It's worth mentioning that the German desperation for shipping was largely due to a self inflicted wound. In 1939 Germany had 3, 500,000 GRT of registered blue water and coastal shipping. Almost a third of this, close to 1,000,000 GRT was blockaded in neutral ports at the beginning of the war because the Germans had failed utterly to plan for this possibility.
To put this in perspective, when planning for Sealion, the Germans had available 550,000 GRT of their own shipping, plus another 200,000 GRT of shipping captured in France and the Low Countries. The total available, 750,000 GRT was LESS than the amount blockaded in foreign ports!
The figures are from Schenk/Groener
Whether Sealion was ever an achievable operation is another question, but the lack of foresight, losing nearly a third of the merchant fleet without a shot or torpedo being fired smacks of the sort of lack of long term planning that bedeviled the German effort throughout the entire war.
Cheers
Steve
To put this in perspective, when planning for Sealion, the Germans had available 550,000 GRT of their own shipping, plus another 200,000 GRT of shipping captured in France and the Low Countries. The total available, 750,000 GRT was LESS than the amount blockaded in foreign ports!
The figures are from Schenk/Groener
Whether Sealion was ever an achievable operation is another question, but the lack of foresight, losing nearly a third of the merchant fleet without a shot or torpedo being fired smacks of the sort of lack of long term planning that bedeviled the German effort throughout the entire war.
Cheers
Steve