F4U Corsairs could use their landing gear as dive brakes, there was a selector in the landing gear controls that allowed the selection of main gear only. leaving the tail wheel retracted.
So I guess if they can keep them down safely to a high enough air-speed, you're good to go.
The Army tried using single engine Navy dive bombers early in WW II but lost interest real quick. A big problem was range.
Which the Navy had less trouble with because they could move the base into position to attack their target.
Obviously long range was desired for new designs which often meant at least some sort of Bomb-bay even if only for part of the load.
1. How much range was needed to operate over the Pacific in conditions from 1942-1943?
2. Regarding bomb-load: Were they still using 30 pound fragmentation bombs for antipersonnel use or larger stuff?
Post war with the introduction of jets there were several problems. One was the above mentioned stalling of development for several years. Jet engine gave unmatched performance but they had around 1/10 the overhaul life of a good piston engine. Something happened ( or a number of somethings) and the performance and engine life uncorked around 1950 and all the promise of the jet engine came in with a rush after 4-5 years of slow progress.
What caused the delay? A matter of simple technological progression, funding shrinking post war, or both?
As far as fighter vs fighter goes in Korea, once the Mig 15 showed up, every straight wing fighter was demoted to a distant 2nd place.
That I'm well aware of, but when it comes to other fighters of the era (and I feel like I'm repeating myself), it didn't perform very good.
While I'm unsure how the Meteor F.4 through F.8 and the Vampire designs from 1946-1950 performed relative to the early F-80 and F-84, and
just about every USAAC attack aircraft in the 1930s had four .30 cal guns for strafing
Which reflects the desire for strafing-planes.
The A-20s, as they left the factory, rarely had more than four .30 cal guns until the first "G" models in Feb 1943.
Of course, but those were very large aircraft
Post-war the USAF didn't order any attack-designated aircraft, did it? The first in the tri-service system is the A-9. A-10 is the only one they have ordered post-WW2.
First of all, the last attack designations that the USAAF had was A-45 if I recall.
Secondly, the tri-service system doesn't start with A-9: Here's the listing from A-1 to AV-8
- A-1: AD Skyraider
- A-2: AJ Savage
- A-3: A3D Skyrwarror
- A-4: A4D Skyhawk
- A-5: A3J Vigilante
- A-6: A2F Intruder
- A-7: A-7 Corsair II (possibly the first to have the new designation scheme off the bat)
- AV-8: Harrier
McNamara dictated the US Navy and Marine Corps adopt a system similar to the US Air Force because he found the USAF system easier to wrap his mind around. He created a committee of several officers from the USAF, USN/USMC, maybe a few army guys, and told them to set-up a new system.
The rules were as follows
- Aircraft currently under development within the USAF that have received a designation keep their designation
- Cargo planes within the USAF currently in development as well as numbers that go up to 142 (no idea why), keep their designation
- Everything else goes back to 1 with the USN planes redesignated into that category
- Everything after that is where all new designs start off from (except cargo planes up to 142)
The USN/USMC wanted the attack designation to remain: I'm not 100% sure why, but it's possible any of the following were possible
- The USN already used the term "Attack" and didn't feel like catering to the USAF terminology unless their careers or lives were threatened
- The term "Attack" is more versatile than "Bomber": Bombers attack with bombs; Attack planes attack with guns, rockets, bombs, missiles, and a kitchen sink if there's one lying around.
- The USN was worried that the USAF would begin to dictate terms of what constitutes a light-bomber to the point that the USN could never hope to operate any off a carrier deck.
And it is useless to compare aircraft from a time of such rapid technological change from seventy years ago, where a couple of months covers so many developments and what was going on elsewhere was secret.
Well, if you're evaluating excellent designs, average designs, substandard designs, or flops, you can compare from everywhere.
Another thing to consider, the political climate within USAF leadership at the time. This was the era (more like error) of the "Bomber Boys," flush with success from WWII's strategic bombing campaign, along with a new bomb that wrecked entire cities, they relegated fighters to bomber intercept and ground attack.
You make very good points, but I want to point out the following
- The USAAF in it's last days, and the USAF in it's very early days were still interested in the idea of bomber-escort: This attitude would change with the B-47, but even into the early 1950's there would be projects like Tip-Tow for the older propeller driven aircraft designs
- Most people think the F-86 interestingly was designed to be an interceptor: It actually was designed to be a medium-ranged day-fighter that could escort bombers with drop-tanks, and be an effective fighter-bomber. It turned out to be a remarkable fighter (it was a good fighter-bomber too), though it's escort capability probably could have been better (though it did work to a point).
- The USAAF had several attack and light-bomber designs flying after the war-ended: The XB-42, XA-43, XA-44, XA-45, and XB-43; With the exception of the XB-42 and XB-43, the others were conceived around 1945. The XA-44 and XA-45 would be given bomber designations (XB-53 and XB-51), the XB-42, XB-43, and XB-51 would fly: The XB-42 would fly during the war (1944) as a prototype (it would remain flying until 1947), the XB-43 (a jet-powered B-42) and XB-51 would fly in the post-war era.
- The A-26 Invader would be re-designated as the B-26 and would remain flying through the Korean war.
Being able to out-maneuver an opponent in aerial combat was not part of the equation.
From 1945-1953, far as I know that was still considered highly important. Missiles seemed to appear on the scene in 1954, and that did have a strong effect on the face of aerial combat. The USAF did categorize fighters into several categories, and interceptors usually didn't carry guns; most others did however.
Commanders were routinely cautioned not to even discuss "dogfighting." Missiles, as the new dogma dictated, would remove the need for aerial combat training.
When was this?
Jets, because of their higher attack speeds, weren't as successful at ground attack as their piston forebears such as the A-1
Yup, turning circle, and endurance with payload are key.
The A-10 came later when the U.S. Army was considering an attack helicopter (AH-56 Cheyenne) that the Air Force saw as a threat to keeping the CAS role.
Which is funny because they didn't even want it -- they just didn't want the Army to have it.
Pierre Sprey used input from A-1 Skyraider pilots and ground commanders to develop the initial design requirements for what became the A-10.
Sprey actually did a good job on this, but Sprey had a tendency to risk terminological inexactitude at times.