Effectiveness of the P-38 (4 Viewers)

[Steamed_Banana]

One generic comment on sources.

Sweeping generalizations against secondary sources strike me as daft. There is a lot of room between relying on a 1960s Martin Caiden book or some generic coffee table "Fighters of WW2" vs books like The First Team, America's Hundred Thousand, American Victory Roll, Eagles of the Southern Sky, Bloody Shambles series, Black Cross Red Star series, Mediterranean Air War Series, etc. references like Jane's, authors like Francillon and Christopher Shores, and yes Claringbould, personal memoirs and biographies of WW2 pilots and commanding officers, these are all 100% valid sources and good ways to learn about the war.

We all use secondary sources. Very few of us go to archives and examine primary sources for WW2, but some of us do that as well. Many of these records are now available online (I'm still upset that WWIIaircraftperformance.org seems to have died, but I've downloaded everything on there I'm pretty sure) and I've perused English, Australian, US, French, Japanese and German records too from a variety of other online sources and avenues. Now days there are even tools you can use to help with translations. I've never gone to an archive in person for WW2 but I have done that many times for some other subjects, and dealt with foreign languages, transcribing archaic scripts etc. I know like every real researcher knows that going to a primary source doesn't guarantee that you will get all the data, let alone interpret it correctly. Relying on secondary sources as well as primary source documents doesn't automatically make you right or wrong in an argument.

We all have our specific areas of focus and main interest, and sometimes discussions turn into a battle between perspectives. One guy is very knowledgeable about engines and guns, another knows aerodynamics. One knows production history, another combat history. One knows the CBI and another the Russian Front. Many focus on aircraft and units from their own nation but less about others, some look at the big picture and others at the minute details.

This should really all be complimentary. Sniping at one another over your type of source or your own area of expertise vs another is just pointless dunghill cock behavior.

Do you want to try to pick petty fights that everyone other than the person you are bickering with will gloss over and tune out, or actually shed light on a subject - with the understanding that you don't know everything about it- and learn from the knowledge of other people?

Some people are into this either partly or fully because they have an axe to grind. Others want to learn. I personally don't have any axe to grind, and no Saparot, I'm not trolling. I have my perspective and array of knowledge and research done, just like everyone else, and it might be one you aren't familiar with yet. Every discussion isn't necessarily a contest. Sniping at someone and then doing exactly the same thing you pounced on them for and refusing to acknowledge it is schoolboy behavior without ever being able to achieve the satisfying conclusion of a schoolyard brawl to settle it. It's a waste of time, and none of us has an infinite amount of that.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

This thread was great until the vituperation set in.

 

[SaparotRob]

This thread was great until the vituperation set in.

Sorry. I made an appointment with my doctor. He's going to lance it.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sorry. I made an appointment with my doctor. He's going to lance it.

Make sure he saves the vitriol, it makes a great chili seasoning.

 

[Shortround6]

Even primary sources need some sort of vetting, mainly for typos.
In the section on this site.

Manual Index - American

Beechcraft 17/YC-43 Bell P-39 Airacobra 1) - Pic Thread 2) - Pic Thread Bell P-39 Airacobra in Russian Bell P-39Q Bell P-63 Kingcobra Pic Thread Bell YFM1 Airacuda 1) - Pic Thread 2) - Pic Thread Boeing B-17 Fortress Pic Thread Boeing B-17 F G Boeing B-29 Superfortress Engineering Flight...

ww2aircraft.net

There are a number of P-38 manuals.
Now unless people think that these files have been tampered with, they are as close to primary sources as most of us are going to get.
But they only tell part of the story. Pilots sometimes did things the manuals told them not to do.
Manual writer may have been overworked and did the 1942/43/44 equivalent of cut and paste?
Or tried to keep the number of charts to a minimum or didn't know.
Difference in cruising speeds with a pair of 500lb bombs vs a pair of 1000lb bombs?
I have written about the use of 1100lbs in the early manual. The 1100lb bomb was in the early series of American bombs, 300lb, 600lb, 1100lb and possibly a 2200lb bomb, Replaced in 1942 (mostly) by the 250lb, 500lb and 1000lb bombs. But not in this manual
Difference in performance would have been minimal.

On the P-38s, once they can lift 300 gal drop tanks they should have no problem lifting even 2000lb bombs. Flying with them may be different. 300 gal tanks held 3600lb of fuel and the tanks weighed another 330lbs according to the weight and balance chart. The manual says do not exceed 250mph indicated with the 300 gal tanks. I don't know if there was a speed restriction while carrying bombs. There are different restrictions on the smaller tanks and on dropping them. Which changed as the later tanks/racks got struts to allow clean separation at higher speeds.
Correct date of manual can be important.
P-38s in general were rather temperature sensitive. Depends on model as the Gs and Hs got more sensitive than the F and much more sensitive than the Es. A change of 20 degrees C could make change of thousands of feet in the pressure limit that could be used. This is before the change in the intercoolers.
There is also some confusion between the intercoolers (only 1 change) and the radiators, more than 1 change?
And the oil coolers and the change from manual operation to automatic.
Changes in the engine cooling (radiator and oil cooling) is much harder to find and often I get redirected to the intercooler aspect

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to "effectiveness"
The P-38s in North Africa had a rather dismal record in fighter-to-fighter combat from Nov 1942 to Sept 1943.
Claims from both sided are about equal but the admitted losses seem to show around about 3 P-38s lost for each 109 lost.
The P-38 pilots were green, even if well trained. The 109s were flown by a high percentage of veterans who have been flying combat since the Battle of France. Not all but the US had either zero or just a few pilots with any combat experience.
The P-38s flew a lot of bomber escort. Not fighter sweeps over the front. American bomber escort at this time kept the fighters close to the bombers and many times the P-38s were bounced from above.
What is important to this discussion is even with green pilots and poor tactics the P-38s kept bomber losses very low. Either the Germans were happy shooting down the P-38s and ignoring the B-17s, B-25s, B-26s or the Germans did not press home the attacks on the bombers. American bomber losses were around 1% of the sorties flown which was way under the losses of the unescorted bombers in 8th Airforce.
Is losing 2-3 P-38s on a mission worth not losing 2 B-17s or 2-3 B-25s/B-26s?
Could the P-40F have done as well?
The P-39 could not, it could not fly the needed distance and it could not fly (fight) at the needed altitudes even if that was in the high teens and not well into the 20s like in NW Europe.
We can look at the P-38s in the Pacific in 1942/43 in other posts.

 

[PAT303]

The P-38s flew a lot of bomber escort. Not fighter sweeps over the front. American bomber escort at this time kept the fighters close to the bombers and many times the P-38s were bounced from above.

This is an interesting point that needs to be remembered, during the BoB and Darwin as examples attacking Spitfires and Hurricanes were bounced while focusing on the bombers, their primary target and suffered accordingly but once the 109's were pinned to the bombers as close escort and in doing so loosing their flexibility it was their turn to take punishment. It is surprising that the USA learnt nothing from the previous 3 years fighting..

 

[GregP]

This is an interesting point that needs to be remembered, during the BoB and Darwin as examples attacking Spitfires and Hurricanes were bounced while focusing on the bombers, their primary target and suffered accordingly but once the 109's were pinned to the bombers as close escort and in doing so loosing their flexibility it was their turn to take punishment. It is surprising that the USA learnt nothing from the previous 3 years fighting..

The US pilots had not been fightging for 3 years. We went to war on 7 Dec 1941. Call it New Year, 1942. The actual first US combat sortie in Europe or North Africa was not likely until March or April of 1942. Meanwhile, the pilots we had were likely getting briefings from AVG notes and perhaps a few notes from the RAF / RN, but from where else?

I can't think of another place just now.

 

[PAT303]

The US pilots had not been fightging for 3 years. We went to war on 7 Dec 1941. Call it New Year, 1942. The actual first US combat sortie in Europe or North Africa was not likely until March or Aopril of 1942. Meanwhile, the pilots we had were likely getting briefings from AVG notes and perhaps a few notes from the RAF / RN, but from where else?

I can't think of another place just now.

Never said they had been fighting for 3 years, I said they didn't learn anything from the previous 3 years fighting, I'm pretty sure the US were totally up to date on what was happening in the rest of the world including aircraft, weapons and tactics used by the RAF FAA and Luftwaffe.

 

[GregP]

Never said they had been fighting for 3 years, I said they didn't learn anything from the previous 3 years fighting, I'm pretty sure the US were totally up to date on what was happening in the rest of the world including aircraft, weapons and tactics used by the RAF FAA and Luftwaffe.

Not really.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

This is an interesting point that needs to be remembered, during the BoB and Darwin as examples attacking Spitfires and Hurricanes were bounced while focusing on the bombers, their primary target and suffered accordingly but once the 109's were pinned to the bombers as close escort and in doing so loosing their flexibility it was their turn to take punishment. It is surprising that the USA learnt nothing from the previous 3 years fighting..

There's a lot of hop-scotching around in time and space in this post. Maybe clear it up and resubmit something that actually makes sense.

 

[PAT303]

Not really.

Must have been a big cave you all lived in then.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Starting with administrivia.

One generic comment on sources.

Otherwise known as take a swipe at others while retaining plausible deniability. It is nice to see this mini essay, complaining of time issues, written instead of providing the data to back the opinions expressed.

Sweeping generalizations against secondary sources strike me as daft.

No one has done this but a crime needs to be defined for all good people to protest against.

Bloody Shambles series, Black Cross Red Star series, Mediterranean Air War Series,

The Shores' books lack the key strength and sortie numbers to enable conclusions about losses.

8th Air Force, days when 28 bombers were reported missing, sorties credited with attacking
09-Oct-43 352
23-Mar-44 710
19-May-44 823
27-Sep-44 1,264
03-Feb-45 1,370

So is 28 "heavy losses" or not?

personal memoirs and biographies of WW2 pilots and commanding officers, these are all 100% valid sources and good ways to learn about the war.

Pierre Clostermann for example. Yes I know he is a major exception, but we are waxing lyrical here about the joys of books.

Skipping the generic bits, including the obligatory the writer as a force for good.

Sniping at one another over your type of source or your own area of expertise vs another is just pointless dunghill cock behavior.

Like for example the funny added to message 378 and insult in message 380

Some people are into this either partly or fully because they have an axe to grind.

Ah the mysterious some people appear, fortunately not the writer in their own eyes.

It's a waste of time, and none of us has an infinite amount of that.

All that time spent on an essay, but no data to back up the claims for P-40 fighter bombers, heavy losses etc.

Even primary sources need some sort of vetting, mainly for typos.

More than that, think of for example the daily report and aircraft/aircrew that go missing but are found some time later.

On the P-38s, once they can lift 300 gal drop tanks they should have no problem lifting even 2000lb bombs. Flying with them may be different.

Often very different, wing racks required more than just the connections given the extra weight away from the fuselage, the wing of the Lancaster bomber weighed in at 6,770 pounds, adding a pair of 500 pound bombs adds 15% more weight, fighter wings were a lot lighter. Another factor was the strength of the external rack.

9th Air Force P-38 dropped 57 and jettisoned one 2,000 pound bombs, B-26 dropped/jettisoned all 465 1,100 pound bombs used by the 9th Air Force. in the ETO.

The P-38s in North Africa had a rather dismal record in fighter-to-fighter combat from Nov 1942 to Sept 1943.

For 1943 overall USAAF fighters logged 1.5 claims per loss to enemy aircraft, given overclaiming that indicates losing the air combats, and that is with the claims from intercepting the Luftwaffe air transport fleets.

Where the 9th and 12th Air Force heavies went, short tons of bombs.

Month	Crete	Greece	Italy	Leros	Libya	Romania	Sardinia	Sicily	Tunisia	Total
194206​						30​				30​
194210​	30​									30​
194211​	31.8​			12​	314​					357.3​
194212​			115​						420​	534.8​
194301​	36​	1.5​	22.3​		209​			158​	593​	1019.4​
194302​			199​				246​	186​	312​	942.6​
194303​			107​				163​	299​	904​	1472.1​
194304​			590​				340​	1147​	582​	2658.1​
Total	97.8​	1.5​	1033​	12​	522​	30​	748​	1790​	2810​	7044.3​

Bombers MIA, 10 Italy, 1 Libya, 3 Romania, 9 Sicily, 11 Tunisia. Given their supply requirements the heavy bombers tended to be far in the rear in early 1943.

What is important to this discussion is even with green pilots and poor tactics the P-38s kept bomber losses very low. Either the Germans were happy shooting down the P-38s and ignoring the B-17s, B-25s, B-26s or the Germans did not press home the attacks on the bombers.

It seems to have been both, hang over from the desert war tactics of staying above the escorts plus lack of firepower to bring down the heavy bombers. Also a lot of early P-38 losses were not on escort missions, since there were not that many missions being run.

Could the P-40F have done as well? ...the needed altitudes even if that was in the high teens and not well into the 20s like in NW Europe.

Altitudes look like they were more set by the expected ground defences, which grew over time around the targets the heavy bombers attacked. The P-40F with drop tank should have been useful escorts for bombing targets in Tunisia, provided the Luftwaffe was largely staying in its own airspace and rendezvous with bombers was usually achieved.

This is an interesting point that needs to be remembered, during the BoB and Darwin as examples attacking Spitfires and Hurricanes were bounced while focusing on the bombers, their primary target and suffered accordingly but once the 109's were pinned to the bombers as close escort and in doing so loosing their flexibility it was their turn to take punishment.

Actually it looks like the Bf110 were the ones given close escort, they had more range, plenty of "free sweep" Bf109 ahead of the bombers on 15 September for example, the RAF fighters seem to have hit the bombers largely from the sides or behind. Fighter versus fighter combat RAF to Luftwaffe,

The loss ratios, including the crashes are July 1.7 to 1, August 1.3 to 1, September 1.4 to 1, October 1 to 1

The loss ratios, excluding the crashes are July 1.3 to 1, August 1.3 to 1, September 1.4 to 1, October 0.9 to 1.

The Luftwaffe had more trouble replacing fighter pilots than the RAF. The Luftwaffe bombers were shooting down RAF fighters.

Also remember the reverse, Luftwaffe fighters bounced by allied escorts.

It is surprising that the USA learnt nothing from the previous 3 years fighting..

The USA had learnt plenty, start with self sealing tanks and armour, it was revising its plans and tactics. In Tunisia it was about to discover the gaps between theory and practice running an overseas air force in combat with everyone from top to bottom having zero or close to zero experience, in conditions much worse than assumed.

The dilution in effectiveness due to the major expansion in the RAF was ending, the USAAF was some months behind, the Luftwaffe was about to start its decline, from on average better trained aircrew in average better performance aircraft using better tactics.

 

[BiffF15]

This thread was great until the vituperation set in.

Word of the day! My vocabulary count just increased.

 

[drgondog]

As to 'when' the P-38s were operational in Africa?
The top P-38 ace in the MTO was credited with a 109 on January 7, 1943 and an ace by February 1943. 96FS/82FG.
All 3 FGs were operational in December 1942.

Escort doctrine across the AAF in 1942 was 'convoy' concept during which the fighter escort remained with the bombers, engaged attacking fighters and returned to escort. The first identified senior officer in AAF that articulated 'destroying enemy air in both the air and the ground' as a change in escort doctrine, was in a memo to General Marshall and Combined Chiefs by General Arnold on November 3, 1943. It was in the context of the broader Air Plan to Defeat of Germany during the Overlord planning. It can be said that Coningham, Kuter, Doolittle and Spaatz had already put into practice the general concepts in the MTO, ditto Kenney in SWPA. The same may be said with respect to Chennault in CBI. In fact, only Eaker and Hunter in ETO upheld the convoy concepts for escort fighters in fall 1943.

As to the beating that P-38s took in the first six months resulted from several brutal 'lessons learned'. The first reason was that close escort, while comforting to bomber crews was a disaster for the escorts in the context that tethering to altitude and sub optimal cruise airspeed. The option to flight or flee was always in the hands of the Luftwaffe. The tactic had the second effect of stifling the natural aggressiveness of fighter pilot to attack. The second was the mismatch between training and reality. The US fighter pilot in 1939 through 1941 was training for battlefield air supremacy - not strategic bombing campaigns for which there were no long-range, high-performance singe engine pursuit fighters equal to the enemy's best point interceptors. The only potential fighter that seem to be able to walk and chew gum over enemy targets was the P-38 - in a role it was not designed for. Nor was it designed for battlefield air superiority against its more agile opponents at low altitude. Its chief attribute was high speed and high rate of climb, but sub par turn and dive capability combined with easy identification. If your enemy can see you, he has time to position an attack with maximum tactical advantage. Last, the P-38 even with its issues was a superior option over P-39 and P-40, but it took time and brutal experience to tailor tactics and training to adopt those tactics to gain an upper hand in NW Africa - but the P-38 pilots did learn to capitalize on the advantages and mitigate its weaknesses.

Pardon me for the following semi-rant as the comment above about 'shoulda learned over three years' touched a nerve.

As to the comments regarding the slow learning curve of US combat troops, air and ground, or aircraft capabilities to fight the Axis when they (collectively the US) had three years to observe? I would offer the following: a.) the strong feeling among the huge majority of American citizens was 'stay out of foreign entanglements'; b.) only the political strength of FDR enabled the vision that 'stay out or not' the US must expand our military officer and NCO 'regular army from a very low professional cadre to a much larger self defense capability for our own shores; c.) expand our industrial base capacity for war related inventory 'just in case'. The US transformed from a 3rd world Army/Air Force (The USN was world class) in 1938 to arguably the world's greatest combined military force in 1945.

One could argue that bad results lacking from applying British lessons learned in France and Africa and Greece to US training programs did arise in Pacific and Africa operations. Fair questions although it leads me ask several.

Using the Britain as an example of applying experience to improving tactical results:
1. What did Britain learn about Japan from Sino-Japanese war, beginning and observable in 1937 that:

• prevented Singapore from being easily neutralized and captured.
• preserved Royal Navy strength and presence in Far East.

2. What did British learn in Norway or evacuation from France that helped shape strategy at Dieppe?
3. What did British learn from American mistakes at Anzio that helped take Caen on schedule?
4. What did British learn from US success at long-range escort to reduce Bomber Command losses in 1944 and 1945?

I am not denigrating either Britain or the Commonwealth contributions. I do question the assumption that we (US) would have been more successful in early combat operations, had we sent more observers or imbedded more staff into RAF/RN and Army operations in France or North Africa. There is a huge gulf between senior leadership words from 'on high' and translating the knowledge gained into benefits and subsequent programs to train farmers, high school graduates, teachers, etc. which flooded into military service in 1941 and 1942 to be more effective NCO/officer leadership - that had to be learned the hard way. We experienced lack of training and leadership during the landings in Africa and also at Kasserine Pass - but we quickly adapted.

Also complicating the learning curve is that the early and visible attitude from British senior leadership (and Churchill) was that 'we know what we are doing, you don't - please give us your war machines and warriors - we (Britain) will lead'. Perhaps the poster child for the attitudes which lingered throughout the European conflict was the constant harping by Montgomery to Churchill to 'put me in charge', dismissing Eisenhower as an able politician'. Montgomery demonstrated a complete lack of awareness that there were American combat leaders such as Patton, Devers and Hodges that were every good as him, and totally unwilling to work for him.

IMO - the political issues between US senior military leaders and the British senior military leaders was the root cause of 'I'm not hearing you' when the British correctly spotted technical and leadership issue in the fight against Germany. That led to 'you may be right, but we are doing it our way until we find that your way is better'. It cost us early, but we adapted early to what worked for us. IMO, it was a far better way to grow, than to subordinate our military to British chain of command and struggle to find our own identity.

But,to the point of British wisdom and control over US military operations:
1. How did US go from getting its ass kicked at Pearl Harbor, and the Philippines in December 1941 to neutralizing the Japanese offensive in the Pacific at Midway, to going on the offensive at Guadalcanal? Was British doctrine and training a factor? I might be wrong but my judgement is that Australia and New Zealand were far more important partners in Pacific Operations - with an even more important attribute. They were Not trying to subordinate US control and assets to their command 'on the basis of experience'.
2. How did the US go from getting its ass kicked at Kasserine Pass to returning the favor shortly thereafter, and going on the offensive against Afrika Corps?
How did US manage to achieve strategic daylight bombing against Germany with low loss rate when RAF was experiencing very high losses to LW to the very end?
3. To what extent did British experience contribute to the art and tactics and tools of airborne ops, amphibious assaults or carrier operations and tactics?

That said, leadership examples delivered by Air Marshal Coningham led to adoption of many tactical practices for close air support for NW Desert Air Force and 9th AF during African ops, which led to doctrinal adoption by AAF globally. RN and Coastal Command technologies and tactics, adopted by US, led to the defeat of the U-boat. RAF technologies and practices for radar applications to bombing, night interception and bad weather operations were adopted by US and essential to the conduct of air operations. RAF far superior in tactical flight testing and training before introduction to combat.

Perhaps somebody may enlighten me but I can't think of any Infantry practices or tactics other that SAS/Commando training to Ranger/1st Special Service Force commando operations. Certainly not jungle warfare as the USMC hit the ground w/o any influence from British Army. Patton's influencer on armor tactics was Guderian and Rommel - not Montgomery. Can't think of any teaching conveyed to USA Army artillery order of battle or tactics.

So, granted that US did not learn on the knee of the wise British the lessons learned fighting the Wermacht or Luftwaffe. The real issue was not really lack of information but more atrocious US leadership at Army Division through NCO levels for the first several months in Africa, as well as the experience that can only be gained 'on the job'.

As to the P-38 experiences, all 8th AF FG were under command and training by RAF in the first several months in the ETO. The RAF Did mentor the 1, 14, 31, 82 and 350th FG pilots, but the RAF experience in lessons learned were limited to Spitfire and Hurricane experiences in combat - not P-38 and P-39. The RAF was ignorant regarding application of P-38 attributes to offset liabilities to practical combat tactics against the LW.

Rant over.

In fairness to RAF excellence, the 495th and 496th FTG were formed to deliver advanced fighter training to US AAF replacements inbound from Training Command, but long after P-38 and P-39 departures to Torch..

 

[special ed]

First heard that word in an old B/W Perry Mason TV episode.

 

[Shortround6]

As to 'when' the P-38s were operational in Africa?.......................................

I gave you a Bacon for trying to fit several (minimum) master's if not doctorate thesis's into one short post. Not at all an easy task.

US naval carrier operations were world class from the start despite only the British having any practical experience and then only with very small carrier groups.
US surface operations were somewhat behind the curve for a year or more.
US Navy Anti-sub was also a bit behind the curve to start.
US Submarine warfare was also trailing.

US tank doctrine was ahead of the British in general.
US artillery may have been ahead, at least in material (guns and shells).
US infantry??

US forces were expanding at a very high rate in 1940-42, much like the British in 1938-1940. Hard enough to try to train forces growing at a high rate using existing doctrine/tactics let alone new doctrine tactics.

P-38 was a real oddball airplane, how was it supposed to fit into anybody's doctrine?
It had two engines but it was not a two-seat fighter (no long-range radio) so it had better performance than a Bf 110 or Ki-45. But it could not maneuver (turn) with the single engine fighters. It had speed and climb over most of the single engine fighters in 1941-42 so it was sort of a world of it's own. There was no good example of British fighter to fall back on. The US had to develop the tactics as the plane was being deployed and while the plane was evolving.
The British did not go to the finger 4 formation right after the BoB. Or at least not wholesale. It seems to have been sort of a unit by unit thing or up to the squadron or wing commanders? The Japanese were not using that formation for the most part in 1942 or later. Use by the Russians in 1941-42?
Blaming the USAAC in 1942?

P-38 was sort of in-between aircraft. Not as old as the P-40/Spitfire/109 but not as new as the P-47/P-51/Tempest
People don't talk much about the Typhoon, it never flew high enough to get into trouble with compressibility.

The whole tactical air power thing was evolving in 1941/42/43. Many British generals did not like how it wound up even in 1942/43.
And a good tactical air power doctrine was flexible. You might have to use the "air umbrella" for a few days or a week to cover a critical operation or battle (like an invasion) but to use the "air umbrella" tactic for weeks on end in low intensity ground combat (waiting to build up supplies for the next big battle) simply frittered away air assets for poor return, while lots of little 'air umbrellas' are not concentrating the air power at a critical point out of the entire front.
Trying to copy British doctrine in 1942 would be hard as the British were still trying to work it out. Idea was there but implementing was harder.

I am not even going into personality conflicts or political conflicts.
British know best was true in certain aspects. Mostly Naval except for naval aviation. In other things it was way off.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Some examples of P-38 combat in the MTO from the Summer of 1943. By this point the P-38 units seem to be heavily engaged, flying escort missions all the way to Rome, but taking moderate losses - about the same as the other active Allied fighters, escorting bombers effectively and inflicting roughly equivalent losses on the Axis fighters, based on this 'spot check'. This doesn't pretend to prove anything but it is my impression based on the fighting record you see below.

These are from MAW IV. I'm mainly only counting the 'confirmed' claims on both sides, there are usually also a few probable and damaged. Two find these I just opened the book in the middle and found two sections where there were a lot of P-38 claims and / or losses.

When I have some more time I will post a similar cluster of daily combat summaries from earlier in 1943 so you can see the contrast. These are from a different book, I think Vol II.

20 June 1943 - P-38Gs from 1st and 14th FG were sent on escort of B-26s to Castelvetrano (Sicily). They were engaged by Bf 109G-6 from JG 53 and JG 77, as well as some other 109G flown y the Italian 363 Sq. Seven P-38 pilots made a total of 14 confirmed claims for Bf 109s shot down, plus probables and damaged claims, and the B-26 gunners claimed 2. The German pilots claimed 4 P-38s and the Italians claimed 2. Actual losses were 4 P-38Gs shot down, 1 damaged (pilot wounded) / 2 Bf 109G-6 reported lost to P38s (two more reported lost to Spitfires the same day).
24 June 1943 - P-38Gs from the 14th FG were sent to Sardinia, followed by P-40Ls from 325 FG, where they engaged Bf 109Gs from JG 51 and JG 77, plus MC 202, MC 205 and unusually!) Fiat G.55 from 51 St CT and Re 2001 from 375 Sq. Later P-38s from 1st FG and 52 more P-38s from the 82nd FG escorted B-26s, and B-25s on strikes at Sardinia. Five P-38 pilots from 14th FG, seven from 1st FG and 1 from 82nd FG made claims for a total of 15 Bf 109s and one MC 202 (plus probable and damaged claims). A British Spitfire pilot made one claim for an Me 210, as did a US P-39 pilot from 91st FG. Gunners on the bomberrs claimed another 2 Bf 109s plus damaged and probables. The P-40 pilots from 325th FG claimed 5 Bf 109s. Actual losses were 5 P-38Gs (3 rom 1st FG, 2 from 14th), 3 P-40s, and a B-24. A B-26 also ditched at base / 3 Bf 109G-6, 1 MC 205, and 1 Re 2001, and 2 Me 210s.
28 June 1943 - 14th and 82nd FG P-38Gs and 325th FG P-40Ls went on a sweep and escort missons for B-26s over Sardinian airfields in a total of five missions. They were engaged by some Bf 109s from JG 77 and MC 202s from six different Italian squadrons. P-38 pilots claimed 2 MC 202s, 5 Bf 109s and a Ju 88. Italian pilots claimed 4 P-38s and 5 P-40s, and a bomber. 325th FG P-40 pilots claimed 4 Bf 109s. Actual losses were 1 P-40L / 1 Bf 109G-6 (to P-40s) 2 Ju 88s, and 1 MC 202. A Cant Z.1007bis was also shot down by Beaufighters on the same day, that was the only RAF claim that day.
30 June 1943 - P-38Gs escorted B-26s to Trapani while 325th FG and P38s from 1st and 14th FG escorted B-17s to Palermo and Boccadifalco. These engaged Italian MC 205s and Bf 109Gs from 155, 150, and 22 Gr CT. 82nd FG P-38s claimed 2 Fw 190s and 1 Bf 109. Losses were / 1 MC 202 crash landed, an Italian 109G also defected, landing at Pantelleria.

Total losses in this period 9 P-38Gs, 4 P-40Ls on the Allied side vs 6 Bf 109G-6s, 2 MC 202s, 1 MC 205, 1 Re 2001. So that is 13 vs 10. Shores doesn't give the number of aircraft engaged but on each of these days either two or three P-38 equipped fighter groups were in combat.

July 30 1943 - two groups of 36 P-38Gs both from 82nd FG escorted B-25s and B-17s on strikes against Pratica di Mare (near Rome) where they engaged Bf 109s from JG 77 and MC 202s from 3 St CT and 51 St CT. Spitfire IX pilots from the US 52nd FG also did a fighter sweep near Bizerta and claimed 2 Fw 190. P-40Ls from 317 Sqn / 325th FG did a fighter-bomber stike and sweep over Sardinia where they engaged Bf 109s from JG 77. 82nd FG P-38 plots claimed 1 Bf 109 an two have shot the windscreen off of a MC 202. 325th FG P-40 pilots claimed 21 Bf 109s. The only RAF claims this day were by Beaufighters against various seaplanes. JG 77 pilots claimed 6 P-40s, Italian pilots claimed 5 B-17s and Actual losses were 1 P-40L / 6 Bf 109G-6 (5 lost over Sardinia, apparently to the P-40s, one over Gulf of Tunis to Spitfires (?)). One MC 202 was reported damaged with a WiA pilot. A Ju 88 and two Cant Z.506 were also lost, apparently to the Beaufighters.
12 Aug 1943 - 31 FG Spitfires did a fighter sweep, British 232 Sqn Spitfires escorted Kittyhawk fighter-bombers against Messina, 50 P-38s from 1st FG escorted B-26s against Grazziani airfield (near Naples). British claimed 1 Fw 190, and a Baltimore bomber claimed an SM 82. P-38 pilots from 1 FG claimed 2 Bf 109 plus several probable including some Fw 190 and Re 2001. B-26 gunners claimed 7 Bf 109s. 79th FG P-40Ls escorted 45 B-25s in a strike against Crotone, claiming 1 FW 190, and several probable Bf 109s. and later 52nd FG Spifires claimed another Fw 190. Actual losses were 2 P-38Gs / 2 Bf 109G-6, and 2 Fw190A-5.
13 Aug 1943 - 1st and 82nd FG P-38s escorted B-26s from four bomb groups to rome. There were also B-24s raid into Germany and B-17s from the 99th BG to strikes around Rome, engaging Bf 109s from JG 77 and MC 202s from 3 and 22 Gr CT, making claims for one MC 202 and one Bf 109. The Italians claimed 3 P-38s and 4 B--24s. 79th FG P-40Ls bombed F-Boats near mainland Italy and were 'bounced' by Bf 109s from JG 77 and Fw 190s from SchG 2, claiming 3 Bf 109s and 1 Fw 190. JG 77 claimed 4 P-40s. Flak on the ships claimed another 4 P-40s and a Spitfire. B -25J strafers with 75 mm guns were attacking ships.The Luftwaffe launched a major anti-shipping strike against convoy MKS 21 with 40 He 111s and 20 Ju 88s, claiming ships sunk but actually sinking the liberty ship Francis w . Pettygrove, and damaging the British cargo ship Empire Haven. British Spitfires from 417 Sqn and 40 SAAF Sqn were also in action and took losses but made no claims. Actual losses were: 2 Spitfires (1 to MC 202s, 1 to flak),1 P-40L from 79th FG (another damaged with WiA pilot but returned to base), 1 B-25 ditched, 2 B-26s shot down near Rome and 2 B-24s shot down / 1 Bf 109G-6 ("by P-40s"), 1 Fw 190A-5, and one MC 202 MiA. 10 He 111s and 6 Ju 88 shot down by AAA while attacking the convoy.
17 Aug 1943- P-38s from 1st and 14th FG attacked targets in Southern Italy, 36 P-38s encountering Bf 109s from JG 77 and (very rare!) Re 2005s fro 22 Gr CT over Cap Sparviento. P-38s claimed one Bf 109 probable, an Re 2005 pilot claimed one P-38 and a JG 77 pilot claimed another. Some P-38s may have been the escort for a B-17 raide into airfields in Southern France. Actual losses were 4 P-38s (3 from 14th FG, 1 from 1 FG). A Fw 190 crash-landed after dive bombing and a recon Ju 88T was lost but neither of these seem to be from fighters.
19 Aug 1943 - 57 P-38s from 14th FG escorted 123 B-17s against Foggia, encounering a large number of enemy fighters from JG 77, JG 53, and JG 3, plus ten Italian fighters from 22 Gruppo (with MC 202s and Re 2005s and one Re 2001). 82nd FG P-38s escorted 100 medium bombers to Sapri and Salerno marshalling yards, also joined by 99th FS (Tuskegee) P-40Ls and A-36 dive bombers, and Kittyhawk IIIs from 250 RAF. B-24s were also on a big raid but it's not clear who was escorting them, if anyone. B-17 gunners claimed 34 enemy aircraft, A-36 piots claimed 1 Bf 109, P-38 pilots from 14th FG claimed 5 Bf 109s and an MC 202. JG 77, JG 53, and JG 3 pilots claimed P-51, 12 B-17s, 3 P-38s, a B-26 and 3 B-24s. Actual losses were 1 RAF Kittyhawk III, 2 P-38s (one from 14th one from 82nd FG), 5 A-36 from 27th FBG, 1 P-40L from 99th FS, 2 B-25s (to Flak), 4 B-17s (2 to Flak and 2 to fighters -one of the latter damaged by aerial bombs (!) before being finished off by Bf 109s) and 2 B-24s / 5 Bf 109G-6 (3 to B-17 gunners), one MC 202, and one Ju 87 also shot down.

 

[GregP]

Must have been a big cave you all lived in then.

First, I wasn't there, so I had no part in WWII as you seem to imply above. Or even Korea. The first "war" I participated in was Viet Nam, and it wasn't a war, it was a "Police Action." Of course, to those who were participating, they couldn't tell it wasn't a war most of the time.

To continue, and just to remind you, WWII was WAY before the internet. So, there were no "instant communications." They didn't learn about "rookie aerial combat notes" on Instagram or FaceBook.

Communications were by written letter or radio, and we weren't transmitting much classified data by radio most of the time except by coded transmissions that were slow by any standards due to manual encoding and decoding. Pilot notes were not worth the effort that would be expended in encoding them, and the authorization to expend the effort was not possessed by squadron commanders / flight leaders. Written letters came by ship, and there was a war on. Early in the war was before convoys, so there was at least a 2 - 3 week or longer delay in communications. Most of the communications were NOT about lessons learned in aerial combat by the British during the time before we were pulled into the war.

If there WERE a few letters about that, they didn't really make it to the advanced flight schools in what we now call a "timely fashion." We can tell that because none of the early-deployment U.S. pilots had that information. They "discovered" the information the hard way, by getting attacked by the "hun in the sun" and other ambush tactics that still worked like they did in WWI. Add to that the fact that most of the German pilots were combat veterans who had already learned the important lessons and were all too happy to teach the American rookies about it in an expeditious fashion.

What are YOU thinking? That modern communication times and methods were the norm?

Early in the war, even the British were still flying in Vic formations, and there was no radar warning. Enemy aircraft were discovered by flying patrols. Everything was visual, and only the few airplanes on routine patrols were able to engage enemy formations unless help was very close at hand and already airborne and at altitude / airspeed.

Methinks I am being trolled here .... Sorry to bite on it, but the comment betrays, dare I say it, modern thinking.

I'm sure the buggers wished they had cell phones ... oh wait, they didn't know what cell phone were. Their "iPhone 17" was an 80-pound tube-type 2-way radio that was installed in some of their airplanes. It was useful if they remembered to also bring along a working microphone and the antenna wasn't too damaged and if the speaker wasn't blown.

Edit: Should have read Drgondog's post before writing this. Well said, Bill.

 

[SaparotRob]

..the claim that half of the books on my bookshelves are invalid for reasons that ... just really aren't clear in spite of going round and round with you about it a dozen or so times by now...

I could counter your literature with the information in my books but I have not yet finished coloring them in.