The Marines stopped using them on carriers because of the loss rate, the RAF cut the wings down and devised new landing procedures to try and address the problem, zero visibility over the nose, it's tendency to float on landing, viscous stall and it's ability to rotate around it's own propeller all caused the high crash rate.
How the Navy Tamed the "Killer Corsair" | History | Air & Space Magazine a brief article on the problem, Winkle Brown didn't have many nice things about it either, something along the lines of it had a few good points, a couple of average ones and a heap of really bad ones.
Hope this isn't some sort of qualifying of the statement regarding more F4U pilots being lost in accidents than in combat . . . because if it is, it is monumentally unsuccessful.
Okay, one by one . . .
The Marines stopped using them on carriers because of the loss rate,
No, not true. The Marines started using F4Us aboard carriers in 1944 and never looked back. The biggest problem was a need for remedial navigation training. You are perhaps referring to the USN declining to assign F4Us to carriers. Some like to attribute this to some pointy heads at BuAer, but the fact of the matter was that the decision was made by Admirals King, Nimitz, and Towers at a meeting in San Francisco in late 1943. The reasoning revolved around the aircraft replenishment and even replacement parts, pipeline and, probably more important, by then aircraft maintenance had become a ships company problem vice the pre and early war individual squadron problem. This meant that there was an insufficient number of F4U maintenance personnel and a plethora of F6F maintenance personnel. By late 1944 the maintenance problem solved itself by the establishment of numerous USN F4U squadrons and maintenance personnel trained right alongside pilots Thus when USN F4U squadrons started appearing on carriers in 1945, there was a supply of F4U maintenance personnel to be assigned to ships company. On the other hand, USMC F4U maintenance personnel were organic to the squadron. Thus, when USMC F4Us went aboard carriers (e.g. USS Essex in Dec 1944, VMFs 124 and 213) they brought their own maintenance people with them. Marines used F4Us (and F6Fs, for that matter) aboard carriers from that first appearance in December 1944 through the end of the war.
the RAF cut the wings down
The RAF had nothing, zip, zero, nada to do with F4Us. Certain, not all, of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm F4Us did, indeed, had their wingtips shortened, but that was a squadron by squadron deal entirely based up to which ship the squadron was assigned. It all had to do with how much overhead there was in the hangar deck. Some of the RN carriers' lack of enough overhead meant the wings on an F4U could not fully fold . . . slice off 15-18 inches and the problem is solved. This had nothing to do with any performance improvements.
and devised new landing procedures to try and address the problem, zero visibility over the nose
I'll say this twice . . . All of the RN FAA F4U squadrons received their aircraft, were checked out, trained, and carrier qualified under USN tutelage at USN air stations and aboard USN carriers. Again in case anyone missed it . . . All of the RN FAA F4U squadrons received their aircraft, were checked out, trained, and carrier qualified under USN tutelage at USN air stations and aboard USN carriers. ALL yes, ALL of them, all 19 of the FAA F4U squadrons accepted their aircraft and trained in the US for an average of about three months. All of them carrier qualified in US waters on US carriers and all this training was accomplished with USN instructors. The first FAA squadron destined for F4Us, 1830, arrived at NAS Quonset Point in June 1943. The rest began their training:
1831 in July 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1834 in July 1943 NAS Quonset Point
1833 in July 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1835 in August 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1836 in August 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1837 in September 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1838 in October 1943, NAS Brunswick
1841 in March 1944, NAS Brunswick
1842 in April 1944, NAS Brunswick
1843 in May 1944, NAS Brunswick
1845 in June 1944, NAS Brunswick
1846 in July 1944, NAS Brunswick
1848 in July 1944, NAS Brunswick
1850 in August 1944, NAS Brunswick
1849 in August 1944, NAS Brunswick
1851 in September 1944, NAS Brunswick
1852 in February 1945, NAS Brunswick
1853 in April 1945, NAS Brunswick
Check the FAA records. Most of what these squadrons were doing in the US is available on the internet, for example, see
First Line Squadrons Menu.
Tall tales do not become true through repletion either in print, including a bunch of junk from Air & Space slicks, or on the web. Most of these F4U RN developed landing practices, and the usual follow-on, first to deploy on carriers, tales date from 1960s and 1970s published accounts which the internet, for all the bad things I can say about it, such as repeating these tales as dogma, now lets us see the data, which lets us put stakes in the hearts of the hoary fables. Hot flash . . . FAA F4Us saw their first carrier combat deployment in April 1944; the USN had a F4U squadron (and a night squadron at that) operating in combat from USS Enterprise in January 1944.
One US naval aviator of my acquaintance, who after a couple of combat tours, carrier and land based, was director of VF training at ComFAirWest from Sept 1943 to Oct 1944, reported that the "crabbing" approach was the only way to land an F4U on a carrier and still keep the LSO in sight. Quoth: "It was the only way we knew how to do it and the only method that made sense. It was not something we felt needed comment." He first flew the F4U-1 at San Diego on November 3, 1943, after returning from a tour in the Solomons in VF-11 flying F4Fs (his first F6F flight was at Espiritu Santo on 14 July 1943, in a plane borrowed from VF-33 as the squadrons crossed paths to and from the combat area, some ratting about with F4Us, his adversary was one Ken Walsh . . . another story for later). Upon return to the states, he became director of fighter training at ComFAirWest where he was flying at least every other day, F6Fs, FMs, F4Us, even the occasional SBD, and sometimes three or four flights a day. Working from his pilot's logbook, his first flight in an F4U-1A was on 31 January 1944. After a couple of FCLP flights in the preceding days, his first actual carrier landing in an F4U, a -1A, was on February 24, 1944 aboard the CVE USS Altamaha, this in prep for the March 1944 RATO experiments. He would always say that the way to land the F4U on a carrier was obvious to anyone with any experience (he earned his wings in November 1940 and was already an ace) and had an inkling as to what he was doing and what needed to be done. The shape of the plane, the position of, and view from, the cockpit, and the need to keep the LSO in sight led one naturally to use wide and side approach, straightening out only at the last few seconds.
Still another naval aviator of my acquaintance, Bob Dosé, one of the leaders in VF-12, an early USN F4U squadron (the members of which were outraged when they had to turn their F4Us over to the local CASU and draw F6Fs for the air group's first deployment), when asked long ago re the RN figuring out how to land on a carrier, told me pretty much the same thing, the technique was obvious and was what they taught their pilots.
zero visibility over the nose
Visibility over the nose was never truly solved, but the change to the raised canopy vice the birdcage canopy certainly helped. Another USN development.
it's tendency to float on landing
According to the above director of fighter training at ComFAirWest, this was a problem causally related to poor technique. It was mostly seen in USMC squadrons destined for carrier duty. The squadrons returning from the Pacific had to essentially be taught carrier landing from scratch due to habits acquired from land operations. It was not that big a deal and mostly eradicated through FCLP. Some like to point to the films of VF-17s first carrier quals as evidence of poor landing handling and the supposed float. John Blackburn was quite specific in his description of the events and if you were to watch those VF-17 films closely you would quickly see what he was talking about. Defective tail hooks were catching on tie-down slots in the flight deck and snapping off, therefore, no arrest and a trip to the barrier. Films make it look pretty bad, but all due to a material failure.
The Royal Navy had nothing to do with this fix. The stall problem was solved by one LT Merle "Butch" Davenport a fighter pilot in VF-17, an aeronautical engineer by trade and training before becoming a naval aviator. He developed the stall spoiler and convinced the Vought folks to take that route. He also worked out lowering the pressure in the struts to reduce the infamous bounce. Said director of fighter training reported never being on the receiving end of the bounce problem, said it was largely a matter of technique.
it's ability to rotate around it's own propeller
Surprise, surprise and not a crash cause. Just about any single engine propeller carrier plane when given full power and going over the side will have a remarkable tendency to rotate and flip over if it has lost lift. The cause of the crash however is another of those poor technique deals. Coming in just outside the stall envelope and suddenly cramming on full power is not really a good idea in a prop driven tail dragger of any make. No, you can't save it and go around . . . let the barriers do their job and you'll probably walk away with no more than an ass chewing.
I'd suggest instead of dragging out tales and fables that can easily be dismissed by some real research and provide no hard numbers on losses, that someone drag out the war diaries from the various squadron operating F4Us, whether or not they made it to combat, and count up the number of pilots lost in non-combat related accidents. Then count up the number lost in combat operations. That would quell the debate on more being lost in accidents than in combat one way or the other. Sorry, that's not the kind of research I do for free. Very tedious . . . 1, 2, next squadron 1, 2, 3, next squadron . . . nope, not for free.