Game changers!

[aurora-7]

Almost made a thread with this exact title until I saw this one. The original post stated in the beginning:

Whilst we all love to debate the merits of favourite planes, few can be regarded as being designs that changed the way the war was fought in Europe.

I move to include aircraft for the war in general, for all theaters.

In that context I choose the Douglas SBD Dauntless.

Though it was not the best of all dive bomber designs of the war or as an aircraft design in general, it's impact was immense. I think few weapon systems can be credited with changing the course of a war and the SBD was one of them. It's actions in the Battle of Midway of June, 1942 changed the Imperial Japanese Navy's (and also Japan's in general) from a war of expansion to a defensive war. 4 aircraft carriers lost that Japan could not readily replace and that bludgeoning completely halted the Japanese Empire's expansion and allowed the smaller US Navy to outpace it's fleet development and begin rolling back Japan's conquests.

There was plenty more of horrendous combat in the following years and at the time the Allies were not aware of the extent of the devastating blow they dealt but a thing the actions of this one weapon on that one day had the greatest proportional effect on the course of the war than any aircraft.

 

[drgondog]

I applaud the mention of the SBD - but it was the USN pilots flying an obsolete dive bomber taking complete advantage of Zeros drawn to the deck by the Torp bombers.

Somehow I missed the contribution in CBI, ETO, Aleutians, and MTO

 

[pinehilljoe]

In that context I choose the Douglas SBD Dauntless.

No question to me, the SBD was the right plane at the right time. We also owe the Naval Aviators that flew them undying gratitude. Walter Lord said it best: "THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO WIN. YET THEY DID, AND IN DOING SO THEY CHANGED
THE COURSE OF A WAR…EVEN AGAINST THE GREATEST OF ODDS, THERE IS
SOMETHING IN THE HUMAN SPIRIT – A MAGIC BLEND OF SKILL, FAITH AND
VALOR – THAT CAN LIFT MEN FROM CERTAIN DEFEAT TO INCREDIBLE VICTORY."

England had its Few, those brave Naval Aviators in 1942 were our Few.

 

[fastmongrel]

Its often hard to spot the moment a battle turned but Midway you can pretty well point your finger and say there thats it. It was an incredible stroke of luck but as the great Gary Player said "the more I practice the luckier I get" without superb pilots in good enough to do the job planes you cant take advantage of the opportunities. The pilots could have been flying Curtiss SBC divebombers and probably still done as much or similar damage.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Another Game Changer, the B-29. It was a jump in technology from prior LRB aircraft. One could argue it was the only plane to successfully carry out a strategic bombing campaign, even without the Bomb.

 

[Shortround6]

Are we talking about planes participated in a battle that changed the course of the war or about planes that changed the tactics of air warfare as it was being practiced at the time?

Momentous as the success of the SBDs at Midway was in the course of the Pacific war dive bombers had been a major component of carrier aviation for years before hand and would continue to be for several years after.

The US Navy and the Japanese had both gone through a succession of dive bombers to reach the ones used at Midway. The SBD certainly confirmed the concept (if the Japanese Vals hadn't already) but there was no major reshuffling of the mix of aircraft of carriers or change in the tactics as a result of the Midway battle.

 

[stona]

Another Game Changer, the B-29. . . One could argue it was the only plane to successfully carry out a strategic bombing campaign, even without the Bomb.

Just how, pray, would you make that argument?
Cheers
Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

The SBD was certainly a notable aircraft and proved itself more than capable on many occasions, but I wouldn't go as far as to say it was a "game changer".

A game changer would be more like the B-29 that caused the Japanese to rethink their fighter design and manufacturing just to counter it. (And in a twist of irony, the B-29 bombing raids were destroying the manufacturing facilities that were trying to produce these powerful new interceptors).

Another game changer could be the Me262, which forced the Allies to shift their tactics to counter the new threat.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Just how, pray, would you make that argument?
Cheers
Steve

My opinion. Based on the Strategic Bombing Survey done after the war. German Industrial output kept going, it was the ground offensive that ended the War. The Survey's conclusion on Japan: "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

The European bomber offensive contributed but was not decisive in the outcome of the War.

 

[stona]

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

But that was not due to the bombing offensive alone, any more than the German surrender was. The Japanese had been forced back to the Home Islands, lost all their early gains, and just like the Germans, had been deprived of the vital raw materials they sought. None of this was as a result of the strategic bombing.
The strategic bombing of Japan was just one element resulting in her defeat. Had Japan still held its territories from New Guinea to Burma and been in a less parlous position in China and the Korean peninsula then the bombing would not have compelled her surrender.

The same applies to Germany. In the case of Germany the wrong question is always asked. The question is not how Germany managed to maintain and even increase SOME production until the last months of the war but what might have been achieved if there had been no combined bombing offensive. The manpower and resources invested in the civil defence and anti aircraft defences would have been freed for other purposes, as indeed could many weapons and ammunition. The disruption caused to industry from everything from sleep deprived workers to absenteeism (it took an average of five days absence for a 'bombed out' German worker to sort out accommodation, compensation etc at the relevant offices). Tens of thousands of tradesmen were retained in Germany to patch up and make habitable damaged buildings, whilst children went to the fronts.The huge investment and disruption caused by the dispersion and in some cases burying under expensive and labour intensive bomb proof structures could also have been used elsewhere.
The idea that the combined bombing offensive was ineffective does not stand up to scrutiny. It certainly did not, and could not, have won the war alone, anymore than the campaign against Japan did. The report of the British equivalent to the USSBS is heavily influenced by the prejudices of some of the authors, just as Harris' post war report is. The truth lies somewhere between, and a more sober and realistic modern appraisal will take this into account.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wuzak]

I would argue that Combine Bomber Offensive played some part in the success of the D-Day landings and invasion success - the attrition of German fighter strength countering the bombing effort made the Luftwaffe's presence at the beaches negligible, the Transportation Plan reduced Germany's ability to move men and equipment to places needed to oppose the invasion and the Oil Plan severely reduced their ability to mount counter-offensives.

Each of the plans had side effects. The Transportation Plan prevented raw materials from reaching production facilities, including coal being moved to synthetic oil plants.

And the Oil Plan disrupted not only oil production but also synthetic rubber and explosives production, which were products of the synthetic oil plants.

 

[stona]

I agree with all that. The real miracle is that the Germans managed not just to carry on under the bombs but to successfully continue to take up the slack in their economy and increase some elements of their war production whilst expending considerable resources in attempts to prevent and or mitigate the effects of the bombing. I don't know to what extent the same applied to the Japanese.

All these factors contributed to Germany's defeat, but the one, unequivocal victory of the offensive, and it was an almost entirely American one, was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Without this victory not just the invasion in mid 1944, but all the preparation for that invasion, including the plans mentioned above, become at best much more problematic, at worst impossible. Bomber Command would certainly not have been bombing by day and it would not have made the substantial (and often over looked) contributions to those plans, particularly the Transport Plan. Harris would have had the excuse he needed to carry on redistributing rubble around the centre of many German cities.
In this respect I don't think the bombing offensive against Japan was nearly as influential. In some respects the collapse of the Japanese air forces was as much a result of Japanese incompetence as it was US/Allied aggression.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

I confess to not reading back over all this old thread, so apologies if this is a repetition. If there ever was a game changer in any theatre it was a long range escort fighter.
Preeminent in the ETO were the later versions of the P-51, but there were others. In the ETO the P-51 was a game changer, and it changed the game in an unexpected role as part of the combined bombing offensive.

On the German side there are only what ifs. The Me 262 was certainly a potential game changer, but it never came close to realising that potential.

Cheers

Steve

 

[aurora-7]

The SBD was certainly a notable aircraft and proved itself more than capable on many occasions, but I wouldn't go as far as to say it was a "game changer".

In terms in changing the nature of how air combat evolved, that's true. While I think it changed the course of the Second World War in the Pacific for the actions it did in a single day, it's not the same as the the P-51 giving new capabilities in fighter escort or the B-29 in load, speed and range capabilities for heavy bomber development.

 

[GrauGeist]

The turn of events at Midway was something short of miraculous, to be honest.

There is no denying that the SBDs stood head and shoulders above all that day, but by the narrowest of margins.

Timing is everything and in this case, worked against the Japanese and favored the USN attacks. There is just so much that could have gone horribly wrong for the USN and even the SBDs could not have prevented that, if the timing of a few events were just a little bit different.

 

[Thorlifter]

If the SBD's taking out 4 carriers is "by the narrowest of margins", what event at Midway is close to it?

 

[GrauGeist]

If you follow the order of battle, you'll see what I am referring to.

Nagumo initially held half his force in reserve, his scout from the Tone was late in reporting the sighting of Taskforce 16, he was recovering the Midway strike force and didn't have sufficient CAP in place, the reserve CAP aircraft were still below decks, they were changing from land-based bombs to naval bombs after a delay in decision making, and on and on.

Had Nagumo brought his full force to bear initially AND brought the rest of the fleet into position AND established a steady CAP over the fleet (launching small groups in a rotation instead of waiting to launch full flights), the SBDs would have been challenged on a level that the TBDs encountered.

As it happens, the air cover over the fleet was low on fuel and out of ammo and were trying to be recovered when the SBDs from Yorktown and Enterprise arrived.

Had the SBDs arrived sooner, the A6Ms would have been in a position to refuse the SBD's attack. Had Nagumo brought up his fleet into a full concentrated arrangement, the AA from the Battleships and Cruisers would have contributed to the defenses, and so on.

It's all alot more complex than what I am describing here, but I recommend reading about the order of battle for Midway and you'll start to see how timing and mistakes left the door open for the SBDs to be able to cornhole the IJN the way they did.

 

[Thorlifter]

Sure, I understand the steps of how the battle unfolded. You are right that many events had to happen just so to set up the SBD's to be as successful as they were. I was just confused when referring to the accomplishments of the SBD's being a game changer as apposed to something being almost as equal.

Clear as mud now!

 

[drgondog]

Steve - IMO I agree with you that the later versions of the P-51 (P-51D by implication in your comments above) were more capable than the P-51B/C by virtue of 50% more firepower. That said, it was the P-51B/C that killed the LW from mid Germany to Poland prior to D-Day and for a significant period afterwards. It took till October for the P-51D fleet to exceed the B/D in operational strength.

 

[pbehn]

I propose the Fairey Swordfish, not so much for its capabilities as an aeroplane but after Taranto and the crippling of the Bismark all of the worlds navies realised that the game had changed. Although an obsolete design it did have the ability to loiter about and carry a RADAR system which is the basis of anti submarine warfare.