Game changers!

[buffnut453]

Haven't read this entire thread but, IMHO, the biggest single game-changer for aerial warfare was the advent of radar. It was a vital contributor to British and German ground-controlled intercept capabilities in both daylight and at night. Installed in fighter aircraft, it enabled the first successful night-fighters and, from there, all-weather engagement of enemy aircraft. Other airborne applications included detecting ships and submarines, as well as ground-mapping radar as a night/bad weather bombing aid. It went to see for over-the-horizon detection of enemy vessels and to improve air defence of ships and task forces. It was deployed with searchlight and AAA units to improve their performance in locating and tracking enemy aircraft. It wass even used for early proximity fuses for heavy AAA munitions. It continues to be a major influence on SAMs and stealth countermeasures to this day.

 

[bobbysocks]

all the talk of Taranto made me look for more on the subject. I found this from a war college ( Canadian I presume )

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment...Taranto,-The--Tactical-Success,-Operatio.aspx

 

[Shortround6]

Steve I said in my original post that it wasnt so much the aircrafts capabilities but what it achieved, wiping out a major part of the Italian fleet and crippling a major battleship at sea. Basically it showed that the theory of air power at sea was a reality. For the Germans the Tirpitz was probably better in a fjord, the British spent enormous resources trying to destroy it and keeping a battle fleet at readiness should it put to sea.

The Swordfish did show the bolded part but since the building programs for carriers in the US, Britain and Japan were already well under way and don't seem to have been modified much, if any, right after the Taranto attack.
Likewise the next generation of carrier strike aircraft don't seem to have been modified/changed much, if any. First flight of the Fairey Barracuda was less than 4 weeks after Taranto so work had obviously been going on well before that. The first two prototypes for the Grumman Avenger had been ordered in April of 1940. First flight of the Japanese B6N was in March of 1941, 4 months after Taranto in response to a 1939 request.
The "game" of measure and counter measure as far as carrier strike aircraft goes would have played out much the same almost regardless of the Taranto raid. Even a complete failure would have been written off as too few obsolete aircraft trying to make the strike.
It certainly would NOT have caused massive cancellations of carrier construction and substitution of battleships.

 

[pbehn]

It certainly would NOT have caused massive cancellations of carrier construction and substitution of battleships.

Quite the reverse, it just showed that battleships were more of a liability than an asset in many theatres. I dont read so much naval history, after the sinking of the Bismark did battleships play a significant part in any theatre of operations? If anything I would think construction of carriers would have been stepped up/maximised.

 

[Shortround6]

Many commentators don't realize the amount of time it takes to design and build large ships. Battleships especially as their armament is so complex. It often took more time to build the main guns and mounts/turrets than the rest of the ship.
Changing Naval construction programs cold not be done on a whim.
The HMS Vanguard, Britian's last battleship was only constructed due to the availability of surplus Turrets/guns from WW I (in part the guns/mounts removed from the Courageous and Glorious upon their conversion to carriers). It was often 6 months to year after a ship was ordered before it was laid down. Often hundreds of tons of structural steel was gathered before construction started but this was not stock sizes, it was plates and girders specifically sized to the hull in question. Also see the number of coastal fortification guns the Germans got from the canceled battleships that were to follow the Bismark and Tirpitz.
Carrier construction did become increasingly important and some programs were highly modified but that was as a result of war losses or further considerations. The US modified the Cleveland class light cruisers into the Independence class carriers but the Buships was against the Idea as late as Oct of 1941. President Roosevelt pushed the idea but it was only after Pearl Harbor that the idea went forward. One conversion being ordered in Jan 1942, two in Feb, 3 in March and the last 3 in June of 1942. 1st one commissioned was in Jan of 1943 and the hull had been laid down in May of 1941 as a Cruiser. All nine commissioned in 1943 and provided a useful reinforcement as much the larger Essex class carriers were completed.
Very, very hard to trace any influence on these decisions to the Taranto raid.
The US used fast battleships as floating flak batteries to help defend the carriers. Of course the Americans had better radar than the Japanese and had proximity fuse ammo for the large batteries of 5in AA guns in the latter parts of the war.
AA guns and gunnery also made large advances during the war. Late war attacks involved aircraft numbers that would have been wild dreams in 1939/40 so comparing late war attacks to early war attacks gets confusing at best.

As evidence of "game" changes see destroyers that landed either guns or torpedoes (or both) in order to carry more anti-sub or anti aircraft armament. Some cruisers sacrificed a main gun turret for more AA guns.

 

[parsifal]

Not from fear of Swordfish!

If Swordfish were a game changer then so were the X-Craft which did more damage to Tirpitz than did Swordfish to Bismarck.

I think a more stringent definition of game changer might be needed

Cheers

Steve

Its true, in a technical sense that swordfish were not directly responsible for the bottling up of the Tirpitz in a direct sense, yet the logic being applied to make this statement is really wide of the mark. In a direct sense, by the time the Tirpitz was finally operational, Swordfish were no longer considered frontline material. Bismarck was basically the swansong of the Swordfish as the FAAs front line strike aircraft, though it continued to serve with distinction from the second rate carriers the RN continued to rely upon, because mainly of the swordfish's benign deck handling characteristics

However in an indirect sense at least, the achievements of the swordfish had a profound effect on the career of the Tirpitz. after the experiences of 1940-41, the DKM issued a fleet wide directive that no capital ship was to be risked in open water operations if an enemy carrier was detected as operating in the area. The only time this could be overridden was with the direct approval of the Fuhrer, and this approval was seldom given.

The Tirpitz continued to be the target of FAA attentions for the remainder of the war, driving home in spades that the battleship as a class of warship was now totally secondary to the capabilities of carrier borne aircraft, and this conclusion, whilst not pioneered by the Swordfish (that had been done 20 years earlier) was at least instrumental in maturing the concept and applying it operationally.

Beginning on 9 March 1942 the Commander-in-Chief Admiral Tovey ordered HMS Victorious to fly off a reconnaissance force of 6 Albacores on a diverging search between 105° and 155° to a depth of 150 miles to search for the Tirpitz during Convoy PQ12 once it was learnt via ULTRA that Tirpitz had been given approval to go to sea. 50 minutes later a strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores under the command of Lt Cdr W. J. Lucas, was flown off behind them. The orders to the strike force were to make a course of 135° and to act on any intercepted enemy reports. At 0802 on 9 March 1942 Albacore coded "F" sighted Tirpitz with the destroyer Friedrich Ihn in company and made a report. Four 4 Fairey Albacores of 832 Squadron, from HMS Victorious, emerged from the cloud abeam of Tirpitz and the destroyer Friedrich Ihn and began to dive to an immediate attack. The third of the Albacores was attacked and the navigator wounded by cannon fire although the Albacore made a successful return to Victorious. At 0917 on 9 March 1942 Tirpitz was attacked by the strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores under the command of Lieutenant-Commander W. J. Lucas from the aircraft carrier Victorious. The attack failed and 2 Albacores was shot down. Undamaged, Tirpitz nevertheless was, by standing orders (the direct result of the Swordfish successes the previous year) forced to abort her mission and proceed at full speed for the shelter of Vestfjord/Bogenfjord, where she arrived later the same day, while the remaining Albacores returned to Victorious. DKM was badly rattled by this experience with Hitler immediately ordering Tirpitz to be confined to the fjords again. She was reduced to a fairly impotent fleet in being role. Whilst all it took for the Tirpitz to assist in the destruction of PQ17 was a few puffs of smoke from her engines, and the Tirpitz was used sheepishly once or twice again, she remained effectively bottled up in port for the remainder of her career, largely impotent as a weapon of war. Her immasculation was not caused directly by Swordfish, but it was the swordfish that had led directly to the crisis in the german admiralty confidence that in turn ruined the career of the great ship. To me that is a game changing effect.

I think there is hardly an aircraft that can claim a greater single impact on the nature of warfare until the B-29 or perhaps the P-51. ,

 

[nuuumannn]

I think there is hardly an aircraft that can claim a greater single impact on the nature of warfare until the B-29 or perhaps the P-51.

Hmmm, Not convinced by this; I don't think it was the threat of the Swordfish that caused such an upset, this is a tactical use of available resources. The Swordfish was a torpedo bomber and its equal in the RAF between the wars was the Blackburn Shark, the two compare closely in terms of size, weight and performance, with the edge going to the Shark, not the Swordfish, yet the latter remained in service for much longer - although it did enter service a year after the Shark. No one would qualify the Blackburn Shark as a game changer, yet, if it were Sharks aboard RN carriers in WW2, the same accolades accorded the Swordfish would have gone to the Shark

We also know that there were senior British (and overseas) naval personnel who were decrying the obsolescence of battleships even during the Great War; Murray Sueter comes to mind, so the impact of aircraft carrier based aviation had already shown to have generated support, and in support of proposed raids against the High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshafen, the conversion of existing hulls into aircraft carrying ships had already been proposed before the war's end - Courageous and Glorious. By the end of the war, every British capital warship had facilities for carrying aircraft, although not all were allocated its own and this was introduced in 1917, so the concept of aviation at sea and its implications were not unknown and were readily foreseen.

As far as changing the nature of warfare, the Swordfish did not. It took part in gallant actions, which were in effect the day to day tasks that aircraft of the RN were expected to do - the concept of what we know as a Taranto style raid was first proposed in the Great War and serious planning was undertaken to its end before the war ended and, as Steve pointed out in an earlier post, taking out enemy ships in their own harbours was RN policy; it was, at the time known as a 'Copenhagen', after Adm Nelson's manoeuvring in 1801.

So, no, can't agree Parcifal; the Swordfish did not bring about a fundamental sea change (pardon the pun) in warfare at all. It was just doing its job; something that the navy did and had been doing for years.

 

[BiffF15]

Okay, here is my question / point? If the Swordfish is not a game changer (and I see both sides of this argument / point), then would it be the pilots / airpower? If the Shark would have made the same impact but didn't, then what is the constant in the equation (air crew / air power). Thoughts...

Cheers,
Biff

 

[parsifal]

Hmmm, Not convinced by this; I don't think it was the threat of the Swordfish that caused such an upset, this is a tactical use of available resources. The Swordfish was a torpedo bomber and its equal in the RAF between the wars was the Blackburn Shark, the two compare closely in terms of size, weight and performance, with the edge going to the Shark, not the Swordfish, yet the latter remained in service for much longer - although it did enter service a year after the Shark. No one would qualify the Blackburn Shark as a game changer, yet, if it were Sharks aboard RN carriers in WW2, the same accolades accorded the Swordfish would have gone to the Shark"

The difference is in the ability of the swordfish to operate from carriers, including escort carriers, in weather conditions that would ground most other aircraft. The shark may well have been able to be adapted to that, im really unsure of its flying qualities. I do know that NO other aircraft of WWII was able to come close to the reliability of the swordfish and its rough weather and STOL qualities as well as its fantastic adaptability. Quoting, or looking at the outright performance will lead you into error with the swordfish. it was a poor performer by any standard, except that it could do what it could do under the most unfavourable conditions.


"We also know that there were senior British (and overseas) naval personnel who were decrying the obsolescence of battleships even during the Great War; Murray Sueter comes to mind, so the impact of aircraft carrier based aviation had already shown to have generated support, and in support of proposed raids against the High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshafen, the conversion of existing hulls into aircraft carrying ships had already been proposed before the war's end - Courageous and Glorious. By the end of the war, every British capital warship had facilities for carrying aircraft, although not all were allocated its own and this was introduced in 1917, so the concept of aviation at sea and its implications were not unknown and were readily foreseen"

Nearly all the major naval powers, except Germany had their believers in Carrier aviation, but with 1 or two major exceptions, these men were not in a position to change policy. Most navies remained firmly wedded to the supremacy of the BB until after the trifecta of Taranto, Bismarck and PH. The swordfish gave the carrier club a weapon at last able to break the battleship sword off at the hilt. Before that, whilst experiemts and trials pointed to the obsolescence of the BB, not many people were moved to accept that.


"As far as changing the nature of warfare, the Swordfish did not. It took part in gallant actions, which were in effect the day to day tasks that aircraft of the RN were expected to do - the concept of what we know as a Taranto style raid was first proposed in the Great War and serious planning was undertaken to its end before the war ended and, as Steve pointed out in an earlier post, taking out enemy ships in their own harbours was RN policy; it was, at the time known as a 'Copenhagen', after Adm Nelson's manoeuvring in 1801."

I can tell you that Taranto is considered in Carrier men's consciousness as a watershed events. after Taranto, the rules of warfare had to be re-written. Some continued to think the attack a fluke of nature, an abherration in the conduct of naval warfare. A result of the so called lacklustre italians. almost on cue the attacks in Taranto were followed by the airstrikes on the Bismarck, when all else had failed the obsolete swordfish again stepped up and proved the fallacy that battleships had nothing really to fear from carrier aircraft, and that this time it happened whilst the ship was at sea, against a ship with the most modern systems and the most aggressive and effective naval commanders then in existence on the planet. Other men had planned and dreamt of this outcome since preparations for the furious attack in 1917 but none of them, without exception had amounted to anything until proven operationally by the swordfish. The swordfish can lay claim to changing the nature of warfare at sea because it was they that put the runs on the board and proved in an operational sense what until then had only existed as untested theory.

"So, no, can't agree Parcifal; the Swordfish did not bring about a fundamental sea change (pardon the pun) in warfare at all. It was just doing its job; something that the navy did and had been doing for years".

Which navy was doing this for years before the Swordfish? There were theories, experiments, some promising experiemtns, but no hard results to base that on before the swordfish. Even the swordfish itself until the latter part of 1940, incorrectly used, could not lay claim to changing the way warfare was conducted. after the battles led by the swordfish were fought, naval power was measured in a fundamentally different way and naval warfare fought in a fundamentally different dynamic to all that came before it. after this brief era of success more modern and well equipped navies took the concept even further. Principally the Japanese, and then finally the Americans who devastated an empire using carriers and to this day project themselves as a world power mostly by their force projection capabilities through their huge carriers.

 

[parsifal]

I don't think its solely the performance of the aircraft, and id even concede that other aircraft could have been used to achieve the outcomes. There is a difference between a "game changer" and a "revolutionary aircraft'. im not claiming the Swordfish was revolutionary as a piece of technology. It was actually its "mundaneness" that made it such a game changer. it was well tested, its capabilities and limits well understood by the time it stepped up to do what it did. it was a game changer because it was the first aircraft of its kind to successfully in and operational sense fight battles in a totally new way and prove, conclusively that battleships could no longer exist without air cover, and in fact were no longer the final arbiters of seapower. there had been theoretical investigations well before the era of the Swordfish, and some very courageous officers (in the RN at least) that went out on a limb and insisted that carrier aviation continue to be developed. until 1938 this was a decidedly unhealthy practice to engage in in the RN, with control of the FAA not under the RNs control until that date.

 

[nuuumannn]

it was a game changer because it was the first aircraft of its kind to successfully in and operational sense fight battles in a totally new way and prove, conclusively that battleships could no longer exist without air cover, and in fact were no longer the final arbiters of seapower.

But it wasn't Parsifal, that's why I mentioned the Shark - anything the Swordfish did, could have been done by something else - that's the point, not its performance. Also it didn't fight in a totally new way as you put it; the foundations for what the Swordfish did had been laid and in that these actions were not revolutionary in themselves because nothing really changed after Taranto; the battleship had already had its heyday before the Swordfish and recognition of the rise of aircraft at sea took place before Taranto and the Swordfish entering service.

It was demonstrated before Taranto that battleships, indeed any enemy warship couldn't operate successfully without air cover in a war zone; within days of the war beginning, a single Heinkel He 111 sank a German destroyer (might have been more than one) with a well placed bomb, because the navy failed to get the message through to the Luftwaffe that it had ships in the vicinity. Had escorting fighters been present the unfortunate incident would not have taken place and perhaps the He 111 would have been shot down - who knows. British ships were regularly attacked at sea during the Phony War. In fact it was a lesson learned during the Great War, why do you think the RN invested so much in naval aviation during that war?

Taranto proved that the RN's policy of Copenhagening an enemy fleet could do serious harm to its ability to fight, but again, it wasn't a new idea and the RN wasn't the first to carry out an air attack against ships in their own harbour. As I put earlier, the Japanese did it with Farman biplanes in September 1914 and they sank a torpedo boat. Whilst not overly successful, in hindsight the concept is hard to miss. Taranto knocked the Italian fleet up a bit, but some of those ships not sunk or damaged beyond repair sailed again and took part in Matapan, which proves that Taranto was not the striking blow that it's made out to be. These two actions, not just Taranto alone, proved to the Italians that the RN was still a force to be reckoned with in the Med. Airpower dominated in the Med, not battleships, but that was a given, not something that was learned specifically from Taranto.

As for the Bismarck, again, a torpedo strike against its rudder, a lucky strike, not a game changing event and something that any torpedo bomber could have done. The loss of the Bismarck didn't change the course of the war for the Germans; let's not overstate its strategic importance.

 

[nuuumannn]

Following on from this debate, if the Swordfish was a game changer, then I'd put up the Sopwith Cuckoo; the first specifically designed aircraft carrier based torpedo dropper. It was designed specifically for a ship launched raid against the High Seas Fleet in its own harbour and although it was never used in anger, exercises after the war and the actions of the Swordfish proved that what the Cuckoo pilots trained for could actually be done. But since I don't think the Swordfish is a game changer, perhaps the Cuckoo wasn't either.

I still maintain that it was the locomotive torpedo that changed naval warfare for ever. You might even say that airpower changed naval warfare for ever, but not specifically the Swordfish.

 

[stona]

You might even say that airpower changed naval warfare for ever, but not specifically the Swordfish.

I would say that, it was exactly my point.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

I would say that, it was exactly my point.

Cheers

Steve

It was mine too when I posted it, the swordfish showed that any aircraft that can carry a torpedo or a depth charge and radar was a danger to ships and submarines. I wish I hadnt said ainything .

 

[stona]

.... any aircraft that can carry a torpedo or a depth charge and radar was a danger to ships and submarines. .

Or bombs, or rockets. Torpedoes were a fantastically expensive and high maintenance method of attacking ships from the air (or anywhere else). They were also by no means the most effective or reliable in the 1940s.

Cheers

Steve

 

[michaelmaltby]

I, like Parsifal, think the Swordfish was a game changer, but on reading the pros and cons in this thread I think perhaps it was Taranto - the operation itself - that was the game changer. In the tradition of the highly risky, daring attacks that Sir Francis Drake pulled off against the Spanish and Lord Nelson against the French and their allies. Taranto was the epitome of the Royal Navy's agressive esprit ... and that was game changing .... the IJN were the students of the RN as were seamen like John Paul Jones.

 

[pinehilljoe]

A little off topic but related to the radar post. A game changer was when Marshall Dowding developed the concept of an integrated weapons system, radar, fighters with HF radios, fighters with 8 machine guns to bring bombers down, hardened communication lines linking the radar stations to a central command center, a combat information center that processed information and directed aircraft in what we now call "real time". No one had envisioned anything like this until Dowding, now its part of all levels the modern military.

 

[stona]

Following on from this debate, if the Swordfish was a game changer, then I'd put up the Sopwith Cuckoo; the first specifically designed aircraft carrier based torpedo dropper. It was designed specifically for a ship launched raid against the High Seas Fleet in its own harbour and although it was never used in anger, exercises after the war and the actions of the Swordfish proved that what the Cuckoo pilots trained for could actually be done. But since I don't think the Swordfish is a game changer, perhaps the Cuckoo wasn't either.

I still maintain that it was the locomotive torpedo that changed naval warfare for ever. You might even say that airpower changed naval warfare for ever, but not specifically the Swordfish.

In 1914 an effort was made by the Air Department at the Admiralty to provide some means of carrying torpedo aircraft into the North Sea to surprise German warships operating in the area. HMS Riviera and HMS Engadine (later to feature in the Battle of Jutland) were both fitted out for this purpose. This was despite the concentration of resources in anti submarine operations. One operation against a German cruiser was set to go when it was cancelled due to adverse weather. No more opportunities presented themselves in 1914 and the aircraft were diverted for more pressing duties, but the idea that torpedo aircraft could cause unpleasant surprises to enemy warships was well established.

In an Admiralty conference of 3rd April 1915 Churchill argued forcefully that the development of torpedo aircraft should be "pressed on with" and envisaged their use against Germany's capital ships in Fleet action or "in his harbours". I mentioned before that attacking enemy fleets at anchor was a well established RN tradition. There was nothing new or radical in the conception of the Taranto attack by illuminating and torpedo dropping aircraft more than 25 years later. Both tactics were developed between 1915 and 1918.

Shortly after this conference two torpedo carrying aircraft were dispatched to the Dardanelles on board HMS Ben-my-Chree with the intention of attacking the German warships Goeben and Breslau. This never happened and initially the aircraft were used for reconnaissance duties. However the Turks would attempt on occasion to push merchant ships through the British blockade and these vessels became targets for the torpedo aircraft. On 12th August 1915 a 5,000 ton merchantman was sunk by an air launched torpedo. At least two more vessels were sunk or destroyed by the same method over the next few weeks. It was the first time a naval blockade of an enemy's merchant sea traffic had been attempted from the air, and the results greatly heartened the Admiralty.
The Squadron Commander. (C. Estrange Malone) on board Ben-my Chree wrote.

"One cannot help looking on this operation as being the forerunner of a line of development which will tend to revolutionise warfare."

The date was 14th August 1915 and Estrange Malone was right. The game changing moment had occurred two days earlier, and it had nothing to do with the Fairey Swordfish.
I cannot deduce what aircraft were used in the Dardanelles, but given that the first flight with a torpedo slung from an aircraft was achieved on 28th July 1914 by an aircraft (unnamed in source) designed and built by Short Bros. that would be my best guess.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Or bombs, or rockets. Torpedoes were a fantastically expensive and high maintenance method of attacking ships from the air (or anywhere else). They were also by no means the most effective or reliable in the 1940s.

Cheers

Steve

The 40s covers an awful lot of time/ground. Yes torpedoes were expensive to build and maintain (and train with) and yes reliability varied from Nation to Nation and even from model to model from the same nation. However at times it was the most effective way of attacking ships (at least sizable ones). In the Norway campaign the British were limited to 250-500lb SAP bombs or GP bombs ( at least that is what they used, whatever may have been available somewhere in the British isles). There were no rockets and using mines on ships in areas away from a coast needs an awful lot of mines.
While the bombs were cheap the aircraft and men were not. One attempted strike on the Scharnhorst after it was hit by a torpedo involved 15 Skua divebombers of which 8 were shot down, in part by German fighters, the rest did attack the ship and scored one hit, which failed to explode (bombs seemingly weren't all that reliable either). There were a total of air four attacks on the Sharnhorst in the days after the torpedo hit from the Acasta and that was the only one that any success at all although the others didn't suffer anywhere near the losses. The first was 12 Hudsons dropping 36 250lb SAP bombs, all missed. the Second was the Skua attack, the 3rd was 6 Swordfish and the 4th was 9 Beauforts using 500lb bombs. The last two were beaten of by AA fire and fighters.
Attacking very large ships with small bombs was seldom going to work. Attacking small ships with small bombs is another story.

 

[Shortround6]

I cannot deduce what aircraft were used in the Dardanelles, but given that the first flight with a torpedo slung from an aircraft was achieved on 28th July 1914 by an aircraft (unnamed in source) designed and built by Short Bros. that would be my best guess.

Cheers

Steve

Shorts 184