Favourite Naval Fighter

[GrauGeist]

According to the USN's NASC report from 1946, more F6Fs were lost to Operational/Other (non enemy related) incidents than the F4U and FG - both in the Carrier based squadrons and the Land based categories.

 

[SaparotRob]

I now wonder how many pilots were actually lost due to landing mishaps. Hopefully that nickname was a bit of an exaggeration earned by washing out pilots, written off airframes, and injuries.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As for exact numbers, sorry I'm not doing all that research to prove a point the available evidence already does.

Yeah, I figured you weren't going to provide numbers. Thanks anyway.

Also, the Corsair wasn't removed "from service". The were removed from most American carrier operations until 1944.

 

[Dana Bell]

I'll let the evidence speak for itself, if a plane is killing enough of it's own pilots during wartime that it is removed from service you know the number was high. The thread is about naval fighters, I voted for the Hellcat, the fighter that replaced the F4U, enough said. As for exact numbers, sorry I'm not doing all that research to prove a point the available evidence already does.

Hi Pat,

That A&S Article is full of bunk. The actual records at the National Archives of VF12 and VF17 praised the Corsair's carrier capabilities, and recommended deployment on carriers. (I have copies.) There were several bang-ups during tests, but fatalities never became an issue. The Corsair was pulled from carrier duty ONLY because the Fleet already had several Hellcat squadrons in service and didn't want to run two separate logistics lines for carrier fighters.

I've been through all BuAer's crash reports, and landing fatalities were surprisingly rare - lots of crashes, few deaths. (Since I didn't copy all the reports, I can't give you percentages.)

By 1944 it was apparent that the Corsair had distinct combat advantages over the Hellcat, and BuAer began pushing the Fleet to reconsider its logistics concerns in favor of performance. The first to bring Corsairs back to carriers were Marine pilots, with the Navy reasoning that they already had experience in the F4U. However, they didn't have experience landing on carriers. Prewar Marine flight training was the same as Navy training - trainees flew everything! However, with the needs for more wartime pilots, the Marine training program eliminated many things that were considered unnecessary - including carrier training. This proved to be a problem, but it wasn't the Corsair's fault.

The Corsair did develop one fault - in 1945 the aircraft bounced heavily on landing. The unit discovering the problem ceased futher training until the bounce could be eliminated. The problem was traced to a lowering of pressure in the main gear struts; with the pressure increased, the entire squadron qualified within weeks.

Most of what has been written about the Corsair has been based on hearsay and stories borrowed from other publications. The National Archives provides a much different story, but it will take many years (if ever!) before the false legends are forgotten and the true story has been accepted. The "ensign killer" name has been applied to several aircraft over the years, mostly by authors trying to make a good story a bit more interesting. It's their fault - not yours - that this bunk continues to be published.

Cheers,



Dana

 

[PAT303]

Also, the Corsair wasn't removed "from service". The were removed from most American carrier operations until 1944.

Well the Navy gave them to the Marines who based them on land, for a carrier based aircraft to be placed on land I'd call it removed from service.

 

[PAT303]

Most of what has been written about the Corsair has been based on hearsay and stories borrowed from other publications.

Well the FAA Corsairs had modifications done to them such as shortening the wings, revised landing gear and unique landing procedures all to try and lower the crash rate, they even raised the pilots seat about 6'' to try and improve the forward visibility, none of that would have been done if the high incident rate wasn't there, funny enough those were the same problems the much maligned Seafire had so the FAA had plenty of experience dealing with troubled aircraft. I have no bone to pick in regards to the F4U, the Hellcat was just a better carrier aircraft, it's as simple as that.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well the Navy gave them to the Marines who based them on land, for a carrier based aircraft to be placed on land I'd call it removed from service.

My taste for hyperbole is ebbing after this conversation. Have a great day.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I thought the wings were clipped to fit to fit into RN hangars, which being armored had less headroom?

 

[Dana Bell]

Well the FAA Corsairs had modifications done to them such as shortening the wings, revised landing gear and unique landing procedures all to try and lower the crash rate, none of that would have been done if the high incident rate wasn't there, funny enough those were the same problems the much maligned Seafire had so the FAA had plenty of experience dealing with troubled aircraft. I have no bone to pick in regards to the F4U, the Hellcat was just a better carrier aircraft, it's as simple as that.

Hi Pat,

The shortened wings had nothing positive to to with carrier performance - British hangar decks were shorter, so the short wingtips were necessary to fit inside the hangar. When newer British carriers had even lower hangar ceilings, and even shorter wingtip (the "short short" wingtip) was introduced. The US Navy considered adopting the British wingtips to simplify production, but found no performance advantages.

The myth of the turning approach being a British solution is just that - a myth. The US Navy had been using the turning approach for years - as seen in photos of the Corsair tests and even the prewar Hollywood movie Dive Bomber. The British did develop a revised landing procedure that the US Navy found useful, but other than a US report mentioning that this procedure existed and was useful, we don't know the precise details.

Remember, the August 1943 orders concentrating on the Hellcat as the primary US carrier fighter came after the introduction of the stall strip and after the introduction of the raised canopy (the so-called F4U-1A). All of the reports based on the Corsair's merits claimed that the type was satisfactory or excellant for carrier operations. Additionally, carriers could carry more Corsairs than Hellcats.

Of course, none of this has any impact on a "favorite" naval fighter. The Hellcat was considered safer and easier to fly. But BuAer considered the Corsair a superior combat aircraft, which is one of the reasons why three factories produced Corsairs.

Cheers,


Dana

 

[GrauGeist]

Well the Navy gave them to the Marines who based them on land, for a carrier based aircraft to be placed on land I'd call it removed from service.

The USN and USMC operated the Corsiar at the same time.
You'll also find several USN squadrons were land-based as well during the same time period.
None of this had anything to do with carrier suitability but rather the need for foreward combat units operating against enemy positions without having to keep a carrier stationed in the vicinity.

 

[R Leonard]

The Marines stopped using them on carriers because of the loss rate, the RAF cut the wings down and devised new landing procedures to try and address the problem, zero visibility over the nose, it's tendency to float on landing, viscous stall and it's ability to rotate around it's own propeller all caused the high crash rate. How the Navy Tamed the "Killer Corsair" | History | Air & Space Magazine a brief article on the problem, Winkle Brown didn't have many nice things about it either, something along the lines of it had a few good points, a couple of average ones and a heap of really bad ones.

Hope this isn't some sort of qualifying of the statement regarding more F4U pilots being lost in accidents than in combat . . . because if it is, it is monumentally unsuccessful.

Okay, one by one . . .

The Marines stopped using them on carriers because of the loss rate,

No, not true. The Marines started using F4Us aboard carriers in 1944 and never looked back. The biggest problem was a need for remedial navigation training. You are perhaps referring to the USN declining to assign F4Us to carriers. Some like to attribute this to some pointy heads at BuAer, but the fact of the matter was that the decision was made by Admirals King, Nimitz, and Towers at a meeting in San Francisco in late 1943. The reasoning revolved around the aircraft replenishment and even replacement parts, pipeline and, probably more important, by then aircraft maintenance had become a ships company problem vice the pre and early war individual squadron problem. This meant that there was an insufficient number of F4U maintenance personnel and a plethora of F6F maintenance personnel. By late 1944 the maintenance problem solved itself by the establishment of numerous USN F4U squadrons and maintenance personnel trained right alongside pilots Thus when USN F4U squadrons started appearing on carriers in 1945, there was a supply of F4U maintenance personnel to be assigned to ships company. On the other hand, USMC F4U maintenance personnel were organic to the squadron. Thus, when USMC F4Us went aboard carriers (e.g. USS Essex in Dec 1944, VMFs 124 and 213) they brought their own maintenance people with them. Marines used F4Us (and F6Fs, for that matter) aboard carriers from that first appearance in December 1944 through the end of the war.

the RAF cut the wings down

The RAF had nothing, zip, zero, nada to do with F4Us. Certain, not all, of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm F4Us did, indeed, had their wingtips shortened, but that was a squadron by squadron deal entirely based up to which ship the squadron was assigned. It all had to do with how much overhead there was in the hangar deck. Some of the RN carriers' lack of enough overhead meant the wings on an F4U could not fully fold . . . slice off 15-18 inches and the problem is solved. This had nothing to do with any performance improvements.

and devised new landing procedures to try and address the problem, zero visibility over the nose

I'll say this twice . . . All of the RN FAA F4U squadrons received their aircraft, were checked out, trained, and carrier qualified under USN tutelage at USN air stations and aboard USN carriers. Again in case anyone missed it . . . All of the RN FAA F4U squadrons received their aircraft, were checked out, trained, and carrier qualified under USN tutelage at USN air stations and aboard USN carriers. ALL yes, ALL of them, all 19 of the FAA F4U squadrons accepted their aircraft and trained in the US for an average of about three months. All of them carrier qualified in US waters on US carriers and all this training was accomplished with USN instructors. The first FAA squadron destined for F4Us, 1830, arrived at NAS Quonset Point in June 1943. The rest began their training:
1831 in July 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1834 in July 1943 NAS Quonset Point
1833 in July 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1835 in August 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1836 in August 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1837 in September 1943, NAS Quonset Point
1838 in October 1943, NAS Brunswick
1841 in March 1944, NAS Brunswick
1842 in April 1944, NAS Brunswick
1843 in May 1944, NAS Brunswick
1845 in June 1944, NAS Brunswick
1846 in July 1944, NAS Brunswick
1848 in July 1944, NAS Brunswick
1850 in August 1944, NAS Brunswick
1849 in August 1944, NAS Brunswick
1851 in September 1944, NAS Brunswick
1852 in February 1945, NAS Brunswick
1853 in April 1945, NAS Brunswick

Check the FAA records. Most of what these squadrons were doing in the US is available on the internet, for example, see First Line Squadrons Menu.

Tall tales do not become true through repletion either in print, including a bunch of junk from Air & Space slicks, or on the web. Most of these F4U RN developed landing practices, and the usual follow-on, first to deploy on carriers, tales date from 1960s and 1970s published accounts which the internet, for all the bad things I can say about it, such as repeating these tales as dogma, now lets us see the data, which lets us put stakes in the hearts of the hoary fables. Hot flash . . . FAA F4Us saw their first carrier combat deployment in April 1944; the USN had a F4U squadron (and a night squadron at that) operating in combat from USS Enterprise in January 1944.

One US naval aviator of my acquaintance, who after a couple of combat tours, carrier and land based, was director of VF training at ComFAirWest from Sept 1943 to Oct 1944, reported that the "crabbing" approach was the only way to land an F4U on a carrier and still keep the LSO in sight. Quoth: "It was the only way we knew how to do it and the only method that made sense. It was not something we felt needed comment." He first flew the F4U-1 at San Diego on November 3, 1943, after returning from a tour in the Solomons in VF-11 flying F4Fs (his first F6F flight was at Espiritu Santo on 14 July 1943, in a plane borrowed from VF-33 as the squadrons crossed paths to and from the combat area, some ratting about with F4Us, his adversary was one Ken Walsh . . . another story for later). Upon return to the states, he became director of fighter training at ComFAirWest where he was flying at least every other day, F6Fs, FMs, F4Us, even the occasional SBD, and sometimes three or four flights a day. Working from his pilot's logbook, his first flight in an F4U-1A was on 31 January 1944. After a couple of FCLP flights in the preceding days, his first actual carrier landing in an F4U, a -1A, was on February 24, 1944 aboard the CVE USS Altamaha, this in prep for the March 1944 RATO experiments. He would always say that the way to land the F4U on a carrier was obvious to anyone with any experience (he earned his wings in November 1940 and was already an ace) and had an inkling as to what he was doing and what needed to be done. The shape of the plane, the position of, and view from, the cockpit, and the need to keep the LSO in sight led one naturally to use wide and side approach, straightening out only at the last few seconds.

Still another naval aviator of my acquaintance, Bob Dosé, one of the leaders in VF-12, an early USN F4U squadron (the members of which were outraged when they had to turn their F4Us over to the local CASU and draw F6Fs for the air group's first deployment), when asked long ago re the RN figuring out how to land on a carrier, told me pretty much the same thing, the technique was obvious and was what they taught their pilots.

zero visibility over the nose

Visibility over the nose was never truly solved, but the change to the raised canopy vice the birdcage canopy certainly helped. Another USN development.

it's tendency to float on landing

According to the above director of fighter training at ComFAirWest, this was a problem causally related to poor technique. It was mostly seen in USMC squadrons destined for carrier duty. The squadrons returning from the Pacific had to essentially be taught carrier landing from scratch due to habits acquired from land operations. It was not that big a deal and mostly eradicated through FCLP. Some like to point to the films of VF-17s first carrier quals as evidence of poor landing handling and the supposed float. John Blackburn was quite specific in his description of the events and if you were to watch those VF-17 films closely you would quickly see what he was talking about. Defective tail hooks were catching on tie-down slots in the flight deck and snapping off, therefore, no arrest and a trip to the barrier. Films make it look pretty bad, but all due to a material failure.

viscous stall

The Royal Navy had nothing to do with this fix. The stall problem was solved by one LT Merle "Butch" Davenport a fighter pilot in VF-17, an aeronautical engineer by trade and training before becoming a naval aviator. He developed the stall spoiler and convinced the Vought folks to take that route. He also worked out lowering the pressure in the struts to reduce the infamous bounce. Said director of fighter training reported never being on the receiving end of the bounce problem, said it was largely a matter of technique.

it's ability to rotate around it's own propeller

Surprise, surprise and not a crash cause. Just about any single engine propeller carrier plane when given full power and going over the side will have a remarkable tendency to rotate and flip over if it has lost lift. The cause of the crash however is another of those poor technique deals. Coming in just outside the stall envelope and suddenly cramming on full power is not really a good idea in a prop driven tail dragger of any make. No, you can't save it and go around . . . let the barriers do their job and you'll probably walk away with no more than an ass chewing.

I'd suggest instead of dragging out tales and fables that can easily be dismissed by some real research and provide no hard numbers on losses, that someone drag out the war diaries from the various squadron operating F4Us, whether or not they made it to combat, and count up the number of pilots lost in non-combat related accidents. Then count up the number lost in combat operations. That would quell the debate on more being lost in accidents than in combat one way or the other. Sorry, that's not the kind of research I do for free. Very tedious . . . 1, 2, next squadron 1, 2, 3, next squadron . . . nope, not for free.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Thanks for such an informative post, RL.

Very tedious . . . 1, 2, next squadron 1, 2, 3, next squadron . . . nope, not for free.

It also disregards Hitchens's Razor.

 

[SaparotRob]

MYTH(s) BUSTED! What a great post, R Leonard. Very informative. Thanks.

 

[VBF-13]

Great post, R Leonard. Filled in the "in-betweens" real nicely, well done. Another thing I think people don't give much attention to is these 6Fs were, by design, crack dive-bombers. Hence, VBF, not VF.

 

[R Leonard]

Chuckle, but even though referred to as Fighting-Bombing squadrons they were not designated as "VFB's" which was the USN designation for Free French USN trained dive bomber squadrons.

 

[VBF-13]

I always wondered why they're Bombing-Fighting, instead of Fighting-Bombing, but for some reason never got around to asking. But in Dad's training logs, the bombing runs are there, plain as ever.

 

[Shortround6]

I'll let the evidence speak for itself, if a plane is killing enough of it's own pilots during wartime that it is removed from service you know the number was high.

The US didn't take the F4U out of service until the end of the Korean war.

773 Corsairs were built between 1946 and 1952.

Strange for such a "killer" aircraft.

 

[PAT303]

I thought the wings were clipped to fit to fit into RN hangars, which being armored had less headroom?

They were and like the Seafire it helped to fix the floating over the deck problem, both aircraft required the planes to be flown into the deck to land which in turn increased the bouncing problem as it completely compressed the struts which threw the aircraft back into the air.

 

[PAT303]

The Hellcat was considered safer and easier to fly.

When we discuss aircraft and their performance I believe this is one of the most important attributes an aircraft can have and why the Hellcat was the better plane.

 

[PAT303]

The RAF had nothing, zip, zero, nada to do with F4Us

The FAA used the F4U before the USN did, they had nothing to do with the design but plenty about it's problems.

Tall tales do not become true through repletion either in print

I keep hearing this but the plane first flew in 1940, was declared land based operational in 1942 but it wasn't until mid 1944 they were carrier based, so the question needs to be asked, why 4 years?.