61 Hurricane, 37 Kittyhawk, 9 Tomahawk, 2 Boston, 4 Blenheim
August 1942 was 4 Spitfire, 28 Hurricane, 20 Kittyhawk, 4 Tomahawk, 2 Boston, 2 Blenheim, 1 Baltimore.
September 1942 was 12 Spitfire, 24 Hurricane, 24 Kittyhawk, 9 Tomahawk, 2 Boston, 3 Baltimore.
October 1942 was 10 Spitfire, 27 Hurricane, 47 Kittyhawk, 6 Tomahawk, 9 Boston, 8 Baltimore, 6 Blenheim

All aircraft, all cause losses, Egypt, November 1941 to October 1942 was 131, 169, 73, 69, 54, 70, 103, 187, 186, 106, 106, 139, there were around 5,000 day sorties in September 1942.

Around 40 A-20C were diverted from USSR shipments to the RAF in the Middle East.

Until mid 1942 the only way for the RAF in the Middle East to deliver bombs was by dedicated bombers, which in turn required dedicated escorts, which in turn meant mission planning took a long time and had problems getting all the aircraft together and over the target. Since most targets during the ground fighting were non fixed this in turn often meant the target was often long gone before the bombers flew by. If the fighting was mobile only fighter bombers had a good chance to hit an enemy ground unit. The dedicated bombers should do pre planned missions against fixed targets, unfortunately in the desert there were few such targets, even the terrain kept moving in sand storms.

A fundamental problem for fighters is they are designed to go fast when level, which meant really fast in a dive, leading to either shallow dives or high pull out altitudes. As ever the lower the ground defences, the more accurate the bombing.

Lockheed built 3,810 P-38L June 1944 to August 1945, plus another 113 from Vultee January to June 1945, by the time it turned up the axis air forces were hard to find in the air.

F2G-1, 3 accepted June to September 1945, then 2 in October, F2G-2 5 accepted post war, F4U-4 first acceptances December 1944, 1,969 built in 1945.

P-51K, the P-51D with a different propeller, 1,337 built September 1944 to March 1945, P-51D production continued until August.

Tempest V, 800 built to end August 1945, very useful catching V-1.

In the sudden scramble for modern military aircraft in the late 1930's the USAAF was going with turbo superchargers, in fighter terms two designs with what should be reliable 1,000 HP class engines, then the big stretch, one with a 2,000 HP class engine. Curtiss was a major producer, an update of the P-36 should provide a good enough fighter in numbers in 1940/41, even though it would probably be not as good as new designs and not have much design stretch, the USAAF went with it. Similarly the USN had the choice of building Hornet to the years old Yorktown design or waiting many more months for something else, they went Yorktown.

Once the P-40 had wing racks capable of more than 40 pound bombs it could carry fuel tanks there, as Francis Dean notes up to 450 gallons external, but while the total fuel decides how far you can go out, internal decided how far you can come home after combat, not much point going beyond 150 gallons external, the P-51 could use almost twice that.

Over in P-39 land the British passed as many of their order as they could to other people, the Australians had a few orphans, ignoring the P-400 the US took delivery of 3,869 out of 8,900 P-39C to Q, deliveries in the US for the USSR were 4,754 including over 2,000 "Britain for Russia". The French ended up with a number.

As of 1 May 1943 the USAAF tactical air force in North Africa had 1 P-39 fighter squadron plus P-39 and P-51 in an observation squadron while the Coastal Air force held two P-39 groups, 81st and 350th, which is where they stayed, the 81st made it to Sicily in October 1943, Italy in February 1944 but not flying missions with the 12th Air Force, then sent to India. The 350th made it to Sardinia in November 1943, Corsica in February 1944, Italy in September 1944 by which time it was a P-47 unit.

The only 8th/9th Air Force fighter group shuffling was done in early 1944, existing P-51, but remembering the 354th FG remained a 9th Air Force unit, after that it was converting 8th Air Force FG from P-38 and P-47 to P-51

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Hmm, The reasons for longevity of the P-40 in 1942 and 1943 and at least midway through 1944 for US operations:
1. It was in high production, and significant commitments to continued production included allocation agreements with Commonwealth air forces. The Russians not so much, the preferred the P-39.
2. Performance, particularly the F and L with the Packard 1650-1, was not as dismal as often portrayed. It was capable medium to low altitude fighter because of outstanding roll rate, good top speed and very good dive speed. Against Axis fighters it was outclassed in climb by the 109 and 190 and A6M. It was outclassed in top speed by the 109 and 190 but 109 not so much at low altitude. Lessons learned - don't get into dogfights on the deck where you can't extend by diving.
3. Tactical flexibility - it was decent middle altitude escort, which was a significant requirement in all theatres for medium and heavy bombardment save ETO. EwanS touched on the CBI/Pac theaters paucity of heavy bombardment squadrons but there were major doctrinal differences compared to ETO. The bombing altitudes were largely 12-18000 feet which enabled a wider range of aircraft types suitable for bomber escort, including P-40s, but P-40s limited by range. It was mediocre, but serviceable as a CAS fighter due to single 500 pound bomb limit and limited range with bomb.
4. Replacement/Production ramp up to US units for P-51B, P-47D was hampered by the same production allocations to a lesser extent, to Commonwealth air forces.

The P-38 issues limiting its full usefulness in 1942 and 1943:
1. High altitude issues are dominantly discussed but the real issue in MTO/ETO/SWPA was early pilot experience and knowledge. A pilot transitioning from singe engine P-40 and P-39, even a combat vet, was in deep trouble counting on roll rate and dive and turn against the top Axis fighters, including the A6M. In N.Africa, the P-38 fighter groups were mauled by experienced LW pilots, particularly in CAS missions when the only advantage was rate of climb. Ditto in SWPA until the P-38 pilots learned to not dogfight the A6M or Ki-43.
2. Limited production capacity for Lockheed combined with producing a very big and costly and complicated 'system' effectively yielded half the production delivery rates of North American and Republic in mid-1943. The result was very slow population of fighter squadrons across all theatres despite huge demand because of its range (Compared to P-39, P-40 and P-47C/D before wing pylons added).
3. Added required maneuverability features slow to produce and deliver. Dive recovery solved by adding dive flaps took two years to introduce between the P-38F and the P-38J-25. Ditto boosted ailerons. The mid 1944 P-38J-25 and P-38L were finally the fighter that Kelly Johnson envisioned in 1939.

Design Objectives:
1. P-38 - High Altitude Bomber Interceptor/Coastal Defense per US Army and AAC doctrine in 1938-1940.
2. P-39 - Same, but limited range, point interceptor for US base defense. High altitude mission abandoned because of supercharger issues. Mission relegated to point interceptor for low to medium altitudes and battlefield air superiority. It was successful when theater doctrine permitted the mission to those parameters. Examples VVS application and SWPA as short range CAS.
3. P-40 - Pursuit, battlefield air superiority.
4. P-47 - same mission as P-38 but with new R-2800 piston engine. Limited range, but greater than P-39, until conventional bomb racks installed to accept US standard bombs and drop tanks in mid 1943 (belly rack) and late 1943 (wing pylons) for application as long range escort fighter. By WWII interceptor standards of 1942, only the P-47M could have operated as an interceptor by 1945.
5. P-51/Mustang I - Pursuit, better than P-40, more range, higher speed, better climb - but Low to medium altitude due to Allison engine.

Reality:
1. Early war requirements for US were point interception at medium to high altitudes, close escort at low to medium altitudes and battlefield (low altitude) tactical support including attack and air superiority.
2. None of the US fighter inventory was suited for all three roles save perhaps the P-38 with dogfight limitations and perhaps the Mustang I with limitation as escort at high altitudes. But the Mustang was not in US inventory until the NA-91 P-51-NA and its introduction was as Recon in 1943.
3. None were a superior match for A6M or Bf 109F or FW 190 in a maneuvering dogfight at low to medium altitudes, given equal pilot skill and tactical engagement parity.

Result:
1. Change the game, change the mix, add features to otherwise capable designs. Replace obsolete as production ramps based on global priorities.
2. Increase 'matching high performance inventory' to dominant theater mission.
3. Overwhelm with numbers of A/c and trained pilots.

FWIIW to the above discussion:
1. Delivery of P-51B/C in squadron operational quantity:
a.) ETO late November 1943 to 354th FG
b.) CBI early April 1944 to 23rd FG. Tex Hill achieved his first VC in P-51B in May 1944. His first P-51A victory was November 1943.
2. Delivery of P-38J-5/-10 in squadron operational quantity:
a.) ETO late November 1943.
b.) MTO March 1944.
c.) SWPA February 1944.
All retrofitted to P-38J-15 status with 55gal Leading Edge tanks by February 1944.
Delivery of P-47D-15 in squadron operational quantity. Include P-47C through D-11 with depot mods for wing pylon.
a.) ETO mid-March 1944
b.) SWPA late February 1944.
c.) MTO mid-March 1944.

Agree with all this except to note that the P-51A definitely did not turn out to exceed the P-40 in the CBI except in range. Outcomes from combat were much worse with the P-51s, and I tried to figure this out for a long time, it may come down to roll rate and how the ailerons were rigged, which changed in the P-51B. B and C also were much faster even down low. Another possible factor was the gun arrangement (making it very prone to jams) which continued to be a problem with the B and C but clearly not as much so.

As for production, I think they were expecting production of the P-40 to taper off in 1942 as they shifted to using them as advanced trainers in the US etc., but demand kept up, partly due to the failure of the P-39 and the limitations of the early P-38 / P-47 / Corsair (and for the British, the Spit V) and because improved tactics, better training, various minor fixed and improvements of later models like the K and M as well as the Merlin engined F and L, and things like upping the boost rate all made them more viable. Most P-40 units around the world from June 42 through Jan or Feb 1944 had positive victory ratios against Axis fighters, including even against FW 190s (with a couple of exceptions).

P-40s of all types could also out-turn the Bf 109, FW 190, and MC 202. Only the FW 190 had superior roll.

I would also note that the early FW 190 did not necessarily surpass P-40F/L in climb, depending on the configuration of the latter. A P-40L or lightened F had an initial climb rate of around 3300 FPM. A P-40K at WEP could also outrun tropical configured Bf 109F or early Gs at low altitude, as could the F and L. The early FW 190 was also basically a medium altitude fighter, although it a higher effective ceiling and kept up a significantly higher combat speed.

Finally I would note, specific tactics in detail were key to improving combat outcomes for all of these aircraft. Things like for example the Thach Weave for the Wildcat. The P-38 pilots apparently developed a high speed / shallow climbing disengagement which worked particularly well in the Pacific and CBI. P-40 and Spitfire pilots learned (partly from captured aircraft) that the Bf 109 roll controls became very tight in a dive and it could only roll in one direction (I forget if it was left or right), even lacking rudder tabs to address this, and so they learned to perform a 'Split S' and dive and roll in the opposite direction to disengage. One problem was that the MC 202 did not have this problem due to a slightly offset vertical stabilizer IIRC. All the DAF fighter units (with the possible exception of the P-38s) also developed 'Big Wing' tactics against Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica fighters, as they were all ((including the Spitfire Vs) subject to attack from above.

Similarly, in the Pacific, the A6M had an almost identical problem of locking controls at high speeds, particularly the earlier A6M2. So Split S and dive was an escape maneuver (one of the reasons for the clipped wings on the A6M3 was to correct this issue, which it partly did). Pilots also figured out that turn rate for the A6M was not as good at high speed so a nose-down turn which would later come to be called a 'low yo-yo' became a standard maneuver with P-40s (49th FG Ace Robert De Haven, who scored victories in both P-40 and P-38, described this in detail). Ki-43s however did not have as much of a problem with control locking, and the AVG developed a different escape maneuver involving something pilots described as a skid and an outside roll prior to the dive, which apparently enabled them to get to evade initial gunfire and a higher speed more quickly, as the Ki-43 had a more limited total dive speed than the A6M. Spit VIII and P-51B/C/D when they showed up relied on zoom climb similar to the P-38.

The trick with all these maneuvers was correctly identifying the enemy fighters. Pilots didn't often see enemy aircraft up close except for very quickly in a flash. This was alleged as one of the flaws of the P-38, due to it's unique silhouette, it was relatively easy to correctly identify it from a distance.