Fw200 Cost Effectiveness

[davebender]

British would achieve much larger savings....no KGVs, no cruisers but more CLaas, no fleet destroyers

HMS KGV. Laid down 1 Jan 1937.
HMS PoW. Laid down 1 Jan 1937.
HMS Duke of York. Laid down 5 May 1937.
HMS Anson. Laid down 20 Jul 1937.
HMS Howe. Laid down 1 Jun 1937.

27 Jan 1939. German Naval Z Plan approved.
6 x H class battleships.
3 x O class battlecruisers.
12 x P class cruisers.
6 x M class light cruisers.
6 Spahkreuzer.
2 CV in addition to the two Graf Zeppelin class already under construction.
The massive Elbe 17 drydock. Current German drydocks are not large enough for the H class battleship.

Point of Departure. 27 Jan 1939.
The German Navy decides to purchase land based naval bombers rather then surface warships.

The backbone of this German naval bomber force will be a purpose built aircraft such as the He-177, Fw-191C or Ju-288. However those aircraft will not enter service for several years. The KM requires an interim aircraft as relations with Britain and France are getting very frosty by 1939.

The He-111 is the only German bomber currently in production with enough fuel capacity to serve as a naval bomber. However Heinkel production capacity is already maxed out. Acquiring He-111s would required the KM to fight with the Luftwaffe for a share of production as well as for production of Jumo211 engines. Even if the KM are paying for the aircraft.

Focke Wulf is currently (Jan 1939) designing a naval patrol bomber variant of the Fw200 airliner for Japan. The design is almost ready to enter production, using facilities currently employed to build airliners. The Fw200 is powered by engines which are not in short supply (BMW132 or Bramo323). Last but not least, the Fw200 is relatively inexpensive.

27 January 1939. Alternate KM Z Plan.
The KM will fund development of the Fw-191C as a naval bomber. This project will require several years to reach fruition.

The KM will fund construction of an additional hydrogenation plant to produce aviation fuel for naval use.

The KM will fund procurement of the Fiume F200/450 aerial torpedo and adequate quantities of aerial mines.

The KM will fund procurement of 40 Fw200s per month as an interim naval bomber. These are naval bombers, in addition to any Fw200s ordered as airliners or transport aircraft. Mass production will begin by the end of 1939.

HMS Lion. Laid down 4 July 1939.
HMS Temeraire. Laid down 1 Jun 1939.
HMS Conqueror. Ordered 16 Aug 1939.
HMS Thunderer. Ordered 16 Aug 1939.

If Britain is really on the ball they might cancel the Lion class battleships before July 1939. However the almost completed KGV class battlehips plus supporting cruisers and destroyers are a done deal.

 

[Shortround6]

Short answer - I don't know. I have seen photos of various freighters with what appears to be a fore and aft deck gun but hard to tell if 20mm or something larger..googling Japanese WWII Freighters, Maru, etc didn't yield much on the armament.

We do know that the Japanese AA was less effective than Allied light AA. The box magazines on the 13mm MG compared to the belts on the American .50s certainly slowed the practical rate of fire as did the box magazines on the 25 mm guns compared to the drums on the Allied 20mm.

 

[parsifal]

Effective range and max range for aerial torpedoes are two widely different things.
The German F5b is going to cover 2000m @40kts but then the motor stops and the torpedo slows to a stop fairly quickly. You also have to consider;
A. that an 8kt ship will cover 400 meters in the same time as the torpedo takes to cover 2000 meters. a 10kt ship will cover 500 meters. how fast is the target ship?
B. what is the actual intercept angle? is the torpedo dropped at 90 degrees to the ships path or at 75 degrees or at 105 degrees? each would require either a different lead or a different drop/run time.
C. How accurate is the torpedo at following the intended course? How many degrees of deviation will result in a miss from 2000meters? The same deviation will result in half the miss distance form the intended aim point when dropped at 1000meters. How long is the ship?
D. What is the run time of the torpedo? the launch of the aerial torpedo is pretty well know to the target compared to a submarine launch. At a range of 2000 meters the target has about 90 seconds to change course/speed (take evasive action). Turning away from the torpedo launched at extreme range has the advantage of adding to the range and perhaps causing the torpedo's motor to run out of fuel (battery power?)


the torpedo dropping aircraft had to be flying straight and level at the time of the drop and pointed a bit ahead of the intended target (collision course for the speed of the torpedo). Upon drop the plane can START it's evasive maneuver/s. It can roll away from the ship to initiate a maximum G turn to minimize the distance but this presents the belly of the plane to the ship (largest target) and slows the airspeed down. It might try a half loop but again this presents a large target, a lot of hang time and the portability of an inverted stall with no room to recover. Early war torpedoes did not take kindly to either high speed drops or high altitude drops, high altitude in this case being even 200 ft. This leaves the plane with adding power to the engine to pick up speed while doing a more gentle turn to keep the wings more horizontal to present a smaller target ( say less than a 60 degree bank )
while 'jinking' changing course and altitude by small amounts to throw off AA gunners aim. It does mean the plane will pass closer to the target ship and quite possibly other ships in the convoy.


torpedoes were the preferred method for sinking ships because a torpedo hit guaranteed letting water into the ship which could lead to it's sinking. A bomb hit on the superstructure or upper hull, while certainly damaging could not guarantee the loss of water tightness of the hull. Skip bombing could not guarantee this either although it was more likely than some other forms of bomb attack. Very near misses were actual as dangerous as actual hits, as the underwater explosion could spring or buckle plates/seams causing major leaks.

There was a saying during the war, that was scuttlebutt, but nevertheless had an underlying truth to it...."if the 20s open up, time to hit the deck" a very true statement. What the above discussion is doing is minimizing the capabilities of the torpedo as a piece of ordinance, whilst maximizing the effectiveness of the 200mm LAA.

Standard engegement ranges for Japanese torpedo bombers were around 2000 metres, and the Japanese air launchewd rorpedo was remarkably similar to the Italian torpedoes I mentioned. At that range a late war USN study found the 20mm guns to be nearly useless. they simply could not engage the the attacking aircraft long enough to do any real damage. 20mm guns were useful in keeping both D/B and T/B types at a distance, but not really very good at shooting anything down. Even though 20mm guns had a theoretical effective range of 1500m, in practice for open sighted types (such as those fitted to merchant ships) the real effective range was closer to about 500m. That study by the USN (I will try to dig it out later) found the most effective weapon in the allied inventory was the 5" fitted with VT fuse, followed by the 40mm Bofors....the 20mm was essentially a defensive weapon, and a last ditch desperate one at that.

Now, to the mathematics of torpedo attack As you say it takes 90 seconds for a torpedo to travel the 2000m, and in that time a merchantmen travelling at 10kts, can move approximately 500metres. however, that is not in any direction. The ship can be assumed to have a tactical diameter of about 1400m, but it might only be able to manouvre about 15 degrees either side of the base course if travelling in convoy, because of the risk of collision. If it was a ship on the outer ring, it could turn port or starbord, but not both. All of which means that its ability to manouvre is restricted, and therefore much easier to predict.

A given merchantment in that 90 second interval is going to take about 30 seconds to react to the torpedo launch, that is 30 seconds before the course of the torpedo is properly estimated (if at all....remember these are merchant seamen, not trained military personnel). If we assume that at that point the wheel over order is given, and maximum rudder applied, its still takes about 15-20 seconds before the helm starts to respond....this is not a destroyer we are talking about. That leaves about 45 seconds of responsive helm time. In that 45 seconds the ship will be able to move about 250 yds and shift from the base course about 15 degrees, or about 58 metres off course. There is still a very high probability of a hit by the torpedo. Now, if the target is attacked simultaneously by at least two aircraft using anvil attacks 9ie one atacker either from ahead, or astern, and one attacjker from the beam position, the chances of a hit are nearly 85% (from memory....this is textbook stuff, but its been a while and im a bit rusty).

Torpedo bombing was vulnerable for the reasons that you say, but in the context of 1941, and incomparison to level bombing, it represented a far safer option, as the numerous torpedo strikes by the british and the very low losses they sustained clearly shows.

 

[parsifal]

HMS KGV. Laid down 1 Jan 1937.
HMS PoW. Laid down 1 Jan 1937.
HMS Duke of York. Laid down 5 May 1937.
HMS Anson. Laid down 20 Jul 1937.
HMS Howe. Laid down 1 Jun 1937.

27 Jan 1939. German Naval Z Plan approved.
6 x H class battleships.
3 x O class battlecruisers.
12 x P class cruisers.
6 x M class light cruisers.
6 Spahkreuzer.
2 CV in addition to the two Graf Zeppelin class already under construction.
The massive Elbe 17 drydock. Current German drydocks are not large enough for the H class battleship.

Point of Departure. 27 Jan 1939.
The German Navy decides to purchase land based naval bombers rather then surface warships.

The backbone of this German naval bomber force will be a purpose built aircraft such as the He-177, Fw-191C or Ju-288. However those aircraft will not enter service for several years. The KM requires an interim aircraft as relations with Britain and France are getting very frosty by 1939.

The He-111 is the only German bomber currently in production with enough fuel capacity to serve as a naval bomber. However Heinkel production capacity is already maxed out. Acquiring He-111s would required the KM to fight with the Luftwaffe for a share of production as well as for production of Jumo211 engines. Even if the KM are paying for the aircraft.

Focke Wulf is currently (Jan 1939) designing a naval patrol bomber variant of the Fw200 airliner for Japan. The design is almost ready to enter production, using facilities currently employed to build airliners. The Fw200 is powered by engines which are not in short supply (BMW132 or Bramo323). Last but not least, the Fw200 is relatively inexpensive.

27 January 1939. Alternate KM Z Plan.
The KM will fund development of the Fw-191C as a naval bomber. This project will require several years to reach fruition.

The KM will fund construction of an additional hydrogenation plant to produce aviation fuel for naval use.

The KM will fund procurement of the Fiume F200/450 aerial torpedo and adequate quantities of aerial mines.

The KM will fund procurement of 40 Fw200s per month as an interim naval bomber. These are naval bombers, in addition to any Fw200s ordered as airliners or transport aircraft. Mass production will begin by the end of 1939.

HMS Lion. Laid down 4 July 1939.
HMS Temeraire. Laid down 1 Jun 1939.
HMS Conqueror. Ordered 16 Aug 1939.
HMS Thunderer. Ordered 16 Aug 1939.

If Britain is really on the ball they might cancel the Lion class battleships before July 1939. However the almost completed KGV class battlehips plus supporting cruisers and destroyers are a done deal.

err, no, all of the bluewater construction by the RN was begun AFTER the commencement of the German naval building programs, not as a result of the Z plan. The Scharnhorsts were laid down in 1935, The Bismarcks were laid down in 1936, as were the Graf Zeppelin. Aircraft Carrier "B" was laid down in 1938 (I think). The Hippers were laid down between 1935 and early 1937. The prewar destroyers were laid down from 1934 to 1937.

The KGV were not commenced until 1937, as were the Illustrious class. The Impacables were laid down in 1939, as was the Unicorn. Between 1935 and 1939, the british laid down 25 CLs (other than CLAAs) and about 100 destroyers. These were all started AFTER the germans had commenced their construction. If the Germans dont lay dowen the ships, the british dont have to either. If the germans do lay them down, but abandon their constructio in early 1939, they make the economic cost of the constrruction, but dont receive any benefit from it, and no resources can be transferred to the maritime air striking force.

German shipyards were inherently slower than british naval dockyards in producing ships....tricky manouvres of trying to get the British to build something they dont need are implausible and unlikley to work

 

[Glider]

Its worth remembering that the KGV were built to replace the R class BB's not to increase the size of the RN. The aircraft carriers to replace the old 'interim' classes such as the Argus and Hermes as well as ensure that the RN retained a world wide presence as aviation was clearly the way ahead.

As with most nations (USA and Japan excluded) the war brought a stop to the production of battleships. The RN did build a respectable number of cruisers and fleet destroyers but they lost a lot as well not just to combat but to diversion to convoy escort duties. Nearly all the pre war A to I class destroyers were converted in this way.

When talking about the effectiveness of the defensive 20mm guns, these did have an effect on the losses inflicted on the attacking aircraft but only after they had dropped their bombs (dive bombers) or torpedos. That said flak supression was effective in reducing the losses. When you look at the very high losses inflicted on the RAF Blenhiem bombers or the Japanese dive bombers by light AA fire you can see the point. They were almost defencless in the face of AA fire and paid the price. B25 skip bombers and Beaufighters/mosquito's had a much better chance of getting home.

 

[Shortround6]

27 Jan 1939. German Naval Z Plan approved.
6 x H class battleships.
3 x O class battlecruisers.
12 x P class cruisers.
6 x M class light cruisers.
6 Spahkreuzer.
2 CV in addition to the two Graf Zeppelin class already under construction.
The massive Elbe 17 drydock. Current German drydocks are not large enough for the H class battleship.

Point of Departure. 27 Jan 1939.
The German Navy decides to purchase land based naval bombers rather then surface warships.

27 January 1939. Alternate KM Z Plan.
The KM will fund development ......

The KM will fund construction.........

The KM will fund procurement ...........

The KM will fund procurement ...........

You seem to think that a vast sum of money was actually spent on plane "Z".

Money approved and money actually spent are two very different things. As are the man hours of labor that were never used in the construction of those ships, their armament, engines and systems.

I was under the impression that a fair amount of the money, man hours, and resources went into the U-boat program?

 

[davebender]

The Scharnhorsts were laid down in 1935, The Bismarcks were laid down in 1936, as were the Graf Zeppelin. Aircraft Carrier "B" was laid down in 1938 (I think). The Hippers were laid down between 1935 and early 1937. The prewar destroyers were laid down from 1934 to 1937.

If we are talking about purchasing Fw200s as an interim naval bomber beginning in 1939 then the Scharnhorst, Bismarck and Hipper class ships would still be built.

Canceling the entire German capital ship program beginning in 1935 would be an entirely different matter. A massive amount of German military spending would be available for other purposes. Much more then you need to purchase 40 Fw200s per month.

 

[davebender]

You seem to think that a vast sum of money was actually spent on plane "Z".

How much do you think it cost to build the Elbe 17 drydock? That single component of the Z Plan would probably fund several hundred Fw200s.

 

[Milosh]

Where are you going to build all these extra Fw200s Dave?

Where were all these extra engines to come from Dave?

 

[Shortround6]

There was a saying during the war, that was scuttlebutt, but nevertheless had an underlying truth to it...."if the 20s open up, time to hit the deck" a very true statement. What the above discussion is doing is minimizing the capabilities of the torpedo as a piece of ordinance, whilst maximizing the effectiveness of the 200mm LAA.

I believe that statement was made in regard to the Kamakazes. By the time the 20mm guns could hit them (or cause enough damage) the kamakaze was was about ready to "ballistic". The flight path of the crashing, out of control plane was going to hit the ship anyway.
Doing enough damage to a plane in a few seconds that is intent on crashing into the ship anyway is a lot different that doing enough damage to a plane to bring it down if the crew is trying to get away or is facing a 2-8 flight back to base.

the 20mm was essentially a defensive weapon, and a last ditch desperate one at that.

Very true against kamakazes but not quite so true against normal attackers. yes the 20mm was a short ranged defensive weapon (it was hardy an offensive one as a AA gun wither on ship or land.) but in the early part of the war is was a significant step up from single or multiple mount .50 cal and .5 in MGs. Especially against aircraft lacking much armor or not having self sealing fuel tanks.

Now, to the mathematics of torpedo attack As you say it takes 90 seconds for a torpedo to travel the 2000m, and in that time a merchantmen travelling at 10kts, can move approximately 500metres. however, that is not in any direction.

true enough but how fast is the ship going? the 10 kt ship moves 500 meters, a 7 kt ship moves about 320 meters. A greater difference than the lengths of typical merchant ships. You could try 8 1/2 knots to split the difference and hope for bow hits on slow ships and stern hits on fast ones?

The closer the torpedo bomber got the greater the chances of a hit.
I don't think I am minimizing the torpedo as a weapon. It was a very powerful anti-ship weapon and the larger the ship it was employed against the greater it's value as the larger ships were more bomb resistant than smaller ships. It is also well to remember that the aerial torpedo under went constant improvement during the war. The American MK 13 torpedo went from dropping limits of 50 ft and 110kts to 2400ft and 410kts by the end of the war. Japanese and Italian torpedoes were better in the beginning than American but a steady run in was still required that made things easier for the AA gunners.

A given merchantment in that 90 second interval is going to take about 30 seconds to react to the torpedo launch, that is 30 seconds before the course of the torpedo is properly estimated (if at all....remember these are merchant seamen, not trained military personnel).

I am not sure the course has to be properly estimated, Torpedo plane coming in on the port side is observed to drop a torpedo. Turn to starboard if possible. If torpedo bombing is at all common they merchant ships should be briefed on simple emergency procedures. Like opening up spacing if under air take to allow for maneuvering, in the early part of the war air attacks are going to be by daylight only (unless they use flares) while the U-boat attacks are more likely by night. Emergency turn and warning procedures.

Torpedo bombing was vulnerable for the reasons that you say, but in the context of 1941, and incomparison to level bombing, it represented a far safer option, as the numerous torpedo strikes by the british and the very low losses they sustained clearly shows.

Level bombing was far safer for the bombers, they just didn't hit much if bombing from 6-9000ft or above. In that regard it was safer for the ships too.

you are right that torpedo bombing could be safer than skip bombing since it didn't require flying right over the target ships/s. But it did require getting closer than the the max range of the torpedo.
Most navy's light AA was pretty poor in 1939-41.
Slow firing heavy MGs with most axis countries using magazine feed guns and 20-25mm light AA guns again feed from small capacity magazines that combined with low cycle rates to give rather poor sustained fire rates. put that together with a handful of mounts for even a cruiser and the AA protection was nominal.

A single Oerlikon gun might be worth 2-3 Italian or German early war 20mm guns.

 

[davebender]

A single Oerlikon gun might be worth 2-3 Italian or German early war 20mm guns.

That's true only for naval weapons. For some reason the German Navy persisted in using obsolecent light flak rather then using the modern 20mm and 37mm weapons employed by the Heer and Luftwaffe.

 

[parsifal]

Hi SR

To be honest, after re-reading our posts, I dont hink there is a lot of difference in our positions. I agree that the fitting of 20mm guns was a great improvement. i agree that high level bombing was the safest method of atack, but conversely that low level bombing was the least safe, unless the flak sources could be suppressed. I think you are agreeing that torpedo bombing in 1941 was safer than low level bombing. There is ample evidence to aupport all of this.....look at the swordfish losses and albacore losses when employed as topedo bomber, versus the Condor losses when attacking far less well defended targets at low level. For an aircraft supposedly cheap, the germans were sure sensitive to the losses they suffered from April to July, to the point they eventually banned swedish turnip attacks by the condors. Swordfish, at that time were also in short supply (or at least the pilots to fly them) so it must be conceded that torpedo bombing was inherently safer.

Also, I still have to take issue that torpedo bombing was an inherently less accurate method of attack than low level bombing. Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, but look at the Swordfish operations in the Med during 1940....employing torpedo attacks, in day and night, they sank alsmost as much shipping in the med as the vaunted Condors, who outnumbered them considerably, had greater range, and greater oppportunities for attack.

So except on the issue of torpedo bombing I do substantially agree with most of what you are sayingl

 

[davebender]

For an aircraft supposedly cheap, the germans were sure sensitive to the losses they suffered

If you only procure 4 aircraft per month it wouldn't matter if the aircraft were free of charge (i.e. Lend-Lease). You cannot afford to lose your only 4 long range maritime recon aircraft. If the KM were purchasing 40 Fw200s per month they could afford to lose a few in combat.

 

[parsifal]

If you only procure 4 aircraft per month it wouldn't matter if the aircraft were free of charge (i.e. Lend-Lease). You cannot afford to lose your only 4 long range maritime recon aircraft. If the KM were purchasing 40 Fw200s per month they could afford to lose a few in combat.

Free of charge??? are you kidding. I suggest you do some further reading about the cost of Lend Lease. Lend lease came at a very heavy price as a matter of fact.


Your right about loss rates, but the Germans were not the only ones suffering shortages in front line strengths at this time......case in point is the entire fleet air arm....in 1939 they received the grand total of 16 pilots for the entire year. Unlike the germans, who continued to waste their scarce maritime resources using profliagtely expensive level bombing techniques (profligate once the british began to equip their convoys with at least some sort of weapon, the Britsh from the start employed far safer, and far more effective (plane for plane) torpedo bombing methods. Swordfish losses whilst sinking 250000 tons of axis shipping in 1940 were close to zero....this continued into 1941. It was a case of abysmal man management versus near perfect man management

 

[parsifal]

How much do you think it cost to build the Elbe 17 drydock? That single component of the Z Plan would probably fund several hundred Fw200s.

This argument doesnt hold water either, if the issue is looked at a little more closely. Sure, we can pick one or two white elephants and say this will fund our perfect plan, however, the Germans pre-war were investing less in infrastructure, and less on white elephants generally than were the British. The majority of British pre-war defence spending was not being poured into the hardware...it was being poured into capital improvement programs. i am sure if I was motivated I could find half a dozen or more white elphant projects in Britian that could be scrapped and used to fund projects to counter the maritime strike force you are advocating.

Dont get me wrong, producing more Condors would have yielded great results....for a time. But it would be a transient advantage, and one cannot assume it would be an initiative that would be left unparried by the British.

Moreover I wonder if this effort to build a new weapon system could not have been better spent simply by building up the U-Boat forces directly. The threat would certainly have lasted longer

 

[Shortround6]

Moreover I wonder if this effort to build a new weapon system could not have been better spent simply by building up the U-Boat forces directly. The threat would certainly have lasted longer

Building 4-5 times the number of Condors and using them as intended , maritime reconnaissance, might have helped the Germans a lot. It would have increase the effectiveness of the U-boats they had. One or two sorties per day was not enough to find the convoys with any regularity and it certainly wasn't enough to shadow the convoys long enough to guide the U-boats to them.

Without much increased reconnaissance any hope of an aircraft strike force doing anything in the western approaches is silly. At 4-6 hours flying time (or more?) from the German bases there is just too much time from the last reported position of the convoy to the strike force arrival for this to work. Add in preparation time and form up time for the formation/s and the idea looks even worse.

 

[Shortround6]

So except on the issue of torpedo bombing I do substantially agree with most of what you are sayingl

I too think we are mostly in agreement, I was trying to point out that aerial torpedo attacks were not usually carried out from maximum range of the torpedo. Closing the range to 800-1000 meters greatly increases the accuracy of the attack and still keeps the aircraft on the fringes of the 'effective' range of the light AA, unlike skip bombing. When attacking convoys is also means a miss has the range to penetrate the convoy to the second or third column?

 

[Nikademus]

There is also the issue of proper maritime training for these Condors. According to Clay Blair Jr, the Condors that were deployed to 'assist' the Uboat force on the whole contributed poorly to the campaign.

 

[timshatz]

Oddly enough, there is some similarity between the German plan to build long range maritime bombers to support/compliment sub activities and the Soviet Plan to do the same thing in the 60s-80s.

I guess it is cheaper and faster to build a long range airforce than a naval presence. Probably less expensive as well.

 

[Shortround6]

There is also the issue of proper maritime training for these Condors. According to Clay Blair Jr, the Condors that were deployed to 'assist' the Uboat force on the whole contributed poorly to the campaign.

Part of the problem was the low numbers and low serviceability. One or even two flights a day from Bordeaux out around Ireland and up to Norway (and back the next day, weather and mechanicals permitting) was not enough to spot convoys with any degree of regularity and even if a convoy was spotted and the location given out by radio it would be hours if not the next day before the u-boats could reach it. By that time the Condor was long gone and with no more course and position reports the U-boats stood little chance of making use of the information they did get.

Look at the problems the British had in getting long range aircraft to cover convoys and relieve each other on a consistent basis so there was constant coverage.