F6F vs F4U, insurance policy?

[JAG88]

I hope someone can shed some light in this issue.

The F4U started development in 1938, the aircraft experienced some problems during testing but in the end the aircraft was acquired and its production contract signed on 30 June 1941... the same day the USN signed a prototype development contract for the F6F.

Was the USN unsure and worried about the F4U or simply wished to have a second iron in the fire, just in case?

 

[Barrett]

I've never heard that the F6 was an insurance policy against a failed F4U. More likely it had to do with quantity. The US knew it could not avoid the coming war, and the Corsair was one of the most complex single-engine machines conceived up to that point. (You have to see the center section to understand that aspect!) The Corsair was a cutting-edge design, a breakout from anything previously attempted. Grumman's design was evolutionary, intended for volume production, using the same engine--made enormous good sense. The props for specific models of each fighter also were identical or very similar.

 

[P-39 Expert]

We almost always had a backup, Corsair/Hellcat, P-39/P-40, B-17/B-24, B/25/B-26, B-29/B-32. Good insurance.

 

[tomo pauk]

I hope someone can shed some light in this issue.

The F4U started development in 1938, the aircraft experienced some problems during testing but in the end the aircraft was acquired and its production contract signed on 30 June 1941... the same day the USN signed a prototype development contract for the F6F.

Was the USN unsure and worried about the F4U or simply wished to have a second iron in the fire, just in case?

Dean in the 'AHT', pg. 558, does mention that Grumman was requested by the USN to make an 'improved F4F' as a back-up to the F4U program.

I've never heard that the F6 was an insurance policy against a failed F4U. More likely it had to do with quantity. The US knew it could not avoid the coming war, and the Corsair was one of the most complex single-engine machines conceived up to that point. (You have to see the center section to understand that aspect!) The Corsair was a cutting-edge design, a breakout from anything previously attempted. Grumman's design was evolutionary, intended for volume production, using the same engine--made enormous good sense. The props for specific models of each fighter also were identical or very similar.

The early F6F was concieved around the 2-stage Wright R-2600, so we might said that USN was also covering their bases against the possible failure of the 2-stage P&W R-2800 program.
Obviously, the R-2800 was installed on the F6F once people realized that a) R-2600 will not cut it on a big & heavy fighter, and b) that mass production of R-2800 is a non-issue.

 

[MIflyer]

The XF4U flew on 29 May 1940 and the first F4U-1 was delivered to the USN on 31 Jul 1942. In September 1942 they found out the F4U-1's carrier landing characteristics were not very good; it was not until April 1944 that the USN was satisfied that the Corsair could be used on carriers and it did not get into carrier service until Dec 1944.

The XF6F-1 did not fly until 26 Jun 1942 and the R-2800 equipped XF6F-3 did not fly until 30 Jul 1942. The F6F equipped a carrier starting on 16 Jan 1943. First F6F combat was 31 Aug 1943.

So the first operational F4U was delivered the day after the first XF6F-3 flew for the first time. But the Hellcat beat the Corsair to carrier service by almost 2 years.

The Hellcat no doubt was helped by the fact they found the F4U was a real performer but it took a lot of effort to incorporate combat lessons learned into the Corsair. Over 100 F4U's had been built before the XF4U-1 finally was delivered to the USN.

I don't think there was any back-up planning, but there was experience to be incorporated in both aircraft, and the F4U had to handle those problems first, by a wide margin. The F4U was an airplane bridging two eras. It had a spot welded fuselage, fabric covered outer wing panels, and wooden ailerons and yet a big two stage supercharged R-2800.

 

[Dana Bell]

"In September 1942 they found out the F4U-1's carrier landing characteristics were not very good; it was not until April 1944 that the USN was satisfied that the Corsair could be used on carriers and it did not get into carrier service until Dec 1944."

That's probably the most deeply rooted bit of mistaken history that just won't die. (It is often accompanied by the story that it took the British to teach us how to land them on carriers!) Despite some issues, all early Navy reports on carrier qualifications rated the Corsair an excellent carrier aircraft. The Corsair was ordered pulled from carriers in August 1943 specifically because there were more operational Hellcat squadrons at the time, and the Fleet didn't want to manage two parallel supply chains. By the time of that order, the stall problem was gone, the raised cockpit was in service, and there had been no excessive bounce problem.

The Corsairs went to the Marines, and several changes were introduced to improve the aircraft's ground characteristics. (About a quarter of Goodyear Corsairs were delivered with fixed wings!) In 1944 BuAer recommended the Fleet reconsider the F4U, despite the problems of having two supply chains. BuAer argued that the Corsair was better than the Hellcat, and that new Corsair versions would soon prove MUCH better than the Hellcat. It was at this point that the bounce problem was discovered, apparently the result of landing gear changes for the shore based versions. The introduction of a pressurized main gear strut solved that, but it wasn't until December 1944 that Corsair squadron began returning to carriers.

Cheers,


Dana

 

[FLYBOYJ]

But meantime at the FAA....

Avalanche Press

 

[pinehilljoe]

But meantime at the FAA....

Avalanche Press

Are there any accounts of FAA Corsairs engaging 109s or 190s?

 

[DarrenW]

Are there any accounts of FAA Corsairs engaging 109s or 190s?

The long and the short answer is unfortunately no, the Corsair never engaged German fighters in aerial combat.

 

[GrauGeist]

We almost always had a backup, Corsair/Hellcat, P-39/P-40, B-17/B-24, B/25/B-26, B-29/B-32. Good insurance.

There was no "backup" between the P-39 and P-40. The P-40 was a follow-on to the P-36 and already had an "in" with the USAAC. The P-39 was a new concept that the USAAC was interested in.
The B-17 predated the B-24 by nearly 5 years. The B-24 was the result of the USAAC asking Consolidated to manufacture the B-17 and Consolidated told the USAAC that they could build a better bomber - so not a "back up".
The B-25 and B-26 were the results of two different USAAC proposals, the B-25: 38-385 (1938), the B-26: 39-640 (1939) - neither was a "back-up", different requirements created different mission profiles involving a medium bomber platform.

The B-29/B-32 comment is actually true - to a certain extent.
The actual back-up for the B-29, was the XB-39 which was powered by four Allison V-3420 engines.
The B-32, which was to be a "fallback" was actually powered by the very engines that caused delays in the B-29: the Wright R-3350 radial.
So in reality, if the R-3350 failed for the B-29, so to, the B-32 and it would then be up to the XB-39 to carry on or wait for the B-36 which was under development during the war and made it's first flight by summer's end of 1945.

Are there any accounts of FAA Corsairs engaging 109s or 190s?

Only the FAA's Hellcat encountered Bf109s and Fw190s in the ETO.

 

[DarrenW]

BuAer argued that the Corsair was better than the Hellcat, and that new Corsair versions would soon prove MUCH better than the Hellcat.

This was a tall order and one the Corsair never managed to accomplish, at least during WWII.

 

[Dana Bell]

This was a tall order and one the Corsair never managed to accomplish, at least during WWII.

Well, I guess that settles that...

Cheers,


Dana

 

[P-39 Expert]

There was no "backup" between the P-39 and P-40. The P-40 was a follow-on to the P-36 and already had an "in" with the USAAC. The P-39 was a new concept that the USAAC was interested in.
The B-17 predated the B-24 by nearly 5 years. The B-24 was the result of the USAAC asking Consolidated to manufacture the B-17 and Consolidated told the USAAC that they could build a better bomber - so not a "back up".
The B-25 and B-26 were the results of two different USAAC proposals, the B-25: 38-385 (1938), the B-26: 39-640 (1939) - neither was a "back-up", different requirements created different mission profiles involving a medium bomber platform.

The B-29/B-32 comment is actually true - to a certain extent.
The actual back-up for the B-29, was the XB-39 which was powered by four Allison V-3420 engines.
The B-32, which was to be a "fallback" was actually powered by the very engines that caused delays in the B-29: the Wright R-3350 radial.
So in reality, if the R-3350 failed for the B-29, so to, the B-32 and it would then be up to the XB-39 to carry on or wait for the B-36 which was under development during the war and made it's first flight by summer's end of 1945.


Only the FAA's Hellcat encountered Bf109s and Fw190s in the ETO.

Call it what you want, backup or not, but why would the AAF build two planes with the same engines (except for B-17/B-24 but they had the same horsepower) that were about the same size and performed the same functions? One is insurance against the failure of the other. Smart business if you can afford it.

 

[GrauGeist]

The P-40 was purchased as a mainstay fighter, the P-39 was purchased on the basis of being a high-altitude interceptor.

It is not unusual for two different types of fighters to have the same engine.

Also, as the ink was drying on the P-40 and P-39 contracts, the USAAC had in service the P-36 and P-35, both which used the P&W R-1830 (along with many other USAAC and USN aircraft). They were also in the process of developing the P-43, which also had a P&W R-1830 - it would first fly in 1940.

In the case of the F6F, it was on the drawing board as soon as the F4F went into production and the F8F was on the drawing board virtually before the F6F went into production.

So *technically* speaking, the F8F could be seen as a "backup" for the F4U, if a person wants to read into things beyond what's really there.

 

[JAG88]

Dean in the 'AHT', pg. 558, does mention that Grumman was requested by the USN to make an 'improved F4F' as a back-up to the F4U program.

Thx, any idea as to when was that request made?

 

[tomo pauk]

"June 1941."

 

[DarrenW]

Thx, any idea as to when was that request made?

The idea of an "improved Wildcat" was shelved when the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics raised the stakes and wanted a fighter with greater capabilities than the F4F could possibly deliver, no matter what level of improvements were incorporated. At that point Leroy Grumman and William Schwendler decided to start from scratch by creating an entirely different aircraft to meet these new requirements. This drastic change in direction occurred rather quickly, as work on Grumman Design Number 50 started only weeks after the Navy asked for a Wildcat with a better performance. This was in June 1941, and by the end of the month a contract was signed for the new design, which ultimately became the XF6F-1.

Source: Hellcat: The F6F in World War II (Tillman).

 

[JAG88]

"June 1941."

Lol! Sorry, brain bad...

 

[Chuck]

I hope someone can shed some light in this issue.

The F4U started development in 1938, the aircraft experienced some problems during testing but in the end the aircraft was acquired and its production contract signed on 30 June 1941... the same day the USN signed a prototype development contract for the F6F.

Was the USN unsure and worried about the F4U or simply wished to have a second iron in the fire, just in case?

 

[Chuck]

Everything I've ever read suggests the F6 was a stand alone design meant to give the Navy an easy to produce aircraft that could match the AM-6 and was carrier capable which they still weren't sure the F4U was.