Finnish air force Mustang kills on Russian Front? (9 Viewers)
- Thread starter taly01
- Start date
Out of 150 ?
It cannot have taken 6 months to fly them to Leningrad ?
They were all deployed in the southern sector of the Eastern Front (mainly 57 GIAP); only 20-30 Vbs were sent in the summer of 1943 to the Air Defence units protecting Moscow and Leningrad to counter high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Have you ever read Kotelnikov's article?
I read Kostelnikov frequently......very productive hero of the Soviet Union.
Vladimir Kotelnikov - Wikipedia
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ThomasP
Chief Master Sergeant
re
"It cannot have taken 6 months to fly them to Leningrad ?"
IIUC the Oct-Dec'42 is the period when the British initiated the shipment. The shipment process itself involved:
Getting boxed up and prepped at the holding facility - upto 2 weeks
Railed or trucked to the port of departure - upto 1 week
Loading on board ship - upto 1 week
Sit around at the port while waiting for other cargo - upto 4 weeks
Go to sea and sail around the Cape of Good Hope upto the Persian Gulf and to the port of Basra - upto 6 weeks
From Basra they were probably railed and/or trucked (still boxed up) north to the Soviet Union - upto 3 weeks
Unbox, assemble, flight test, etc - upto ? weeks
So figure upto 4 months and 1 week getting the aircraft to Baku, Ashkabat, etc, in the Soviet Union, followed by however long it took to get the aircraft ready to head north to Leningrad.
"It cannot have taken 6 months to fly them to Leningrad ?"
IIUC the Oct-Dec'42 is the period when the British initiated the shipment. The shipment process itself involved:
Getting boxed up and prepped at the holding facility - upto 2 weeks
Railed or trucked to the port of departure - upto 1 week
Loading on board ship - upto 1 week
Sit around at the port while waiting for other cargo - upto 4 weeks
Go to sea and sail around the Cape of Good Hope upto the Persian Gulf and to the port of Basra - upto 6 weeks
From Basra they were probably railed and/or trucked (still boxed up) north to the Soviet Union - upto 3 weeks
Unbox, assemble, flight test, etc - upto ? weeks
So figure upto 4 months and 1 week getting the aircraft to Baku, Ashkabat, etc, in the Soviet Union, followed by however long it took to get the aircraft ready to head north to Leningrad.
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I read Kostelnikov frequently......very productive hero of the Soviet Union.
Vladimir Kotelnikov - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
This is another Kotelnikov, who had absolutely nothing to do with aviation. The article was written by Vladimir Rostislavovich Kotelnikow, who died in 2022.Ok I found him:
Vladimir Kotelnikov (1951–2022) was a prominent Russian aviation historian, author, and aerospace engineer. [1, 2]
Background and Career
- Education: Graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1975 and earned his Candidate of Science degree in 1981.
Teaching & Consulting: Lectured on aircraft piston engine design at the Moscow Aviation Institute and served as a consultant for Russian aviation museums and aircraft restoration projects.
Editorial Work: Acted as an editor for the Moscow-based aviation history journal Aviakollektsiya starting in 2003. [1, 2]
Notable Research and Writing
- Focus: Conducted extensive archival research into Russian aviation history during the inter-war and World War II periods, with a special emphasis on foreign aircraft operations and testing in Russia. [1]
Publications: Authored dozens of books and hundreds of articles published internationally. Major works include:Lend-Lease and Soviet Aviation in the Second World WarRussian Piston Aero EnginesEarly Russian Jet Engines: The Nene and Derwent in the Soviet UnionAir War Over Khalkhin GolSoviet Military Aviation in Central Asia 1917–41 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
I bet he is the "untouchable authority" like Stenman and Keskinen in Finland.
I found this AI info:
Soviet politruks (political commissars) did not systematically alter individual Soviet Air Force (VVS) kill scores on their own whim, but the structural demands of the Soviet propaganda apparatus—which they managed—incentivized and institutionalized the heavy over-claiming of victories. [1]
While a politruk could not simply sit at a desk and write fake numbers into a pilot's official logbook without any combat context, the entire bureaucratic system they oversaw was geared toward producing high-morale figures. Post-Cold War archival research and cross-referencing with declassified German Luftwaffe logs have revealed that Soviet combat units over-claimed aerial victories significantly, sometimes by massive margins. [1, 2, 3]
The phenomenon of inflated kill scores in the Soviet Air Force was driven by several key systemic factors rather than isolated administrative forgery:
1. The Strict Verification System (On Paper)
To prevent outright lying, the VVS officially required a stringent verification process. For a pilot to receive credit for a kill, the downing of the aircraft had to be: [1]
2. How the System Was Manipulated
Despite the rules, politruks and commanders routinely bypassed verification accuracy in ways that inflated individual and unit scores: [1]
- Group Kills Credited as Individual Kills: A common practice in Soviet squadrons was to take a single shared victory (where 3 or 4 pilots shot at one German plane) and credit it as an individual victory to each pilot, or to the squadron commander, to build up "Hero of the Soviet Union" resumes. [1, 2]
- The Ghost of "Socialist Competition": Politruks were responsible for driving "socialist competition" between different regiments. Regiments competed for elite "Guards" status, flags, and collective awards. This created an unspoken agreement between pilots, commanders, and politruks to validate highly optimistic combat claims so the entire unit looked superior on paper. [1]
- Rubber-Stamping Poor Verification: If a pilot claimed a Messerschmitt dived into the clouds smoking, a politruk eager for a propaganda victory would easily accept vague ground-troop testimony to officially log it as a confirmed kill rather than a "damaged" aircraft. [1]
3. Historical Reality vs. Claims
Archival studies highlight the scale of this inflation. For example, during the massive air battles over the southern flank of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, Soviet Air Force records claimed they had shot down roughly eight times as many German aircraft as the Luftwaffe actually lost in that sector. [1]
Summary
Soviet politruks did not secretly rewrite official air force logbooks out of nowhere, but they actively fostered a high-pressure environment where over-claiming was highly rewarded, protected, and weaponized for state propaganda.
So as the records are a "fairytale"...then possibly the enemy score on their records weren't accurate either....no matter how much engineering background you have as an author.
Soviet politruks (political commissars) and zampolits (deputy commanders for political affairs) played a significant role in altering, inflating, and reshaping enemy aircraft kill scores, primarily driven by the demands of wartime state propaganda. [1, 2]
While overclaiming occurred in every major air force during World War II due to the chaotic nature of dogfights, the Soviet system had a unique political apparatus layered on top of its military command that systematically incentivized score inflation. [1, 2, 3]
The Role of Politruks in Score Inflation
- Propaganda Over Accuracy: The primary job of a politruk was to maintain ideological purity and boost troop morale. A highly decorated, high-scoring fighter pilot was the perfect tool for state propaganda. Politruks actively managed "trench newspapers" and press releases. If an aggressive or politically favored pilot claimed a victory, political officers frequently pressured the unit's technical staff to officially register it, even if the strict military criteria for confirmation (such as ground team confirmation or wreckage retrieval) were lacking. [1, 2, 3]
The Discrepancy in the Numbers
Because of this political padding, modern archival research comparing Soviet combat logs directly against German Luftwaffe loss records (Kriegstagebuch) reveals significant inflation. For instance, during intense battles like Kursk, Soviet fighter units routinely claimed up to 40% to 100% more aircraft shot down than the German records indicate were actually lost or damaged in that sector. [1]
This institutionalized distortion was so deeply embedded that even senior Soviet officials recognized it; post-war Soviet staff officers noted that in the field, it was informally understood that a unit's reported enemy losses were automatically expected to be higher than reality as a matter of standard ideological reporting. [1]
AI data also.
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They must have runned out of mustangs quickly if also Kössi Karhila got two ?
This is how it was described in all literature we have availbale...up to 50 at a time....with 20-30 Il-2 that they were escorting.
It took a while for them to get accustomed to it...albeit they had them already in Musmansk.
Spitfires over the Kuban
Supermarin Spitfire Vb being prepared for delivery to the Soviet Union at Abadan, Iran in 1943. Photo submitted by C-F. Geust Along with British Hurricanes, the Soviet Air Force (voyenno-vozdushnyye sily—VVS) also managed to fly another aircraft of the Royal Air Force as a front-line fighter—the...
lend-lease.net
Please cite at least one source relevant to topic ("cobras over Karelia"). So far, you haven't presented anything other than your own fantasies and irrelevant texts.
It is obvious you never read a book about these combat flights over Karelian Isthmus:
In the skies of Karelia during World War II (particularly during the massive 1944 Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive), Soviet Lend-Lease P-39 Airacobra formations ranged from pairs of 2 aircraft up to massive, multi-tiered sweeps of 16 to 32+ aircraft. The Soviet Air Force (VVS) deployed these fighters using flexible, vertically stacked tactical groups rather than rigid, single-level armadas. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
Core Tactical Building Blocks
Soviet P-39 units (such as the 19th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment operating in the north) abandoned outdated pre-war formations in favor of highly fluid, small-unit tactics: [1, 2]
- The Pair (Para): Consisting of 2 aircraft (a leader and a wingman), this was the fundamental combat element. The wingman's sole responsibility was to protect the leader's tail while the leader attacked. [1, 2, 3]
- The Flight (Zveno): Consisting of 4 aircraft (two pairs flying in a loose, staggered arrangement). This replaced the rigid, radio-less three-plane "Vic" formation used earlier in the war. [1, 2, 3]
Group Operations & "Stepladder" Sweeps
For standard patrols, escort missions, and free-hunting (svobodnaya okhota) over Karelia, these blocks were combined into a larger Group (Gruppa), typically composed of 8 to 12 aircraft. [1, 2]
During heavy combat in 1944, the VVS widely adopted the tactical innovations pioneered by ace Alexander Pokryshkin (who achieved legendary success flying the P-39). Formations were organized into a "Kuban Stepladder" (or bookcase) system: [1, 2]
- Strike Group: An initial wave of 4 to 8 P-39s flying at lower altitudes to engage enemy fighters or strike ground forces.
- Support & Cover Groups: Successive flights of 4 stacked progressively higher in altitude (ranging from 2,000 to 5,000+ meters).
- Reserve Group: A final pair or flight cruising at the highest tier to dive down and ambush any enemy aircraft attempting to counter-attack the lower groups. [1, 2, 3]
If you want to look closer at these aerial battles, I can provide more details on:
About 2500-3000 planes were available for Soviet AF to knock out Finland before the race to Berlin. Finns had 200- 400 airworthy planes.
Finns would have been made into mince meat without the detachment Kurt Kuhlmey from Latvia. They had some counter measureas...in form of Ju-87s and FW-190 As.
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drgondog
Major
I don't think you understood my question. The aircraft were damaged the night of June 21/22. Assuming that the decision that several were deemed unflyable to Italy on the 23rd, where the 4th FG would join the 15th AF for two weeks before returning the last Shuttle leg to UK - that would only leave two days to repair an 'unflyable' Mustang, learn to fly it - then immediately commit to combat vs the Finns in one day????????It took a while for them to get accustomed to it...albeit they had them already in Musmansk.
Spitfires over the Kuban
Supermarin Spitfire Vb being prepared for delivery to the Soviet Union at Abadan, Iran in 1943. Photo submitted by C-F. Geust Along with British Hurricanes, the Soviet Air Force (voyenno-vozdushnyye sily—VVS) also managed to fly another aircraft of the Royal Air Force as a front-line fighter—the...lend-lease.net
Who is stupid enough in the VVS to commit a fighter that is wrecking Bf 109s and FW 190s, without studying it in detail, for a long period of time?
FulmenTheFinn
Airman 1st Class
I came to the same conclusion last week. Between this and the other thread where he's calling people clueless bots (myself included, lol), and Russian bots, constantly making fantastical claims without ever presenting a shred of evidence, ignoring everything written to him, and endlessly spamming ChatGPT-generated AI slop in his posts, I'm just glad this forum has an ignore button.
On the bright side, the stuff about the Spitfires sent to the USSR and how they were used there posted by multiple people who actually know a thing or two about what they're talking about, has been very interesting.
It's a pie-in-the-sky idea, because how would the Finns obtain them in the first place. But for the sake of argument let's say there's a time portal that teleports 40 P-51Ds to the Finns in 1941. My answer to the question then is: probably less than one might initially think. There would've been no access to spare parts, the Finns only really had 87-octane fuel, their runways were unpaved (i.e. a lot of dust kicking up outside of winter, requiring the installation of tropical filters - or at least installing them was advisable) and by European, and I imagine American, standards short, and most air combat over and near Finland occurred at relatively low altitudes, perhaps at around 1,000-4,000 metres (~3,300-13,100 ft), or less. Perhaps
drgondog could comment on how the P-51D would do under such conditions and limitations. I genuinely don't know.But I imagine even if it could have performed decently under those conditions, the lack of spare parts would've killed operating the aircraft. Historically a lack of spare parts grounded the few Finnish Hurricanes for most of the Continuation War (1941-44), and due to a lack of spare engines the Fiat G.50s were grounded for much of it too, particularly the latter half of that war (which is partly also why their KLR in Finnish use is very high, though not as high as is usually claimed; they were spared the hardest years of the air war). Conversely the Finns were able to keep their Brewster 239 and Curtiss Hawk 75A fleet flying the entire Continuation War and beyond. This was only possible because they could use spare parts obtained from Soviet planes and German stocks. In the 1930s the Americans had licensed the Soviets Wright Cyclone engines, among other things, and the Soviets then built very large quantities of their own spin-off designs. These were then captured by the Finns, and the Germans captured many more of them, which the Finns purchased from Germany. They weren't as well-made as the original American engines and engine parts, but with a little tuning they could be fitted onto the Brewster (the plane normally using a Wright R-1820-G5 Cyclone, American parts and all). The Curtiss Hawk used various iterations of the Pratt & Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp (initially some had a Wright R-1820-G205A instead, but these were swapped out for Twin Wasps IIRC due to reliability issues), but a lot of Twin Wasps had been supplied to France before the French surrender, which were then captured by the Germans. They too were then, like the Curtiss Hawks themselves, purchased from Germany by the Finns.
One thing also worth mentioning is that the heavily armoured Il-2 was tough to shoot down with 4 x .50 cals. I'm not sure two more .50s would've made that big of a difference in that particular case. The engine-mounted 20 mm cannon on a Bf 109 G on the other hand, had little issue taking down Stalin's Sturmoviks. IIRC a few G models delivered to Finland in '44 even had a 30 mm cannon in the nose! And then there were the attachable 20 mm wing gunpods as well, though my understanding is it was preferred to fly without them due to how heavy they made the aircraft in a dogfight.
With all that in mind, the real question is, I think: what could the Finns have done with more Bf 109s, and earlier? Hell, throw in some Fw 190s too, which they did try to get but Germany wouldn't sell them any (the Germans needed them for themselves).
Also regarding the octane thing, I have made a table of the FAF's fuel and lubricant stocks, and I might as well put that here just to show how little high-octane fuel the FAF had in 1941-44.
