Fuel Transport

[denny]

What was the process for getting fuel to the farthest reaches of The Russian Campaign.?
Was it coming from Germany and Romania.?
I am not even sure, after reading The Octane Thread, if Av Gas was even made anywhere but Germany.
Anyway...........did Germany and its Allies have lots of 1 or 2 Thousand Gallon tank trucks to get all of that stuff out East.?

Was it transported by The Luftwaffe, or "The Wehrmacht", or some type of Reserve or Civil Service personnel.?
Not sure if the Germnan Army and Air Force handled their own needs or if it was done all by one group of people that serviced all the needs of The German Military.
Thank You

 

[pinehilljoe]

I am conjecturing, Trains where the rail lines extended, Trucks, and many many horse drawn wagons. The Wehrmacht relied on horse drawn transportation until the end of the War.

 

[denny]

I am conjecturing, Trains where the rail lines extended, Trucks, and many many horse drawn wagons. The Wehrmacht relied on horse drawn transportation until the end of the War.

Yeah.....thank you.
I am 100% ignorant about the ability of The Wehrmacht to move stuff by train once they crossed the border deeper into Russia.
I understand the guage was different and that the Russian Army must have attempted to sabotage SOME of it at least.?

 

[Snautzer01]

Yeah.....thank you.
I am 100% ignorant about the ability of The Wehrmacht to move stuff by train once they crossed the border deeper into Russia.
I understand the guage was different and that the Russian Army must have attempted to sabotage SOME of it at least.?

Some?? Hell the would bomb rocket shoot or shit the crap out of it when the had the change. Production fields where for a time out of reach.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

From memory, railroad transport of all sorts of Wehrmacht supplies through the swampy eastern part of the USSR was often interdicted by partisan operations, such that the Germans had to deploy several divisions of second-rate security troops to help safeguard the railways. And the further on the supplies had to go, via rail or truck, the more fuel had to be used to move those supplies.

Those two factors meant that shoestring ops were a commonstance for the Germans on the Eastern Front.

 

[Snautzer01]

From memory, railroad transport of all sorts of Wehrmacht supplies through the swampy eastern part of the USSR was often interdicted by partisan operations, such that the Germans had to deploy several divisions of second-rate security troops to help safeguard the railways. And the further on the supplies had to go, via rail or truck, the more fuel had to be used to move those supplies.

Those two factors meant that shoestring ops were a commonstance for the Germans on the Eastern Front.

And yet the trains of jews homos gypsys and every other human they did not want alive kept on comming.
Oh and tanks ....and . So no. They were deprived of the oil fields not transportation. Late 44 road transport got iffy.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And yet the trains of jews homos gypsys and every other human they did not want alive kept on comming.

I don't think partisans were attacking trainloads of extermination victims.

Oh and tanks ....and . So no. They were deprived of the oil fields not transportation. Late 44 road transport got iffy.

An example of the growth of partisan effectiveness can be found in statistics kept for the winter of 1941-1942. More than 1,800 German vehicles were destroyed, as were 650 bridges. Attacks against German rail lines resulted in the derailing of 225 trains.

[...]

The length of the German communications and supply lines all along the front made them prime targets, and partisan forces were once again ordered to concentrate on disrupting them. In the summer and fall of 1942, demolition squads carried out numerous attacks against fuel and supply depots and the German railway network far to the rear of the front. Hundreds of railway and highway bridges were destroyed, and more than 300 trains were derailed between June and November.

[...]

Between June and October, partisans in the Smolensk sector derailed more than 300 trains and another 226 were lost in the Bryansk sector. In Belorussia, more than 800 trains were derailed between June and November.

Hundreds of railway bridges were also destroyed during the last half of 1942. The Germans, already stretched to the limit at the main front, were forced to pull out more divisions to deal with the partisans. By the end of the year, 10 percent of the German field divisions on the Eastern Front had been switched from fighting the Red Army to performing antipartisan duties.

Soviet Partisans: The Rag-Tag Scourge Along WWII's Eastern Front

Soviet partisans took a heavy toll in German lives and tied down troops needed to fight the advancing Red Army during World War II.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

 

[NevadaK]

Going from memory, here.

Rail transportation is significantly more energy efficient than truck in terms of volume/distance/fuel used and the limitations of Nazi resources mandated that material supplies be moved as close as possible to the front by train rather than truck (or horses). The concentration of critical goods to rail lines vs roads (which have more route fluidity) elevates risk in the system to congestion or failure due to poorly managed traffic or interruption in service. The timing and movement of prisoners to the concentration and extermination camps did significantly impact Germany's ability to supply the eastern front. Allied intelligence noted this on many occasions and it has been speculated that Allied reluctance to interfere with "transports" was partly due to the negative impact they had on the Nazi war effort.

 

[Milosh]

Wasn't part of the reason for the German failure in North Africa was the difficulty of getting supplies, including fuel, the closer the Germans got to Egypt.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Wasn't part of the reason for the German failure in North Africa was the difficulty of getting supplies, including fuel, the closer the Germans got to Egypt.

The further they got from ports, the more gasoline was burnt delivering the rest to the front line. Logistics was the biggest part of the reason for the Allied victory in NA, I think.

Axis lines were easier to interdict.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The timing and movement of prisoners to the concentration and extermination camps did significantly impact Germany's ability to supply the eastern front. Allied intelligence noted this on many occasions and it has been speculated that Allied reluctance to interfere with "transports" was partly due to the negative impact they had on the Nazi war effort.

The big movements of people were in 1942, during the year or so the extermination camps operated, then there were the other times when the trains were given priority over other traffic, which the Heer complained about, but not a significant amount of lost cargo capacity overall. In October 1941 the Germans planned to have 724 trains arrive at the Dnieper supply base, and received 195. The allies had trouble interdicting the French and Italian rail systems, they did not have much ability to do so in Poland or Hungary.

At least one refinery at Ploesti could produce 90 octane aviation fuel according to the various reports. The USSBS says direct exports Romania to the German army in the east in tonnes, 1941 34,351, 1942 369,452, 1943 715,749. In 1943 Romania represented about 62% of crude oil available to the European Axis. However it had built an economy using that oil, in 1938 6.6 million tonnes of crude, 1.7 million tonnes of oil products used domestically, 1943 it was 5.27 million tons of crude, 2 million tons domestic oil consumption. Oil shipped to Germany normally used barges on the Danube, the allies mined the river.

Rail was the chief mechanism to supply the German army in the east, though ships were used on the Black Sea and Baltic. The Reichsbahn ran the rail system, so maybe look up its histories. No information on the size of bulk fuel shipments and when/where they were broken down into smaller shipments/containers. There does not seem to have been many German tanker trucks. Truck supply in the USSR had the well known problems of lack of trucks and bad roads.

The initial 1941 advance gained from captured supplies, but the main lines of advance were not always along the rail lines, leaving them to be cleared by follow up troops, which slowed down bringing the line into service. The Soviets were quite successful in evacuating rolling stock, sabotaging signal systems and track. Apart from the gauge issue one other Soviet difference was their locomotives were designed to go for longer distances before needing water, so fewer water points, a problem for the standard gauge locomotives.

As the war went on partisan operations against the rail lines the Germans had in service increased.

It is quite old now and probably should be considered as an introduction but check out Supplying War by Van Crevald.

The multi volume set Germany and the Second World War will have some more details.

For an idea on the overall fuel situation, Oil and War by Goralski and Freeburg. In 1940 Egypt had an oil output of 17,773 barrels per day, that is more than Germany. Its capture, assuming the same 1943 production, would have added another 14% to axis crude oil supplies.

 

[elbmc1969]

Some?? Hell the would bomb rocket shoot or shit the crap out of it when the had the change. Production fields where for a time out of reach.

Interestingly, the Soviet air forces devoted relatively little effort to interdiction missions (attacking supply lines). Soviet official figures are shockingly low compared to U.S., Commonwealth, and German figures. Partisan activity seems to have substituted for interdiction.

 

[EwenS]

Oil & War has recently been republished by USMC Press and is available to download FOC as a .pdf here

Oil & War

 

[elbmc1969]

John Astell is revising his work on Soviet energy in WWII, which touches on the German situation. Hopefully, it will be published in the next few years because it's incredibly interesting and by far the best synthesis of material available.

 

[33k in the air]

Going from memory, here.

Rail transportation is significantly more energy efficient than truck in terms of volume/distance/fuel used and the limitations of Nazi resources mandated that material supplies be moved as close as possible to the front by train rather than truck (or horses).

From the book How to Make War by James F. Dunnigan (revised edition published 1988, p.454):

When supply is moved by sea or rail, the fuel required is not a significant factor. To move a ton of material 100 km by train requires 14 ounces of fuel. A large ship uses about half that amount. When material is moved by truck or air, it's a different story. By truck, 1 percent of the weight moved will be consumed as fuel for each 100 km traveled. By air, the cost will range from 2 to 5 percent, depending on the type of aircraft. Large commercial cargo jets are the most efficient. Helicopters are notorious fuel hogs and can consume 10 percent of their cargo weight for each 100 km traveled. Moving supply by animal, including humans, will have the same fuel cost as aircraft because of the food required.

p.453:

This is in sharp contrast to World War II supply needs. The German Army, somewhat of a cross between the largely motorized Western armies and the generally unmotorized Russian Army, required an average of 28 pounds per day per man. Some 40 percent was ammunition, 38 percent fuel (one quarter being fodder for horses) and the remainder rations and spares, etc. American units required 55 pounds per man per day. About half was ammo and 36 percent fuel.

 

[Dimlee]

Interestingly, the Soviet air forces devoted relatively little effort to interdiction missions (attacking supply lines). Soviet official figures are shockingly low compared to U.S., Commonwealth, and German figures. Partisan activity seems to have substituted for interdiction.

Agree. For me, it remains one of the Eastern Front mysteries.

 

[GrauGeist]

The German rail system (Deutsche Reichsbahn) was actually quite complex and was able to move material quickly. The troop transfer by rail for the invasion of Russia is still the world's largest troop movement by rail.

As mentioned above, the Soviet broad gauge was incompatible with the German system, so this forced the Germans to lay new track (an absurd amount) in order to have a rail system in the east. This was mostly because the Soviets destroyed their rolling stock as they retreated, denying the Germans the ability to use the captured system.

 

[elbmc1969]

Agree. For me, it remains one of the Eastern Front mysteries.

Oh, it's not a mystery, it's just fact. You can find both German and Soviet reports on how much damage partisans did the German rail operations. I used the term "shocking" only to describe the reaction of those of us who are used to the proportions flown by other air forces.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Soviets also had this:

The Red Army's ZhDT-3 railroad torpedo...

 

[elbmc1969]

The Soviets also had this:

View attachment 655872

The Red Army's ZhDT-3 railroad torpedo...

If you want to end up on an FBI watch list, Google "Ilya Starinov godfather ied".

The blog that the article is on is absolutely fascinating, but I guarantee that your local intelligence agency, and possibly several others, will be very, very worried about the keywords in your reading.