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It is not an 'enduring myth' that LeMay decided to strike at low level - after exhaustive examination of B-29s ops by Possum Hansel and the lack of success of traditional 8th AF doctrine.Here is how the actual mission unfolded
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Note that the very first B-29 raid on Japan was a night mission. One of the enduring myths of WWII is that Curtis Lemay came up with the idea of night bombing with B-29s. Night bombing was planned as a part of the repertoire before the B-29s first combat mission.
The article is not claiming to report reliability and it clearly cannot do so. They are using when engines were removed, a big part of reliability measures is the engines that failed or were shut down because of problems but were repaired while staying attached to the aircraft, the flip side of fit the spare rather than fix the repairable existing engine.OK - and I read that - but again what IS NOT being shown, and I'll repeat one more time "is the type of overhaul."
Why is this important?!?!? Because it REALLY shows the wear and tear on the engine, RELIABILITY and what components are subject to that wear and tear.
You have made it quite clear how varied the work can be for a non standard overhaul, versus a scheduled one, but why the need to introduce the overhaul information and the engine reliability when it is clear the report is covering operating life not reliability?So as stated, these numbers are wonderful but at the end of the day they don't really paint a true degree of reliability on those engines sent to "overhaul" for non-combat issues.
ObviouslyThe article is not claiming to report reliability and it clearly cannot do so.
And that's my point and as stated; for one reason or another, is not indicatedThey are using when engines were removed, a big part of reliability measures is the engines that failed or were shut down because of problems but were repaired while staying attached to the aircraft, the flip side of fit the spare rather than fix the repairable existing engine.
Because when it's identified, the type of overhaul that was required is when you will get a TRUE indication of engine reliability! For example, you could of had an engine that had low compression, maybe due to bad rings or valves on two cylinders. Rather than repair on the aircraft (which would more than likely be considered a non-routine "repair"), the entire engine was removed and sent to "overhaul."You have made it quite clear how varied the work can be for a non standard overhaul, versus a scheduled one, but why the need to introduce the overhaul information and the engine reliability when it is clear the report is covering operating life not reliability?
It is not an 'enduring myth' that LeMay decided to strike at low level - after exhaustive examination of B-29s ops by Possum Hansel and the lack of success of traditional 8th AF doctrine.
He didn't base his decision upon 'theoretical possibilities', but on the hard facts that Japanese a.) had poor night fighter capability, b.) inadequate infrastructure to put out fires of mostly wooden buildings, c.) much of Japan's mfg was provided by shops inside city limits, d.) engine stress to climb to high altitude was reduced, e.) pulling most armament and flying at much lower altitudes enabled 2-3 tons more bombload.
None of his subordinates came to him and said "Gee, we read that Night Bombing was part of the B-29 repertoire, so we guess that its' ok".
This one is a bit cheaperLeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.
An excellent read (but not at that price!)
Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/
Your link didn't show up, but Mission With LeMay is worth a hefty price - but I got mine a loong time ago.LeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.
An excellent read (but not at that price!)
Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/
Each Bomb Squadron was supposed to have 15 aircraft.How big was a B-29 squadron in WWII?
Four of the six first 6 B-29 combat missions were undertaken at night. The first mission (Bangkok) was originally a night mission but was rescheduled to day.LeMay was also aware of the results of tests on a replica Japanese village constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in1943.
The weapon, the M69 incendiary, he used to burn the heart of out Japanese towns was the fruit of lessons learned.
An excellent read (but not at that price!)
Amazon product ASIN 034528304X
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/034528304X/
But remember, when B-29 operations against Japan from China were first discussed in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, the B-29 had only flown 4 months previously and US was fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea. Deployment to India was delayed by the problems with the B-29. It was only after the "Battle of Kansas" in early 1944 that they were able to deploy to India via Africa in April. And it was scaled back from 2 Bomb Wings to 1 due to progress in the Central Pacific.Staging through China from India was obviously dumb. Not sure Darwin would have been any better, and in no case would it hit the Japanese home islands. There's a reason why thousands of Marines and soldiers fought and died over the Marianas. It wasn't the moonlit walks on the beach.
But remember, when B-29 operations against Japan from China were first discussed in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, the B-29 had only flown 4 months previously and US was fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea. Deployment to India was delayed by the problems with the B-29. It was only after the "Battle of Kansas" in early 1944 that they were able to deploy to India via Africa in April. And it was scaled back from 2 Bomb Wings to 1 due to progress in the Central Pacific.
And the Japanese didn't just sit idly by. Operation Ichi-Go from April 1944 pushed deeper into China and allowed IJA bombers to threaten the B-29 forward bases. So for two months between late Aug and late Oct 1944 the XX Bomber Command were not flying missions against Japan.
The island hopping campaign in the central Pacific wasn't approved until the Quadrant Conference in Aug 1943. Planning for the first step, Operation Galvanic to the Gilbert Islands, didn't start until the beginning of Oct and the first islands targeted were invaded in Nov 1943. Those relied on the many ships that were only coming into service during 1943.
The air bases acquired and / or built on the islands taken in these early campaigns provided staging posts for later B-29 deployments to the Marianas (places like Kwajalein taken in Jan/Feb 1944). The Marianas campaign for Saipan, Guam and Tinian took place June - Aug 1944. Then the massive air bases and supporting facilities needed to be built. The first B-29 didn't deploy to Saipan until 12 Oct 1944. It was 17 Nov before the first mission was flown to Japan.
So in January 1943, the only possible route to deploying the B-29 against the Japanese Homeland, dumb though it may seem in retrospect, was from China.
Edit:- The XXI Bomber Command came into existence on 1 March 1944. It was to be responsible for B-29 operations from the Marianas.
The second B-29 Bomb Wing to be formed, the 73rd, was then training in the USA. Originally to go to China under the, XX Bomber Command, in June 1944 it was transferred to the command of XXI Bomber Command and prepared to move to the Marianas.
Meanwhile the 58th BW operated in the CBI until it flew its final operation there at the end of March 1945. It then moved to the Marianas to join XXI BC. It then moved to Tinian in April flying its first mission from there on 5th May.
It was at the Sextant Conference in Cairo in November 1943 that the decision was made to target the Japanese oil facilities.Right. It was still extraordinarily expensive, and largely ineffective. A better use for that 1943 time period would be attacking the refineries in NEI on a steady basis.
The cost of the Doolittle raid may have been the Lexington. If the Enterprise was at the Battle of the Coral Sea instead of returning from the Doolittle raid the outcome may have been more favorable to the USN.Figure out the cost per ton of bombs dropped by the Doolittle raid.
Two carriers at how many men and how many tons of fuel oil over how many days plus escorts plus..............
As a stunt or diversion it was one thing, as an on going campaign it was another.