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I hope someone can shed some light in this issue.
The F4U started development in 1938, the aircraft experienced some problems during testing but in the end the aircraft was acquired and its production contract signed on 30 June 1941... the same day the USN signed a prototype development contract for the F6F.
Was the USN unsure and worried about the F4U or simply wished to have a second iron in the fire, just in case?
I've never heard that the F6 was an insurance policy against a failed F4U. More likely it had to do with quantity. The US knew it could not avoid the coming war, and the Corsair was one of the most complex single-engine machines conceived up to that point. (You have to see the center section to understand that aspect!) The Corsair was a cutting-edge design, a breakout from anything previously attempted. Grumman's design was evolutionary, intended for volume production, using the same engine--made enormous good sense. The props for specific models of each fighter also were identical or very similar.
Are there any accounts of FAA Corsairs engaging 109s or 190s?
There was no "backup" between the P-39 and P-40. The P-40 was a follow-on to the P-36 and already had an "in" with the USAAC. The P-39 was a new concept that the USAAC was interested in.We almost always had a backup, Corsair/Hellcat, P-39/P-40, B-17/B-24, B/25/B-26, B-29/B-32. Good insurance.
Only the FAA's Hellcat encountered Bf109s and Fw190s in the ETO.Are there any accounts of FAA Corsairs engaging 109s or 190s?
BuAer argued that the Corsair was better than the Hellcat, and that new Corsair versions would soon prove MUCH better than the Hellcat.
This was a tall order and one the Corsair never managed to accomplish, at least during WWII.
Call it what you want, backup or not, but why would the AAF build two planes with the same engines (except for B-17/B-24 but they had the same horsepower) that were about the same size and performed the same functions? One is insurance against the failure of the other. Smart business if you can afford it.There was no "backup" between the P-39 and P-40. The P-40 was a follow-on to the P-36 and already had an "in" with the USAAC. The P-39 was a new concept that the USAAC was interested in.
The B-17 predated the B-24 by nearly 5 years. The B-24 was the result of the USAAC asking Consolidated to manufacture the B-17 and Consolidated told the USAAC that they could build a better bomber - so not a "back up".
The B-25 and B-26 were the results of two different USAAC proposals, the B-25: 38-385 (1938), the B-26: 39-640 (1939) - neither was a "back-up", different requirements created different mission profiles involving a medium bomber platform.
The B-29/B-32 comment is actually true - to a certain extent.
The actual back-up for the B-29, was the XB-39 which was powered by four Allison V-3420 engines.
The B-32, which was to be a "fallback" was actually powered by the very engines that caused delays in the B-29: the Wright R-3350 radial.
So in reality, if the R-3350 failed for the B-29, so to, the B-32 and it would then be up to the XB-39 to carry on or wait for the B-36 which was under development during the war and made it's first flight by summer's end of 1945.
Only the FAA's Hellcat encountered Bf109s and Fw190s in the ETO.
Dean in the 'AHT', pg. 558, does mention that Grumman was requested by the USN to make an 'improved F4F' as a back-up to the F4U program.
Thx, any idea as to when was that request made?
I hope someone can shed some light in this issue.
The F4U started development in 1938, the aircraft experienced some problems during testing but in the end the aircraft was acquired and its production contract signed on 30 June 1941... the same day the USN signed a prototype development contract for the F6F.
Was the USN unsure and worried about the F4U or simply wished to have a second iron in the fire, just in case?